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My research seeks to illuminate the forces and factors that shape the 
experience of frontline service work (FLSW). Relations of production have 
traditionally been emphasised as the centre of gravity in FLSW experiences. 
More recently the gaze has shifted towards relations of consumption, based 
upon a belief that the presence of the customer at the point of production has 
qualitatively reoriented the experience of shop floor life. 
To further clarify the nature and significance of relations at the point of 
production and consumption I embarked upon a three-year study as a 
“complete participant” in Wine Corp PLC (WC). This extended a seven year 
period of informal data collection as a frontline employee, which combined 
to provide ten years of “behind the scenes” access in total. Such a vantage 
point offered unique longitudinal exposure to co-workers and other “lead 
actors” who produced and reproduced WC. 
The data and analysis revealed four forces and factors that are under-
represented in mainstream “service triangle” accounts of FLSW. Firstly, the 
importance of individuality tends to be understated, as variations in 
personalities and characters have significant bearings upon FLSW life. 
Secondly teams matter, as co-workers have a far greater bearing than many 
accounts allow for. Thirdly anteriority effects are significant, meaning that 
the past acts as a key constrainer and enabler of present-day actors. Lastly 
and most importantly, the power and influence of “outside” forces and 
factors to overshadow and act upon “inside” actors is underestimated. The 
real power in WC is neither management nor customers but rather 
shareholders, whose structurally-embedded ideology of “shareholder value” 
reigns supreme over in-house relations. My model of amphitheatrical 
relations contributes an analytical framework that synthesises connecting 
mechanisms between the people and parts that comprise “internal” and 






Key terms are defined throughout the thesis, as they become significant. Three 
definitions should be clarified out at the outset: 
(1) Frontline service work – My definition has three components (a) it 
involves working directly with customers; (b) it a subordinate position in 
an employment relationship; (c) it involves simultaneous production and 
consumption.1
Frontline service work is abbreviated as FLSW, as mentioned overleaf. 
The abbreviation is also used for frontline service worker.
(2) Management – Parker (2002: 6-9) identifies three definitions of 
“management.” I align with his first: “[a] group of executives directing an 
industrial undertaking.”
(3) Customers – A dictionary definition typically has two components: (1) “a 
person who buys good or service from a shop of business”2 and (2) “a 
person of a specified kind [e.g., “tough customer”/“nice customer”] with 
whom one has to deal.”3 The difference between those two definitions is 
actually important to this thesis, as will be explored in Chapter Seven. 
The point I make therein is that customers are individuals (as per 
definition one) who conform to types along a social spectrum (as per 
definition two).  
1






CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is a story of stories about frontline service work (FLSW), and they each 
revolve around an organisational actor called “Wine Corp.” This is a pseudonym, as is 
the case with all actors who feature throughout.4 As the name implies Wine Corp (WC) 
is a product specialist that operates in the retail sub-sector of the UK service economy. 
When compared to the behemoths that continue to dominate wine retail (the “big four” 
& “super discounters”) WC is a small enterprise - a blip on the “average wine drinker’s” 
radar. Yet it is far from small, employing over 1,500 people across a network of 200+ 
“bricks-and-mortar” outlets and generating over £400m in annual sales. This makes it 
one of the largest and most influential wine specialists in the UK, even if its market 
share remains small compared to well-known retail generalists. Its influence is reflected 
in the fact that it receives considerable attention in trade publications, with its every 
strategic foray picked over by the industry’s “commentariat.”5 The same has been the 
case with City analysts given that WC has been a public limited company (PLC) since 
the mid-1990s, when its shares were listed on the London Stock Exchange.  
A decision to tie WC’s fortunes to those of “The City” fired the starting gun on a sub-
plot that makes the telling of WC’s story an important endeavour, alongside a number 
of other factors. In the first instance WC is worthy of attention because it is a large 
FLSW provider, employing roughly 1,000 people in stores throughout the UK. None of 
these people are “back office” because WC was built upon a “lean functional 
flexibility” model, where “everybody does everything” in a HR system reliant upon a 
small number of skilled FLSWs. Given its deployment of quality not quantity, WC 
developed a system of mass graduate recruitment as a solution to its labour and skill 
requirements. Such a scheme is rare to my knowledge, making WC an interesting locale 
to develop an understanding of graduate’s early career options in the UK labour market. 
Another noteworthy characteristic of WC is that it occupies the “mass-customised” 
middle-ground between elite merchants at the quality end of the market and “mass-
service” providers of “cheap plonk” at the other end. It therefore provided an interesting 
test case to explore important theoretical insights such as Frenkel’s (2006) 
4
 The only exception is “household name” competitors. The agency of key competitors is central 
to the story so I viewed it as important to identify them for “cross-validation” purposes.
5
 I use this term as reference to a class of professional media commentators. 
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conceptualisation of a customised “middle ground,” and Korczynski’s (2002) 
“customer-oriented bureaucracy.” Both speak to the challenges of managing tensions 
between costs and service quality. 
Retail in the UK 
Retail is big business; in the UK alone it contributes £194 billion to economic output 
according to a recent Government report, 11% of the total.6 The sector has also 
outperformed in the aftermath of the Great Recession (2008), growing between 1-2% 
per annum whereas the rest of the economy grew between 0-1%.7 Its importance has 
therefore grown throughout the last decade. Adding to its significance it employs 4.6 
million people in the UK which is 15.2% of total employment.  Put another way, retail 
employs more than 1 in 7 UK workers making it the largest sector of private 
employment.8
Its quantitative significance alone should provide ample justification for scholarly 
interest in retail and FLSW, the sector’s public interface. If further justification is 
necessary though, it should be emphasised that this sector and type of work has piqued 
the interests of those engaged in range of socio and cultural debates. For example, 
“cultural turn” and “post-structural” scholars have made service sector work and 
experiences a focal point of their argument that Western societies have transitioned 
from “production centric” to “consumption centric” (see Bauman, 1998). In relation, an 
interesting thing about FLSW is that production and consumption occur at the same 
time and in the case of “brick-and-mortar” retail, in the same space. Another argument 
that has gained traction in the “consumer age” is that brands have become increasingly 
important as facilitators of individuality, meaning and identity formation (see du Gay, 
1996; Klein, 2000). Retail matters as a re-seller of brands and as a “brandscape” (Lloyd 
& Payne, 2014) in its own right.  
6
 Rhodes, C. Brien, P (2018) The retail industry: statistics and policy, House of Commons 






A key debate that these propositions allude to is whether and to what extent a general 
shift towards an economy and society oriented around the production/consumption of 
services rather than goods is qualitatively distinct from prior eras. A conjoined question 
is whether this pattern represents progress towards a utopian “better world” or is 
actually spawning a dystopian reality of hyper-surveillance and “post-structural” 
controls? Furthermore, does the presence of the customer liberate or further subjugate 
FLSWs, or is their presence actually of little consequence because “monopoly capital” 
continues to govern shop floors irrespective of sectoral nuances? (Burawoy, 1979 & 
1985) As Deery et al. (2002) have observed the shift to service work in service 
economies is not in any doubt. What is contested is the meaning of that change and how 
it can be conceptualised. 
Research agenda 
Given its qualitative and quantitative significance it would be reasonable to expect 
FLSW, retail and FLSW in retail to receive a lion’s share of scholarly attention in 
business schools and industrial relations departments. Unfortunately there is little 
evidence that this is the case – in fact, there seems to be consensus that both are 
underrepresented in light of their significance (Bozkurt & Grugulis, 2011). For 
instance, Kerfoot & Korczynski (2005) have argued that service work is relatively 
under-researched and marginalised in mainstream discourse on modern economies.  
Extra attention seems long overdue but the right kind of attention is also required. On 
this I wish to make two points. Firstly, in my view some degree of academic tribalism 
has got in the way of theoretical development on the subject matter. Debates over 
service work have sometimes resembled a stag rut between celebrants of different 
schools of thought, with the primary concern being to illustrate the supremacy of their 
ideas over others. There is a danger then that theses become more about theoretical 
minutia than the thing(s) they proclaim to speak of.9 Following Korczynski & 
9
 Thompson (2009) and others have made the same argument concerning the “labour process 
theory debate,” which shifted emphasis towards the subtleties of abstruse theoretical 
foundations and away from the empirical domain. Parker (1995) has expressed similar concerns 
that relativism has stood in the way of constructive theoretical engagement based upon moral 
and ethical positions. 
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Macdonald (2008) I am of the view that bridge-building is likely to prove most fruitful 
in developing insights into FLSW. Throughout this thesis I do articulate points of 
disagreement but also seek to highlight the value of work that I fundamentally disagree 
with. Thus, within the limits of ontological consistency I have approached my research 
with an agnostic view of “right” and “wrong.” 
Moving from theory to empiricism, much of the research in the sector is based upon 
“snapshots” from “outsider” perspectives (Ashforth & Humphreys, 1993). Whilst this 
may be appropriate for certain lines of enquiry there are others for which it seems 
particularly ill-suited (ibid.). The study of normative work cultures springs to mind as 
an example, because the remarkable in the unremarkable may be difficult to access 
without up-close study and reflexivity over time. Questions concerning “organisational 
behaviour,” the nature of management practices and work experiences also seem like 
apt candidates for an immersive long-term approach. Without this, it is difficult to 
establish whether findings and analyses are true reflections of the case or true 
reflections of the snapshot. 
The timespan of my research was ten years10 - a period of such duration that time itself 
became revealed as a force and factor in shaping management’s behaviour and FLSWs’ 
experience. To build upon this discovery I opted to dig deep into the organisation’s 
history (see Chapter Five), so as to better explore how oft-forgotten constraints and 
opportunities of the past framed present-day agency. Chapters Six focuses on the last 
decade of the organisation’s journey and the experience of FLSWs throughout. This 
chronological approach helps to unlock links between cause(s) and effect(s) at different 
levels of abstraction (macro, meso, micro) that are difficult to support without rich 
longitudinal data. 
My research question and research design fused a number of aspirations. My core aim 
was to elucidate a better understanding of the experience of FLSW in a setting that is 
qualitatively distinct from the “big box” cliché, which is comparatively well researched 
(Lloyd & Payne, 2014). Is large scale “mass-customised” FLSW “good work” and if so, 
10
 Three of these years were formal research. In other years I gathered data informally as a full 
participant in the setting. 
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what makes it good? If it fails to live up to that billing then what forces and factors 
prevent it from doing so? Also what are the respective roles of management, customers 
and co-workers in all of this? Lastly, how can behaviour and experiences within FLSW 
be explained in terms of what really matters and how it really works? (Watson, 2011) 
As is no doubt apparent my research agenda was ambitious so the focus inevitably had 
to narrow as the fieldwork unfolded. In this I abided by a general principle of 
ethnography - my research method of choice – that the researcher starts out with broad 
interests and narrows it on a rolling basis. This was my intention but as the research 
developed and story unfolded, I became only more determined to retain as broad a 
research question as possible. To me what made the data and case fascinating was the 
emerging connections between “big” and “small,” by which I mean local (micro), 
institutional (meso) and national (macro) forces and factors. Narrowing the focus to a 
given actor (e.g. FLSWs) or relationship (FLSW-customer) may have precluded broader 
exploration of how an “ensemble cast” of people and parts intersected to produce and 
reproduce the phenomena under study. In light of this my research question became:  
What are the forces and factors that shape the experience of FLSW in Wine 
Corp? 
Structure of the thesis 
The following chapter provides an analysis of some of the most important conceptual 
developments and theoretical debates concerning FLSW. The main objective is to 
articulate distinctions between influential theorists or schools of thought from which I 
take my cue. A secondary objective is to identify space for an original and worthwhile 
theoretical contribution to knowledge. Chapter Three pursues a similar objective - 
albeit, with a view to the identification of empirical opportunities rather than theoretical 
ones. Chapter Four then sets out how I have sought to construct my research with a 
view to optimising the value of output whilst minimising inherent methodological 
13 
limitations. At this point I introduce critical realist philosophy (CRP), because it reflects 
my ontology and underscores my theoretical contribution as presented in Chapter Nine.   
As mentioned above, two of the four data chapters tell the chronological story of WC’s 
development and modern eras. The first of these (Chapter Five) is the “origin story” of 
the case study organisation. What makes it interesting in my view is that it tells several 
interlinked stories of social, economic and cultural change that constrained and enabled 
agency amongst the visionaries who founded the company. WC is shown to be a 
product of these particular people and circumstances. Chapter Six is split into two parts. 
Part A tells the story of the next stage in WC’s lifecycle when a second generation 
inherits the management reins. Taking over in 2008, the timing could have barely been 
more fortunate because the Great Recession ravaged the sector and left WC the “last 
man standing.” Due to this the “second generation” were handed an opportunity to 
solidify WC’s domination of the middle ground that could fairly be described as “once 
in a lifetime.” Rather than seize that opportunity though, management focused on 
squeezing every last drop of potential profit out of it. Chapter Six Part A examines how 
and why this “alternate history” played out and with what effects. Chapter Six Part B 
then tells the story of a new regime that was brought in to “reboot” WC when powerful 
behind the scenes actors finally lost faith in the second generation. To stall relative 
decline, a “rock star” CEO was installed with an impressive entrepreneurial résumé and 
an inspiring “everybody wins” stakeholder/sustainability rhetoric. His experiment with 
an alternative approach failed and FLSWs found themselves going “back to the future,” 
experiencing a pincer movement of renewed cost-controls and technocratic 
“empowerment” that was anything but empowering.  
The next two chapters depart from the pattern of chronological analysis by synthesising 
specifics concerning the organisation of WC FLSW (Chapter Seven), and the 
experience of it per se (Chapter Eight). The former is effectively a bridge between 
Chapters Five and Six and Chapter Eight, in that it elucidates the labour process and 
control systems that have resulted from past and present managerial discretion. Another 
aspect of Chapter Seven is that it seeks to develop an understanding of the situated role 
played by people (acting as customers and colleagues). It is established that social 
relations are inextricably linked to the experience of FLSW in WC, whilst these are 
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linked in turn to the design of the labour process and management’s attempted 
interventions. Chapter Eight takes the analysis one step further by seeking to clarify the 
impact of work design on satisfaction. To this end management’s survey data is used to 
clarify the positives and negatives of WC FLSW. The data reveals that FLSW social 
relations represent a highly valued dimension of the role. It also reveals that social 
relations could be a major impediment to positive experiences of WC daily life. With 
this in mind, the final section of Chapter Eight seeks to explore how and why certain 
FLSWs act and affect others as they do. The effects of these “enemies within” are 
examined via case studies of two individuals who put the nature of normative deviance 
into sharp relief.  
Chapter Nine contributes my analytical framework of amphitheatrical relations. Its 
value stems from its capacity to house different levels of analytical abstraction within a 
simple consolidated model. In doing so it provides a theoretical construct apt for the 
separation of people and parts, places and spaces which I believe is necessary for a valid 
understanding of the layered phenomena under discussion. Equally important in my 
view is the CRP concept of anteriority, which I deploy in Chapter Nine as a means of 
establishing links between past and present. My chronological data presentation 
illuminates both agential and structural dimensions of the calcifying process that 
anteriority implies.  
The final chapter provides a short summary of the main arguments alongside a 
reiteration of my take on the value of the contribution. The limitations of the study are 
addressed and I set out suggestions for a future research agenda. I also return briefly to 
some of the themes from the literature review that were side-lined in Chapter Nine so as 
to maintain topical focus. 
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CHAPTER TWO: A REVIEW OF THEORY PERTAINING TO 
FRONTLINE SERVICE WORK AND A PROPOSAL FOR 
CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
The value to be gained from further attempts at unveiling the nature and experience of 
FLSW is one of the few sentiments commentators share. Some have argued that 
conceptual development has not kept pace with newly gleaned empirical insights 
(Korczynski & MacDonald, 2008). Others have argued that conceptual developments 
have not kept up with FLSW’s cultural and economic importance in advanced societies 
(Allen & du Gay, 1994), at least until recently. 
The most compelling opportunity for novel insights into FLSW resides in a three-tiered 
analysis of social relations at the point of production/consumption. What this means in 
practical terms is that the experience of FLSW is synchronously examined with a view 
to unearthing (1) the influence of broad socio-economic and cultural forces; (2) the 
institutional factors that shape labour processes within specific environs; and (3) the 
interpersonal and intrapersonal behaviour of people within domains of service 
provision. Thus the objective is not to elevate one tier of analysis over another but 
rather, to examine the interplay - as well as the limits - imposed by forces and factors 
inherent to different levels of causality. A primary aim of this chapter then is to 
illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of theoretical treatments at different levels of 
analysis, in order to illustrate the potential for a contribution based upon critical realist 
assumptions. 
To begin to develop this perspective, the following literature review charts a course 
through significant conceptual innovations centring upon FLSW from the 1980s 
onwards. The emphasis of major works throughout this period has been twofold. Firstly, 
they have sought to extend debate over the extent to which FLSW differs in style or 
substance to manufacturing work (Allen & du Gay, 1994). Secondly, they have sought 
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to synthesise the qualitative significance of the service sector’s rise to pre-eminence in 
Western economies. 
Section One of the chapter will start with a discussion of Hochschild’s emotional labour 
thesis given its significance in shaping debates over FLSW. A summary of her 
contribution will be followed by discussion of the work Erving Goffman, bearing in 
mind the influence of his interactional analysis upon Hochschild’s conceptual 
framework. Whilst Goffman’s pre-occupation with the “interaction[al] order” embodies 
titular connection to interactional service work, I will argue that building upon his 
legacy does not necessarily mean the micro-analysis of situational encounters. 
Goffman’s final essay spoke of the “loose coupling” between macro structures and the 
“interaction order” that he failed to explore himself in the latter stages of his career. 
That said, his earlier publications provided posterity with a conceptual superstructure 
that offers considerable scope for organisational analysis. 
Section Two re-focuses upon service work theory specifically, as conceived by those 
who may loosely be described as “cultural turn” or “linguistic turn” theorists. One of the 
most important shapers of the UK debate has been Paul du Gay, so his work and 
guiding assumptions will be discussed in detail.  This will be followed by a review of 
work based upon alternate assumptions vis-à-vis the forces and factors that guide FLSW 
experiences. Thus, within Section Three people and parts are emphasised - with some 
accounts focusing upon the role play of human actors and others, focusing primarily 
upon contradictions and limits imposed by structural formulations. Important 
distinctions will be articulated between these accounts and those presented prior. 
The same basic questions will be posed of each perspective: what comparative 
advantages do they offer in explaining the phenomena under study in a more 
comprehensive way, and what tools do they offer for contemporary development? As 
Thompson (2009) argues, these are the arbiters of good theory. It will be concluded that 
considerable scope remains for a credible alternative perspective on the experience of 
FLSW, one that incorporates bridge-building (between pre-existing concepts) and a 
dose of “sociological imagination” (Korczynski, 2008: 78). 
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Section One: Emotional labour in everyday life 
In the opening sections of The Managed Heart Hochschild develops an analogy of 
continuity and change in early and late capitalism (2012: 3-9). To illuminate the former 
she draws on a poignant example from Capital, where Marx observes a boy repeating 
the same monotonous lever-pulling procedure for twelve hours. By engaging in such an 
act the boy was enabling the commercial exploitation of his body, whereby control over 
its use is surrendered in exchange for pay. The key difference for Hochschild between 
this experience and those typifying late service capitalism however, is that emotional 
labour is also normalised as a commodity for FLSWs. 
Hochschild’s opening homage to Marx distils the key theme of her work - the 
exploitative nature of the Western capitalism. Whilst on the surface the labour of an 
American airline attendant may appear to have little in common with that of a factory 
worker in Dickensian Britain, they are united by the common thread - the selling of 
their human capacities as labour power.  
What separates them are the specific capacities they are required to sell. Whilst the boy 
is selling his physical capacity, his mind, thoughts and expressions remain his own. It 
does not matter what he thinks (or seems to think) about pulling the lever so long as he 
turns up and does it. The same may not be said for the airline attendant, as she is 
expected to enact her physical capacities in a way that projects positivity. The 
implication is that contemporary FLSWs are estranged from their feelings and their 
actions as part of the production process. Macdonald and Sirianna (1996: 4) articulate 
this contrast: 
“The assembly-line worker could openly hate his job, despise his 
supervisor, and even dislike his co-workers, and whilst this might be an 
unpleasant state of affairs, if he completed his assigned tasks efficiently, 
his attitude was his own problem. For the service worker, inhabiting the 
job means, at the very least, pretending to like it, and, at most, actually 
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bringing his whole self into the job, liking it, and genuinely caring about 
the people with whom he interacts.” 
The forgoing analogy pertains to a key distinctive feature of FLSW: the presence of the 
customer at the point of production. Whilst the young boy described above enjoyed 
degrees of spatial separation from end users, modern FLSWs have to deal with them 
directly. Consequently there is no clear distinction between the service provided and the 
manner in which it is provided, making performances a part of the product itself (Urry, 
1990). Given the socio-economic significance of quality and brand in late capitalism 
(see Klein, 2000), performative “emotional labour” has become a contested terrain 
between management and employees.  
Hochschild defines emotional labour as “the management of feelings to create a 
publically observable facial and body display … [which] requires one to induce or 
suppress feelings in order to sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper 
state of mind in others” (2012: 7). In practical terms this involves regulating behaviour 
in accordance with the perceived desires of customers at management’s behest, meaning 
that FLSWs are pressured to supress their feelings in commercially advantageous ways. 
The chasm between “emotion work” (i.e. private acts with use value) and “emotional 
labour” (public acts with exchange value) is bridged by “transmutation” (p.19) the 
author continues. This refers to corporate attempts appropriate exchange value from use 
value, by artificially inseminating FLSW with bundles of cherry-picked qualities that 
are otherwise deployed at the individual’s behest. 
In wider society there is nothing new in the expectation that individuals will fine-tune 
their behaviour in accordance with display rules. What is new is management’s 
systematic attempt to top-down engineer the embodiment of FLSW from afar. As 
Hochschild (2012: 194) surmises “we have carried our ancient capacity for gift 
exchange over a great commercial divide where the gifts are becoming commodities 
and the exchange rates are set by corporations.”
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2.1.1. Implications of the managed heart 
The argument above carries myriad implications relevant to both FLSWs and wider 
society. In her assessment of the effects of emotional labour upon FLSWs Hochschild 
theorises three “stances” (2012: 188 – see Figure 1), each with differing psycho-social 
consequences. One such stance was fundamental identification with the role, whereby 
the individual became immersed to a point where they cease to recognise a distinction 
between self and outward projection. At the other end of the spectrum were the 
conjurers of illusion, who positively perceived of themselves as little more than the thin 
line between fantasy and reality. A final stance rests between the two, with the worker 
neither fully investing nor separating from the role. 
Each of the stances bears different risks; the wholehearted identifier is susceptible to 
burn out, because their personalised investment renders them especially vulnerable in 
the face of mistreatment. Detachment and distancing reduces this risk but exacerbates 
others, like feelings of being fake or robotic.  
Figure 1: Hochschild’s three stances and their outcomes11
11
 My evaluation of Hochschild’s three stances (2012: 186-189). 
20 
This de-humanising aspect puts into sharp relief how FLSW (as with manufacturing 
before it) has become subsumed into the logic of mass production; albeit, in the case of 
FLSW the assembly line has moved “inside the head” (Taylor & Bain, 1999). Given its 
ensnaring character, Hochschild argues that emotional labour carries the risk of 
interfering with vital cognitive systems by nullifying or quashing actors’ capacity for 
authentic feelings. 
As for wider social effects, two are particularly relevant to the present discussion – one 
economic and one cultural. The former centres upon a paradox of emotional labour; that 
an inverse relationship can exist between the emotional content of work and material 
rewards. In general the more a job involves public communication the less well paid it 
is (Hochschild, 2012: 202), opening up important questions about how and why the 
value ascribed to these roles is so low. Hochschild does not address this in any depth, 
only observing that disadvantaged groups are disproportionately concentrated in the 
sector. She also argues that macro-economic factors including globalisation and late 
capitalists’ focus on profits conspire against FLSWs’ interests. 
The second effect of the omnipresent managed heart is an equal and opposite 
fetishisation of natural feelings and spontaneity, i.e., the unmanaged heart. Apparently 
the shackled nature of interactions within Western society has underpinned a 
countervailing yearning to be “free.” A premium is therefore attached to authenticity, 
which perversely is appropriated by corporations and fed into the policies that govern 
FLSW. Hence, in some instances the corporate response to these yearnings has been to 
invite employees to think and act outside the box - provided that is, they confine 
themselves to the bigger box. 
2.1.2. Managed heart: Impact and issues 
The academic influence of the Managed Heart may be attributed to a number of factors. 
An important one is timing; being published during a period of significant socio-
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economic change and conceptual development. Her thesis captured the zeitgeist of the 
moment whilst expanding upon celebrated works of the prior generation, especially 
Goffman (1959) and Braverman (1974). To the former’s account of everyday 
performative norms she added subtext on the confluence of pressures that direct them 
within corporate life. To Braverman’s influential work she contributed a conceptual 
framework to explore the psychological frontier of the changing nature of work. 
However arguably, a problematic issue with Hochschild (2012) is that she does not go 
far enough in examining the political factors and power imbalances that shape the 
phenomena she describes. It is ironic that she embarked on a journey to progress the 
work of Braverman but neglects a key theme – that being, the extent and nature of 
management control. Her most noteworthy contribution to control debates is to suggest 
that it “boils down to practical politics” (p.189). This fails to acknowledge the myriad 
forces and factor that shape management’s agency (e.g. ideology, authority and 
legitimacy, and placement within wider power relations). 
If the forces that act upon the employment relationship “from without” is under 
theorised then the same may be said of resistance within (Bolton, 2005). Hochschild 
does discuss things that may be termed “resistance,” describing for example the 
negative effects of intensification and role contradictions within her case study. 
However, she fails to adequately connect these observations to the broader context of 
social relations at the point of production. Thus, it is argued that she tacitly accepts 
compliance and Western “market-led capitalism” (Coates, 2000: 244), as the normal 
state of things. 
Her focus on emotional labour would have been well complemented by a deeper 
analysis of routine day-to-day behaviour (Korczynski, 2002). The role of the “stage” 
itself is understated, as is the role of “props” (i.e. work systems) in mediating FLSW 
relations (see Goffman, 1959). Chapter Nine of this thesis serves as a corrective by 
giving equal billing to the stage and wider socio-economic relations (the 
“amphitheatre”) in the production of FLSW experiences. Such a framework better 
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enables analysis of the frontier of control (see Batstone, 1988; also Leidner, 1993) and 
the interplay between people and parts (i.e. systems and structures). It also allows for 
clearer analysis of the blurred boundaries between actors and roles, social experiences 
and work experiences (see Bolton’s critique of Hochschild – Chapter Nine). 
A final related issue is her treatment of personality, which she effectively folds into her 
concept of emotional labour thereby conflating the two (see p.xvii & p.185). A more 
promising position is to conceptualise personality as a partially intransitive set of traits 
and attributes, which independently intersect with other forces and factors to shape the 
experience of FLSW. The significance of this theme will be developed in Chapter Eight.
2.1.3. Goffman’s influence  
Hochschild’s main focus was upon the interactional interface of flight attendants’ 
FLSW experience, with a view to the emotional impact of being the performative face 
of a commercial entity. Her indebtedness to Erving Goffman is explicated in the 
appendix to the 20th anniversary addition of The Managed Heart (2012, pp.221-232), 
where she described the value of Goffman’s insights as they related to her case. In 
particular she highlighted how Goffman’s detailed analysis of affective deviants enabled 
her to “prove the rule(s)” that governed the social space under her microscope. One of 
Goffman’s chief concerns was the interactional means by which social solidarity was 
attained and maintained and a point that Hochschild developed is that such an 
accomplishment was hard work for her cohort. Each situation “taxes the individual” 
according to Hochschild (2012: 224) and the affective deviant was “one who tries to 
avoid paying these social taxes.” As was set out above conformity and compliance was 
the “normal” response, albeit with varying degrees of commitment. Her analysis of 
“role distancing” and “close identification” (as coping strategies) clearly ran in parallel 
with Goffman’s (1959, 1961) categorisations. 
Hochschild also drew attention to the limits of Goffman’s sociology though, laying 
emphasis on two critical points. Her first concern was the lack of structural connections 
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between the wide range of social situations that Goffman analysed. She argued that for 
Goffman “social structure … is only our idea of what many situations of a certain sort 
add up to” (p.225). This supposed lack of emphasis upon institutions and their supra-
situational effects is a touchstone of dissent amongst Goffman’s critics (see especially 
Gouldner, 1971). Even amongst scions of the “Chicago School” there was a sense that 
Goffman had over-laboured the minutia of face-to-face encounters at the expense of 
developing broader connections. As Blumer (197112) notes:  
“He has limited the area of face-to-face association with a 
corresponding exclusion of the vast sum of human activity falling 
outside such an association. Further he confined the study of 
face-to-face association to the interplay of personal positioning 
at the cost of ignoring what the participants are doing.” 
Hochschild’s second reservation was Goffman’s dismissal of the notion of an “inner 
self” – that is, individual psychology that exists autonomously of socialisation processes. 
According to Hochschild this treatment rendered actors as passive co-producers of social 
orders rather than as heterogeneously active agents. To support her position she cites 
Goffman’s (1967) oft-quoted remark that his work concerned “moments and their men, 
not men and their moments.” She also points to the passive language used by Goffman 
in his description of actor’s behaviour, drawing examples from Encounters (1961). The 
significance of this to Hochschild was that Goffman’s “two selves” thesis13 did not 
allow for “deep acting,” as this state of play requires a depth of conscious engagement 
that failed to resonate with Goffman’s passive representations. 
Even celebrants of Goffman accept that he exhibited some degree of wilful ignorance in 
relation to the nuances and idiosyncrasy of individual’s mind spaces. In a sophisticated 
and otherwise favourable review Scheff (2000: 3) remarks: 
12
 Cited in Williams, 1986, p 350. See references. 
13
 Official self and performing self – see Goffman, 1959 in references. 
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“I think that [Goffman] was prejudiced towards individual 
psychology, entrapped in a way that was quite similar to his 
fellow Americans… Goffman rebelled against most of the 
dominant institutions, but not against the bias in social science 
and society against the psychology of individuals.” 
Such claims are difficult to dispute given the bombastic language that Goffman used to 
dismiss the significance of individual psychology. He mocked the tendency of 
sociologists to treat “personal” matters as sacrosanct because in his view, whatever inner 
realm existed was fundamentally a social derivation. Hence Goffman saw no need for 
the “touching tendency to keep part of the world safe from sociology.”14
2.1.4. Goffman’s journey and his critics 
Something that goes undisputed is that Goffman’s sociology began and ended with the 
study of the “interaction order.” This was the term he used to express his objective of 
examining and explaining aspects of face-to-face relations sociologically (Smith, 1999). 
His licence to do so was granted on the basis of interpersonal encounters being socially 
organised and therefore amenable to systematic social study (ibid; see also Goffman, 
1983). Adding to their significance was the notion that face-to-face interactions 
represent the nexus point of social cohesion. In Goffman’s eyes any and all forms of 
human organisation are mediated and made possible by mundane communicative 
performances in everyday life (Manning, 2008). By implication, an understanding of 
working consensuses and social orders must be grounded within the social situations in 
which they are achieved.  
For Goffman social order was a precarious and fragile accomplishment exactly because 
it is pursued through interactional processes. Of particular importance was the process of 
social validation that underscored everyday exchanges, where initiators selected 
performances in anticipation of certain responses and then moderated them in light of 
14
 Goffman 1961a, quoted in Smith 1999: 10. 
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actual responses (Manning, 2008). Much of Goffman’s analysis chronicled and 
categorised everyday behaviour with a view to demonstrating (a) the sensitivity of actors 
to minor deviations from expected conduct and (b) the trans-situational resonance of 
normative expectations (Fine & Manning, 2000). In terms of the latter Goffman was 
especially animated by opportunities to conceptualise daily life as a “ritual order” 
whereby societal beliefs are affirmed, encoded and reified (Williams, 1986). 
Much of the criticism of Goffman’s work pertains to this self-acknowledged 
“bracketing” of his domain of enquiry. Giddens (1998) for example conceded that 
Goffman reigned supreme as an analyst of the communicative space that linked 
individuals and macrosocial structures. He nonetheless chastised Goffman for focusing 
upon this narrow domain to the extent that he neglected equally sophisticated analyses 
of the people or things the “interaction order” connected together. At the people end of 
this spectrum, some have argued that a core constituent of Goffman’s analysis was 
something of an “everyman” in a continuous state of hypersensitivity (Scheff, 2000). In 
relation, Goffman’s position that certain individuals were not significantly more or less 
able and willing to satisfy the expectations of others (based upon traits unique to them) 
perhaps stretched credibility. 
Two further criticisms are worthy of note. A common position on Goffman is that he 
was at best unclear on the three main pillars of social science; those being, data 
collection, analysis and theory generation (see Williams, 1986). It did not help that 
Goffman started afresh to a significant degree with each major work and as 
consequence, failed to build momentum towards a body of replicable methods and 
modes of analysis. The closest he came in this regard was Frame Analysis (1974) which 
was a decade in the making. The meaning of this text remains a matter of debate, as is 
discussed below. 
A second key reservation of Goffman’s critics was that his micro-interactional emphasis 
detracted from an institutional-level gaze upon which such things as hierarchy and 
power manifest themselves. Along these lines Gouldner (1971) has proven one of 
Goffman’s most fervent critics, arguing that by ignoring social structures and 
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stratification Goffman simply aides in their perpetuation. This impression has led some 
(e.g., Dawe, 1974) to argue that Goffman was a conservative – in other words, he had 
little interest in progressive change. Others have argued that Goffman lacked a theory of 
agential change which is ironic given his explicit focused upon the supposed epicentre 
of social order’s maintenance. By Goffman’s logic disorder and change must emanate 
from the same social situations that breathe life into order and continuity. 
Whilst some of these claims are contested (as I will discuss next) there is an acceptance 
amongst Goffman’s supporters and advocates that his analysis was ahistorical in nature. 
To focus on the situational and episodic inevitably meant decentring legacy effects and 
the institutional bedrocks in which they reside. To make this point Gouldner (1971) used 
the example of modern mass bureaucracies, over which individuals have little power or 
influence. Such impotence (as “cogs in the machine”) damages self-worth according to 
Gouldner (ibid), and orientates actors’ performances towards the specific end of 
impressing management rather than a general end of impression management. This is an 
important observation, in that it opens up a question of whether Goffman’s toolkit could 
explain behaviours and experiences in large capitalistic enterprises. Hochschild did not 
believe this to be the case, so drew upon Braverman (1974) and the Marxian tradition to 
explore the distinctive features of capitalism and profit-pursuant organisations.  
2.1.5. In Goffman’s defence 
To risk over-simplification one could argue that there was an “early” and “late” 
Goffman, with the difference being degrees of emphasis upon micro-social analysis. 
Smith (1999) traces the narrowing of focus to the late 1960’s, during which time “the 
situational concerns of his early writing are deepened” (p.3). As a by-product, 
Goffman’s early emphasis upon the wider structural formations that constrained actors 
in situational exchanges took a backseat. Nonetheless, defenders of Goffman’s legacy 
draw upon his earlier works to rebut claims that he was prone to interactional 
reductionism. Manning (2008) for example highlights how Goffman kept “twisting” his 
analysis in The Presentation of Everyday Life (discussed further in Chapter Nine) 
towards wider frames comprising technical, political and structural elements as well as
dramaturgical ones. Asylums (1960) is perhaps the best example of Goffman bringing 
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the “frame” into the foreground. In doing so he provided a vivid account of how 
structures (both physical and managerial) and ideology combined to constrain and shape 
behaviour and experiences amongst inmates under study. Resistance was depicted 
therein as a rational and normal response to the limits imposed by rules and procedures 
within “total institutions.” Here Goffman’s analysis had much in common with 
Foucault’s work on similar environments; especially the latter’s conceptualisation of 
resistance as something that exists in a binary constitutive relationship with power.15
With due consideration of his early works it seems reasonable to argue that it is unfair to 
tarnish Goffman with a micro-reductionist brush. There also appears to be adequate 
grounds to contest claims that Goffman was not interested in such things as power, 
hierarchy and social stratification. As an indicator of latent concern, one of Goffman’s 
(1951) earliest essays explored the symbolic resources drawn upon to differentiate actors 
and demark social rank. This illustrates concern in - and awareness of - social 
stratification even if it was not an overt or primary theme in his later work. As Williams 
(1986) argues Goffman did not ignore structures but rather failed to “attend to any 
specific type(s) of institution in great detail.” 
Curiously, in his final essay Goffman returned the theme of structural effects and sought 
to clarify his view of their relationship with the “interaction order.” He stated his 
position as follows:  
“…what one finds in modern societies at least, is a non-exclusive 
linkage - a ‘loose coupling’ - between interactional practices 
and social structures, a collapsing of strata and structures into 
broad categories, the categories themselves not corresponding 
one-to-one to anything in the structural world, a gearing as it 
were of various structures into interactional cogs … a set 
transformational rules, or a membrane selecting how various 
externally relevant social distinctions will be managed within 
interaction.” 
15
 Foucault (1991) – See references.  
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                                                                       (Goffman, 1983: 11)
Perhaps frustratingly, Goffman follows these remarks with a list of examples and 
benefits of a “loose coupling” approach rather than ruminating over the epistemological 
implications in explicit detail. What seems clear however is that Goffman rejects any 
form of structural or agential reductionism or determinism. The two are deeply 
interwoven according to Goffman whilst the specific phrasing “a gearing … of various 
structures into interactional cogs” suggests that the former (structures) precedes the 
latter (interactions). This would fit with Gonos’ take on Frame Analysis as well as 
Barley & Tolbert’s (1997) proposal for institutional analyses - as discussed in the next 
section. At the same time structures and interactional orders are (or at least can be) 
substantively detached from one another, as the term “loose” implies. Perhaps then it 
behoves the researcher to explain how and why “couplings” are more or less “loose” in 
particular contexts. 
2.1.6. Reading Goffman and following in his footsteps 
According to Gonos (1977) Goffman set out his position on the structure versus agency 
schism some years earlier in Frame Analysis. As mentioned above this was Goffman’s 
long-percolating attempt at explaining “the structure of experience individuals have at 
any moment of their lives” (p.13). Gonos (1977) argues that the dual concepts of 
“frame” and “situation” represent distinctly pitched lenses for the analysis of experience. 
The former speaks to systems of governance (i.e. structures) that precede and constrain 
actors, whereas the latter speaks to Goffman’s conventional concern with the interaction 
order. What Goffman may be inviting then is a simultaneous analysis of situations 
within frames so as to understand the phenomena under investigation. The caveat that he 
later adds is that frames and situations (and therefore experiences) may only exhibit 
“loose couplings,” although it should be noted that he was talking about society in 
general. It appears self-evident that agents are limited to greater extent in say, total 
institutions than in “normal” society. In accordance, it stands to reason that the same 
applies to less total institutions such capitalist enterprises and their labour processes. 
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Those who have followed in Goffman’s footsteps in service work domains have tended 
to continue with the study of the “interactional order” as it relates to their particular 
“situations.” Examples include Manning’s study of police work (2003), Oakes’ (1990) 
study of insurance agents and Miller’s (1964) study of car salesmanship. Each of these 
draw upon Goffman’s theatrical metaphor (Goffman, 1959 – see also Chapter Nine), but 
mainly focus upon the interactional order as Goffman did. What this precludes and 
neglects is a more structurally-orientated analysis that makes broader use of Goffman’s 
“analogical superstructure” as Fine and Manning (2000: 468) eloquently refer to it. 
Failing to do so meant failing to pursue something that Goffman hints at in Frame 
Analysis and his remarks above. Manning (2008: 679) senses the opportunity in his 
interpretation of The Interactional Order (1983 – as quoted above): 
“[Goffman] asked what made possible the sometimes orderly 
interaction he found so engaging. That which is found on the 
surface was made possible by something else. It is the 
‘something else’ that is the heart of sociology and arguably the 
heart of organisational studies?” 
One implication of these remarks is that it is not entirely clear what a continuation of 
Goffman’s project should look like. Is a matter of “doing as he did” or “doing as he 
said?” Neither presents a straightforward proposition because what he did and said 
remains a source of debate. Scheff (2000) and Williams (1986: 679) both observe that 
there is no “generally sanctioned” reading or interpretation of Goffman, which make his 
work a source of irritation and fascination according to the former. It may be the case 
that a lack of clarity combined with the lack of a roadmap for data collection, analysis 
and theorising explains the failure of mainstream sociology to pick up where he left off 
(Manning, 2008). Major theorists including Hochschild (above), Giddens and Habermas 
developed their frameworks with Goffman in mind but cherry-picked substantive 
elements of his work (see Fine & Manning 2000). 
To conclude this brief discussion of Goffman’s work and legacy, it may be useful to re-
appraise the common notion that he failed to provide posterity with a replicable method. 
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In the first instance Goffman was ever and always a qualitative researcher who relied 
upon the toolkit of ethnography. In his first major publication Goffman (1959) made 
clear inherent affinities between ethnographic method and his pre-occupations with self, 
performance and the cultural and social organisation of interaction. That said, the 
specifics of Goffman’s approach do remain abstruse - even whilst scholars have 
suggested means of summoning his spirit. According to Travers (2000) Goffman’s 
raison d’etre was the “unmasking [of] veiled orthodoxies wherever they were 
encountered.”16 As Scheff further explains: 
“Goffman’s method of investigation was to engineer a 
continuing clash between taken-for-granted assumptions in our 
society and his incongruous metaphors and propositions.”17
At its heart then, Goffman’s analytical project arguably centres upon pulling back the 
veil of immediate reality in order to illuminate what lies beneath. An important aspect of 
this was to expose the dark side of institutional arrangements; contrasting the images 
they conjure with shadowy inner-workings that serve to maintain order. In pursuit of 
such an aim authoritative entities were deceptive at best and sadistic at worst for 
Goffman (see Asylums, 1960; also Williams 2008 for discussion), and his project often 
involved taking the side of the underdog. Thus, whilst the minutia of Goffman’s 
approach may be little known and hard to replicate - there seems little reason to believe 
that institutional analysts cannot poke holes in the veneer as he did. Perhaps this is (or 
ought to be) the heart of sociology and organisational studies as Manning (2008) implies 
above. 
In the Methods Chapter below I set out an analytical framework that I believe is best 
suited to the continuation of organisational studies in Goffman’s tenor. What it also does 
is facilitate an adaptation of Goffman’s “analogical superstructure” for the purpose of 
understanding what lies behind the veil of Wine Corp. Lastly, the critical realist 
framework I adopt is compatible with suggestions offered by the likes of Barley & 
16
 Quoted in Scheff, 2000, p.12. 
17
 Ibid., p.7. 
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Tolbert (1997) for remedying some of the recognised limitations of Goffman’s oeuvre. 
For instance, one of the suggestions they make for connecting structural webs to 
interactional orders is to focus upon “scripts” (behavioural regularities) that encode 
everyday experiences in a multidirectional and longitudinal dynamic. This will be the 
level at which my analysis is pitched, and what I have sought to argue here is that it 
represents a meaningful and valid way of taking forward Goffman’s project. In what 
remains of this chapter I will discuss alternate theories and perspectives of FLSW that 
are instructive in the development of my research. 
Section Two: Frontline service work in the cultural turn 
Whilst most mainstream theorists of FLSW have sought to retain the analytical 
significance of material conditions and their effect upon social relations, others have 
called for a radical departure in favour of an alternate mode of thinking. Umbrella terms 
attributed to this disparate band of scholars include “cultural turn,” “linguistic turn,” 
post-industrial and post-modern theorists. There is considerable risk of terminological 
confusion here, made all the more complicated by the fact that theorists who have been 
attributed such labels tend to reject them (see for example Parker, 2002). That said, 
what this disparate band have in common is their fundamental rejection of entitative 
ontologies and epistemologies. Instead the subject of their gaze has become 
knowledge/power, subjectivity, identity and their formulation via discourse and 
“discursive structures.” The implications of this conceptual break and its concomitant 
rejection of reality are highly significant to the present discussion. 
Generally cultural-turn theorists embark by arguing that Western society has itself gone 
through a radical transformation, whereby it has ceased to be production-centric and has 
instead become consumption-centric (Bauman, 1998). In accordance identities have 
attached themselves to individuals’ actions and activities as consumers, with a resultant 
diminution of work as the centre of gravity. A conjoined premise is that “subjectivity” 
has become the basis of capitalism and its reproduction (Thompson, 2009). As a 
consequence, objective realities emanating from such things as structurally uneven 
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distribution of power and resources have been denied or relegated to the margins of 
significance. 
The nature of this culture metamorphosis means that it has powerful reorienting effects 
upon FLSW according to cultural turn theorists. The coming of the consumer age 
carries an implication that service spaces are no longer mere locales of rational 
exchange (Gabriel & Lang, 2006). It is so much more: a place where meanings are 
formulated and status reified. People no longer head to church at weekends to find 
meaning; they head to the nearest shopping mall or cathedral of culture instead (Ritzer, 
1999). 
Scholars have distilled these notions into several well-known conceptualisations. In 
successive essays Ritzer (1993; 1999) popularised the dual notions of McDonaldisation 
and the enchantment of a disenchanted world. The latter refers to capitalism’s attempt to 
reignite the magic and mystery that its own machinations demystified. The former 
encapsulated the onward march of instrumental rationality into the realm of 
consumption, as well as the growing pervasiveness of consumerism as the 
organisational interface of modern life. Bryman (2004) makes analogous arguments, 
contending that the simulation and illusion that characterise Disney’s theme parks are 
coming to dominate the service sector and wider society. 
Neither Ritzer nor Bryman were oblivious to the question of whether jobs in 
“enchanted” or “Disneyised” workplaces were simultaneously infused with fairy tale 
character. Both retained a focus upon the unpleasant aspects of working in 
environments characterised by intense “stage management,” even as they gave primacy 
to the logics of consumer culture in explaining the nature of the environments under 
study (Warhurst et al. 2008).  
Regardless, an important consequence of these trends is that FLSWs are required to 
adopt a “hybrid identity” (Allen & Du Gay, 1994), acting as producers of meanings as 
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well as services. Management are similarly implicated; they are required to manage the 
production of meanings with the level of energy traditionally reserved for the 
stewardship of profits.  
In calling attention to the boundary-spanning nature of FLSW in terms of their cultural 
significance, these accounts have surfaced ways in which FLSW may differ 
experientially from frontline work in other sectors. That said, one of the most common 
criticisms it that the pendulum swung too far in that direction - meaning that the 
distinctions between goods and service production and their labour processes are 
exaggerated (see Beynon, 1992; Sturdy, 2001; Taylor, 2002).  
Theorists such as Bradley et al (2000 in Warhurst et al., 2008) have countered that a 
“cult of work” is a more valid conceptualisation of modern life than cult of 
consumption. They refer to the proliferation of long hours (see Grimshaw & Rubery, 
2010), non-traditional contracts and the penetration of work-related ideology into non-
work confines as exemplars. In the UK for example, the growth of zero-hour contracts 
may be seen as embodying a break-down of the safety net that once protected life from 
capital’s colonisation (Fleming, 2017). 
Against an empirical backdrop of zero-hour contracts and broader “precariatisation” 
(see Savage et al. 2013), it is difficult to accept Bauman’s (1998) proposition that work 
is “nothing” in contemporary lives (see Warhurst et al., 2008: 97). Critics have argued 
that such a notion is more utopian fantasy than reality, based upon over-extrapolation 
from extreme cases. It is widely remarked that contemporary service economies actually 
resemble an hour glass, with large concentrations of “good” and “bad” jobs with little in 
the middle (ibid.). A large proportion of FLSW resides at the bottom end of the socio-
economic pile as Hochschild above observed. For example, whilst 40% of retail 
workers meet the definition of low pay in the UK only 14% of manufacturing workers 
do18 - even though both spheres operationalise many of the same neo-Fordist modes of 
18
 Defined as 2/3 median national pay; see Clarke, S. D’Arcy, C. (2016) Low Pay in Britain 
2016, Resolution Foundation. 
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production. These considerations undermine paradigm shift optimism and underline a 
more “bleak house” (see Chapter Three) perspective on FLSW. 
A final issue with Bauman’s de-centring of work is that it renders unproblematic the 
patterns he commentates upon. In Bauman’s consumer society workers indulge their 
consumptive yearnings and aspirations (for beauty, pleasure, novelty, etc.,) through 
cathartic engagement in the FLSW labour process. “Co-production” is said to bridge the 
divide between producer and consumer, because the former is subsumed in the 
experience of the latter. Hence frontline producers are reimagined by Bauman as 
embodied cultural artefacts, opinion leaders and expert guides. Unitarist imaginings 
such as these risks de-politicising and over-simplifying the experience of employment 
within such roles. 
2.2.1. Customer sovereignty and the rise of the enterprise 
In a series of publications du Gay and collaborators (du Gay & Salaman, 1992; du Gay, 
1993; du Gay, 1996) have provided the best known account of FLSW in the cultural-
turn cannon. As with all such accounts it argues that a fundamental rupture has 
occurred, one that is both cause and consequence of the reformational power of 
discourse and its binate linguistic constructions.  
Du Gay (1996: 43) defines discourse as “a group of statements which provide a 
language for talking about a topic and a way of producing a particular kind of 
knowledge about a topic.” Elsewhere discourse has been defined as giving “social 
existence to objects … [consisting of] practices that systematically form the objects of 
which they speak” (Ezzamel & Willmott, 2008: 192/193). 
Du Gay’s synthesis of the reconstructed nature of FLSW centres upon two discourses 
that are mutually constitutive – those of enterprise and customer sovereignty. Each was 
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forged against the contextual backdrop of radical socio-economic change but neither is 
reducible to them. The origin of his key concepts is not specified, leading some to argue 
that they seemingly emerge from nowhere (Fournier & Grey, 1999). 
The nub of Du Gay’s position resides in his discourse of enterprise, which has 
irrepressibly remodelled and reconceptualised organisational life according to the 
author. It has wreaked havoc on pre-existing forms of organisation (e.g. bureaucratic 
models, technocratic administration) like a whirlwind, universally reconfiguring work in 
accordance with its vicissitudes. Given its virulent nature its effects have been 
widespread, pervading government policy and corporate strategy alike. It also provides 
the rationale for individual actions and cycles of organisational upheaval reminiscent of 
Schumpeter’s (1994: 82) “gale of creative destruction,” whereby industry becomes 
locked in a permanent pattern of competitive self-immolation. Yet the discourse of 
enterprise goes further by taking creative destruction beyond industry and into all walks 
of life.  
A problematic issue with du Gay’s discourse of enterprise is its nebulous composition. 
Du Gay’s definition of enterprises has no fixed reference points, creating the impression 
that it is everywhere and everything. Perhaps that is the point, but a more cynical 
interpretation could be that it is nowhere and nothing if it cannot be synthesised 
coherently. Du Gay’s most lucid position is that enterprise refers to “[the] kind of 
action or project that exhibits enterprising qualities or characteristics on the part of 
individuals or groups” (du Gay, 1996: 56). These include “initiative, self-reliance and 
the ability to accept responsibility for oneself and one’s actions” (ibid. 268). An 
institutionalised incarnation of these is the “enterprise culture,” wherein “boldness and 
a willingness to take risk in pursuit of goals are regarded as human virtues and treated 
as such” (du Gay and Salaman, 1992: 628). Du Gay accentuates the distinctiveness of 
this new alignment via contrast with the sclerotic bureaucracy that enterprise culture has 
sought to displace. 
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He continues to argue that the power of enterprise discourse stems from its cross-
germination of neo-liberal policy, business practices and the reflexive capacities of self-
actualising subjects. These fuse to normalise a moral code based upon the virtuousness 
of the free market principles and the malfeasance of any impediments to them (e.g., 
unions, bureaucrats, and “jobsworths”). To vanquish the stain of the old order, 
enterprise mobilises new forms of governance that operate in tandem to preclude 
aberrant forms of behaviour. These include “governance of the soul,” “control-led de-
control” and proxy management via technology (du Gay & Salaman, 1992: 625-627). 
Along these lines enterprise discourse constitutes a fundamental shift in the nature of 
work, especially on the FLSW cultural and economic frontier (du Gay, 1993). 
A key sub-strand of enterprise discourse according to du Gay is an organisational 
imperative to be intimately involved with the customer, striving continuously towards 
improvement for the betterment of their experience. The cult of customer sovereignty
thus refers to the ascendancy of the customer to the role of preeminent actor in the 
“service triangle” (Gabriel, 2008) of customers, managers and employees. For the 
subordinate members of the triad it imposes upon them an onus to meet the cultural 
aspirations of customers because “getting it right economically means getting it right 
culturally” (du Gay, 1993: 577). By implication FLSWs must tune into the life projects 
of these exalted beings, who seek out meaning and self-elevation via consumption. 
The discourse of customer sovereignty is seen by du Gay as both cause and 
consequence of a wider reconceptualization of subjects as consumers (discussed above). 
Through these processes customers have become knowledgeable in their endeavours 
and monarchical in their expectations. Demand has become idiosyncratic and 
fragmented as a result, and service organisations have little choice but to 
metamorphosise around these demands (du Gay, 1996).  
Taken as a whole these interconnected discourses have systematically re-orientated 
FLSW. They have elevated the customer to the position of supreme actor in service 
arenas. They have also shaped management solutions befitting the age including 
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“loose/tight” forms of surveillance technology and culture management (Peters & 
Waterman 1982 in du Gay, 1996: 61). Furthermore they have induced a rolling purge 
principle, enabling organisations to shed their bureaucratic skins and grow ever closer to 
the customer.  
2.2.2. Du Gay: Conceptual reservations 
The limitations of du Gay’s thesis could be summed up as systematic under-
exaggeration and over-exaggeration. The net effect is to overstate change and its effects 
on work relations, whilst discounting continuity and its analytical implications. Much of 
said problem resides in his adaptation of a constrictive ontology that limits his 
exploration of extra-discursive forces and factors vis-à-vis FLSW (Fournier & Grey, 
1999).  
A critical hindrance of du Gay’s reductionism is that the space for contestation is 
fundamentally denied, especially in relation to FLSWs who are depicted as enfeebled 
subjects. Within this framework the knowledge and power of the customer is overstated 
whilst the opposite treatment is afforded FLSWs. A related issue is that FLSWs and 
customers are each deterministically depicted as servant or master respectively. This 
discounts the possibility that individuals on either side of the fence could mobilise rival 
discourses or non-discursive resources in pursuit of heterogeneous agendas (Sturdy, 
1998).  
It seems reasonable to expect considerable variation in actor’s knowledge and power on 
either side of the service divide, not to mention variation in individual’s willingness to 
take advantage. People are also changeable; their deployment of agency is unpredictable 
within specific contexts. Human variability sits uncomfortably with du Gay’s theoretical 
generalisations. 
There are further issues with du Gay’s thesis. One such example is that it is ahistorical, 
failing to adequately link the phenomena he describes to pre-existing power 
asymmetries. Another issue is that by shrouding enterprise discourse in paradigm shift 
language, he limits his scope to analyse the continued relevance of bureaucratic 
orthodoxy and the basis of its self-replication. Yet another issue is that many of the fads 
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(e.g., TQM, enhanced appraisal, performance targets, etc.,) and organisational changes 
(delayering, re-skilling, “empowering”) that supposedly comprise “enterprise” could 
just as easily be argued to be rehashes of old ideas (Scott & Marshall, 2005).  
A final strand of reservations relates to the one-side treatment of each the constituent 
members of the service triangle and their relationships with one another. Management 
for instance are rendered as relatively servile subjects, stripped of autonomy and 
strategic discretion by the irrefutable logics of enterprise and customer sovereignty. 
What this does not acknowledge is the extent to which management remain active 
gatekeepers of what customers want and who the customer is.  
FLSWs on the other hand have the significance of their engagement in an employment 
relationship denied due to du Gay’s emphasis on the higher calling of consumption. 
FLSWs are better understood as participants in a linguistically-mediated identity game 
than wage labourers according to this logic, which conveys unitarist assumptions about 
FLSW relations. This leaves little space to explain certain FLSWs relative immunity to 
the discourses of which he speaks (Leidner, 2006). As for the customers, they are 
portrayed as cultural conquistadors on a mission of meaning construction. Other aspects 
of their humanity are cast aside by du Gay and relegated to the outer limits of decision 
making filters. The problem with this argument is confounding evidence that customers 
remain polytheists rather than monotheists (discussed further in Chapter Seven). 
Section Three: People and parts as forces and factors  
2.3.1. Sub-sectorial analysis  
What I am referring to here is a range of theoretical treatments that share an assumption 
that FLSW is too diverse for decontextualized generalisations. With this in mind, it 
becomes necessary to foreground and theorise typological distinctions so as to better 
articulate the forces and factors that shape experiences. One widely-cited mode of 
disaggregation is to sub-divide FLSW into organisations or sub-sectoral strata pursuant 
of “high road” or “low road” strategies (see Mason & Osbourne, 2008). These are 
qualitatively differentiated by the product markets they cater to, the labour markets they 
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draw upon and the skills necessitated (Nickson et al., 2011). High-road settings may 
also be differentiated by social prestige, with psychological benefits for FLSWs and 
knock-on effects for FLSW relations. Some sectors, brands, settings and products 
embody “cultural capital” (see Wright, 2005) whilst others may be stigmatised in ways 
that impact upon the wage-effort bargain and social dynamics (Goffman, 1963). 
Another approach is to examine FLSW through the nexus of contradictions and the 
strategies that organisations pursue to deal with these contradictions. A well-known 
typology draws a division between organisations seeking competitive advantage 
through “mass-service” versus those pursuant “mass-customised service” instead. The 
distinction rests upon whether the business model gravitates towards high volume/low 
prices or high value-added via service quality (Frenkel, 2006). Batt (2000) framed the 
distinction in terms of “mass production strategies” versus  “relationship management 
strategies,” arguing that each invoke downstream effects on patterns of work 
organisation and skill content. It follows that these “differentiation strategies” 
(Arrowsmith, 2010: 195) will intersect with worker responses in general terms 
(Edwards, 2009). 
Building on this theme, some theorists have sought to express the subtleties of FLSW 
through a spectrum. In Figure 2 knowledge work is presented as being at one end of a 
spectrum whilst mass-service resides at the other.19 The defining characteristics of the 
former are that roles are underpinned by theory, they have technical dimensions and are 
explicit, i.e., they are codified to some extent (Thompson et al., 2000). In contrast mass-
service roles are understood as tacit, contextual and social whilst lacking in high value-
added content. The model assumes a linear link between job satisfaction (monetary and 
psychological) and dimensions of labour process control (skill, autonomy and 
discretion). 
Between the two extremes lies “mass customised” which straddles the divide between 
cost-driven and value-added models. Whilst not as rewarding as knowledge work, it 
does contain features of it that afford FLSWs greater control over the labour process. 
However, the downside of this approach for FLSWs and management is that they find 
themselves situated between two battle fronts with incompatible logics. One could 
easily foresee how the best of both worlds for customers could easily become the worst 
19
 Based upon my synthesis of Frenkel’s typology (2006: 357-363). 
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of both worlds for FLSWs, with the latter trapped between intangible service quality 
expectations and concrete performance measures (Taylor & Bain, 1999). 
Figure 2: The spectrum of FLSW 
2.3.2. Customer-oriented bureaucracy  
Perhaps the most compelling explication of the contradictions that shape FLSW is 
provided by Korczynski and collaborators (Korczynski et al., 2000; Korczynski & Ott, 
2004; Korczynski, 2005, 2008). His main accomplishment is to sew together strands of 
theory so as to better understand the implications of competing pressures. With his 
theory of the “customer oriented bureaucracy,” he is able to dually navigate both 
frontiers of production and consumption.  
The customer-oriented bureaucracy (see Table 1) represent management’s attempt to 
reconcile a contradiction between rationalisation and customer-orientation. 
Korczynski’s notion of customer-orientation is reminiscent of the cultural-turn 
41 
perspective, wherein customers are constructed as dominant cultural beings in search of 
enchantment and illusion. However, he departs from the assumptions of the cultural turn 
by arguing that customer sovereignty is better understood as a convenient myth rather 
than reality. Management rhetoric is therefore re-imagined as something more akin to 
ideology, which serves the purpose of channelling FLSWs’ energy towards customer 
happiness.
What jeopardises the illusion is the constraints imposed by bureaucratic complexes, 
which function as the structural embodiment of management’s control agenda. Hence a 
contradiction between rationalisation (systemisation of inputs/outputs) and customer-
orientation (qualitative experience): a simultaneous attempt to enchant consumption 
whilst masking the restrictive systems that govern it. The notion is reminiscent of 
Burawoy’s (1979) argument that the labour process exists to obscure and secure surplus. 
Re-cast for FLSW, the role becomes one of performing “magic” (i.e., enchanting the 
service process to secure revenue) whilst obscuring the dreary reality of production that 
secure profit. 
Table 1: Dimensional map of the customer-oriented bureaucracy 
                                                                                     (Source: Korczynski, 2008: 79)       
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In practical terms enchantment necessitates management concessions away from 
unfettered rationalisation, so that FLSWs have sufficient scope to maintain customers’ 
illusion of relational superiority (Korczynski, 2008). It thus befalls FLSWs to 
proactively maintain customers’ sense of sovereignty within diverse service encounters, 
effectively rendering them “contradiction reconcilers.” To some extent then they are 
understood as operating between a rock (management’s control agenda) and a hard 
place (customer’s illusion of primacy). It is within such a place that FLSWs gain their 
agential power though, because customers and managers each depend upon their 
intermediary role to secure objectives. 
The customer-oriented bureaucracy has a number of virtues vis-à-vis the arguments set 
out above. In the first instance it provides a broadly applicable framework to 
comprehend the structured antagonism underpinning triangular relations. It also 
accounts for constraints imposed on each party (in spite of power disparities), and the 
residual scope for agency where culture and commerce elide. 
Importantly, Korczynski’s concept has the capacity to explain why the substance of 
service offerings differs so much from the marketing material (a theme in Batt, 2007). 
Given that sovereignty is cast as rhetoric rather reality (contra du Gay), foundations are 
also laid to explain the extent of customer disillusionment. It seems inevitable that 
tensions will boil to the surface and reveal themselves in such a dynamic.  
A further accomplishment of the customer-oriented bureaucracy in my view is its 
alignment with conceptualisations emanating from sub-sectoral analysis. For example, 
the acute pressures that supposedly emanate from “mass customised” strategies could be 
expressed as an outcome of attempting a stable balance between opposing enchantment 
and rationalising aspirations. Novelty and excitement seem an anathema to the brute 
instrumentality of mass production. Logically, any attempt to enact both within the 
same labour process will engender compromises that partially diminish the benefits of 
one extreme or the other.  
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Overall Korczynski’s claim that the customer-oriented bureaucracy “takes forward 
discussions of the culture of the customer by locating a wider material basis within 
everyday economic activity for the culture of customer sovereignty” (2005: 84) is 
useful. However, a number of issues also limit its value in understanding the experience 
of FLSW. A key reservation is that this model understates the commonality and 
viability of overtly disenchanting low-road models. Managers of firms at all points on 
the compass are liable to make arguments about how the customer is king in their 
organisation. Yet the specific realisation of this principle is born of management’s 
strategic impetus, which may direct organisations towards divisive market approaches 
or monopoly power rather than inclusive unitarism. To take an infamous example (see 
Harvey & Turnbull, 2015), Ryanair is now Europe’s biggest airline despite its service 
quality being more traumatic than enchanting. A Guardian article recently declared the 
brand as being “built on being reliable bastards.”20 Its chief executive seems to take 
sadistic pleasure on waging war with its customers and FLSWs in my opinion, as the 
following public statements indicate: 
“MBA students come out with: ‘My staff is my most important 
asset.’ Bullshit. Staff is usually your biggest cost. We all employ 
some lazy bastards who need a kick up the backside. 
Anyone who thinks Ryanair flight is some sort of bastion of 
sanctity … is wrong. We bombard you with as many in-flight 
announcements and trolleys as we can. Anyone who looks like 
sleeping, we wake them up and sell them things. 
You’re not getting a refund so fuck off. We don’t want to hear 
your sob stories. What part of ‘no refund’ don’t you 
understand?”21
20
 Davis, R. “Ryanair strikes,” 07/07/2018. 
21
 Hogan, M. “Michael O’Leahy’s 33 daftest quotes,” The Guardian, 08/11/2013.
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Another reservation is that Korczynski does not make explicit some of the logical 
inferences he draws upon. The customer-oriented bureaucracy has not sprung from 
nowhere any more than du Gay’s discourse has; they are each embedded in relations of 
power, politics and access to material resources. Managers are pro-active and reactive in 
ensuring that enchantment turns a profit, making Korczynski’s (2005: 73) “underlying 
contradiction” less of an abstract thing and more of a day-to-day struggle at the point of 
production (Bélanger & Edwards, 2013). 
2.3.3. Labour process theory 
A potential complement to Korczynski’s analysis would be to draw upon the critical 
traditions of Labour Process Theory (henceforth LPT) more extensively and explicitly. 
LPT conceives capitalism as comprising dual strategic objectives: to remove 
indeterminacy (to the extent that is practicable) whilst transmuting and/or appropriating 
knowledge, skills, feelings and bodies for the purposes of competitive advantage and 
profit (Warhurst et al., 2008). The binary nature of managerial prerogative thus contains 
contradictory compulsions to regulate and control FLSWs and to free them to add value 
(Hyman, 1987).  
The relevance of this dualism to FLSW has been a recurrent theme throughout the 
preceding discussion. Managers need to control or “rationalise” the labour process so as 
to deliver consistently at minimal costs. They also need staff to deploy their agential 
power and creative capacities to satisfy customers irrespective of constraints imposed 
upon them. In light of this, the preoccupation of LPT is in developing nuanced accounts 
of how such contradictions are practically and strategically managed within capitalist 
political economy (Thompson, 2009).  
Another pertinent feature of LPT is that it makes a number of prescient observations 
about the service sector, which are especially relevant to “cultural turn” theorists. Some 
amongst the latter acted as cheerleaders for the rise of service work and decline of 
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manufacturing jobs, believing that consumer-age roles represent a move up the 
content/rewards scale (as depicted in Figure 2). Labour process theorists take umbrage 
with this, arguing that it overlooks the actual composition of the service sector and 
much FLSW. In terms of the latter, it is argued that excessive focus on intangibles have 
blindsided some to the continued dominance of tangibles synonymous with mass-
service production.  
As for the sector generally, labour process theorists have argued that there is nothing 
intrinsically good about service jobs because positive attributes (e.g., higher knowledge 
content, discretion and autonomy) do not flow from them naturally. Most UK FLSW is 
firmly embedded at the mass-service end of the spectrum, leading to the contention that 
far more “McJobs” than “iMacJobs” have accompanied the rise of the service sector 
(Thompson et al., 2001: 926). Cultural-turn critics argue that much of the confusions 
stems from a muddle over form and content, meaning that differences in the outward 
appearances of FLSW (compared to manufacturing) gloss over enduring similarities in 
how they are structured, organised and experienced. Some of the supporting evidence 
will be evaluated in the next chapter. 
Section Four: Discussion - theorising the experience of FLSW 
The purpose of this chapter has been to explore the most significant conceptual 
developments and theoretical treatments of FLSW, in order to identify their strengths 
and weaknesses and synthesise opportunities to move the agenda forward. A second 
objective has been to illuminate key debates and the contributions of influential 
theorists to them. A final objective has been to juxtapose competing positions in terms 
of the implications and limitations at different levels of analysis. The ontological 
contours of rival positions have also been illuminated. 
Korczynski & MacDonald (2008) argue that three approaches may be adopted when 
confronting the range of insights into FLSW: the post-modern approach, the elevation 
approach and the bridge-building approach. The post-modern approach centres upon 
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the fundamental irreconcilability of social theory. To pursue truth is a futile exercise 
because any attempts to better articulate the FLSW experience is stymied by the 
impossibility of truths other than discourse. In contrast, the elevation approach seeks to 
supplant one perspective with another by demonstrating its superiority in explaining the 
phenomena under study. The final approach - bridge-building - seeks instead to bring 
perspectives together for the betterment of scholarly knowledge. 
It is possible to mobilise Korczynski & MacDonald’s template to understand the post-
modern accounts, in that they build their own bridge between the first two approaches. 
Paradoxically they insist upon the inescapable relativism of competing truth claims 
whilst implying that their doctrine is the one true gospel (see Knights & Vurdubakis, 
1994, for a pronounced example of this type of thinking). In contrast, the value apparent 
in more subtle paradigm shift theses resides in their capacity to explain how and why 
FLSW may have changed in accordance with the forces and factors of which they 
speak. That being said, their conceptual tools appear less able explain continuity and the 
endurance of social objects. 
Another reservation over paradigm shift theory regards its ahistorical formulation and 
de-politicising of the work sphere as a place of contestation and exploitation. Neither is 
eschewed by Hochschild (2012) by way of contrast, who provides an instructive 
example of bridge-building. By exploring the distinctive features of FLSW in light of 
broader features that capitalist workplaces, she was able to theorise the former as the 
onward march of the latter. Put another way, she was able to show how something new 
(FLSW’s intangible qualities, performative requirements and associated risks) is an 
expression of something old (exploitation within inherently unequal capitalist labour 
relations). The robustness of Hochschild’s approach as a means of exploring both 
distinctive and common features is amongst its strong points in my view. Its major 
limitation was its over-emphasising of these particular dynamics at the expense of a 
subtler appreciation of individual nuance and day-to-day experience. 
The customer-oriented bureaucracy can be reasonably conceived as an attempt to add a 
material/structural backbone that may enhance the positive aspects of the paradigm shift 
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critiques whilst alleviating their weaknesses. It does this by separating out commercial 
and cultural discourses and by disaggregating rhetoric from reality. Amongst other 
things Korczynski’s approach provides a better template for analysing conflict within 
the service realm. Its main limitation is that it draws attention away from political 
economy by focusing instead on the service interface.  
In contrast, LPT embodies a non-constrictive framework for analysing social relations 
at the point of production – one that is premised upon assumptions that may guide a 
deeper understanding of FLSW within advanced economies. By its very nature LPT 
hones in on inner-workings and seeks to explain experiences in light of broader socio-
economic relations and power disparities. There are however two important 
opportunities to develop the LPT project: (1) by better incorporating normative control 
(Warhurst et al., 2008) and (2) by better assimilating the inherent variability of people. 
Both of these projects are well underway (see for example Bolton & Houlihan, 2007) 
but would benefit from extra impetus.  
Drawing inspiration from Thompson (2011: 767), Figure 3 seeks to chart the 
developmental progress of FLSW theory as a genealogical tree. Despite the obvious risk 
of over-simplification it provides a useful means of illustrating the interconnections and 
underlying assumptions of major works. It also shows where attention has been 
comparatively lacking. 
A general deficit depicted in Figure 3 is the limited representation of agency and people, 
who are invariably reduced to homo economicus or bonded subjects of discourse 
(Archer, 2000). The re-insertion of human actors into the work sphere may not only 
enhance an academic understanding of FLSW, but also of the experience of work 
generally within contemporary conditions. Of course, this assumes that a more subtle 
appreciation of individuals and groups is not at the expense of an equally subtle 
appreciation of the broader forces and factors that constrain/enable them. A need for 
balance underlines the case for a stratified analytical approach that is primed for an 
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exploration of the interrelationship between parts and people (Archer, 1996). The layers 
of a stratified ontology are disentangled for illustrative purposes in Figure 4 below. 
To summarise, influential accounts of FLSW differ considerably in their 
conceptualisation of it. Some posit the quantitative rise of service work as a qualitative 
improvement in work experience, whilst others argue that it adds new forms of 
exploitation to old ones. Whereas some argue that FLSW should be conceived in 
cultural and customer-centric terms, others argue that the emphasis should remain on 
management and relations of production. Each of these matters necessitates further 
deliberation with a view to research, the subject of the next chapter. 
Figure 3: Genealogical tree and space for conceptual development
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Figure 4: A stratified ontology of organisational life 
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CHAPTER THREE: A REVIEW OF EVIDENCE ON THE 
EXPERIENCE OF FRONTLINE SERVICE WORK  
Introduction 
In assessing the nature and quality of FLSW it is commonly argued that two camps have 
formed that convey substantively different views of life within them. Often these are 
referred to as the “bleak house” and the “happy house” (Turnbull & Wass, 1997; Rose, 
2002: 41). The former conjures the grim realities of Victorian workhouses as a 
metaphor for contemporary FLSW, albeit in these updated accounts workers are 
whipped and driven by an inter-locking control matrix rather than “simple” control 
(Edwards, 1978) typical of earlier periods. Particular attention is paid to “technocratic 
control” here given the myriad of new technologies available for monitoring and 
surveilling FLSWs (see McPhail, 2002, for an overview). These technologies are 
envisaged as conduits of Taylorism within service settings, acting to control line speed 
and “product quality” thereby replicating the dreary conditions of factory work. When 
these are combined with less mechanistic ideological tools drawn from the “new service 
school” (Korczynski, 2002: 19), management are thought to have assumed dystopian 
levels of power and control that are similar in substance and style to those prophesied in 
Orwell’s 1984 (see Willmott, 1993).  
By way of contrast the “happy house” observers have called into question the 
inevitability of neo-Fordist strategies and Victorian workhouse conditions. They posit 
examples of “high road” strategies and evidence of genuine FLSW satisfaction. A key 
distinction they make is that whilst oppressive powers may exist, this is not to say that 
they will be exercised by default. Ultimately it is a question of management’s agency 
and strategic and tactical orientation. 
Section One below explores research that embodies each of these interpretations, 
drawing upon some of the most widely cited evidence. Attention will firstly be paid to 
call centres given the wealth of evidence generated in such settings, particularly in 
51 
relation to control mechanisms. The wider relevance of these studies will be 
subsequently explored via research in other sub-sectors that exhibit similar features. The 
section concludes with an overview of contrary evidence from “happy houses.” 
Emphasis will be placed upon the factors that distinguish them. 
Section Two presents research findings from an alternate source of evidence: micro-
analysis of FLSW life, based primarily upon ethnographies at the people/unit level. 
What these studies show is the manner in which FLSWs appropriate meaning and resist 
management and customers alike. Viewed at this level FLSWs have powers and 
properties that are unique to them as people, as well as contextual advantages that assist 
them in wrestling control away from ostensibly dominant parties. Section Three then 
synthesises key points as they relate to theoretical paradigms (Chapter Two) and a 
proposal for new research (Chapter Four). 
Section One: “Bleak house” and “happy house” accounts of 
frontline service work 
One of the most vivid accounts of FLSW has been provided by Fernie and Metcalf 
(1998) in their comparative case study of four call centres. Their position is 
encapsulated in two quotes that crystallised their views: 
“This occupation merits study because the possibilities for 
monitoring behaviour and measuring output are amazing to 
behold – the “tyranny of the assembly line” is but a Sunday 
school picnic compared with the control that management can 
exercise in computer telephony 
…For call centres, Bentham’s Panopticon was truly the vision of 
the future and these organisations are the very epitome of what 
Foucault had in mind.” 
52 
Explicit here is the notion that an interlinked triangle of information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) can be mobilised to enact a near-totalising control matrix. The 
power unleashed by the interconnection of transactional terminals, databases and 
automatic call distribution systems represents a paradigmatic shift in how work is 
organised and experienced according to the authors. ICT’s constitute an assembly line 
in the literal sense, whilst also providing management with a comprehensive toolkit to 
surveil inputs and outputs. 
Two particular powers that call centres managers enjoy are the “facility of remote 
listening” (Callaghan & Thompson, 2001: 23) and a monopoly over statistical data. The 
former concerns managers’ unconstrained ability to monitor employee performance in 
real-time and/or after the fact. The latter concerns managers’ ability to quantify almost 
any aspect of FLSW performance as either individuals or team members. In 
combination these facilitates enable management to become an omnipotent force, able 
to systematically control the pace and quality of FLSW. 
This explains Fernie and Metcalf’s use of antiutopian language to describe the 
experience of call centre work. Management’s power is seen as being at the binary 
expense of FLSWs powerlessness, which is both a cause and consequence of an 
excruciating mix of old economy elements (Fordist production) and new (digital control 
systems). The assembly line thus remains entrenched whilst new technology extends 
management’s reach in unprecedented ways (Taylor & Bain, 1999). 
Whilst a consensus has formed around the notion that Fernie and Metcalf’s thesis 
exaggerates managerial control and sweatshop conditions, a substantial amount of 
research does nonetheless support a “glass half empty” perspective. For example, 
research on teamwork within similar settings has suggested that they actually serve as 
mechanisms of intensification (Bain & Taylor, 2000) and corporate indoctrination 
(Callaghan & Thompson, 2001) rather than as bases of support and solidarity. In 
actuality the pace of the line and work design severely curtailed FLSWs ability to 
interact with fellow team members. The authors therefore argue that these policies are 
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more rhetoric than reality, acting primarily to coerce in-house competition in pursuit of 
productivity gains. Similar insights have been gleaned from research on other facets of 
“humanistic” management within call centres including quality circles, team briefings 
and individualised/team-based incentive schemes (Taylor & Bain, 1999). 
One of the most compelling bleak house accounts of FLSW is provided by Wallace et 
al. (2000). Based upon four case studies of high performing call centres in Australia, 
they argue that these operators have each converged upon a distinct strategy for 
balancing the contradiction between efficiency and service quality (as described by 
Korczynski in Chapter Two). They refer to this as the “sacrificial HR strategy” (SHRS), 
which involves using up and “burning out” FLSWs in the full knowledge that they will 
buckle under dual qualitative/quantitative pressures. They argue that high-turnover and 
emotional burn-out are tolerated and actively encouraged as means of securing a low-
cost FLSW conveyor-belt. 
The logic guiding the adaptation of SHRS according to Wallace et al. (2000) was its 
supposed cost/benefit superiority vis-à-vis sophisticated HR strategies, which may 
mitigate the harmful effects of FLSW but at higher costs. In contrast, SHRS involves 
management recruiting FLSWs in full knowledge of a substantial discrepancy between 
the nature of work (intensively paced, highly structured and routinized) and FLSWs 
intrinsic motivations (for enjoyable, sociable work). The misalignment is treated as a 
solution not a problem though, because it sets the conveyor-belt process in motion. It 
brings workers in and forces them out “voluntarily” once their goodwill and emotional 
energy has been harvested. The authors argue that SHRS is made possible by certain 
contingencies including divisible tasks, ICT integration and a large pool of cannon 
fodder that make rapid turnover sustainable.  
3.1.1. Looking beyond the call centre archetype  
One reason why call centres have received a lion share of researcher’s attention is that it 
has been regarded as a trailblazer – a sub-sector that spearheads and exemplifies “[new 
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strategies] by capital to create controlled and cost-efficient environments that can 
restructure and expand the provision of services to the customer” (Callaghan & 
Thompson, 2001: 9). Its advanced ITC integration is its prominent feature, although it 
also serves as a vanguard of “de-layered” organisational structures (Belt et al. 2000 in 
McPhail, 2002) and “rationalised” management (as described by Korczynski et al., 
2000).  
That said, a substantial body of evidence suggests that “bleak house” conditions extend 
far beyond call centres. In particular there is compelling evidence of new controls 
complementing old ones, whilst management increasingly disaggregates into a separate 
orbit to that occupied by FLSWs. For example, in four case studies of service 
organisations operating in distinct sub-sectors (telecommunications, food retail, 
banking, and public sector community-care), Grimshaw et al. (2002) discovered 
uniform processes of “flat hierarchy” re-structuring. One effect was to decimate middle 
ranks, which in turn exacerbated skill and reward polarisation by limiting scope for 
incremental development. The organisations therefore came to represent the “hour 
glass” theorised by Warhurst et al. (2008) in Chapter Two. The diminishment of the 
career ladder also enhanced the probability and price of being trapped at the bottom, 
amplifying the pressure to get ahead at any cost. The overall effect of winner-take-all
was workers “choosing” intensification and unpaid responsibilities because the 
alternative was to languish at the bottom. 
The upside for management is that the house always wins via divide-and-conquer, 
reduced costs and an enhanced capacity to exercise power arbitrarily and abusively. If 
this sounds hyperbolic it is worth taking stock of the opening remarks of a recent House 
of Common’s report22 on Sports Direct, one of the UK’s largest companies: 
“A spotlight has been shone on the working practices and 
business model of Sports Direct. What the spotlight revealed was 
extremely disturbing. Workers … were not being paid the 
22
 Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmbis/219/219.pdf 
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national minimum wage, and were being penalised for matters 
such as taking a short break to drink water and for taking time 
off work when ill. Some say they were promised permanent 
contracts in exchange for sexual favours. Serious health and 
safety breaches also seem to have occurred. For this to occur in 
the UK in 2016 is a serious indictment of the management.” 
The effects and implications of polarisation have been addressed in other studies of “big 
box retail” as well as the café sector. Grugulis et al. (2010) found that FLSW’s 
(including frontline managers) have little discretion and autonomy but are nonetheless 
held responsible for success or failure. Lloyd & Payne (2014) made similar discoveries, 
arguing that their research sites exhibited a tyranny of targets against the backdrop of 
extreme disparities between responsibility for performance and control over 
performance. In their study of ten organisations within the café sector they highlighted a 
consistent pattern of centralised control over “brandscaping,” layout, product range, 
pricing, pay and staffing levels. The only residual space for frontline managers to 
exercise autonomy and discretion was in the shaping of the “quality of human 
relationships and the actual experience of work” (p.484).  
One of the starkest “bleak house” evaluations of FLSW was provided by Turbull and 
Wass (1997) in their study of High Street Retail. They focused upon a large city store 
employing upwards of three hundred FLSWs, wherein management paid lip service to 
“good human relations” whilst engaging in practices that led to rolling hostility. As a 
consequence, FLSWs reported feeling that they were treated “as if [they are] nothing” 
(p.108) and antipathy towards management became deeply engrained. “Soft HR” 
policies were ultimately eroded into insignificance by the overriding imperative of 
management control. A particularly unsettling discovery was that store managers were 
even trained to give “standard answers for all the usual complaints” (p.106). It was 
hardly surprising in these circumstances that dialogue was reported to have completely 
broken down between FLSWs and managers, who came to be seen as “empty suits.”  
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Thus, across the seventeen case study organisations covered in this section there is 
considerable overlap in the FLSW experience and the forces and factors driving it. A 
separation of conception and execution (as discussed by Braverman, 1974) appears to 
be a cornerstone, with FLSW roles increasingly confined to the latter. In the meantime 
bureaucratic control has enacted a tight web of constraints, often substituting for 
disbanded layers of supervision.  
3.1.2. Socio-economic stratification 
If we accept that FLSW organisations have become top and bottom heavy - with 
management and technical lieutenants concentrated at the top and powerless FLSWs at 
the bottom – then polarisation takes on special significance. Amongst other things it 
implies deepening divisions and more pronounced distinctions between the officer and 
soldier classes and less scope for upward mobility. Given a choice between the fast lane 
(with relatively good pay and job conditions) and the bus lane, it is hardly surprising 
that fierce competition breaks out amongst FLSWs whilst solidarity is undermined. 
At another level the emergence of a two-tiered labour market has significant policy 
implications. A key justification for “upskilling” via university degrees was that it 
would enhance economic competitiveness, as those extra skills would be deployed in 
workplaces (see Lloyd & Payne, 2014). Yet it is difficult to see how graduates into the 
UKs service-led jobs market can make such an impact when strategic brainwork is 
performed by the few (at head office command centres) at the expense of the many. On 
this basis it seems fair to question whether “UK plc” and its service organisations will 
yield substantial returns upon graduates’ (now privatised) investment in their “human 
capital” if all too many find themselves stuck at or near the bottom.  
As for graduates themselves, they confront a structurally-engrained challenge not 
dissimilar to Grimshaw et al.’s (2002) FLSWs above; that being, a substantial 
supply/demand imbalance (see Keep & Meyhew, 2006) combined with considerable 
long-term costs associated with failure to secure the officer-track role. Whereas a 
university degree may have once stacked the deck in favour of graduates, the 
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transformation of degrees into commodities has diminished their value considerably. 
Gold-standard “grad schemes” have become overwhelmed by applications from mass 
produced graduates - a situation that was worsened by the 2008 recession. One story 
that made headlines was eight barista roles that garnered 1,700 job applications.23 It is 
not known how many of these were graduates but it does illustrate the ferocity of 
competition for a certain tier of FLSW in a hollowed out economy. 
It seems reasonable then to anticipate that organisations will reap a similar control and 
productivity dividend from graduates as they do with entry-level workers generally. The 
possibility of a long and slow struggle up the career ladder heightens the desirability of 
“grad schemes” that are marketed as fast-tracks to the officer class. Simultaneously, 
awareness and fear of a two-tiered labour market may also render graduates highly 
vulnerable and pliable in the face of powerful employers. A miss-match between supply 
and demand on the described scale appears ripe for exploitation. 
These propositions are evident in a recent article in The Guardian24 which reported 
upon research carried out by the IPPR think tank.25 A key finding was that an internship 
had become a CV “must have” even though many offer little by way of substantial 
learning opportunities. Another finding was that recruitment processes were opaque and 
put less privileged graduates at a systematic disadvantage. They reflected the truism that 
“it’s not what you know but who you know.” Still another feature of the IPPR report was 
that it located the proliferation of internships (which often corresponded with poor pay 
working conditions) as an offshoot of the supply/demand imbalance as described above. 
Economic turmoil exacerbated disequilibrium as stated: 
“The sharp decline in job opportunities, triggered by the 2008 
recession, led to an oversupply of graduates with the result that 
23
 Fricker, M. “The Costa the recession: more than 1,700 desperate job hunters apply for just 8 
coffee shop roles,” The Mirror, 19/02/2013. 
24
 Doward, J., Munro, M. “Poorer graduates struggle for jobs as unpaid internships soar,” The 
Guardian (15 April 2017) 
25
 Institute for Public Policy Research (2017) The inbetweeners: The new role of internships in 
the graduate labour market.
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firms have been able to get highly skilled workers even for low 
paid, insecure work such as internships.”26
The efficacy and legitimacy of “winner takes all” is premised upon an implicit notion of 
fairness. It is assumed that the “cream will rise to the top;” talent will rise to the level of 
its competence and rewards will be fairly (if unevenly) distributed. Many of these 
assumptions go to the heart of the neo-liberal socio-economic model as applied to 
“human capital.” The problem is that evidence poses serious questions over these 
assumptions. In Williams (2004) study of US toy retailers for example, she found that 
labour was distributed overwhelmingly along race, gender and class lines. Different 
degrees of negative work experience were allocated on prejudicial bases, wherein “the 
hierarchical and functional placement of workers according to managerial stereotypes 
results in advantages for white men (and to a lesser extent white women), and 
disadvantages for racial/ethnic minority men and women” (p.484). What William’s 
introduces here is the possibility that within “bleak houses,” the bleakest experiences of 
all are reserved for disadvantaged minorities whilst the “gravy jobs” (Roy, 1952: 429) 
go to white men.  
3.1.3. Beyond technocratic and bureaucratic control 
The review so far has resonated with continuity notions of the service economy 
transition, whereby FLSW is regarded as an extension of the control-centred 
exploitation of earlier capitalist eras. There is nonetheless a body of evidence to suggest 
that new forms of control have complemented management’s arsenal that are specific to 
FLSW. One such basis of control is the customer feedback mechanism as described by 
Fuller and Smith (1991). They argue that the facility it offers for customers and 
management to vicariously control service encounters poses a constant threat to 
FLSWs. Customers become the eyes and ears of management, providing surveillance on 
their behalf whilst gaining a powerful control lever in their own right. As for 
management, their reach has been extended deep into qualitative dimensions of FLSW 
that were once inaccessible given the costs of traditional forms of monitoring. Hence 
26
 Doward, J., Munro, M. “Poorer graduates struggle for jobs as unpaid internships soar,” The 
Guardian (15 April 2017). 
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managements’ power to direct, evaluate and discipline reaches new levels via feedback 
mechanisms that co-opt customers as proxies. 
Another strand of management control synonymous with FLSW concerns “aesthetic 
labour,” which has significant implications for stratification as described in the previous 
section. Warhurst and Nickson (2007) argue that as well as seeking to appropriate 
and/or reconfiguring emotions in light of their service prerogative (Hochschild, 2012), 
management also seek to leverage “desired corporeal dispositions” (p.107) as a source 
of competitive advantage. What they are referring to is the “embodied attributes and 
capacities of employees” and their exploitation of them to differentiate brands. In doing 
so they commodify the social capital of FLSWs (see Wright, 2004 & 2005; Leslie, 
2002), using recruitment and selection to cherry pick human billboards. The advantage 
that this affords those who “look good and sound right”27 is evidenced by Sallaz (2009), 
Wilson (2016) and Williams (2004) above. 
Yet another management strategy that has received attention in recent years is neo-
normative control, which has some degree of overlap with aesthetic labour in that it 
centres upon commodification of the attributes that belong to FLSWs. Whereas 
normative control centres upon moulding selves as a means of acquiring commitment 
and effort (see Kunda, 1992), neo-normative control is a strategy that implores FLSWs 
to “be themselves” (Fleming & Sturdy, 2009). The management logic here is that if 
FLSWs are allowed to bring their “authentic” personalities to work they are more likely 
to enjoy the experience, with positive “mirror effects” for service quality (Korczynski, 
2002: 25). Fleming & Sturdy (2009) found the strategy had the opposite effect for 
FLSWs, because it actually functioned as a Trojan horse to “selective[ly] enlist” (p.571) 
a narrow neo-corporate version of “self” within blurry yet onerous parameters. As a 
consequence the policy led to role confusion and anxiety about appropriate behaviour. 
27
 This paraphrases Williams & Connell’s (2010) title “Looking good and sounding right.” The 
article makes a similar argument to Wilson (2016) on the value that management attaches to 
aesthetic qualities in FLSW. 
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Another interesting proposition is “market control” as set out by Darr (2003), which has 
features in common with customer feedback mechanisms as described above. In this 
instance management invoke and mobilise customer demands as a way of presenting 
themselves as a benevolent controlling force, interfering only out of the common good. 
By specifying customers rather than themselves as the antagonistic force, management 
pursued intensification whilst obscuring its own role in the process. Darr (2003) 
comprehended this strategy as one that is tailored to the challenge of managing 
knowledge work. Its technical sophistication limits the effectiveness of traditional 
control methods he argues (e.g. technical or direct control), so management focused on 
manipulating people rather than the labour process. 
In summary, there is compelling evidence of both continuity and change in relation to 
management control strategies between manufacturing and service-led eras. New 
control mechanisms do not appear to have displaced “old” ones – rather, they appear to 
have complemented them to form “control hybrids” (Reed, 2011). The next section 
considers evidence from cases that appear to have risen above the “race to the bottom,” 
with a view to understanding their differentiating factors. 
3.1.4. “Happy houses” and factors that distinguish them 
A comparative lack of evidence of FLSW “happy houses” suggests a number of 
possibilities. One is that happy houses are less common than bleak houses, whilst 
another is that they have received less empirical attention. Yet another possibility is that 
researchers may have over-emphasised negative aspects and under-emphasised positive 
aspects within the studies that have been conducted. This accusation was levelled at 
Fernie and Metcalf (1998) whose research was discussed above.  
One of the few studies that takes upon itself the “happy house” mantle is provided by 
Jenkins and Delbridge (2014), who focused upon a “model of ‘mass customised 
services’ which emphasises … quality and value added” (p.872). What the authors show 
is that a particular confluence of factors converge to upend cliché Panopticon 
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dreariness. A key factor was the nature of control and ownership itself, which rested in 
the hands of charismatic owner/operators who established the business out of frustration 
over how such businesses are normally run. They held a belief that a differentiated 
“high road” strategy may thrive by providing an alternative to mass-produced/low-
quality service. 
Given that the business defined itself in opposition to the proto-typical FLSW factory, 
effort was expended to ensure a pleasant work environment by management. There 
were no performance targets; bonuses were ad hoc “surprises” rather than integrated 
aspects of performance evaluation; and also, FLSWs were at liberty to use their 
common sense to take downtime at suitable moments. Overall then there was an 
authentic commitment to FLSWs quality-of-life in terms of both intrinsic and extrinsic 
satisfaction, bearing in mind that pay was good by local standards according to the 
authors. 
Two additional facets make Jenkins and Delbridge’s findings interesting. Firstly, the 
authors identify that many of the FLSWs had previously worked at a universally derided 
call centre nearby. The experience cast a long shadow in my view, perhaps explained 
FLSWs willingness to reciprocate management’s kindness with high performance. 
Secondly, neo-normative control was not experienced as management manipulation or 
coercion in this case. FLSWs regarded it instead as a sincere invite to treat the 
workplace as an unregimented space, suggesting that in some instances neo-normative 
control may be authentic and conducive to commitment. Trust is perhaps the 
differentiating factor, because suspicion and confusion (as was discovered by Fleming 
and Sturdy) strikes me as a likely outcome of an otherwise coercive regime suddenly 
inviting FLSWs to “be themselves.” My knee-jerk reaction would be to ask what are 
they really after?
An earlier call centre study by Lankshear et al. (2001) exhibited a similarly upbeat 
assessment of the FLSW experience. Again leadership was a factor because the size and 
scale of the organisation lent itself to benevolent forms of “simple control” (Edwards 
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(1978: 95). Concurrently, the personable nature of social relations meant that whilst 
industry-standard monitoring and surveillance ICT were integrated into the labour 
process it was not utilised by management in oppressive ways. Once more FLSWs had 
autonomy and discretion (at least by call-centre standards), and quality of life policies 
such as job rotation were positively embedded aspects of work design. A final “happy 
house” factor was the products sold (vacations) were inherently meaningful according 
to the researchers. In their view FLSWs were not dealing with an empty commodity but 
rather a “happy” product.  
An influential comparative case study by Mason and Osborne (2008) is worth outlining 
at this point because it implies additional links between products, scope for discretion 
and FLSW experiences. Such links were theorised in Chapter Two, which posited a 
potential relationship between skill and knowledge requirements and intrinsic/extrinsic 
satisfaction (see Figure 2). Along these lines Mason and Osborne found that FLSWs in 
electrical stores received considerably higher pay than those in food retail whilst also 
enjoying a greater degree of autonomy. The authors felt this reflected the differential 
nature of product knowledge requirements and customer interactions, which dually 
facilitated the commercial viability of a “high-road” model within electronics retail. 
Pettinger (2004) expands upon this theme by arguing that retailers seek to position 
themselves on a continuum so as to align with customers’ pre-conceived expectations of 
price and quality. Her own comparative case study within the garment sub-sector 
illuminated a high degree of segmentation. At the elite end of the spectrum were those 
who bundled together high quality products and high quality service as part of a 
premium experience for customers. At the other extreme were low-price/low quality 
operators amongst whom service expectations were minimal as per the deep-discounter 
model. In between were those with mid-market strategies that exhibited service 
expectations and prices that reasonably fit between the two poles. Real world examples 
might be Next (middle), Primark (bottom) and Armani Exchange (top). 
63 
The most useful element of Pettinger’s analysis is the implication that a negotiated order 
exists between brand managers and customers premised upon socialised compromises 
(see Leidner, 1996). The knock-on effect for FLSW is significant, in that some roles are 
cast with few performative expectations whilst others are cast with an expectation of 
sophisticated acting. Thus the nature of the labour process and its degree of 
qualitative/quantitative orientation is derived from the strategic positioning of the 
organisation within a given sub-sector. Pettinger (2004: 180) summarises the 
interconnections as follows:  
“customer service is in part an interaction between worker and 
consumer but is framed by the ‘service culture’ of the brand, 
expressed through the products, the store and the work that is 
involved in enabling service and resulting from economic 
impetus of the organisational to sell.”
Summary: Not the inevitable bleak house? 
Whilst some of the research presented here cannot necessarily be proclaimed “happy 
house” as such, it does nonetheless paint a less foreboding picture than preceding 
accounts. Certain factors appear conducive to better work experiences including 
simple/paternal control; authentic implementation of quality-of-life policies (e.g. job 
rotation); a significant degree of discretion and autonomy; sincere neo-normative 
control policies; and also, working with positively meaningful productions. Skill and 
knowledge content also appear to lend themselves to the possibility of “high road” 
models that may afford better pay and job conditions. 
What appears to separate bleak houses and happy houses then is the presence or absence 
of these factors. Such a tentative conclusion is supported by survey research in Sweden 
on the retail sector (Andersson et al., 2011). Contrary to the popular image derived from 
research in Anglo-American context, they found a “highly positive picture of the 
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experience of retail employment” (p.266). At one level of analysis they attributed their 
findings to well-functioning workplaces that feature many of the characteristics of 
happy houses just described. At another level though they argue: 
“clearly the results of our study cannot be explained by the 
existence of some enlightened companies, store managers or the 
chance factor. Instead we need to find explanations on the 
institutional level and to the extent that the Swedish retail sector 
is a participant in the norms of employee relations in the 
national labour market”
                                                          (Andersson et al., 2011: 271) 
What makes Andersson et al’s remarks noteworthy is the link it posits between macro, 
meso and micro-level factors. As with Pettinger the authors highlight how management 
strategies are not devised in a vacuum and are in fact constrained and enabled by extra-
organisational forces and factors. A logical corollary of Andersson et al.’s remarks is 
that FLSW experiences are structurally nested in national political economies. 
Section Two: People on the frontline 
An over-arching theme in the evidence presented so far is the pre-eminence of 
management and its deployment of agency as the force shaping FLSW experiences. 
They do after all devise the commercial, operational and HR strategies based on their 
perceptions of risks and rewards vis-à-vis labour and products markets. They also 
develop and enforce control systems that seek to align FLSW with their prerogatives at 
the point of production/consumption.   
It is interesting then that some research has called management dominance into 
question, suggesting that it may be more a matter of perspective or point of view. At the 
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unit-level of analysis28 there is counterpoised evidence of organic cultures, counter-
cultures and un-official hierarchies that distort and subvert management’s agenda. There 
is also evidence of individual-level powers and properties that enable FLSWs to 
reconfigure the meaning of work. In addition a range of findings highlight FLSWs 
ingenuity in turning "constraints" on their head and mobilising them as power resources. 
Still other studies suggest the existence of anti-management collusion amongst FLSWs 
and customers. Recognition of these findings lends credence to the notion that FLSW 
remains a stage for social relations, irrespective of top-down control. 
For example, in a nuanced account of social relations at the point of 
production/consumption Bolton and Houlihan (2005) provide a perspective that deviates 
remarkably from cultural turn assumptions (see Chapter Two). They argue that 
customers are far more heterogeneous in their wants and expectations than “linguistic 
terrorists” (p.686) suggest. Whilst some “mythical sovereigns” were lulled into false 
beliefs concerning their right to rule according to the evidence, two other customer 
types were apparent - “functional transactants” and “moral agent” (p.699). The former 
refers to people who seek to achieve their goal(s) with minimal service input and 
maximal time efficiency. The latter refers to those who represent themselves as part of a 
higher moral order premised upon enlightened ideals such as justice, fairness and 
goodness. Given the potential gap between customer expectations and management 
“truth,” Bolton and Houlihan argue that customers actually feel like “victims of the 
system [too] – trapped in an unforgiving cycle of so-called quality service provisions.” 
(p.695). In effect they are in a mirror position to that of FLSWs, stuck between 
management illusions and the policy constraints they impose upon FLSW actors. 
What Bolton and Houlihan highlight is the inherently economic and social nature of 
FLSW, featuring different actors with different expectations of the service “stage.” 
Because of this FLSWs have to act as “contradiction reconcilers” (Korczynski, 2008), 
mobilising their own resources (moral, ethical, commercial, normative, etc.) as part of 
performances in which customers mobilise theirs. Playing the part well requires acting 
28
 A unit is defined here as a “single and clearly demarcated service operation” (as per Hales 
and Nightingale, 1986; Lloyd & Payne, 2014). 
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skills amongst FLSWs, which Bolton & Houlihan (2005) take as evidence to the 
contrary of “linguistic terrorists” who treat them as “cultural dupes.” 
The social sophistication of FLSW is further apparent in various ethnographies of 
service settings. In her study of betting shops Filby (1992) shows how female FLSWs 
made use of their sexuality as a power-resource to control male managers and 
customers. Mocking, ridicule and flirtation were each mobilized as mechanisms to 
regulate behaviour either through reward or punishment. Thus despite organisational 
rules in a highly regulated sub-sector, Filby (1992) argues that localised and individual-
specific factors held great sway over the work experience. A vibrant culture mediated 
socio-economic relations, underpinning a negotiated order that regulated the setting. 
Benson (1978) and Paules (1991) made analogous observations of waitresses and 
department store workers. Paules found that whilst waitresses had little power over the 
structural constraints that governed their work, they did retain considerable power to 
resist management and customer control. These powers were generally subtle but 
nonetheless effective in restoring acceptable settlements between role set constituents. 
Benson’s research derived complementary observations. As with Filby she emphasised 
the centrality of organic workplace cultures to the establishment of FLSW practices. 
These were constrained but not determined by management, who were disempowered 
by their dependence upon FLSWs capacity to cater to affluent clientele. This 
interdependence led to patterns of conflict and accommodation, with neither party able 
to make unilateral changes to the prevailing order without consequences.  
One of the most instructive unit-level studies is Rafaeli’s (1989) work on supermarket 
cashiers, which is one of the few explicit attempts at resolving the conundrum over who 
holds sway over FLSW. Her conclusion, as expressed in Figure 5, was that customers 
have more “immediate influence whilst cashiers are on the job” whilst management’s 
influence was “legitimate but remote” (p.247). She attributed the greater immediate 
influence of customers to five factors: physical proximity; duration of proximity; 
customer feedback; the volume of information exchange; and the value FLSWs hold in 
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customers. In line with Paules (1991) and LTP tenets generally (see Chapter Two), 
Rafaeli contextualises her claims by arguing that an indeterminate battle for control lies 
at the heart of service encounters. In stores FLSWs and customers contested each 
other’s right to dominate proceedings and conflict manifested as a result. 
Figure 5: Relational dynamics driving the FLSW experience 
                                                                             (re-produced from Rafaeli, 1989, p.254) 
Rafaeli’s attempt at evaluating the relative power of role set actors once more 
underlines a potential risk of over-emphasising management in the analysis of FLSW. 
Her data highlights how in day-to-day terms, the battle line may be drawn along the 
FLSW-customer axis rather than the worker-management one. That said, a problem 
with this notion is that it may understate management’s historical role as the shaper of 
the systems and structures that generate conflict along the worker-customer axis in the 
first place. In this sense management may be argued to act as the hidden hand even in 
service encounters. It is worth recalling that many of the factors that conflict may relate 
to are unilaterally governed by management as Lloyd and Payne (2014) and Grugulis et 
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al. (2010) found. These include price mechanics, stock levels, stock listings, staffing 
levels, EPOS functionality, store layout and labour process design. 
Another problem with Rafaeli’s account is that it is difficult to discern whether some of 
her supporting evidence is better regarded as expressions of power or powerless-ness. 
For example, she argues that customers’ participation in the labour process (e.g. by 
packing their own shopping, heckling and badgering staff) are indicative of their power. 
Yet these could just as easily be construed as expressions of frustration at their lack of 
control, making claims over “immediate influence” more tenuous in my view. 
To summarise, I would argue that a compelling case exists for an agnostic approach to 
the study of the FLSW experiences once studies at different level of abstraction are 
juxtaposed. What I mean by this is that emphasis should be attributed on the basis of 
inductive and “retroductive” reasoning rather than simple inferences about the 
relationships amongst and/or between actors (management, FLSWs, customers) and 
parts (systems and structures). I argued in Chapter Two that theoretical accounts of 
FLSW have tended to under-emphasise agency and veer too close towards technocratic 
or structural-economic determinism. The distinguishing feature of the body of evidence 
is a tendency to either (a) focus on the experience of stage actors to the exclusion of 
broader socio-economic relations or (b) focus on management and control to the point 
where it is hard to see much else. 
Section Three: Discussion 
The picture that emerges from a review of evidence has two main features. Firstly, it 
suggests that crude generalisations about the experience of FLSW risks overlooking 
forces and factors that are obscure at given levels of analysis. The socio-economic 
sophistication of FLSW at an intersection point of production and consumption should 
militate against reductionism. Bolton and Houlihan (2005: 692) express this sentiment 
when they argue “it is important to see that the extent of control upon those involved in 
service encounters … will be limited by the variability of the human character and the 
creative capacity of both employees and customers.” Analytically neither the structural-
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level (macro) nor people-level (micro) should be granted pre-eminence a priori. The 
task of the researcher should be to synthesise the powers and properties of both to the 
extent that is possible. 
Regardless, a consistent theme above has been the significance of power/control 
dynamics as forces and factors that frame FLSW experiences. This speaks to the 
conceptual limitations of a unitarist worldview (see Korczynski, 2002: 37-39) which is 
premised upon a belief in the fundamental harmony of interests between role set 
constituents. A more tenable position is that relations of production and consumption 
embody a fundamental disharmony with structural and materialist roots. As a reflection 
of this, the most convincing accounts of the experience of FLSW exhibit pluralist 
assumptions linked to the LPT tradition (introduced in Chapter Two). It is worth taking 
a moment to expand upon these assumptions so that their significance may become 
clear. The first assumption is that a structural antagonism underlies the employment 
relationship (see Bélanger & Edwards, 2013), meaning that there are competing 
interests between owners/agents of capital and labour. The second assumption is that 
indeterminacy is inherent to the contract of employment, which derives from 
employers’ inability to buy realised labour power. Strictly speaking capital can only 
buy labour time unambiguously, meaning that control systems (including a dedicated 
management class) are necessary to turn potential labour power into actual labour 
power. The final assumption is that power is asymmetrical, meaning that conflicts over 
such things as “a fair day’s wage for a fair day’s work” are heavily stacked in capital’s 
favour.  
With a view to the evidence presented above, I would argue that the centrality of control 
at all levels of analysis validates LPT’s analytical emphasis on patterns of conflict and 
accommodation (Edwards, 1995). If there is a chink in the armour of LPT though it 
resides in its limited reach into the social side of economically antagonistic relations. It 
is on this basis that I opted to include some of the more enlightening micro-studies of 
FLSW (e.g., Benson, 1978) that explicitly fix their gaze upon the “stage actors.” 
Viewed at this level the experience of FLSW appears to take on another character, 
where management and political economy fade into the background and actor’s 
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everyday lives become the foregrounded spectacle. What emerges here is a world of 
“figures, personalities and bums” as Filby (1992) put it. At the unit-level of analysis 
colleagues, customers, and local factors may well have more “immediate influence” 
than remote powers in distance places. Few studies of FLSW have adequately sustained 
a stratified analysis of the powers and properties of people on the one hand and systems, 
structure and processes on the other hand to bring clarify (see Ackroyd & Fleetwood, 
2000). The importance of the balancing act boils down to the fundamental indivisibility 
of social and economic dimensions of FLSW, which calls upon an analytical framework 
adept at incorporating both.  
Moving on, the second main feature of the evidence base is that it does substantiate 
some of the theoretical propositions set forth in Chapter Two. For instance, Frenkel’s 
(2006) model of mass-service/mass-customised FLSW (see Figure 2) appears validated 
to some extent in its depiction of their causes and consequences. Mason & Osborne 
(2008) in particular lent support to a link between job content and FLSWs experience. 
Pettinger (2004) also showed how market segmentation forges service/quality bundles 
with profound effects upon the composition of FLSW roles. Another theme borne out 
by studies is the hour glass conceptualisation of service economies. Several 
investigations surfaced evidence of management retreating into its own semi-detached 
orbit in some senses, relying upon control hybrids and deploying a form of weaponised 
polarisation.  
With these findings in mind it is perhaps reasonable to argue that the balance of “bleak 
house” and “happy house” accounts fairly reflects the polarised bottom-feeding/bottom-
breeding state of Anglo-American service economies. Even though there are concrete 
examples of high-performing “happy houses” in archetypal mass-service sub-sectors, 
there remains scant evidence of widespread adaptation amongst large FLSW 
organisations. 
As was clarified in Chapter One, the selection of the WC case was inspired by the 
outward appearance of a large FLSW organisation adopting a “high-road”/“mass 
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customised” model based on graduate-only recruitment. I hoped to understand how this 
model sustains itself and resolves the contradictions that supposedly go with it. I also 
wanted to further illuminate life on the frontline of such an organisation, as my research 
question indicates: 
What are the forces and factors that shape the experience of FLSW in Wine 
Corp? 
The next chapter explores the methods and methodology I mobilised in pursuit of my 
quarry. It also lays the groundwork for a “critical realist” theoretical framework that will 
be built upon in Chapter Nine.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHODS & METHODOLOGY  
The present discussion seeks to clarify the procedures that were used in service of the 
research agenda, as summarised in Chapters One and Three. It also seeks to illuminate 
the decision making processes that orientated my methodology whilst laying bare 
philosophical foundations. The chapter therefore commences with an overview of 
critical realist philosophy (CRP). Attention is drawn to its central tenets and points of 
distinction vis-à-vis alternative theoretical frameworks. These are considered in light of 
extant theory and research on working lives so as to underline the opportunity that CRP 
presents in extending the boundaries of knowledge. 
Subsequent to a review of the epistemological implications of CRP, it will be argued in 
Section 2 that a longitudinal ethnographic case study represents an ideal embodiment of 
CRP principles. The core elements of the methods will be explored to further underline 
ontological/epistemological fit, drawing upon Dalton’s work to illustrate its viability for 
the task in hand. Section 3 then hones in on practical matters, covering the whole gamut 
of data collection and analysis. Section 4 focuses attention on data veracity and 
participant protection measures, with the latter taking on special significance in my 
research given the methods deployed. Finally, Section 5 reiterates key themes and 
evaluates my approach in light of arguments set out in previous chapters. 
Section One: Ontology and epistemological assumptions 
The most important objective accounts of FLSW were set out in Chapters Two and 
Three. LPT for example embodies the materialist assumption that a structural 
antagonism lies at the heart of the contract of employment (Edwards, 1986; 1990), 
setting the stage for workplace pluralism. Hochschild’s theory of emotional labour 
mobilises the same basic premise. For her, capitalism is an inherently exploitative 
system and social relations at the point of production/consumption are a manifestation 
of that in the first instance. These accounts thus share the same ontology that extra-
discursive things exist in the social world, and exert themselves upon workplace 
relations in profound ways. 
73 
A second school of thought posits work experience as a “discursive” phenomenon that 
may only be understood with due consideration of subjectivity and social-psychological 
mediations (see Watson, 2002). The work of prominent authors such as Du Gay et al. 
(1996; see also Westley, 1990; Hopkinson, 2003; Ezzamel & Willmott, 2008; Rouleau 
& Balogun, 2011) reject the possibility of extra-discursive things existing, and pre-
suppose an ontology of a social world constituted in discourses alone (Ackroyd & 
Fleetwood, 2000). The implication for the conceptualisation of FLSW is that practices 
and actions are forged solely by “discursive formations” that are outcomes of thought 
and language (Du Gay et al, 1996; Reed, 2005).  
This latter philosophical approach to an understanding work-life does have its merits. 
For example, to suggest that FLSW is socially constructed is useful for the purposes of 
explaining its changeability, given the temporality of discursive formations and their 
effect upon actions and practices. Despite this, to ground explanations of FLSW 
exclusively in discourse theory creates fundamental problems whilst perhaps 
circumventing others. Firstly, if FLSW is rooted in discourse alone then surely groups 
of workers should be able to talk constraints upon their role out of existence? (Sayer, 
2000a). Yet considerable evidence suggests that it remains deeply entrenched in 
hierarchical constraints (see Hales 2002). Secondly, if FLSW is temporally socially 
constructed then it seems reasonable to expect it to be significantly changeable across 
time, space, and organisations? Yet again, compelling evidence suggests that stability 
and continuity prevail to a greater extent than change (see Hales & Tamangani, 1996; 
Hales 2005; Tengblad, 2006). A third problem with discourse theory is that advocates 
often reduce individuals (with unique properties and powers) to subjects, equally 
vulnerable to discursive power (see Ackroyd & Thompson, 1995; Reed, 2011). How 
and why particular individuals mobilise, adopt or resist discourses in different 
circumstances thus remains ill-explored (see Watson, 2002, for such an example). 
In summary, accounts of FLSW tend to be firmly entrenched in either “objective” or
“discursive” explanations and consequently side-line actors and/or social systems. This 
impasse has important negative consequences. Chiefly, those with a structural bent have 
difficulty in explaining variability and heterogeneity and change over time. 
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Alternatively, those who reduce FLSW (and experiences of it) to discourse struggle to 
explain continuities but do provide a viable explanation for the basis of change.  
4.1.1. The basic premise of critical realist philosophy 
One of the distinguishing characteristics of CRP is that it substitutes a “flat ontology” 
for a “stratified” one (Sayer, 2000a). This stratification involves a conceptual separation 
of three intersecting social domains: “the empirical,” “the actual,” and “the real.” In Roy 
Bhaskar’s (1989) oft-cited Reclaiming Reality “the real” is defined as whatever exists
regardless of whether we are cognisant of its nature. It is the dominion of interrelated 
objects and structures which each have distinct causal powers, properties and liabilities 
(Carter & New, 2004). These foundational powers often lay dormant and/or concealed 
at the empirical level but are nonetheless determinant of “how it really works” (Watson, 
2011). 
In contrast, “the actual’ concerns tangible manifestations of “real” powers when they 
are activated and “what eventuates when they do” (Sayer, 2000a: 12). It is thus 
concerned with events and happenings during which the “real” superimposes the 
“empirical” (Carter & New, 2004). This latter term refers to the domain of lived 
experience which Bhaskar (1989) describes as a “subset of the actual.” It embodies the 
“transitive realm” of discourses and discursive formations and the subjective “life-
world” of agents (Sayer, 2000b; Schutz & Luckmann, 1974), who are each equipped 
with their own distinct powers and properties (Archer, 1995).  
Bhaskar’s (1989) stratification has important implications for the analysis of the 
experience of FLSW. It suggests that whilst work is in a sense socially constructed and 
discursively mediated, it is nonetheless pervaded by extra-discursive causal structures at 
deeper rooted levels. CRP therefore clarifies the interplay between objects and agents 
by positing them as mutually but separately causal. Thus FLSW is partly driven by 
agential powers and properties that “can be causal” (Carter & New, 2004) although this 
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agency is both constrained and enabled by relatively autonomous, stable and enduring 
objects.  
4.1.2. The transitive and intransitive realm, analytical dualism and 
anteriority 
A conceptual separation between the transitive and intransitive domains resonates with 
the preceding debate over structural vis-à-vis discursive determinants of the experience 
of FLSW. This is because CRP in the first instance posits a social world of objects that 
exist “out there” and beyond an individual’s knowledge and thoughts. This is referred to 
as the “intransitive” realm, a domain of structures and “things” that exhibit a relative 
autonomy to act upon us and govern social relations. Yet, to say that they are relatively 
autonomous (Archer, 1996) carries the important implication that objects are not 
impervious, and are vulnerable to re-constitution from within the “transitive realm.” 
This refers to the socially constructed domain of temporal and contested knowledge and 
discourses that emerge within the open social systems of innovative human agents 
(Sayer, 2000a). 
The interrelationship between the transitive and intransitive realms has been best 
articulated in the work of Margaret Archer (1995, 1996). Following Bhaskar (1989), 
Archer argues that an “analytical dualism” is necessary to examine social life. That is 
because on the one hand the discursive (transitive) realm is ontologically distinct from 
the intransitive realm of objects. On the other hand, analytical dualism is necessary for 
the purposes of analysing the interplay between those forces that transform and 
reproduce social activity and the reasoning power of actors. As Archer (1996: 693) puts 
it: “analytical dualism provides the most powerful tool in practical social science, yet 
one which has been slow to develop and whose full potential in terms of theoretical 
purpose and practical utility have still to be fully recognised.” Archer further argues that 
this hampered deployment has related to an a priori failure to qualify structure and 
agency as analytically distinct and temporarily separated.  
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This brings us to the key theme of “anteriority.” For Archer (1996) “structure” and 
“agency” equally shape the experience of work, and yet their mutual effects are 
apportioned and separated by time. Structures (the intransitive realm) precede people, 
and exhibit autonomous and enduring powers and properties that constrain and enable 
actors. At the same time people are innovative, reflexive and reasoning; able to respond 
contingently to shifting contexts in a way that may ultimately (but not 
straightforwardly) change “real” objects for future generations. Anteriority thus implies 
that the agential power of today’s actors may either reinforce and/or gradually modify 
pre-existing structures, which will then act to constrain and enable future generations in 
turn (Archer, 1996). By implication new generations do not enjoy a free hand to 
instantaneously re-construct the social world as they see fit, as prior generations 
promulgate and bequeath a legacy of structures that limit their capacity to do so. 
In summary, CRP provides concepts that may be mobilised for the purposes of bringing 
together discourses and structures into a coherent, stratified explanatory framework of 
work life. Exactly how these analytical tools will be transmuted into a practical research 
design is explored in the next section. 
4.1.3. Epistemological implications for the study of work experiences 
Numerous implications may be derived from the principles of CRP as they relate to a 
comprehension of what shapes the experience of FLSW. “Epistemology” refers to how 
we may study or come-to-know what exists (Ackroyd & Fleetwood, 2000). Firstly, CRP 
presupposes a social world that is “out there” and “in some central respects” available 
to researchers via observational methods akin to those utilised in the study of natural 
phenomena (Carter & New, 2004: 1). Therefore it stands to reason that in order to 
reveal the complex realities of FLSW, we should observe it closely and rigorously.  
Secondly, CRP suggests that a research design based upon snapshots may fail to capture 
the essence of the phenomena under study because underlying “real” structures and 
mechanisms are neither immediately nor empirically available (Bhaskar, 1989). Hence a 
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requirement for a sustained and systematic study over time that may tease out causal 
chains not immediately available for analysis.  
Thirdly, CRP envisages an emergent social world in which actors and structures each 
have their own properties and powers that intersect unpredictably and contingently to 
produce outcomes within finite contexts (Archer, 1995; 1996). From this we may infer 
that if we are to analyse divergent outcomes (e.g. why FLSWs act/react differently), we 
are required to observe and theorise the dynamics of these contingencies and contexts in 
turn. It is difficult to see how this may be achieved without a research design that 
achieves up-close and immersive access to the phenomena in question. 
Two further epistemological implications warrant emphasis. On the one hand, there is a 
requirement to capture the particular powers and properties that agents deploy and how 
this intersects with FLSW experiences (Taylor & Bain, 2004). Attention to subtle 
individual differences in how people construct themselves and perceive their space may 
illuminate the effect (or lack of effect) of individual characteristics. In this regard, there 
is much to be gained from a study of different FLSWs across comparable contexts (see 
Delbridge, 2004). On the other hand, researchers are also required to capture the 
particular powers and properties of objects so that we may understand their nature and 
effects (Carter & New, 2004). As will be described below this involves a process of 
analysing backwards; firstly, by identifying patterns at the empirical level through 
rigorous observation and data analysis. Secondly, by “reverse engineering” models that 
may explain these patterns.  
Section Two: A longitudinal ethnographic case study 
Each of the preceding epistemological implications points to longitudinal ethnographic 
case study design. Longitudinal means repeated observations over time. “Ethnographic” 
refers to “the researcher … participating in people’s daily lives … watching what 
happens, listening to what is said, and/or asking questions through formal or informal 
interviews, collecting documents and artefacts – in fact, gathering whatever data are 
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available to throw light on the issues that are the emerging focus of enquiry” 
(Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007: 3). A case study may be defined as “an empirical 
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context where 
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and in which 
multiple sources of evidence are used” (Patton & Appelbaum, 2003: 60). 
Perhaps the most poignant way of exploring the practical implementation of the 
methodology is to review a classic study. Dalton’s (1959) investigation of workplace 
relations is a good example because it continues to be regarded as one of the most 
insightful studies on the social and political dynamics of organisations (see Hales, 
1999). Its depth of detail and “thick description” (Geertz, 1973) are made possible by 
the author’s exceptional deployment of ethnographic practices in my view. 
A first key feature of Dalton’s approach - one that corresponds with ethnographic 
practice generally - is that it does not embark with a refined research question or plan. 
Rather, his starting point was a general interest in the nature of managers’ work that he 
would seek to pinpoint once in the field. To that end he assumed a full-time staff role 
and soon stumbled upon an ill-explored quandary with problematic implications for pre-
existing literature. As Dalton (1959: 3) describes “[as] a participant at Milo and 
Fruhling, I was repeatedly puzzled by the gap between official and unofficial ways of 
doing things, and by the emotional splits and name calling among associates.” Such 
quandaries commenced a process of empirical and analytical “funnelling” (see Figure 7 
for an illustration) for Dalton (1959), which honed his focus incrementally. 
Given the sensitive nature of the subject matter and the difficulties that would arise 
from alternative approaches, Dalton opted for covert participant observations as the 
primary means of data collection.29 This was supported by what he termed 
“conversational interviewing,” (p.280) by which he meant seeking to explore key topics 
covertly and during the course of mundane daily conversations. In addition, Dalton 
negotiated access to confidential documents (e.g. staff records) to explore links between 
29
 Dalton (1959) did not debate ethical issues associated with covert research. 
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the data they contained and the foci of his investigation. His evidence was then 
collected and collated in work diaries which detailed amongst other things observations, 
utterances, hunches, and tentative links. These propelled a feedback loop of further field 
exploration alongside refinement and modification of the object of the study itself. 
Along these lines research questions would be dropped, added, or re-phrased; data 
would be re-classified or re-categorised; and “errors of interpretation and emphasis” 
(Dalton, 1959: 278) would surface re-orientating the project. 
Whilst Dalton does not specify his job role (in the main research site) so as to protect 
key informants, he does discuss its suitability to the overall task. Firstly his role 
required considerable time amongst line managers on the shop-floor, making it 
conducive to “conversational interviewing” and first-hand observations. Secondly his 
relatively unbound role assisted in the development of a network of informants whose 
actions, utterances, and interpretations eventually formed the bulk of the data. These 
factors relate to a key assumption of ethnography: that valid representations of the 
phenomenon under study are crucially dependent upon the researcher’s ability to 
immerse themselves in the theatre of study. 
Characteristics of ethnography 
Several common denominators of ethnography are apparent in the prior discussion of 
Dalton (1959). One such example is the inductive process upon which ethnographic 
research is premised. Neither the questions nor the specific mode of investigation are 
usually clarified a priori. Rather, they are derived from the researcher’s broad interests 
(e.g. managers’ work) as well as their on-going literature review and provisional field 
activity (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). Two additional characteristics relate to the 
subtleties of ethnographic analysis. Firstly, data collection and evaluation occur 
concurrently (rather than sequentially) and cross-germinate one another. Secondly, 
analytical categories do not precede data collection but emerge incrementally (and often 
with considerable revision), as the researcher moves back and forth between data 
collection and analysis and as the focus narrows or shifts (ibid.). Such characteristics 
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represent a stark contrast with standard practice in quantitative research, where 
questions and categories are antecedents of data collection and analysis. 
To build upon this comparison another contrast between ethnographic and quantitative 
research relates to the tools practitioners use. Quantitative researchers seek to transmute 
social enquiry into objective instruments that may yield representative findings 
communicable in “formal” (mathematical) language (Halfpenny, 1979). In contrast, 
ethnographic research is overtly dependent upon the researcher’s actions and 
interpretations. Their primary instrument is their own ability to see and hear; to ask 
pertinent questions; to accurately record data in dynamic “open systems” (Patton & 
Appelbaum, 2003) and to synthesise explanations for the phenomena under study.  
A final key characteristic of ethnographic research is concomitant epistemological 
assumptions. Ethnographers would argue firstly that their research captures “truths” 
beyond their subjective dispositions, whilst secondly they would argue that their 
research yields highly valid insights that are otherwise unattainable (Watson, 2011). In 
relation to the former claim, contemporary ethnographers do not aspire to generate 
“final truths” (ibid, p.208) and seek instead to develop accounts of “relative 
plausibility” (Roulston, 2010: 202) or “probable truth” (Thorne, 1997: 125). In relation 
to the latter, such a claim is born of two key assumptions. Firstly, causal explanations 
for social phenomenon are assumed to be uniquely ascertainable via an in-depth focus 
upon contextually grounded action (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). Secondly, 
“meanings” are assumed to be paramount in ascribing explanation to social phenomena 
and ethnography is deemed to have unique capacity in exploring them (ibid.).  
For the sake of brevity I have located a general discussion of the pros and cons of 
ethnography in the Appendix (Section 1). It shines a light on some of the most 
insightful and rigorous organisational studies carried out with similar objectives to my 
own, in order to illustrate the fit between research objectives and design. A “S.W.O.T” 
analysis (Table 2) summarises key points that are factored into my approach to data 
collection and analysis – the subject of the next section. 
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Table 2: S.W.O.T analysis of an ethnographic case study 
Section Three: Details of the case study, methods and methodology  
4.3.1. Case study and unit of analysis 
As the research question indicates the unit of analysis is FLSW. The primary objective 
is to articulate the experience of FLSWs by shining a light on “high-road” “mass-
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customised” model(s) within the service sector. The concept of “mass-customised” was 
summarised in Chapter Two, where it was theorised as a half-way house between 
knowledge work (high skill, high autonomy and high rewards) and mass service 
production (low skill, low autonomy and low satisfaction). Organisations pursuant of 
the latter tend to adopt “low road” strategies as a reflection of intense price competition 
at the bulk/commodity end of the service spectrum. In contrast, knowledge work and 
more premium forms of FLSW are commonly associated with “high road” strategies. 
Adopters are thought to offer a more humane work experience with better job 
conditions, opportunities for growth and intrinsic/extrinsic rewards.  
With that mission in mind WC was selected as the case study organisation for three 
main reasons. Firstly it proudly proclaims itself a good FLSW employer, exhibiting 
many archetypal hallmarks of a high-road model. The company has a large graduate 
scheme that regularly features in “Top 100 Graduate Employers” lists, whilst the 
majority of its FLSWs are graduates in the early stages of their career. It therefore offers 
an interesting opportunity to compare rhetoric and reality alongside theory and practice. 
Secondly WC is an ideal “qualifying case” to examine Frenkel’s (2006) claims on 
mass-customised service work. As Vincent & Wapshott (2014: 158) argue “given the 
partial nature of all theory and the complex, open, and multiply determined nature of 
reality, theories will inevitably need to be qualified in relation to particular 
circumstances.” WC’s history as well as its competitive strategy and market position 
(see Chapter Five) makes its particular circumstances an enlightening example of “mass 
customised” in action. Thirdly, I have been through WC’s graduate management 
scheme and therefore benefit from “insider” status therein. With hindsight, I struggle to 
imagine an outsider being able to capture the experience of FLSW in WC without 
becoming a “part of the furniture” as I did. 
4.3.2. Access and negotiation 
I was given permission to conduct longitudinal participant observations at multiple WC 
sites and to perform interviews with FLSWs subject to their consent. Permission was 
also granted for the analysis of a range of internal documents, with the proviso that 
83 
commercially sensitive information would not be published. A formal access request 
was submitted to the Retail Director and negotiations progressed over the following 
three months with an ever expanding circle of inclusion at HQ and local levels. As the 
conversation developed “informed consent” was ascertained from gatekeepers and 
prospective participants (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995) - many of whom expressed 
keen interest. There is little doubt that such enthusiasm was a partial consequence of 
long-term collegial relationships. The purpose of the research was described in general 
terms as “an attempt to better understand retail work.”
Out of this process an agreement emerged over who would be involved and how they 
would contribute, discussed further below. Prior, it ought to be stated that no conditions 
or restrictions were placed upon the research beyond a “quid-pro-quo” that I work 
overtime for the organisation during peak trading periods. It was also requested that I 
suspend extra-ordinary research activities (i.e. interview) during these periods. 
4.3.3. Observations 
Systematic observations were carried out in two phases over a four-year period (2014-
2018), although I was initially recruited into the organisation in 2009 and had begun 
tentative investigation in 2010.30 The primary purpose of participant observations was 
to continue on my journey of “deep-immersion” within the WC FLSW context 
(Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). Throughout the research period I worked in close 
quarters with observed colleagues, shadowing their experience and contributing to it 
throughout the day. Thus I was involved in the full spectrum of daily activities, “fitting-
in” to the extent that was possible and actively participating as a co-worker rather than 
acting as a “fly on the wall” (following Watson, 2001).  
Conscientious attention was paid not only to the substance of FLSW but also to how it 
was framed and mediated by instructions, emotions, narratives, linguistic practices and 
30
 I contacted my thesis supervisors in 2010 to pitch the research proposal. 
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so forth. The identification of contradictions and/or congruencies between talk and 
reality informed analysis of the relative power of determinate factors. As stated above, a 
basic premise of CRP is that patterns that cannot be fully explained at the “empirical 
level” (Bhaskar, 1989) because they are anchored by sub-empirical phenomena. 
Six stores were subject to observations and three were the primary focus of study, being 
observed on more than forty occasions. The number of observations was driven by my 
work schedule as a part-time paid employee of the company. It is fair to say that in 
terms of understanding the day-to-day I long surpassed the point of diminishing 
marginal returns towards the end of study. That said, its lengthy duration proved critical 
to the main contribution (see Chapter Nine) which only revealed itself in the final stages 
of my investigation. As for sample size, six stores represented a pragmatic compromise 
between the dual aspirations of “breadth” and “depth.” Breadth was considered 
desirable because it may enable the elucidation of similarities and differences across 
similar contexts. “Depth” was considered beneficial in the sense that observing 
individuals across a range of circumstances, situations and events seemed likely to 
illuminate nuances and complexities that may enrich the CRP analytical process (Carter 
& New, 2004). 
Sample selection was partly opportunistic, in that stores within commutable distances 
were selected where I happened to have pre-existing relationships with FLSW teams. 
However, interesting distinctions between sites was also a factor. The most significant 
distinctions were total sales and team size, which past experience suggested to be 
significant bases of variation. Another intriguing distinction (that emerged in the early 
stage of the research) was the type of retail space stores occupied, i.e., their size, layout 
and the extent of front-stage/back-stage space. Basic details of the retail units subject to 
observation are set out in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Sites and characteristics 
As Table 3 shows there were over two hundred days as participant observation, which 
took the form of the “complete participant” (Spradley, 1980). What distinguishes this 
approach from “active participation” is that I was immersed in the case study 
organisation before I began the formal research process. Whilst my job title was part-
time sales assistant it is fair to say that I exceeded my role due to prior knowledge and 
experience. For much of the research period I was an unofficial trouble shooter in 
“Region X,”31 plugging holes in rotas. This was ideal for the purposes of the research 
because I was an ad hoc member of multiple teams. 
31
 The retail division is geographically divided into ten regions. My sites were all within “Region 
X” – see Figure 6. 
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To document interesting insights and events as the day unfolded I would use a notation 
app on my phone, which I found more practical than paper and pen. Amongst other 
things a thumb scanner made the content of my phone private whilst a note pad would 
not have been, given my inability to keep it on my person during work-time. Notes were 
written up and fleshed-out on a secure home computer, with the time lag rarely more 
than a couple of hours. The main priority was to capture evidence accurately whilst at 
the same time getting thoughts and ideas documented for later consideration.  
4.3.4. Further investigation via interviews 
In addition to “conversational interviewing” (Dalton, 1959) I also carried out fifteen 
face-to-face interviews, mainly with FLSW colleagues. Table 4 provides a list of 
participants and Figure 6 locates them within the organisation’s structure. Interviews 
were inspired by a desire to glean further reflections upon our shared experience and to 
dig deeper into their construction of meaning. Another objective was to explore topics 
of interest that may not have been satisfactorily covered during work time. Where 
possible interviews were carried out away from WC premises (Archer, 2007), although 
it was ultimately left to the interviewee to select the venue (Cook, 2010). Ample gaps 
were left between interviews and other research activities to allow time for planning and 
transcribing (see Burgess, 1991). Each session enacted a semi-structured format (as 
recommended by Silverman, 1997 and Mason, 1996) and was ordered by an aide 
memoir (Burgess, 1995), that led with open questions and offered targeted follow-ups if 
necessary. Two recording devices were used to capture data.  
Most interviews were carried out in the final year of the research to enable reflections 
upon the period throughout which systematic observations took place. The exact 
number of interviews was determined by my perception of diminishing marginal 
returns. Once I got to a point where additional interviews added little in terms of fresh 
insights I accepted this as the point at which costs are likely to exceed benefits 
henceforth. Transcripts were produced by a sub-contractor and secured in three 
locations alongside other digital data. 
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Table 4: Primary research participants and key characteristics 
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Figure 6: Wine Corp Retail organisational structure
4.3.5. Documentary evidence 
As an employee of WC I had access to a constant stream of internal documents, both 
traditional and non-traditional in nature (see Table 5). These were invaluable in terms of 
assessing links between management actions and FLSWs experiences. They were also 
useful in illuminating activities in the wider organisation and the forces and factors 
affecting them.  
One interesting data stream was the in-house “Huddle” webcasts which became a 
prominent feature of WC relations during the research period. These were published on 
the intranet and served as a video bulletin board. Therein senior managers (who rotated 
as host) would answer questions submitted by employees and share their thoughts and 
reflections. Another valuable data source was the “Virtual Post-box” which could have 
been tailor-made for the purposes of my research. This no-holds-barred Q&A between 
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management and staff was anonymised, allowing the latter a rare window of 
opportunity to communicate “how they really feel.”  
Table 5: Secondary data and its research value 
4.3.6. Ethnographic analysis 
As with Dalton (1959) my research did not commence with pre-ordained questions. 
Rather, it started out as a general enquiry into the nature and experience of “quality” 
FLSW. I was interested to understand whether conceptualisations of quality tiers in 
FLSW had any basis in fact, or whether they were more rhetoric than reality. 
Furthermore, I was interested in appraising how management and customers mediated 
the experience of FLSW, following in the footsteps of Rafaeli (1989) who sought to 
arbitrate over their relative power and influence. 
There were four main stages to the analysis (see Figure 7) that were overlapping rather 
than chronological as per ethnographic convention. The first stage involved sub-
dividing data thematically, so as to build a body of evidence on areas of particular 
interest (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). Given the multifaceted nature of my data 
some segments became part of the evidence base on multiple topics. The second stage 
involved reviewing the content of the data in order to identify patterns. What 
similarities and differences resonated? What consistencies and inconsistencies become 
apparent across spaces and time?  
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The third stage of analysis once the data had been sifted and sorted within topic was to 
cross-examine evidence in light of other topics, to evaluate the extent to which findings 
in one area intersected with findings in another. The major focus here was to assess the 
inherent limitations of potential explanations; for example, to what extent can X (certain 
stimulus, traits, attributes) explain Y (certain responses)? Limitations were taken as a 
cue to dig deeper into the data and to further evaluate tentative assumptions and 
theoretical models. Inherent to the process was a constant dialogue between the data and 
theoretical/empirical literature (see Chapters Two and Three), with the former guiding 
the latter.  
Figure 7: Four stages of analysis 
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Stage four then constituted the final phase of the feedback loop, where outcomes from 
the analytical process would then direct the collection of additional data. For example, I 
may return to the field with a written objective to “learn more about X” or to “search the 
intranet for Y.” Once accrued these insight would complement the analysis and another 
round of the four-stage process would commence, up until the point at which further 
cycles seemed unlikely to alter the final analysis. 
Rather than make use of specialist software packages (e.g., NVivo) I opted to build my 
research database with the Microsoft Office suite. I have many years of experience 
using said suite and have received advanced training, instilling in me the confidence that 
I could use it to manage and manipulate large volumes of data. I had developed an 
effective system during earlier research projects and felt unconvinced of the benefits of 
bespoke software at the time. 
The mode of analysis outlined utilised three well-established and widely recognised 
qualitative analysis techniques (see Yin, 2014: pp.142-169). Pattern matching was the 
essential feature of stage 2 of my analysis, which was used to stratify the data in terms 
of links and discontinuities. Explanation building was the core objective of stage 3, 
which sought to interrogate possible explanations in light of emerging evidence. Here I 
made use of the CRP analytical tool of retroduction (see Rees & Gatenby, 2014) which 
basically involves working backwards from the data, imagining what has to exist in 
order to explain manifest patterns (discussed further below). Another feature of stage 3 
was cross-case synthesis, which compared and contrasted similarities and difference in 
people and places to weigh the significance of contextual factors. I selected these modes 
of analysis because I saw them as most complementary to the specific enquiry, whilst 
further believing that they may act in tandem to optimise the value of ethnography as 
described above. Boiled down the conceptual justification for the study was theory 
elaboration.
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Section Four: Quality assurance and ethics 
A number of commentators have established guidance for what “quality” qualitative 
research involves and looks like. Bluhm et al. (2011) used five key markers of best 
practice: (1) a strong theoretical foundation; (2) triangulation; (3) longitudinal design; 
(4) counting the countables and (5) accuracy checks. Along similar lines Yin (2014) 
identifies the following as means for achieving high-quality analysis:  
(1) Attending “all the evidence,”
(2) Assessing “all plausible rival interpretations,”
(3) Focusing on “the most significant aspect” of your case and 
(4) Using your own “prior, expert knowledge”
                                                      (Note: p.168, emphasis in original) 
Some of the strategic elements that satisfy these criteria have been discussed in prior 
sections. Of particular note, a strong theoretical foundation was established in a detailed 
discussion of CRP. On the one hand it was argued that CRP analytical tools (e.g., 
analytical dualism; separation of intransitive and transitive realms) can be mobilised to 
overcome the theoretical drawback of alternative paradigms. On the other hand it was 
argued CRP exhibits an epistemological fit with practical approaches synonymous with 
ethnography.  
Another criterion satisfied above is to use prior expert knowledge. I did this by studying 
an organisation in which I am a long-established insider with behind-the-scenes 
knowledge of “how it works around here.” Still another is counting the countables: 
records have been kept of who contributed what as Tables 3 and 4 indicate. Other 
features of the research that satisfy the benchmarks set out below. 
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Longitudinal design - the formal research period was four years in duration whilst I was 
employed by the organisation for the five years prior. Short “snapshot” studies are self-
evidently problematic from the point of view of CRP, because it perceives underlying 
reality as something which emerges at critical moments within the fullness of time. 
Short-term studies may miss such moments and/or capture them but fail to allow time to 
comprehend their vicissitudes (Burawoy, 2013). 
Three forms of triangulation as identified by Denzin (1978) were mobilised in pursuit 
of valid and credible insights. Those were theory triangulation; data triangulation and 
methodological triangulation. As longitudinal design implies data was collected at 
multiple time points, whilst it also features a cast of 35 “lead actors” across seven sites 
(including HQ). Hence the basic elements of data triangulation were incorporated into 
the research design. As for methodological triangulation, interviews and observations 
were utilised in a mutually informing symbiotic way to enhance analysis. Concurrently, 
a range of documentary evidence catered to data requirements that field activities alone 
would have failed to satisfy. Finally, a wide array of theories has been drawn upon to 
explain the data as will become apparent in the following chapters. 
Data inclusion and presentation – in the data chapters a concerted effort has been made 
to represent the sample as accurately and fairly as possible. Nuances and complexities 
have been incorporated wherever practicable rather than set aside for convenience’s 
sake. Along these lines I have sought to identify and explain both the “normal” and the 
“abnormal” in amongst the data; in fact, the analysis contained in Chapters Seven and 
Eight is premised upon an assumption that exceptional/abnormal cases can “prove the 
rule.” 
Write up - Drafting began in early 2017 and continued until September 2018. As said 
there was no clear separation between data collection and write-up stages, partly 
because I maintained regular contact with informants throughout. Continued 
engagement facilitated “accuracy checks” because “critical friends” (Yin, 2014) acted 
as sounding boards for general ideas. At the same time my thesis supervisors played a 
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vital role in distilling objectives, thereby mitigating the risks of endless drift or data 
overload.
A decision that will soon become apparent in the data chapters was my choosing to 
write the ethnography in the first person, laying naked my role in its construction. I did 
this for a couple of reasons. Firstly, I felt I could tell the story far more efficiently by 
using my own experience as the primary vehicle of exploration. Secondly, bringing 
participant observation to life unavoidably requires narration because the data cannot 
speak for itself. With this being the case overt inclusion of the researcher-role strikes me 
as the best partial solution to the verstehen problem (see Tucker, 1965). For 
clarification, I should stress that I reject deconstructionist’s notion that the 
author/researcher can only speak for themselves - believing instead that there is a social 
world “out there” that is knowable. My analysis draws upon hundreds of verifiable facts 
and its credibility is underlined by its satisfaction of widely acknowledged “quality” 
criteria as shown presently. That said, it remains true that I am the narrator and some 
would take that to mean that there is nothing more to this account than my narration. In 
response, I can only say that I have done my best to develop the most plausible account 
possible and to lay bare my role in its production. 
In light of these considerations I have presented my research in the form of an 
autoethnography, the main aim of which is to demystify the research process as 
suggested in the following remarks: 
Autoethnography is an approach to research and writing 
that seeks to describe and systematically analyse personal 
experience in order to understand cultural experience. This 
approach challenges canonical ways of doing research and 
representing others and treats research as a political, 
socially-just and socially-conscious act. A researcher uses 
tenets of autobiography and ethnography to do and write 
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autoethnography. Thus, as a method, autoethnography is 
both process and product. 
(Ellis et al., 2011: 273)
Autoethnography turns on its head the positivist’s “silent researcher” writing style (see 
Dalton 1959 for an example). It invites “confession” (Van Maanen, 1988) on the part of 
the author in terms of their role in data collection, analysis and conceptual development. 
It involves the researcher “showing their workings” to borrow a phrase from GCSE 
maths. 
Ethical issues, data management and security 
In the developmental stages of the research ethical issues were flagged-up as a 
management challenge. The risk of harm appeared self-evident given the possibility of 
participants saying and doing things that deviate from management’s aspirations. 
Without careful concealment of identities there is some possibility that censure, 
reputational damage and/or disciplinary action could result from the publication of the 
research. 
Another possibility is that the case study organisation may be harmed through 
participation. It stands to reason that an “insider” investigation into any organisation 
may produce findings that cast it in imperfect light. Indeed, the very purpose of the 
study was to get beyond the glossy veneer of organisational PR and to expose multi-
dimensional truths that it conceals. To do otherwise would betray the object of the 
study, although this is not to say that the ends always justify the means. On the contrary, 
any social researcher is subject to numerous moral and ethical constraints and can only 
do their best to walk a tightrope between exposing the unvarnished truth and protecting 
participants. Table 6 summarises steps that were taken in this regard. 
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Table 6: Steps taken to protect data and participants 
Section Five: Discussion 
Chapters Two and Three sought to illustrate the gaps in knowledge and related 
opportunity that in-depth study of FLSW presents. At this point it may be useful to 
appraise the contours of the research in light of key themes developed in the literature 
review chapters. Chapter Two concluded with an argument that omissions and flaws in 
major theoretical paradigms restrict their singular capacity to explain the phenomena 
under study, mainly due to monolithic ontologies. Three further propositions were set 
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out. Firstly, that bridge-building between theoretical schools of thought represents the 
most promising avenue for a better understanding of FLSW. Secondly, that a 
“stratified” analysis of frontline socio-economic life – one that separates out parts and 
people – may provide means of overcoming reductionism commonly associated with 
entitative or “cultural turn” perspectives. Thirdly, it was suggested that over-emphasis 
of structures or discourse(s) has marginalised the significance of “intermediate” forces 
and factors. These are neither so entrenched that they are impervious nor so ephemeral 
that they can be talked out of existence by whoever comes along. Examples of such may 
be normative codes of conduct; group norms; the traits and attributes of particular 
people and negotiated orders. It was suggested that these forces and factors require 
better exploration in future accounts. 
Chapter Three sought to extend the unfolding analysis by illustrating how problematic 
issues apparent in theoretical literature also proliferated amongst empirical accounts. I 
therefore attempted to show that much of the widely cited research congeals at one end 
of the epistemological spectrum or the other, focusing primarily upon people or parts. 
Polarised emphases along these lines limits comprehension of the interplay between 
causal mechanisms at different levels of abstraction. The danger is that much the 
complexity and subtlety may be lost, bearing in mind the multi-dimensional 
composition of FLSW.  
Thus few accounts of FLSW have synthesised the multi-dimensional nature of FLSW 
with sufficient dexterity in my view, and this provides a key theoretical justification for 
the research as described. Another justification is that WC represents an interesting 
“qualifying case” for a theoretical proposition (Frenkel, 2006) that has gain traction in 
recent years as was discussed above. Two further justifications warrant reiteration at 
this point. (1) FLSW settings are widely cited as nodal points in economic and cultural 
exchange in, making them interesting locations to explore the boundaries between 
different forms of capital production (see Chapter Two; also Bourdieu, 1986). (2) 
Evidence suggests that FLSW for many is experienced as existing on the frontline of 
proletariatisation or “precariatisation” processes (see Chapter Three), making it 
important to understand whether and to what extent a “third way” (Giddens, 1998) is 
possible within FLSW organisations. 
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In light of these factors I would argue that a clear case exists for further research into 
the experience of “high road” FLSW and the forces and factors that shape it. I would 
also argue that the respective tools of ethnography and CRP represent the most 
compelling means of providing an original, credible contribution to knowledge. 
99 
CHAPTER FIVE: WHEN A PLAN COMES TOGETHER 
This first data chapter seeks to tell the back story of WC so as to provide contextual 
insights into the case study organisation and the industry in which it operates. It is in 
effect the “setting the scene” chapter, so the significance of much of its content will 
only become apparent in later chapters. The idea is to build a foundation of knowledge 
on the historical formation of WC and FLSW within it, based upon a belief that 
contemporary experiences have their roots in the past. Section 1 allows WC’s 
management to tell its story in their own words, providing a basic overview of the 
company’s idealised self. Section 2 seeks to place that into historical perspective by 
outlining the organisation’s origin story. Section 3 then explores the effects of the 
recession that emerged in 2008, seeking to explain how it proved a greater opportunity 
than a threat for WC. A grasp of the significance of late 2000s events is crucial to an 
understanding of the powers they reflected and also set in motion. These will be the 
subject of Chapters Six and Nine. 
Section One: Who and what is Wine Corp? 
Despite having worked for the company for ten years, I nonetheless set about the 
process of filling in the blanks in my own knowledge of it to write this chapter. Over 
those years I had heard many origin stories about the organisation, and many 
interpretations of the logics that underpinned its commercial and operational strategy. 
These narratives were passed from one generation of FLSWs to the next, sometimes 
explicitly (through organisational induction, in-store training, etc.) and sometimes 
implicitly as colleagues reminisced or explained company policy to customers.  
The organisation’s website was an obvious starting point to refresh and expand one’s 
knowledge of its early origins. As with any contemporary stock market listed company 
operating on a certain scale, some investment is made in PR. The investors’ website in 
particular provides a glossy representation of the organisation as a savvy but principled 
citizen that simultaneously puts customers, investors and staff first.  
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My intention upon entering the website was to read the history page for summation 
purposes. What I found myself doing instead was activating a YouTube link that 
promised “An introduction to WC.” It turned out to be a poor tool for my objective, as 
was the website generally. The only reference to its early history was a black and white 
picture of a rustic looking WC store, overlaid by the following text: “In 1980…a few 
friends with a passion for wine…started something special…” That sequence is 
immediately followed by “since then we’ve grown…into the UK’s largest wine 
specialist,” at which point the background music becomes up-tempo and a montage 
commences of wholesome looking FLSWs labouring with conviction. These video reels 
are spliced with pictures of shiny WC vehicles traversing UK roads and famous wines 
merchandised in stores. 
The remainder of the four-minute video is a procession of management actors talking 
their way through a contemporary overview of the organisation. It assumes no pre-
knowledge and features an assortment of gushing management comments such as the 
following: 
“I just love this business, it’s about customers, it’s about shops, 
it’s about wine, put those things together and you get WC.” 
(Tim Stapleton, Retail Director) 
Of course, much the same may be said of any bricks and mortar retailer with a focus 
upon a given product category so follow-up commentators hone in on the unique selling 
points (USPs) the organisation claims to possess. For the purpose of coherent narration 
these are framed by a rhetorical question:  




“We fill this gap between the supermarkets and fine wine, we 
take people on this journey, we introduce them to new and 
exciting wines across all price points…” 
(Head Designer) 
“They get this amazing customer experience, they speak to the 
Wine Gurus, who are so knowledgeable, and can actually spend 
time – and want to spend time – with each of the customers, if 
you get the customer experience right, everything else takes care 
of itself…” 
(Customer Director) 
“It’s not just a product, wine is something more than that, and a 
great deal of what goes into making that is the fact that there is a 
story behind it, there’s a person.” 
(Merchandising Director) 
These utterances neatly sum up the rhetoric of the retail business. A core assumption is 
that wine is not “just [any] product;” there is something elevated and storied about it 
necessitating special treatment. WC intervenes in the market to provide just that, filling 
a niche between supermarkets concentrated at the bottom end of the market and 
boutique retailers at the premium end. It therefore occupies something of a middle 
ground in price/quality terms, whilst putting quality of service and staff expertise front 
and centre as a basis for differentiation and competitive advantage. As the Corporate 
Statement spells out in the Annual Report(s) (henceforth AR) FY2001-2004: 
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“WC differentiates itself by the high quality of its customer 
service and advice, the diversity and quantity of stock available 
to purchase in each store, its dedicated on-site parking, wines to 
taste every day, the ability to order instore or via the website and 
the availability of free delivery throughout the UK.” 
The finale of the four-minute video focuses upon how the “amazing customer 
experience” is developed and delivered in practice. At this point emphasis falls upon 
key aspects of HR management such as recruitment, training and career development. 
These are posited as lynchpins of the unique and pervasive culture that is evidenced in 
the video with interview snippets featuring FLSWs and managers alike. The HR 
Director sets the tone:  
“We have people in our business that are so passionate about 
the product – and so passionate about serving customers – so 
that makes for a fantastic combination … They are given a lot of 
training, a lot of support, but really it is your character and 
personality we want to shine through.” 
Fellow directors elaborate further on the cause and effect of the “unique WC culture”: 
“We’re really really picky about who comes to work in this 
organisation, the people [on the shop floor] are all here because 
we think they are great, they’re gonna have a fantastic career, 
and more importantly they are going to make WC that special 
business in the future.”  
(Retail Director) 
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“One of the greatest things about WC is that when there is 
something to do, people just roll their sleeves up and do it.” 
(Operations Director) 
“I have never been part of such a committed team, that really 
want to make a plan live, and deliver on the benefits that we set 
out to do.” 
(Transformation Director) 
As said, the remarks of top management are interspersed with commentary by FLSWs. 
The latter expand upon management’s perspective by sharing insights on their own 
experience: 
“It is hard work, but it is also fun so it is what you make it.” 
(FLSW #1) 
“Before I started, I wasn’t expecting it to be a long-term career; 
as soon as I joined I completely changed my mind, I want to own 
my own store.” 
(FLSW #2) 
“The rewards you get when you put the effort in, and if you are 
enthusiastic about it, yeah it’s a no brainer for me [laughs], it’s 
a great team, you work with some amazing people.’ 
(FLSW #3) 
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By happy coincidence two of the FLSWs with starring roles in the video were close 
colleagues of mine. From one I was able to get the story of its production process: 
M.J: “Wayne, did you know you have a starring role in the 
‘introduction to WC’ video on the investors’ site?”
Wayne: “[brief pause] You mean the recruitment video?” 
M.J “No, there’s a four-minute video on the investors website 
that basically talks through what the company is about for 
potential investors.”
Wayne: “What do I say in it?” 
M.J: “Stuff along the lines of ‘you get out what you put in,’ and 
the ‘rewards are there if you’re willing to work for them,’ that 
type of thing.”
Wayne: “Oh yeah that’s from the recruitment video, that was 
awesome, it was professionally done so it was really good.” 
M.J: “How did you come to be involved in it?”
Wayne: “I was talking to Doug Slazenger [regional manager] 
and he said ‘what do you think of this [in an in-store recruitment 
video] Wayne, do you think it’s a good idea?’ So I said ‘yeah’ 
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[shrugging to suggest indifference], and he said “Oh great 
you’ll do it for me then!?” ’ 
For Doug to select Wayne for a starring role would come as no surprise to observers of 
social relations in Region X. Since joining in 2012 Wayne had established himself as a 
firm favourite in the eyes of his regional manager. His traits and attributes closely 
aligned with that of an ideal-type WC FLSW (discussed further in Chapter Eight), 
making his casting logical and predictable in that sense.  
The story of my other close colleague cherry-picked for the role provides an alternative 
insight into WC life to that presented thus far. Rose personified CEO Dan Mitchell’s 
mantra that “in terms of recruitment, we bring in people who remind customers of their 
sons and daughters.”32 In all my time with WC I had never personally worked with 
someone to whom the customers took such an instant liking. This affection derived from 
her congenial demeanour which she consciously but effortlessly over-dramatized in the 
presence of customers.  
Rose was commonly regarded as a prized FLSW, and it was therefore dispiriting when 
she became my first ever store colleague to opt for unemployment over continuation 
with WC. Part of her explanation was that she “couldn’t face another Christmas,” a 
sentiment that many WC FLSWs could empathise with. However, the straw that broke 
the camel’s back was an unsettling change of store manager which amplified general 
frustrations with the hidden underbelly of working for the company. She explained it to 
me as follows: 
“I spoke to my mum about it and I was just saying that I can’t be 
doing with the long days and late nights … with commutes it can 
be 12 or 13-hour days … I don’t have a life; all my friends are 
going out and I’m either working or too tired … so my mum says 
32
 The same remark was made in an interview with a broadsheet newspaper, 2012. 
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‘well if you’re not happy why don’t you just leave and help out 
round here.’ [Note: her parents ran a small business].” 
The difference between the upbeat actor in the video and the despondent figure making 
these remarks struck me as allegorical of the gap between airbrushed and non-airbrushed 
life in WC. The most remarkable thing about Rose’ story is how unremarkable it was. 
Throughout my time at the company I have listened to countless FLSW escapees cite an 
identical list of grievances.  The penultimate stimulus and post-departure destination 
vary each time but “[I’ve] just had enough” is the recurring theme. 
One of the interesting discoveries I made about the cycle of life in WC is how little it 
appears to have changed. Those leaving in 2018 posited much the same reasons as those 
leaving in 2009 when I first joined the company. Going back even further, I discovered a 
careers case study in a broadsheet newspaper (published June 1999) that clearly implied 
that poor working conditions stretched back much further. It begins: 
“At least Susan Devon had the bottle to admit she had a 
problem. ‘For three weeks I kept asking myself what have you 
done?’ [In joining WC]” 
The extreme nature of FLSW in WC over Christmas (as mentioned by Rose) was also 
apparent in the following remarks: 
“… If you’re looking for a glamourous introduction to the wine 
trade WC ain’t it … Susan had joined just before Christmas and 
was plunged straight into an exhausting 12-hour day, 6-day 
week.” 
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When these insights are considered alongside data presented in Chapters Six, it becomes 
clear that some of the gruelling aspects of FLSW in WC stretch back over two decades 
at least.33  This begs the question why has so little changed in the interim? More 
specifically why have management failed to remedy omnipresent grievances at the heart 
of FLSW turnover? In my view the answer is complex and multifaceted, rooted in the 
organisation’s past and present as well as the constraints and opportunities that preceded 
its existence and emerged afterwards. The next two sections begin the process of 
unravelling that story.  
Section Two: Wine Corp’s early history and development 
Of all the claims made in the “Introduction to WC” video discussed above, the notion 
that the company has “come a long way” appears uncontentious at first glance. It did 
after all begin as a single store in north London in 1980 and has since morphed into a 
multi-channel PLC with diverse operations in three international markets (US, Australia 
and France) and £476m in revenues.34 Viewed through another lens though, a 
compelling argument can be made that continuity has anchored the retail business to a 
greater extent than change has varied it. That is because the organisation has defined and 
differentiated itself by sticking to blueprint, at least until recently. Prior, much of the 
change could be characterised as attempts to complement and/or enhance the original 
vision rather than displace it with something fundamentally different. 
The inception of WC and its foundational logic cannot be separated from the socio-
economic milieu that synchronously emerged in the affluent south east of England at the 
time. As long time CEO James Smythe (J.S) reminisced in an interview in 2008:35
“We were part of the Thatcher boom in the 1980s when 
customers would drive their Porsches to the Battersea store and 
load up.” 
33
 Susan Devon commenced employment in 1997. 
34
 Press release, 2018. 
35
 Interview, regional newspaper.
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Nostalgically expressed in these remarks are some of key underpinnings of the WC 
raison d'être. The organisation set out to target affluent and discerning customers who 
were able and willing to buy in bulk. The strategy was less about meeting pre-existing 
customer demands and more about concerned with carving out a faith-based niche as the 
following analysis contended:36
“Unlike traditional market innovations, WC’s hasn’t been down 
to seizing on a gap in the market. Instead, CEO JS insists he and 
his co-directors simply had total belief in their proposition and 
the market would follow. ‘We had to create a gap,’ [Smythe] 
says, ‘as there were plenty of places you could buy wine. We 
were clear there was an opportunity for a very differentiated 
business … we were sure, but whether there was a need, who 
knows.’ ” 
The cornerstone of the differentiation referred to here was the concept of operating as a 
“case merchant,” which in practical terms meant requiring customers to buy a minimum 
of twelves bottles of wine. Inevitably such a prospect would narrow the potential 
market, making WC inaccessible to those with limited means and/or little interest in 
volume buying. That said, it also presented the organisation with important competitive 
advantages that exploited weaknesses of the dominant market players during the 1980s. 
In a fundamental sense purposeful stratification enabled WC to pursue its primary 
purpose of “ruthlessly target[ing] middle class drinkers’37 via an exclusionary policy 
that deterred mass-market participation.  
Unfortunately, the exact extent to which the “12-bottle policy” (as it was colloquially 
known) was really a product of entrepreneurial “blue sky thinking” is lost to posterity. 
The reason is that legal regulations concerning the sale of alcohol and 
36
 Online business forum, 2007. 
37
 Article, national broadsheet, 2012.
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commercial/residential zoning also substantially contributed to its formation.38 By 
establishing itself as a “case merchant,” WC could technically be categorised as a 
wholesaler rather than a retailer for zoning purposes thereby opening up cheap 
commercial premises that were inaccessible to conventional competition. Thus, WC 
exploited a legal/structural loophole to gain a foothold in the market - an apt illustration 
of “anteriority” in action (see Archer – Chapter Four). 
Being away from commercial centres facilitated the acquisition of inexpensive freehold 
opportunities with free parking, thereby enabling the commercialisation of bulk “cash 
and carry” operations (akin to “booze cruise” warehouses on the French side of the 
Channel). In addition, low rents enabled stores to act as warehouses literally and 
figuratively. Inventory could be held in stores rather than at regional or national 
distribution hubs, removing the operational cost of the latter. To accommodate stock 
stores adopted a unique inside-out appearance which collapsed the distinction between 
sales space (front stage) and storage space (back stage). To bring the two together 
cheaply and practically, shelving was constructed on wooden pallets out of boxes the 
wine came in. Loose bottles would be displayed on top and a “POS” (point of sale) 
would be attached (see Figure 8).  
Figure 8: Wine Corp shop floor 
38
 Article, national broadsheet, 2008. 
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What further differentiated WC however was that unlike “stack ‘em high sell ‘em 
cheap” cash-and-carry warehouses in France, the former did not target the bottom end 
of the market. Rather than tackle the over congested entry level WC sought instead to 
pick up where the supermarkets left off as JS explained:39
“Clearly supermarkets have the dominant slice of the wine 
market, unsurprising led by Tesco. However whilst they will 
typically have a bigger breadth of lines at lower price points, our 
range will visibly broaden from the supermarkets at £5 and 
above. And if you want to buy wines in quantity in the 
supermarkets, it’s actually quite difficult whereas we will have 
several cases.” 
In basic terms then the WC concept was to sell quality wines in bulk utilising a low cost 
warehouse model. A business journalist expressed this succinctly: 
“[WC is] a business flogging cases of wine to wealthy customers 
out of low rent premises…” 
By combining simple store design, cheap premises, a lack of storage duplication and an 
upmarket/bulk focus WC was able to compete and often beat supermarkets on price for 
“quality wine” without sacrificing on margin: 
“We don’t have the buying power of the supermarkets but 
nonetheless we are substantial buyers of wine at £5 and above. 
We’re shipping containers full of wine and that is the economic 
quantity to ship – so we’re at no disadvantage.”40
39




Whilst seeking to be price competitive the essence of the business model however was 
to sell itself on the basis of superior customer service as was made clear above. To that 
end, a staffing model was adopted that sought to invert that of “big-box” mass-service 
producers (e.g. Asda-Walmart). These tend to emphasise “numeric flexibility,” with 
FLSWs typically working short shifts on part-time and/or short-term contracts (Wood, 
2016). FLSWs are predominately female and perform low-skilled roles within highly 
compartmentalised labour processes (Williams, 2004). In addition, little if any product 
knowledge is expected or required of FLSWs (Pettinger, 2004). 
In contrast, WC’s approach to staffing may be described as lean functional flexibility. A 
small number of highly qualified graduate FLSWs were employed in each store, 
working long hours in small teams. They were expected to learn all aspects of store 
operations whilst mastering the panoply of service dimensions (product knowledge, 
salesmanship, proposition features, etc.). Management anticipated that a combination of 
skill, knowledge and enthusiasm would enable superior service over that offered by the 
dominant mass-market players. In the meantime labour costs would be contained by 
employing comparatively few “upskilled” people. 
The embodiment of the WC HR system was the graduate management training 
programme, which dates back to its early foundations. An undergraduate degree (or 
equivalent) was treated as an entry requirement to join WC, whilst the frontline was 
almost exclusively comprised of full-time permanent graduate staff. One regional 
manager encapsulated the HR system to me in 2012 by remarking scornfully “we don’t 
do zero hours at WC.” As a company insider I knew that this remark carried much 
deeper meaning than its face value implied. The implication is that WC is superior to 
“generalised other” (Mead, 1934) retailers, not only for customers but for FLSWs as 
well. One example of WC’s self-proclaimed differentiation is that it acts as one of 
largest clients of the Wine and Spirits Education Trust - the UK’s gold standard industry 
qualifications body. All FLSWs were put through its “level-3” qualification, which is 
equivalent to two GCE A-levels. High performers were also offered the chance to 
complete the WSET diploma, a potential gateway to more senior and specialist roles in 
the wine industry.  
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The remuneration package also featured elements that ostensibly differentiate WC from 
low-road/“race to the bottom”41 FLSW employers. JS described the package as follows: 
“[WC FLSWs] get a basic salary, monthly commission, profit-
related pay, and every member of staff who stays more than 
three years gets share options … we have certainly paid off a few 
graduate loans and financed a few new cars.” 
To put these elements into perspective I have provided a simplified overview of 
compensation in the year I joined the company (see Table 7).42 As can be seen a 
“London weighting” was paid FLSWs who had to base themselves in or around 
London. 
Table 7: Remuneration of Wine Corp FLSWs, 2009 rates43
Further evidence of enlightened employment practices as well as exceptional benefits or 
opportunities were not difficult to come by. Susan Devon (mentioned above) explained 
in her broadsheet interview that she enjoyed three promotions in 18 months, which fairly 
41
 See Walsh, J. The Guardian, 11/07/17. 
42
 For present day pay rates see p. 275. 
43
 Pound sterling; pre-tax and deductions.
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accurately illustrated the potential for upward mobility within stores pre-2008. FLSWs 
also had important areas of discretion, particularly over what they sold and how they 
sold it. Internally there was no pressure to push particular products although FLSWs 
were instructed to pursue “up-sell/add-sell” opportunities. Compelling sales incentives 
were however offered by suppliers. These include lavish trips to vineyards in far flung 
parts of the world, cash incentives and rarefied prizes such as jeroboams44 of prestige 
wines. Store(s) with the highest sales of a given supplier’s products would win the 
award(s) on offer. Some long-serving staff had gamed the system to win multiple trips 
and prizes that they boasted of years later. 
5.2.1. Teething problems and rolling out the format 
Whilst cornerstones of the WC model were envisaged at its inception, it nonetheless 
took fourteen years for the organisation to settle into a pattern of stable growth. 
Previously, it went through multiple changes of ownership and teetered on the edge of 
bankruptcy on numerous occasions. Indeed the earliest incarnation of WC “quickly went 
bust”45 under the stewardship of founder and visionary Tom Oliver, and was bought out 
of receivership by “society guy” Jamie Barrowman and business partner Noam 
Patterson. Together they injected capital and industry know-how whilst Oliver was 
retained in a general management capacity. Together the group set about developing WC 
into a sustainable multiple retailer via organic means. By 1985 the company had fifteen 
stores spread across Greater London and the affluent “home counties.”  
In 1986 Oliver departed WC to start another company “Elvan,” which was acquired one 
year later by frozen foods chain Coolwhites. Coolwhites was owned by well-known 
retail magnate Deacon Hill and JS (quoted above) served as its managing director. The 
acquisition fused the management team that would ultimately transform WC into a 
national chain and PLC several years later. Prior to that Coolwhites was itself purchased 
in 1987 by a rival frozen foods chain, but Deacon Hill retained ownership of Elvan. 
Smythe left Coolwhites to become Managing Director of the newly independent wine 
chain whilst WC’s founder Tom Oliver became buying director. The triumvirate then 
44
 A three litre bottle.
45
 Article, national broadsheet, 2008. 
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embarked upon an overarching ambition to merge Elvan and WC under a single banner 
to be rolled out nationwide.46 It took them five years to realise that ambition and in the 
meantime the covetous party engaged in underhand tactics to secure their quarry as JS 
explained: 
“We made the initial attempt [to acquire WC] in 1989. We could 
see we weren’t going to get it so we had a vested interest in 
ensuring the people that did get it paid far too much so we 
successfully bidded up and they [the rival bidders] – did pay too 
much and took on huge debt. We continued to develop Elvan but 
frankly we always had an eye on acquiring WC later so quite a 
bit of my time was spent ensuring we were well positioned and 
talking to the people who had the influence, which was 
principally Kraftwork Hedges, as they had the debt, whilst also 
opening stores against WC.”47
The takeover was achieved when WC’s management became embroiled in a 
“disastrous”48 attempt to penetrate the US market. It rendered the business insolvent, 
enabling the Elvan triumvirate to acquire their target at the deflated price of £2.5 
million.49 In order to minimise its losses debt holder Kraftwork Hodges wrote-off a 
“substantial” portion of WC’s debt as JS recollects: 
“I think [Kraftwork Hodges] only got 1p for every thousand 
shares so there was no equity value left in the business.”50
Elvan and WC merged in FY1991/92 and adopted the branding of the latter across the 
36-store combined concern. Completion of said merger paved the way for the envisaged 
46








 Article, online business forum, 2007. 
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national expansion, although the new entity had to fight for its survival first. The 
problem was twofold: internally there were considerable costs and complications 
associated with tying the two organisations together. More significantly, the UK 
economy was plunged into recession by the “Black Wednesday” crisis that emerged in 
September 1992. The pound devalued as an immediate consequence, with severe knock-
on effects for retailers in general and sellers of non-essential goods in particular. As one 
commentator put it “wine sales took a pounding.”51
The scale of adversity was such that WC had to “debt load” its balance sheet and 
imposed a company-wide 10% pay cut to survive. This was offset by the introduction of 
profit related pay so that “if we turned around the business everyone would benefit” 
according to JS. “PRP” later became a cornerstone of FLSWs’ compensation package as 
mentioned above. Given the internal and external challenges WC finished FY1993 with 
a £500,000 loss. In contrast, FY1994 resulted in a £400,000 profit as external conditions 
improved alongside and internal performance. Subsequently WC’s leadership 
commenced its long anticipated roll-out against a backdrop of steadily increasing 
revenue and profit. 
5.2.2. Organic expansion 
A significant landmark in the organisation’s expansion programme of national 
expansion was its listing on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), a sub-market of 
the London Stock Exchange, in 1996. Given the significance of this to an understanding 
of contemporary organisational dynamics (a theme explored in subsequent chapters) it is 
interesting to note the casualness of the man who oversaw the process: 
“It wasn’t hugely important financially, although we raised £2 
million for freehold investment, as we’re a cash generative 
business but we decided building presence was the way to go 
51
 Article, national broadsheet, 2008.
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and that we’d achieve that as a lot of our customers read the 
financial press.”52
As Figure 9 shows, in the aftermath of stock market listing WC enjoyed a prolonged 
period of revenue growth.  This corresponded with proportionate profit growth with the 
exception FY2001 (see Figure 10) when the organisation was only able to match the 
previous year’s figure due to cost-of-sales increases.53
Nonetheless, the growth period between 1994 and 2008 validated a business model that 
did not exist in the UK prior to 1980. At that point WC was no more than a figment of 
one wine aficionado’s imagination and it took fourteen years to transform it into a stable 
entity. With the passing of time its elevation was reflected in industry accolades as well 
as robust financial performance. For example, by 2001 it had been awarded “high street 
retail chain of the year” four years consecutively by the industry’s most prestigious 
award body. Also, from 2003 onwards WC became a feature of well-known “best 
companies to work for” countdowns in UK broadsheet newspapers. 
Figure 9: Revenue (£m) 1996-2008 
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Figure 10: Profit before tax (£m) 1996-2008 
The period of sustained growth under discussion was underpinned by adherence to a 
tightly prescribed formula, one that further systematised and closely adheres to the WC 
model as originally envisaged. As JS remarks: 
“Unlike most businesses that switch direction and constantly 
reassess the map to reach their destination, the WC way was 
plotted some 14 and a half years ago – and hasn’t been veered 
from since.”54
The main objective for JS throughout the period was to oversee a disciplined roll-out of 
stores, ensuring that revenue and profit grew in tandem. For the nine-year period 
between 1992 (when WC and Elvan merged) and 2001, WC added seven premises to its 
estate on average per year. The challenges posed by national expansion were two-fold; 
firstly, it was difficult to find suitable premises given the specificity of requirements:55
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“All of them are on main roads preferably on a location between 
where more affluent people work and live, with good awareness 
and visibility … there must be room for a car park, 800 wines 
and 11-12 weeks of stock – around 3-3,500 square feet.” 
Secondly, costs had to be kept down in recognition of the growing dominance of low-
cost mass-market operators. One means that WC pursued in this regard was streamlined 
logistics, as the company continued to utilise a single 25,000 square foot warehouse to 
supply its growing estate. This lean system was made possible by the stores themselves 
acting as local distribution hubs/storage depots as mentioned above. 
To further leverage the store-centric distribution model management took the decision to 
service online orders through local stores (rather than through a centralised facility) 
when the website was launched in 2000. Orders would be routed to the nearest store 
using order management software, and FLSWs would correspond with the customer and 
execute their order with store-held stock. Free delivery from local stores was a pre-
established USP for WC, so it appeared logical to utilise that system to enhance return 
on capital employed. Importantly, it also enabled WC to control the service interface 
outside stores. 
The logic of local servicing was extended to another key division of the business: WC 
Commercial. This division was born unceremoniously in the basement of a west London 
store in 1994, making use of surplus space. The objective was to capture business-to-
business trade, focusing mainly upon media and entertainment customers thereabouts. 
Specialist business development managers (“BDMs”) were employed to capture and 
retain new business, whilst store teams were expected to identify and develop leads. 
Once an account was acquired responsibility would pass to the nearby store to manage 
the relationship in practical senses. PR material describes “Commercial” as follows: 
“A specialist on-trade supplier who aims to support businesses 
to make their wine lists more profitable, with the unique 
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advantage of running their supply chain through WC retail 
stores”56
Whilst treated as separate business divisions on paper, both “commercial” and “online” 
(which each account for approximately 10% of revenue) are operationalised through 
retail branches. 
5.2.3. Cost control and asset management 
One aspect of company discipline concerned the marketing budget, which remained at 
1% of revenue fastidiously.57 As recently as 2008 the organisation did not advertise, 
relying instead upon word-of-mouth to bring in new customers. The marketing budget 
was channelled towards pre-existing costumers instead, who were regularly mailed 
marketing materials upon joining the database. The flagship marketing instrument was 
the quarterly-released “Perfect Glass” magazine featuring price lists, seasonal offerings 
and editorial content. Its publication spoke to WC’s desire to “talk to, tempt, inspire and 
educate its customers through in-store tastings, wine holidays, helplines … its website 
and highly qualified staff.”58 It further reflects the broad vision of acting as a destination 
that provides a “pleasurable experience.”  
In 2007 the organisation had 375,000 “active customers” who spent 40% more per bottle 
than in the supermarkets, with an average transaction value of £117. Thus, the customer 
base was small compared to leading generalists but WC customers were able and willing 
to spend more on wine. The average purchase was eighteen bottles per-shop, and 
customers were typically “in their early 40s and a relatively affluent professional.”59 A 
downside of its catchment was that these customers visited infrequently - twice per year 
on average.60
56
 Financial Results 2016/17 – press release. 
57
 Article, national broadsheet, 2003. 
58
 Commentary, online business forum, 2007. 
59
 City editor, national broadsheet, 2003. 
60
 In-house company analysis.
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In an overarching sense then the company developed strategically in ways that 
complemented the extant business model. The online and commercial businesses utilised 
and leveraged pre-existing physical and human assets. In turn, marketing was geared 
towards the acquisition of repeat business and the mobilisation of “customer assets” as 
advertising agents to the wider market. The steady growth of WC’s unconventional 
model led to considerable praise being heaped on CEO JS. One industry analyst 
described WC as “the aristocrat of the sector,” one of two UK chains that “stand out for 
defying [supermarket] hegemony.”61 Another sector analyst described WC as having a 
“database to die for,”62 whilst a leading market research agency described the 
organisation as “the only real star amongst the specialists.”63 Still another singled out JS 
as one of the key architects of the “UK wine revolution.”64
By 2007 WC had a 3% market share in still wines and a 10% market share of 
Champagne. This may sound unremarkable when considered in light of the market 
leader outselling WC by ten bottles to one.65 However, a more considered appraisal 
would weigh the fortunes of WC vis-à-vis its high street specialist peers. Between 1980 
and 2007 supermarket competition had forced all but four high street chains out of 
business. Once familiar storefronts like Victoria Wine, Unwins, Augustus Barnett, 
Bottoms Up, Fullers, and Peter Dominic had been consigned to history in a relatively 
short space of time, bearing in mind that “off-licenses” had dominated the market since 
the 1860s (Midgley, 2010) WC’s comparative success stemmed from a clear mission 
and sense of identity; it knew what it can and cannot do well as the following assertions 
underlines: 
“JS is adamant that WC won’t do any of the following: launch 
any high street stores; sell by any denomination smaller than a 
61
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case of 12; start selling sub £3 a bottle budget wine; launch its 
own label.”66
Section Three: Recession and the heyday of “Wine Corp 1.0” 
To recap, WC enjoyed a remarkable period of growth between the last industry affecting 
“external shock” in FY1993 and FY2008. Revenue and profit grew consistently because 
of disciplined expansion, like-for-like growth and incremental scale efficiencies. The 
company “ruthlessly targeted middle-class drinkers”67 with a unique service proposition 
centred upon skilled staff delivering USPs. Amongst these were expert advice; the 
opportunity to “try before you buy;” free delivery; free parking; free deposit backed 
loans of ancillary products (glasses, ice buckets, ice bins) and a unique depth and 
breadth of stock.  
In 2007 stores typically carried between 400-600 product lines and thereby offered an 
unrivalled range, at least by “bricks-and-mortar” standards. Roughly two-thirds of 
product lines were permanent listings meaning that they were procured on long-term 
contracts. The final third were temporary listings made up of one-off parcels and wines 
supplied on short-term agreements. Often these were secured on favourable terms as a 
prelude to permanent listings, and/or to enable suppliers to gain a foothold into the UK 
market.  
A key benefit of the scale upon which WC operated was that it was not so big an 
organisation that small parcels became uneconomic, and yet it was not so small that it 
could not easily absorb a one-off purchase of several thousand cases. Hence, as a buyer 
and seller the organisation enjoyed significant advantages of over bigger and smaller 
rivals. As one buyer explained: 
66
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“If you look at the scale on which a Tesco operates there’s just 
no pointing buying [a one-off] 5 or 10 thousand bottles … the 
profit would be a drop in the ocean for them.” 
In August 2008 two events happened within weeks of one another that would define the 
subsequent half-decade for the company. The first event was the retirement of JS, who 
had been at the helm of WC since its modern foundation in 1991. He was to be replaced 
by Dan Mitchell (DM), who had been groomed for the role as part of a carefully 
choreographed succession plan. It is difficult to overstate the extent to which DM had 
already become “Mr WC” by the time that I arrived in the organisation in 2009. He 
joined the company via the same graduate management training programme as me in 
1985. He was quickly talent spotted and nurtured through the ranks becoming retail 
director of the combined concern in 1991 and Chief Operating Officer in 2006.  
Aside from being a “part of the furniture” DM’s temperament and charisma made him a 
larger-than-life figure embodying multiple forms of authority. Almost everyone in the 
company around that time had a DM story and I was no exception. My first encounter 
involved a dispute over grammar, when he expressed reservations over the use of an 
Americanised spelling on a “tasting note” I had written for the “wine of the week.” Later 
he also relayed (via my area manager) that my appearance was “too scruffy” and needed 
sharpening up. My second encounter with the renowned CEO better encapsulated the 
“roll your sleeves up and do it” ethos as described by the Operations Director above. On 
this occasion DM was dissatisfied with an unresolved electrical wiring problem that was 
causing a partial lighting failure in my store. Even as we explained that company policy 
had been adhered to he took it upon himself to fix the problem, spending the next two 
hours deconstructing wine stacks (so as to access the electricity control panel) and 
fiddling with wires and switches. Upon his departure the lighting problem remained 
unresolved.  
Many of the stories that circulated about DM were altogether less comical though. One 
antic for which he was particularly well-known was to take a store manager “out into 
the car park” with the implied purpose of severe reprimand. Colourful language and 
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shouting were customary so these impromptu “feedback sessions” were dreaded by store 
managers. I only witnessed one such episode which validated that they happened, even 
if that occasion did not prove their severity. That said, one well-informed manager told 
me they had led to “plenty of managers crying in their cars” and having met DM I 
found this credible.  
With weeks of DM becoming CEO the second major eventuality played out: the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers on 15th September 2008. This proved to be the penultimate 
catalyst of the sub-prime/credit crunch crisis precipitating “double-dip” recession from 
2008 onwards. The initial impacts of economic contraction were significant and 
detrimental to WC. Profits fell by more than half,68 principally due to the collapse of 
Champagne purchases in “the City” where WC enjoyed a large market share. Exact 
figures are not available but the company did confirm a “double figures” sales decline.69
The other drain on profitability was “Cash & Carry Land” (C&CL), WC’s sole example 
of non-organic growth at that point. Acquired in 2001 for £7million,70 C&CL was a 
small estate of “booze cruise” warehouses in France. The weakness of the pound 
combined with an emerging “staycation” trend rendered C&CL a costly liability.71 In 
FY2009 WC declared a £5.3 million impairment relating to the business division. To put 
that into perspective pre-tax profit was £7.4m for that financial year. Thus the slow-and-
steady period of growth that emerged in the middle of the prior decade was thrown into 
reverse by macro-economic factors and internal vulnerabilities. Declining profit 
coincided with a dramatic revision in the stock price. A £1 investment in WC in 
February 2008 would have reduced in value to £0.27 one year on.72
Regardless, in the medium term the domino effects of recession proved an 
unprecedented blessing for WC. The single biggest boon was the collapse of the 
company’s remaining national sub-sectoral competition. First to buckle was First 
Quench, the parent company of Threshers and Wine Rack in June 2009. At its height in 




 Business analysis, national broadsheet, 2009(a). 
70
 Interview, online business forum, 2007. 
71
 Business analysis, national broadsheet, 2009(b). 
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 WC - investor relations.
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14%. Even with a much-diminished footprint of 1,300 outlets by 2009 it remained the 
UK’s largest specialist chain by some margin. All of its stores were closed in the 
aftermath of it being put into administration that summer. As First Quench disappeared 
Oddbins became the sole remaining specialist operating nationally. It survived the 
deepest recesses of economic contraction in 2009 but followed First Quench into 
administration in Q1 of 2011. Whilst its footprint was considerably smaller with 278 
stores, Oddbins’ disappearance was perhaps more significant to WC because it had a 
significant foothold in the mid-market.73 Hence, WC stood to gain a considerable 
proportion of Oddbins’ market share whereas supermarkets were better positioned to 
feast on the carcass of First Quench. 
WC further benefited from the tactics of the large supermarkets who increasingly 
dominated the wine market as discussed above. As recession hit the “big 4” (Tesco, 
Sainsbury’s, Asda, Morrisons) “turned their guns away from Waitrose and aimed them 
at Aldi and Lidl” as DM explained to a new intake of graduates in 2009. These 
supermarkets dramatically scaled back their wine range and placed enhanced emphasis 
on low-cost/low-margin lines. As a consequence customers seeking quality offerings 
found themselves deprioritised and ill-catered to, leaving the mid-market field altogether 
less congested. One industry analyst captured the transition well: 
“The supermarkets have … shifted their focus away from WC’s 
core customer, who buys a £6-£8 bottle of wine, to focus on the 
value end.”74
A celebrated wine critic made similar observations – albeit, without specific emphasis 
on WC: 
“The downside [of change in the UK wine industry since 1988]? 
The biggest has been the reduction of choice in the high street … 
73
 Defined roughly as bottles in the £6-£15 price range at 2008 prices. 
74
 Industry analyst, national broadsheet, 2011.
125 
Inevitably, this has made the supermarkets stronger than ever. 
Some of them use their buying power to list exciting wines (take 
a bow Marks & Spencer, Waitrose, The Coop and Booths) but 
most don’t, preferring to use cut price deals to entice customers 
into store.” 
The overall effect of the market shake-out that commenced in FY2009 was polarisation 
and diminishment of competition. On the one hand there were fewer participants in the 
market and on the other hand, the remaining participants polarised further into two 
distinct segments with one driven by price sensitivity and the other driven by quality 
sensitivity. One industry participant made the point as follows: 
“You have to understand that there are two markets for wine: 
the bulk market and the discerning market. Most people who buy 
quantities of wine buy on price and on offers. You see that in the 
supermarkets: people pulling bottles off the shelf without looking 
at what they are buying … One of the problems for the multiples 
is that they compete on exactly the same proposition as the 
supermarkets, and they can’t win.”75
 5.3.1. “Foodies” & “Winos” – riding the wave and creating the wave 
If WC found itself the sole occupant of a “sweet spot” on the supply-side then it is fair to 
say that demand-side factors also moved in the organisation’s favour during 
recessionary times. A key example was the booming “foodie culture” that coincided 
with the UK’s “love affair” with wine. These trends preceded the 2008 recession but 
became more pronounced during times of “austerity.” “Staying in [was] the new going 
out” as DM liked to remark, arguing that home dining had become a fashionable and 
cost-conscious substitute for nights out. The success of cookery programmes like the 
BBC’s “Saturday Kitchen” seemed to be both cause and consequence of said trend. A 
75
 Quote from Midgeley, D. (2010) – see references. 
126 
portion of that show was often filmed on location in WC stores, occasionally leading to 
“market runs” on recommended products. 
Whilst external factors had a positive net impact upon WC’s prospects it would be 
wrong to attribute improving performance to these alone. Under DM’s leadership the 
organisation was emboldened by prevailing circumstances and set about expanding as 
rivals contracted. He reminisced the maelstrom as follows: 
“I actually quite enjoyed it, to be honest. I had seen two 
recessions before and it gave you a licence to do exactly what 
you want to do because you could say to everyone ‘don’t you 
realise there’s a recession on.’ ” 
DM’s ability to enjoy a “down market” was greatly assisted by the strength of the 
balance sheet he inherited. WC had negligible debt going into the financial crisis, 
totalling £0.1m. When a colleague asked DM whether “[FLSWs] have anything to worry 
about” vis-à-vis the recession he responded as follows: 
“We’ve got nothing to worry about because we don’t have any 
debt, and most of our estate is freehold which means we own our 
properties.” 
Given perceived opportunities and a relative lack of constraints, DM set upon a strategy 
of expediting the long-standing WC model of organic growth. In the first instance this 
meant expanding the search for freehold opportunities in what had become a “buyer’s 
market.”76 In the second instance it meant expanding graduate recruitment in a labour 
76
 Interview with DM, national broadsheet, 2012. 
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market with similarly favourable conditions.77 As Retail Director Oliver Mitton 
remarked in 2009: 
“[the recession] has helped us actually. We have been able to get 
a quality of staff that we probably wouldn’t have been able to get 
otherwise.” 
Another area of expansion was in product markets, because the global recession had led 
to a glut of supply against the backdrop of contracting demand. Again, a buyer’s market 
emerged wherein WC occupied a unique position to easily absorb large quantities of 
surplus. Management leveraged its strength to acquire a stream of “parcels” at 
exceptionally low prices between 2009 and 2013. Value was passed onto customers and 
WC benefitted from a PR coup because these parcels garnered publicity in the 
mainstream press.  
DM’s tenure comprised a four-prong retail strategy as shown in Figure 11. To some 
extent it expressed mindfulness of emerging circumstances but the business model 
remained resolutely tied to that of his mentor J.S. The difference between the two CEOs 
was ambition and envisaged scale, because DM believed that the UK mainland could 
accommodate 330 stores, where JS proposed a more conservative 175.78 In accordance 
with the enlarged target sixteen stores were opened per year between FY2010 and 
FY2014, which one industry expert evaluated as follows: 
“WC’s expansion is fairly modest by normal retail standards, 
but when its growth is compared with the off-licence sector, its 
survival, let alone expansion, is remarkable.”79
77




 Article, national broadsheet, 2012.
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It should be said that minor innovations were implemented during the early stages of 
DM’s tenure (such as free “introduction to wine” courses), although the only substantial 
policy shift was to reduce the minimum purchase from twelve bottles to six. 
Management hoped that this would make WC more accessible, particularly to younger 
people with less storage space and disposable income. Trialling suggested net benefits 
meaning that the reduction in the average number of bottles purchased was outweighed 
by countervailing positives. One such examples was a higher “new customer conversion 
rate,” referring to the number of “walk-ins” who followed through with purchases. 
Figure 11: Dan Mitchell’s four-pronged strategy 
Industry commentators placed a great deal of emphasis on the switch to a “mixed six 
case” in explaining the rise of WC’s fortunes subsequent to 2008,80 although I would 
argue that it was of limited importance when compared to the external factors described 
so far. Whatever the balance, WC’s market performance and financial results between 
FY2009 and FY2011/12 further fuelled the “golden boy” image that emerged during the 
late 1990s. As Figure 12 shows revenue grew from £202m to £280m during the high 
watermark of the double-dip recession, a 39% increase. Profits grew from £7.4m to 
£23.2m (see Figure 13), a 320% increase. 
80
 For example, one online business report (published in 2010) described the policy as 
“instrumental in increasing the number of customers by 54,000 to 472,000 in the course of a 
year.” 
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Figure 12: Revenue (£m) 2009-2012 
The ascendency of the organisation was marked by more than sales and profit growth. 
Its market share expanded from 3% in FY2010 to 4% in FY2012, explaining much of 
the increase in revenue.81 The average bottle price also increased to £7.80 (compared to 
a national average of £4.80), meaning that customers were spending 61% more on 
average at WC. The expanded differential reflects the dual forces of market polarisation 
(as described above) and “trading up” to better quality options. Taken together these 
forces explain something of a paradox - that being, high(er) prices acting as a strength 
not a weakness in a period of adverse economic conditions. For producers and 
consumers alike its market position distinguished it as a quality/value place to buy and 
sell in the UK market. As one industry commentator put it in 2011: 
“WC’s strength lies in the fact that its average bottle price is 
nearly £7, versus £4.60 in supermarket aisles, making it an 
important route to market for producers with pricier wines…”82
81
 Article, national broadsheet, 2012. 
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Figure 13: Profit before tax (£m) 2009-2012 
A final effect of the processes described so far is that WC became a prime occupant of 
the industry spotlight. Its performance had moved the organisation to the centre-stage, as 
industry and market commentators increasingly took an interest in its fortunes. Articles 
featuring the organisation proliferated and appeared to change in nature. They became 
less about the organisation per se and more about stock market performance and 
analysts’ interpretations. The later increasingly told the story of WC and framed the 
narrative, as is the case in the following commentary: 
“Walter Pinkman, analyst with Aldridge securities, said the sales 
decline matched his forecast of a 3% fall in sales for WC during 
the second half of the year. “UK performance is therefore 
broadly in line with expectations,’ he said. The broker has cut 
his earnings per share estimate for the year to March 2009 to 
14.3p from 14.7p … but has kept its “buy” recommendation, 
seeing brighter prospects ahead.”83
83
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As was discussed above WC’s share price dropped precipitously during the high tide of 
the financial crisis. It lost approximately three quarters of its value whilst the FTSE 100 
industrial benchmark lost less than half. As the markets recovered though WC 
dramatically outperformed industrial averages with the share price exceeding 500% (as 
compared to circa-90% for the FTSE 100) in the following five years. Whilst it is not 
possible to attribute out-performance to any specific factors, it is reasonable to believe 
that the “commentariat’s” love affair with the company was to some extent cause and 
consequence. This theme will be expanded upon in the following chapters. 
Section Four: Discussion 
One conclusion that may be drawn from the forgoing discussion of WC's establishment 
and development is that it neither spawned nor multiplied in a vacuum of 
entrepreneurial/managerial “blue sky thinking.” The advent of WC intersected with 
broad socio-economic and cultural shifts that drove and reflected market polarisation in 
the UK. In its early period WC capitalised on a foreseeable shift in consumer behaviour 
within the sector. More recently it became a significant player in its own right, 
exacerbating the structural division between mass-market and “quality” goods/service 
providers.  
A second conclusion is that constraints and opportunities each played their respective 
role in WC’s emergence and growth. Constraints imposed by licensing laws and zoning 
regulations inhibited pre-existing market participants whilst constituting the guiding 
hand for WC’s business model. The wholesale policy acted as the “base concept” and a 
cluster of offshoot policies reified its niche of “mid-market” differentiation. The idea 
was to exceed bottom-of-market participants in terms of product/service quality whilst 
exceeding elite merchants in terms of value. If achieved then WC could be the “best of 
both worlds” between price and quality. 
Although external macro and meso forces and factors have been shown to be central to 
the WC story the agential input of management should not be understated as said. A 
132 
considerable degree of creativity, ingenuity and skill was required to transform a loose 
vision into a profitable business system. Once established, then discipline would have 
been required to maintain and sustain adherence to the “WC way” in a competitive 
environment characterised by constant flux. 
A final conclusion that may be drawn is that WC owed much of its success to the way it 
managed assets both physical and human. The roll-out of new divisions provides an 
excellent example of how WC’s management profitably pursued new revenue streams. 
The fast-growing online business leveraged pre-existing assets (store vans) and USPs 
(its free delivery service) to increase revenue with low marginal costs. Similarly the “on 
trade” commercial business involved better utilisation of store space and upgrades to IT 
systems supporting “off-trade” activities. Again, the pay-off was sales with low 
marginal costs and improved return on capital employed. 
The next chapter tells the story of the DM regime in the period between 2009 and 2015, 
with an emphasis upon the dual effects of continuity and change. A key theme of the 
discussion will be the constrained agency of management given the legacy bequeathed 
by predecessors as discussed in this chapter. Particular attention will fall upon the nature 
of management-FLSW relations, building further upon the theme of airbrushed versus 
non-airbrushed WC life introduced at the outset. 
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CHAPTER SIX: A DECADE IN WINE CORP 
Chapter Five concerned itself with reaching back into the past of the organisation and 
industry, in order to situate the decade of ethnographic research that the present chapter 
concerns itself with. This Chapter is split into two parts, with Part A focusing upon the 
regime of Dan Mitchell (DM) and Part B focusing upon the successor regime of Lyle 
Fisher (LF). The main objective is to connect the situated experience of FLSW with 
social-economic forces and the structurally embedded agency that framed and 
constrained it.  
A question that may be posed of “extending out” from shop floor observations is 
whether it shifts the emphasis towards things that ethnography is not well equipped to 
speak of. The question I refer to is why study people in places if you are going to talk 
about extra-situational phenomena that are not available (or easily available) for study 
at that level? In anticipation of such reservations I wish to make three points. Firstly, as 
I embarked upon this study it was not my intention to progressively fixate upon forces 
and factors outside the setting that shaped experiences within it. My initial focus was 
upon mundane aspects of daily life as it related to the labour process (see Chapter 
Seven), going so far as to record interactions with a view to examining them in intricate 
detail. I only departed from micro-study as I grew progressively certain that the rhythms 
of shop floor life were to some extent unintelligible without developing connections to 
the broader institutional context (see Barley & Tolbert, 1997). 
A second logic that underpinned the study of institutional effects via personal 
engagement in WC’s FLSW was that it was epistemologically compatible with the 
critical realist framework, as described in Chapter Four. Within critical realism the 
principal analytical tool is “retroductive reasoning,” which means asking what has to 
exist in order to explain whatever emerges at the empirical level. This mode of analysis 
presupposes that the first step in the process is empirical-level engagement, because this 
then cultivates leaps of sociological imagination. In my view ethnography is the best 
and perhaps only way to develop a sufficiently nuanced understanding of frontline life 
so as to facilitate credible retroduction. 
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Finally, whilst it is common for ethnographers to confine themselves to immediate and 
local-level connections a considerable number have looked beyond them – sensing a 
need to explain situations in light of structural frames. One exemplar is Burawoy’s 
Extended Case Method (1998), wherein he develops an argument in support of 
“reflexive science.” Whilst phases one and two of his research procedure may be 
regarded as standard features of post-positivist ethnographic methodology, his third 
phase focuses upon “extending out from process to force.” (p.19) He illustrates the 
value of his “vertical approach” by cross examining his ethnographic work in Zambia. 
What he progressively discovered there was that the outcomes and experiences of 
“Zambianisation” at the local level could not be explained without simultaneous 
examination of national-level interplay. Twenty five years on and with the benefit of 
hindsight, his main regret was his failure to further extend his case to the international 
level. He felt that this was a necessary next step in fully capturing the forces and factors 
that shaped social dynamics in the copper mines he observed: 
“Looking back now I underestimated the importance of 
international forces … [In light of these forces] the Zambian 
economy is being recolonised at the behest of its own African 
government.” 
Nonetheless, the end result of Burawoy’s analysis was the contention that the experience 
of “Zambianization” at the workplace level was shaped by politics, power and 
economics that were unapparent thereupon. To further underline the explanatory value 
of “extending out” Burawoy (1998: 6) identified a number of other ethnographies that 
have adopted the principle including Smith’s (1990), which elucidated the power of 
markets over working lives. It is in this vein that I lay emphasis upon the two WC 
regimes in Parts A and B below, given that the research question concerned the forces 
and factors that shape the experience of FLSW in WC. They are written as self-
contained but deeply interconnected essays on “causes” and “effects,” which will be 
further expanded upon in subsequent chapters.  
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PART A: THE “CRISIS” OF WINE CORP 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, an array of factors elevated WC into an 
industry and City darling in the early years of the present decade. At the heart of the 
matter was explosive profit growth, with the company comfortably exceeding market 
expectations between FY2010 and FY2012. This contrasted markedly with the steady 
and consistent growth that defined the fifteen-year period up to the recession, under the 
leadership of James Smythe (JS). 
Paradoxically, much of this success was driven by adverse market conditions which 
ultimately served to thin out competition and alter the supply/demand balance between 
wine suppliers and retailers. Survivors of the market shakeout found themselves in an 
unprecedentedly strong bargaining position, and a similar chain of events played out in 
the graduate labour market. Some of the UK’s more prestigious entry-level graduate 
employers scaled back recruitment during the recession,84 whereas WC scaled-up and 
attracted a calibre of staff perhaps beyond its grasp prior. The majority were drawn from 
prestigious Russell Group institutions and entrants with 1st class honours were not 
uncommon. 
The purpose of Part A is to tell the inside story of how rapid growth and a reputation as 
the best in the business rapidly soured. Whereas the period between 2009-2012 
witnessed an organisation in ascendancy (see previous chapter), the immediate 
aftermath saw it reframed as one in “crisis.” The objective then is to explore said crisis 
in light of causes and effects, with an emphasis upon the impact of continuity and 
change for FLSWs and customers. It will be argued that management became locked 
into a pattern of short-term profit maximisation that greatly undermined the experience 
of FLSW actors. Whilst sales and profits did not fall off a cliff, they did shudder to a 
halt because of lost momentum. As sales growth seized up management sought to 
sustain profits through an ever-intensifying programme of cost control and “direct 
control,” which reduced rather than enhanced competitiveness in the marketplace. 
84
 See Curtis, P. Shepherd, J. (2009) “Graduates facing ‘slim’ job market in downturn,” The 
Guardian.
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Whilst these factors did not necessarily cause WC’s relative decline in and of 
themselves, they did exacerbate it by diminishing relative strengths. In the meantime 
competition improved and proliferated with some offering a strong service propositions, 
and others assaulting WC’s core market of quality-value bought in-bulk.  
Part A begins by clarifying the meaning of “crisis” before examining the impact of 
management’s prior policies upon contributing factors. In relation, it will be shown that 
a key aspect of FLSW in WC is a contradiction between “operational” and 
“commercial” role requirements which jostle for time and attention. The practical effect 
of management’s stewardship was to lock FLSWs into a near constant fire-fight 
between contradictory pressures throughout the period, with the perverse effect of 
making them feel and seem too busy for individual customers. The latter’s defection 
then justified cuts to the frontline that further amplified the problem in a self-
perpetuating spiral of decline.  
Subsequently, the nature of management control will be discussed with emphasis upon 
the enhanced role of regional managers (RMs). This will be followed by analysis of the 
specific challenge posed by competitors and management’s response which was to 
defend profits, hastening relative decline. Part A concludes with a consideration of why 
management myopically held course. 
Section One: The meaning of crisis 
It is interesting to consider the origin of the “crisis” label because it was neither 
embraced nor accepted by WC’s leadership. Primarily the term (and others such as 
“ailing” and “failing”)85 emerged in the aftermath of financial results for FY2013, when 
the organisation failed to sustain previously rapid growth. Profit did grow by £0.5m in 
FY2013 but sales contracted by 2.1% from £280.3m to £274.4m. This was the first time 
that sales had fallen since the formation of modern WC in 1992, and it could not 
85
 Both used in broadsheet commentaries around the time. 
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credibly be attributed to external factors alone. Furthermore, the trajectory of growth 
prior (see Figure 14) put its sudden absence into sharp relief and facilitated a shift in 
narrative arc from “star performer” to “problem child.” 
Figure 14: Wine Corp profit before tax (£m) 
There were reasonable bases to question the extent to which stalled profit and sales 
growth really warranted the label “crisis” as management would have been eager to 
point out. There was little appetite for rigorous critical introspection amongst media 
outlets though, who seemed content to mirror the dour interpretations of City analysts.86
For example, one could have argued in management’s defence that 
retaining/consolidating market share and healthy profits in FY13 was an acceptable 
achievement in an increasingly cutthroat marketplace. The management line ways 
exactly that; the thrust of both AR-FY2013 & AR-FY2014 was to say that investment in 
“strategic initiatives” (e.g., a new Head Office and distribution centre) had combined 
with negative sectoral growth and rival’s loss-leading to stymie growth temporarily. 
86
 From at least 2011 onwards WC’s trading statements received wide media coverage 
featuring City analysts’ interpretations. 
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Management essentially argued that the cake had become smaller and competition more 
voracious at a time when WC was enduring short-term pain for long-term gain. 
The gap between management’s rhetoric of differed gratification and frontline reality 
was strikingly ironic for those who worked on it though. Whilst it was true that a much-
enlarged footprint had forced management’s hand in expanding central operational 
capacity, talk of “investment for the future” seemed little short of Orwellian to FLSWs 
who were struggling with ever diminishing resources. WC had always extracted profit 
based on small teams adding value through lean functional flexibility (see previous 
chapter) and there was no “golden age” when resources were abundant and the work 
pace was leisurely. That said, the gap between lean and mean was a fine one that 
management increasingly transgressed as the Dan Mitchell era became embedded from 
2010 onwards. Sales targets increasingly became the stuff of fantasy, whilst multi-
pronged pressures to do more with less became saturating and demoralising.  
6.1.1. From steady growth to profit maximisation 
When judged upon what they did rather than what they said, management chartered a 
course with an implied purpose of optimising near-term profits during the fair-weather 
years post-FY2009. There were many aspects to this but it was suppliers of labour (i.e. 
FLSWs) and merchandise who bore the brunt, as management sought to capitalise on 
opportunities for marginal gain that emerged within prevailing circumstances (see 
Chapter Five). Above all, FLSW expenditure was micro-managed and reduced to levels 
increasingly regarded as dangerous to FLSWs and self-evidently detrimental to the 
company. A growing sense of outrage is passionately stated in an email sent to Dan 
Mitchell (DM) in the summer of 2011 (Figure 15), although everyone in the company 
was “cc’d” in. The sender was an anonymous FLSW who had reached breaking point. 
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Figure 15: FLSW resistance to “austerity” conditions 
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In the immediate aftermath I did not encounter a single FLSW who disagreed with the 
substance of the argument here. A few took umbrage with the language, arguing that 
“calling him a prick is not productive.” Nonetheless, the overarching response was to 
acknowledge the extent of the problem whilst despondently agreeing that “nothing will 
be done so there’s not much point” (as one veteran store manager explained at the 
time). 
What made this message poignant for me personally was an overlap between one story 
it contained and my own experience around the time. The email was sent in July and the 
timing was no coincidence, as the six weeks up to school holidays is a stress high point 
in the year - with frenetic activity coinciding with “skeleton crew” staffing levels. In 
these circumstances the day job becomes one of constant crisis aversion – i.e. muddling 
through by whatever means until a full cohort of staff is available again. During the 
busiest two weeks of that Summer I was left alone to run my store for ten continuous 
days myself. The full trading week within that “10 day stretch” set the record for store 
takings outside of Christmas, speaking to the volume of trade and activity. Despite this I 
was abandoned and only received “temporary cover,” which referred to a FLSW from 
another store covering deliveries and returning to their home store immediately 
afterwards. The rotas would show my store as being “on two” – i.e., staffed by two 
people that day – but in reality I was “on one” because temporary cover would provide 
no store assistance. Were they to do so then it would leave their own store “on one,” 
transferring the problem rather than resolving it. 
Several years on I can still recall my anger and frustration at the “stitch-up” (to use WC 
parlance). It remains the only time in ten years when I broke the “third wall” and shared 
my true feelings with a customer who had the misfortune of catching me at the wrong 
time. It was not intentional, but the customer made some unsolicited remarks along the 
lines of “you seem stressed” and “why are you here on your own” and I responded 
without reference to the usual diplomatic script. As with the emailer above, I knew full 
well the futility of communicating my frustrations upwards so found myself venting to a 
customer instead. 
Being “on one” remains to this day the most fiercely disliked aspect of FLSW in WC. 
Due to the company policy of “getting graduates to be delivery drivers” as the emailer 
put it, three staff members would have to be rostered to avoid extensive periods of lone 
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working on a given day. For many smaller stores this would have been to field their full 
team of three FLSWs, which rarely happened in practice due to routine days off, 
holidays, sickness and “cover” - the practice of sending FLSWs to work in other stores. 
This explains the meaning of the complainant’s remark that “I can count on one hand 
the number of times I have been in store with three members of staff.” He/she was 
highlighting the gap between staffing levels on paper and in practice. 
Worst-case-scenarios of working “on one” were fortunately infrequent, but still 
happened often enough to justify vehement health and safety concerns amongst FLSWs. 
A few instances were of sufficient magnitude to warrant national press attention, such a 
knife attack in a London store in 2014. As was reported: 
“A man entered and first demanded money from the safe before 
threatening to kill the employee. A violent struggle ensued in 
which the victim was beaten with a bottle of wine causing 
serious cuts to the head as well as stab wounds to the arms and 
hands. Cash was stolen and the assailant left the premises after 
locking the heavily bleeding victim in the toilet.’87
Interestingly, the comments section became a forum for past and present WC employees 
to share experiences and condemn management. A few other comments appear to have 
been left by concerned outsiders: 
Anon.1: “So that’s how much the Board … value the health, 
safety and wellbeing of their staff? Bizarre – what a great 
company to work for.” 
Anon.2: “Well put Anon 1, Truly awful company to work for. The 
way they treat their employees is appalling….” 
Anon.3: “How many staff were present? If the victim was locked 
in the toilet it sounds like no other staff were there. An entire 
store full of high-value stock, with cash on site and only one 
member of staff present to open and watch the store. Staff need 
87
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to be protected and kept safe. Perhaps they should review how 
many staff are on duty, as one staff member … is an easy target, 
2 is better and 3 is a possible deterrent.” 
Anon 4: “There is far too much ‘solo working’ at WC and it is 
simply unacceptable. I would often work shifts alone for 2-3 days 
… and even when there are two staff members in store, one is out 
for most of the day doing deliveries … Asides from fear of attack 
or robbery, quite simply no provision was made for employees to 
take their lunch break (in which time, contractually you are 
allowed to leave the store) or toilet breaks as closing the shop 
was ‘frowned upon’ by RMs.” 
Anon 7: “One of the reasons I left the company was lone 
working. I used to get very nervous working alone, especially 
when multiple customers were in store. As to management not 
wanting staff to close the store, I was working alone quite often 
and printed a sign saying ‘back in five minutes’ to put on the 
door for toilet breaks etc. CEO [DM] visited the store, saw the 
sign and tore it up saying that the door should always be 
unlocked during opening hours.” 
Asides from the institutionalised practice of “lone/solo” working, the other major 
employment-model bugbear was the “cover system.” To elaborate, cover within WC is 
an extreme form of flexibility that requires FLSWs be redeployed to other store within 
their region - sometimes with no notice. The commonality of the practice was such that 
junior FLSWs could go weeks without working in their home store. I myself have 
endured countless periods as “cover bitch” (to use a common frontline terminology). In 
one memorable example I was instructed to run a store for two weeks that I had never 
even visited. I would be “lone working” for the duration and was given only one day’s 
warning. Written instructions were provided to activating/de-activating the alarm and I 
was otherwise “thrown in at the deep end.”  
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Not only was the task daunting but it self-evidently exceeded a contractual requirement 
to comply with “reasonable requests.” With daily commutes said cover assignment 
stretched a ten-hour day into a twelve-hour day. Furthermore this “ten day stretch” 
translated into 120 hours of solo working/commuting between my days off, with only 
mileage as additional compensation. Most FLSW’s “quite liked” or “don’t mind doing 
cover occasionally” but systematic abuses such as this one were deeply resented. A 
person “doesn’t have a life” as Rose put it in the previous chapter. 
To fully understand the challenge of “lone working” requires a detailed grasp of the 
nature of the FLSW experience. In the first instance customers have an uncanny knack 
of coming in “waves” rather than a steady flow, so lone workers can easily be 
overwhelmed. Bursts of commercial activity could come at any time in WC stores due to 
a high proportion of “atypical” shoppers (i.e. those who do not work full-time office 
hours), with the additional implication that there was limited predictability to work 
around tactically. 
Waves are likely to be common in many FLSW environments but the effects are better 
absorbed by some formats than others. For those operating self-service/numerical 
flexibility (e.g. supermarkets), waves may be absorbed by tactical rostering and FLSW’ 
alternation between simple functions (till work and shelf-stacking). Self-service tills 
may also act as a pressure value, providing a means for some customers to serve 
themselves. The problem that FLSWs in WC confront is that many customers have the 
dual expectation of efficient and personal service, creating a contradiction for the solo 
worker that is only partially manageable. By definition a FLSW cannot offer “quality” 
personal service to more than one customer at a time. Furthermore waves can bring an 
assortment of customers with some looking for tailored/expert service and others 
looking for frictionless and quick transactions, not unlike the customers who use self-
service tills in supermarkets. It is not possible for a lone worker to satisfy several 
customers with different wants and expectation at the same time in WC stores. The 
overall effect is to render them highly vulnerable to the inherent unpredictability of 
customer flows, and after ten years’ experience I continue to find these situations 
daunting exercises in damage limitation.  
Structural and systemic weaknesses are determinate factors in shaping the prevalence 
and nature of these circumstances. A key factor is the antiquated and non-intuitive 
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“EPOS” (electronic point of sale – aka “till”) system, which makes complex transactions 
(e.g., multi-destination orders) difficult and time consuming irrelevant of operator 
experience. Hypothetically even simple transactions would be beyond the scope of 
customer self-service because unlike with self-service tills (the type common in UK 
supermarkets), the interface is not self-explanatory. Obviously stores are not structurally 
set up for self-service either, meaning that customers would have to transgress territorial 
boundaries to process their own sales.  
These pressure points of WC FLSW in general and “lone working” in particularly were 
amplified during “cover” because I would be on unfamiliar terrain. Whilst stores are 
standardised in some senses they also differed in terms of unofficial customs and layout. 
This can make it difficult for cover staff to operate efficiently and effectively outside of 
their home store. I recall times where to my embarrassment, I had to ask for customers 
help in finding things or getting things done because they seemed to know the store I 
was covering better than I did. It is difficult to imagine Tesco or Sainsbury’s FLSW’s 
asking customers for help in the same sense. 
6.1.2. Store operations  
In WC lexicon FLSW was divided into two elements: “commercial” and “operational.” 
The former boiled down to activities directly relating to the processing, execution and 
nurturing of sales. The latter referred to store-related activities that do not correspond 
directly with the wants or needs of any particular customer. Many of the operational 
aspects of FLSW were closely associated with commercial activities to the point where a 
distinction between “operational” and “commercial” was blurry in practice - for 
example, the enactment of a promotion has both operational and commercial 
dimensions. Regardless, operational activities represented a large constituent part of 
FLSW in WC. Specific examples include van safety checks; toilet, kitchen and car park 
cleaning; routine store safety checks; office supply orders, direct orders for merchandise; 
“stock runs;” “IBTs” (moving stock between stores); stock takes; stock rotations (where 
merchandise sections are relocated) and rota management.88
88
 A detailed overview of remarkable operational elements features in the Appendix, Section 6. 
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Taken as a whole the range of operational challenges were considerable and FLSWs 
were required to manage and execute all of these within (and often without) their small 
teams. As “functional flexibility” implies there was no budget to outsource the less 
appealing aspects of FLSW, meaning that graduates are hired as toilet cleaners as well 
as delivery drivers (to paraphrase the anonymous emailer above). Some operational 
requirements were time sensitive with stringent deadlines (e.g. stock takes), which took 
up to one week of every month to complete. Others were rolling requirements that 
lubricated the day-to-day functioning of a store (e.g. cashing up, tasting counter 
maintenance). If left unattended many of these would not grind the operation to a halt 
but prolonged neglect would make work-life considerably less liveable. 
Unquestionably the most physically exerting and time-consuming operational activity 
was the “drop” – WC lingo for receiving and merchandising depot deliveries. Most 
stores got one or two drops per week, each containing one or more pallets comprised of 
circa-650 bottles of wine or equivalent (see Figure 16). A typical drop would consist of 
2-4 pallets with varying content. Sometimes a pallet would be filled with one popular 
product and other times it would feature innumerable products in small quantities. 
Figure 16: A two pallet drop 
“Bitty” pallets were particularly time consuming because they involved a greater 
number of distinct merchandising moves. In contrast, pallets with large quantities of 
fewer products could be merchandised quickly because the time-consuming aspect of 
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merchandising was carving out the “gap” (see Figure 17) and clearing/rebuilding 
sections as part of the process. Considering these efficiency gains, merchandising 200 
bottles of a single product took a fraction of the time that 200 bottles of multiple 
products would. 
Figure 17: Merchandising Tetris 
Several other factors acted to make drops the preeminent operational challenge for 
teams, and these go to the heart of the store format/business model. Firstly because 
stacks of wine acted as the shelving, elaborate systems of “store standards” had evolved 
that FLSWs were required to adhere to. Products must go in their respective 
regional/product-type sections (i.e., Australia, Chile, Sparkling, rose); must be divided 
into red and white; and must be “date rotated” so that older stock sells first. Rows must 
be neatly lined up, level, and have minimal gaps between products to replicate the 
presentational standards of fixed shelving (see Figure 18). Furthermore, up-to-date 
“POS” (price/information ticket) must be on display and signage in place to demarcate 
respective sections. 
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Figure 18: Textbook Wine Corp merchandising 
It is easy for outsiders to underestimate the time and effort involved in merchandising 
and date rotating - say, fifteen cases of lager into a tightly packed section (see Figure 19 
below). One would be required to clear the space to access the product; remove and 
restack older cases nearby (without blocking the aisle); transporting new cases to the 
gap; insert them securely; reintegrate the older stock in reverse date order; replace 
anything you removed to clear the space in the first place, then put out a “POS” if 
necessary. With intermittent commercial “distractions” (i.e. customers) this one simple 
operation could take a lone worker a couple of hours on a busy day. In such situations 
being “on two” makes a dramatic difference because you can “double-team” 
merchandising and “sub-specialise” when customers are present (see Chapter Seven). 
Figure 19: Textbook beer merchandising 
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A second factor that made drops the chief operational challenge was that store teams 
had little control over what got distributed. A lack of storage space within the solitary 
depot meant that merchandise had to keep moving and stores got what they were given. 
Any meeting of actual stock needs would be coincidental, so teams would often find 
themselves overwhelmed with unneeded and impractical merchandise – for example, 
two pallets of New Zealand wines when the respective section is full. It is worth 
reiterating that many stores had little backspace, so the content of drops had to go 
somewhere on the sales floor without breaching “store standards.” To make matters 
worse time pressure emanated from the fact that drops had to go “away” prior to the 
next one, otherwise stores would become inoperable. Neglecting customers on this basis 
was a structurally-embedded institutional norm. 
It is only when the jigsaw of operational and commercial features of FLSW in WC are 
put together that one can begin to appreciate the challenging nature of the role. In an 
ideal world operational and commercial challenges would be evenly spaced and 
synchronised with resource allocations. In reality, periods of intense commercial 
activity were mirrored by periods of intense operational pressure and lean-functional-
flexibility was easily overwhelmed by surges in customer demand and/or failures of 
labour supply. When this occurs life on WC’s frontline became a lonely, helpless and 
frustrating experience due to the sheer impossibility of handling so many competing 
priorities effectively. 
The boom years of rapid profit growth between FY2010 and FY2012 were fuelled by a 
“perfect storm” scenario for FLSWs of solo working, under-resourcing and conflicting 
operational/commercial demands. I do not recall ever meeting a WC FLSW who did not 
accept that “the job swings in roundabouts” - shorthand for inevitability of peaks and 
troughs. That said, when “swings in roundabouts” morphed into systematic and 
systemic “taking the piss” then a line was crossed and anti-management sentiment 
proliferated.  
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6.1.3. Meet Doug Slazenger 
To tell the story of life within WC’s Region X without mention of its notorious regional 
manager (RM) would be to provide an incomplete picture. If DM was the patriarchal 
“Mr WC” then Doug Slazenger could fairly be described as “an apple that hadn’t fallen 
far from the tree.” Dan and Doug had much in common: they both “bled blue” (an 
insider’s term for WC fanaticism); they were both big men physically and they both 
enacted their role in a “big man” manner. Furthermore, in the way that everyone had a 
DM story (as mentioned in the previous chapter) everyone also had a Doug story – one 
that typically made him the butt of humour.  
As such, Doug-centred gossip was rarely flattering but it did fairly reflect his larger-
than-life presence. To many he was a buffoon, oblivious to the unreasonableness of his 
expectations and at the same time impossible to please. To take but one example of his 
antics, if a team exceeded all headline KPIs for a given month it would only lead to 
Doug attempting to find an obscure indicator that the team had not exceeded. He would 
then inform them that “growth in beer sales had slowed” or “margins are down on fizz” 
or something equally marginal in significance. Pettiness like this underpinned a 
consensus that Doug “hadn’t got a clue,” although some FLSWs did exhibited a slightly 
more nuanced perspective. One store manager explained to me that “I don’t like him but 
I respect him.” Others argued that “he’s alright” or “he’s OK,” but would typically 
counter-balance their assertions with a range of caveats.  
Another widespread observation concerning Doug’s behaviour had regard for his naked 
favouritism, which was based primarily upon his perception of FLSW’s personality. 
Doug liked “big personalities” as a rule, and his treatment of FLSWs hinged almost 
entirely upon his appraisal of them in this regard. Doug conflated the attributes of cliché 
extroverts with the perceived requirements of good salesmanship and “bringing in the 
punters” (to use his term). In Doug’s mind these were the hallmarks of his own success 
as a store manager, and he never tired of telling stories about his sales heroics. 
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Against this backdrop Doug reluctance to demonstrate his sales skills to FLSWs was 
surprising and incongruous, although it came much to their relief. Doug’s sales 
technique was to stalk customers like a predator stalks its prey. The latter’s insistence 
that they were “fine” or “just looking” would normally be ignored and Doug would 
pursue them, offering advice and unsolicited recommendations. Doug preached “soft-
selling” but did not practice it, leading to several customer complaints relating to his 
aggressive and harassing style. He nonetheless used that style as the benchmark to 
assess subordinates’ skill with customers. Those who pursued customers and pushed 
hard on special offers, USPs, add-sells and up-sells were awarded Doug’s designation 
as “commercially aware” or “savvy.” Failure to enact such methods risked relegation to 
the status of “bit part actor” in Doug’s mind, which put perennial pressure upon FLSWs 
in Region X to performed over-dramatised displays of salesmanship to avoid adverse 
labelling. 
Further quirks were that Doug would endlessly contradict himself within and between 
store visits, phone calls and emails. As a typical example, on one visit Doug would 
insist that merchandising standards “don’t matter” and that bad merchandising indicates 
“a busy store.” On the next visit (with other factors equal in visible terms), he would 
insist that had merchandising is an indicator of underperformance and instruct the teams 
to remedy it accordingly. This lent Doug an air of unpredictability and reinforced the 
notion that FLSWs could not win either way. 
Through the lens of subordinates Doug was a flawed RM with frustrating limitations. 
Aside from the aforementioned aspects of his persona Doug was regarded as a robotic 
“company man,” indifferent to FLSWs’ concerns. Even so a “better the devil you 
know” sentiment echoed throughout Region X, in part because Region Y’s RM made 
Doug seem loveable by comparison.89 The man in question Sep Parker was notorious 
for micro-management and machine-like regurgitation of “company line.” He reminded 
those in Region X that life without Doug would not necessarily be an improvement in 
circumstances. 
89
 Region Y borders Region X. Some colleagues had worked in both regions. 
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6.1.4. Dan Mitchell’s “trusted” field commanders 
Both Doug and Sep were figureheads of a new generation of RMs that came through the 
ranks during the early stages of DM’s tenure as CEO. Dan sat on the final interview 
panel for promotion to RM, such was the importance attached to the role. He and his 
Retail Director wanted people who would vanquish WC’s supposed “dark old days,” 
and transform WC into to a “professional” and systematised chain. Dan’s role model 
was Tesco, the UK retail giant whose market dominance seemed unassailable during 
Dan’s formative years on the WC board. Both he and his mentor JS regularly professed 
their admiration for Tesco, often framing their thoughts in terms of “what Tesco would 
do” or “what Tesco would not want us to do.” 
Whilst never stating it as explicit policy, one of the ways in which DM would seek to 
emulate his posterchild was to enhance command and control as the principal 
management style. In accordance the role of RMs would be to police frontline 
performance, ensuring that management’s prerogative was pursued in both letter and 
spirit. The intended outcome was for WC stores to become “more like supermarkets” 
with standardised layouts and procedural regimentation.  
Given these aspirations the promotion of Sep and Doug was rational from the 
management’s perspective. They wanted RMs who would be uncompromising in their 
aspiration to align management’s conception with store reality. They also wanted 
people who would be unflinching at the prospect of optimising profitability by pursuing 
KPIs at the lowest possible cost. As a reflection of the ethos, a retired RM confided in 
me that his former peers competed to be the most under budget each year. To put it in 
his words “they’re fucking their own people over.” Another well-known RM practice 
was to leave it a month or more before replacing FLSWs, meaning that lulls in the trade 
or staff holiday cycles did not necessarily provide respite from understaffing. Slack in 
the system was non-existent in WC, meaning that a few resignations or instances of sick 
leave would throw the whole region into crisis (bearing in mind that the cover system 
would redistribute capacity and cross-contamination would therefore occur). 
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The standard application of such practices goes some way towards explaining the 
ambivalence towards Doug within Region X. There was no doubt amongst seasoned 
observers that RMs’ agential scope was tightly leashed, particularly during their 
formative year when they would be chaperoned by a “bleed blue true believer.” This is 
not to say however that RMs were not powerful actors, they were after all budget 
holders for their region and the most senior manager full-time in the field. They also 
had the power to dismiss FLSWs (unlike store managers) and to champion favourites, 
which Doug and his ilk took to new extremes by appropriating the power to determine 
promotions to store assistant manager. Previously this was vested in store managers but 
the new generation of RMs could not resist adding it to their power/control armoury, 
one can only assume with management’s blessing. 
There were logical advantages to justify this appropriation of control. It enabled RMs to 
prioritise the broader interests the region and to fast-track favoured FLSWs towards 
store manager posts. It also enabled them to coordinate “chain-moves”90 throughout 
regions to broaden experience and/or retain valued staff. Nonetheless, the downside in 
Region X was experienced by FLSWs who had failed to curry Doug’s favour. They 
would often find themselves permanently side-lined with no conventional basis of 
appeal. 
The appropriation of power over store promotions symbolised and exemplified the shift 
towards top-down control and centralised decision making. Henceforth RMs would 
have the final say on all matters of substance whilst generally functioning as conduits of 
management’s prerogative. Essentially the role was to make regions as profitable as 
possible whilst simultaneously ensuring that all stores “sung from the same hymn 
sheet.” To that end they were put under considerable pressure themselves as one former 
RM explained to me in a telling anecdote: 
Informant: “Did you ever meet Sally McGuinness?” [one of the 
most senior RM’s in WC] 
90
 Where promotions are used as an opportunity to move a number of FLSWs sideways, 
assuming the same roles in other stores. 
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M.J: “Yeah, I met her once at a store opening, she seemed solid 
… she’s got a good reputation.” 
Informant: “Yeah she was … Well she quit and went to work on 
the meat counter at Tesco’s. Apparently she loves it, she’s just 
back to doing what she likes which is dealing with people. She’d 
just had enough…”
6.1.5. Top-down communication 
Weekly phone calls were Doug’s primary instrument of command and control, wherein 
he would run through a list of items covering commercial and operational matters. 
Typically he would want to know “your plan” and whether you have “actioned” various 
priorities as defined by him. Small talk was rarely indulged, and conversations were 
always mono-directional. Finite details were discussed but guiding assumptions were 
never open to debate. 
Doug’s other primary instruments were store visits and emails. The former mirrored the 
format of the weekly telephone exchanges, either through shop-floor “walk-and-talks” 
or sit-down performance reviews if the store manager was present. The frequency of 
store visits was roughly proportionate to team esteem in Doug eyes, the less frequent the 
visits the better regarded the team were. To see Doug regularly was a warning indicator 
and FLSWs regarded it as such. Their standard response to a visit was “Oh God Doug’s 
here” or “I really hope he doesn’t stay long.”
Emails were the final element of Doug’s “three-line whip” and they acted as 
information disseminators and/or instruction summaries. Many were one-line reminders 
whereas others were pages long. Figure 20 is a typical example during a trade high 
point:91
91
 Sent at the beginning of June, 2013. 
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Figure 20: A typical Doug overview and list of demands
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This email may seem perfectly reasonable, at least until the pressures of June are 
considered. Due to the factors described above it was perfectly possible that FLSWs 
would have felt too busy to read the email, let alone action its more burdensome 
instructions. A promotion bulletin alone runs 30-40 pages, so reading it may be the 
equivalent of half-a-day’s work once the flow of commercial activities is taken into 
account. Recruiting for in-store events would also seem like a luxury when your only 
concern is to process customers as quickly as possible, so you can tend to other 
customers or matters. It is also worth noting the jumble of competing expectations in 
relation to service interactions. FLSWs are not simply expected to “grow on last year’s 
numbers” but also: (1) sell out a range of products (that customers may not want); (2) 
convince customers to contribute to WC’s website (by logging product 
recommendations); (3) highlight a number of offers before they expire; (4) sign 
customers up to multiple courses (which they may have no interest in attending) whilst 
also (5) delivering upon USP’s and other sales/service “non-negotiables” not explicitly 
referred to. As stated above, the gap between expectations and feasibility formed much 
of the basis of FLSWs perception that management “don’t have a clue.” 
That said, upon close inspection it was clear to me that RMs were aware of the gap 
between illusion and reality in WC stores. The clearest indication came during DM’s 
regional tours, when RM’s would put FLSWs under considerable pressure to create a 
temporary illusion of frontline health – knowing full well that stores would look 
exhausted and war torn otherwise. When discussing this with colleagues I used to draw 
upon an analogy derived from “Mao: The Unknown Story” (Chang & Halliday, 2005) to 
describe the farcical nature of masking reality to placate leaders. Apparently when Mao 
used to visit rural provinces during the deadly “great leap forward” famine, senior 
official would plant healthy imported crops along the parade route to create a fake 
chimera of the success Mao’s “post-science” agricultural policies. Their own positions 
would be preserved and enhanced, whilst Mao would derive further justification to 
broaden and intensify his policies that were starving people en masse. RMs played a 
similar role in the resource-starvation of WC’s frontline. 
156 
Section Two: The “Sharon Dilbert era” and the end of the Dan 
Mitchell era 
Despite reassurances offered to investors in official publications, by FY2013 it was 
increasingly clear that DM’s growth model had ran out of steam. DM himself admitted 
to FLSWs that new store openings were the only authentic driver of revenue growth, 
and even their impact had become less emphatic as diminishing marginal returns took a 
toll. By then the company had a well-established footprint in areas with high 
concentrations of “typical WC customers” (i.e. middle-class professionals with high 
disposable incomes). This meant that estate expansion had either cannibalised pre-
existing stores or had pushed the firm into increasingly sub-optimal areas. 
In the meantime, like-for-like growth had spluttered to a halt and in many instances 
gone backwards. Evidence of this was not difficult to come by for FLSWs, as monthly 
targets drifted ever further away from plausibility. WC’s standard expectation of 10% 
growth per-store per-annum translated into an expectation of 1/3 sales growth every 25 
months on a rolling basis. Whilst this may have been briefly possible in the immediate 
aftermath of the recession when socio-economic conditions were uniquely conducive to 
WCs mid-market growth, few outside management believed that this was sustainable. 
Once resource deprivation and the condition of older stores was also considered then 
these expectations bordered upon preposterous.  
Whilst it is difficult to attribute to specific factors with precision, relative decline was 
fundamentally a case of competition becoming better from FY2011 whilst WC became 
worse. The company did retain a large cohort of loyal customers, mainly drawn from 
“baby boomer” demographics with very high disposable incomes. Footloose and “smart 
money” had begun to flee elsewhere though, sensing that the winds had changed in 
favour of old rivals with enhanced propositions. Either that or they were enticed away 
by the novelty of new entrants to the market, as discussed below. 
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WC’s long-established USP of discounted bulk-buying had become widely imitated by 
FY2012/13 (e.g., Aldi, Tesco and Sainsbury’s each offered discounted case buying and 
free home delivery). To make matters worse supermarkets grew increasingly fond of 
using branded wines as loss-leaders to drive footfall, much to the detriment of a 
specialist like WC that increasingly resembled a supermarket for wine – albeit, without 
the ability to offset losses via other product categories. A related challenge was posed 
when super-discounters like Aldi, Lidl and Costco flanked the “big four” by seasonally 
ranging wines with extraordinary price/quality trade-offs.92 Many became award 
winners, and broadsheet critics fawned over this exciting disruption to the status-quo. 
What made this trend especially significant is that it constituted a strategic foray into 
WC’s stronghold of “quality-value.” 
Whilst on one flank the supermarkets had undermined WC’s USPs and taken the 
initiative in an intensifying price/product-quality war, on the other flank a flourishing 
boutique sector had muscled in on WC’s service/customer experience USP.93 A variety 
of factors including reduced high street rents and a backlash against corporate sterility 
underpinned the rejuvenation of “indies.” The best of this new generation would bring 
together boutique styling and an array of “alternative” wines. They would also exhibit a 
strong customer service proposition, typically driven by owner-managers with a passion 
for the product and a personal investment in nurturing customer relationships. Like-for-
like prices tended to be 20-40% higher than WC’s (based upon my own observations), 
but experiential factors seemed to justify a premium for certain segments of the market. 
Figure 21 below features an award-winning example of a new generation “indie” that 
opened in 2010, in direct competition with my home store. 
Lastly, the growth of online retail furnished every “bricks-and-mortar” with enhanced 
competition. Whilst established specialist e-retailers like Laithwaites, Virgin Wines and 
The Wine Society did not leap forward during the time under discussion (according to 
industry consensus), a variety of new entrants did threaten to entice WC’s customer 
base. For instance e-retail behemoth Amazon greatly expanded its presence in the wine 
92
 See for example Beckett, F. “Wine: why the cost-conscious should consider Costco,” The 
Guardian, 13
th
 September 2014. 
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category, becoming a “go to” for WC’s own staff to snap up famous names on heavy 
discounts. Another upstart was “WebWines,” which quickly established itself as the 
sharpest e-operator on the block in the aftermath of its launch in 2008 (discussed further 
in the Part B).  
Figure 21: Quality-orientated high street “indie” 
6.2.1. Management’s response 
As the market strode ahead WC’s management decided to stick to its guns and hold 
course with its strategy. Put simply they focused inwardly on cost reduction to sustain 
profitability, with a view to addressing the relative competitiveness of the customer 
offering. To this end a new HR Director was brought in with clear “slash and burn”
mandate. The aftermath became known as “the Sharon Gilbert era”- shorthand for the 
high watermark of bleakness in WC that corresponded with her tenure.  
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Throughout this period long-standing customs and practices were scaled back, rationed 
and/or abandoned altogether. Some were of significant monetary value to FLSWs such 
as the restructuring of performance bonuses, and the removal of rights to take company 
vans home. The former reduced the bonus pot to such an extent that it became 
meaningless to FLSWs in monetary terms, despite management’s proclamation that it 
led to a “better/fairer system.” As for the removal of van rights, this axe fell 
indiscriminately and cost some FLSWs thousands per-year in additional fuel costs. As it 
happened one of Region X’s most respected and experienced managers explained to me 
“I’ve just had a four grand pay cut.”94 He left the company soon after for that reason 
having served WC for more than a decade. 
Another chip to fall was the staff Christmas party – the marquee event of the WC social 
calendar. It was the sole occasion where management “spoiled” FLSWs and brought the 
whole company together in one physical space. DM explained in a sombre email that 
the Christmas party had become “too expensive” and “unsustainable” in light of 
company expansion. By the time this announcement came FLSWs had already 
developed a “what’s next” … “nothing’s too sacred” mind-set. In fact, what did come 
next was a sizeable reduction in the training budget despite management’s claim in 
financial reports that extra investment was a factor in holding back profit growth. 
In addition to scaling back on major budgetary items a new era of micro-managed cost-
control was phased in. Henceforth all procurements would require RM approval 
including for items as trivial as toilet rolls, pens and paper. Another absurdity was that 
“direct orders” (merchandise supplied directly) would require RM and HQ sign-offs, 
which would only occur once FLSWs had provided proof of sale and/or “transaction 
history” to justify the expense. What this created was a chicken and the egg situation, 
where stores could not build up transaction history because they could not get stock, and 
could not get stock because they could not build up transaction history. Consequently, 
by summer 2013 WC stores had empty spirit shelves which FLSWs had to pad out with 
the little stock they had. If customers wanted to bulk-buy spirits they would have to pay 
in advance and wait for delivery, which was hardly an enticing prospect when 
supermarkets had full shelves of cheaper merchandise. 
94
 Including bonus changes. 
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The problems with the spirit shelves were mirrored throughout many sections of the 
store that summer. FLSWs would have to work hard to create the illusion of 
healthy/normal stock levels, usually by propping up retail “shelves” with commercial 
stock (i.e. wines sold to trade customers) usually held backstage. In years gone by the 
challenge was fitting in the bustling excess, whereas by 2013 the challenge was to mask 
the lack of stock to maintain “store standards.” 
As perks and incentives were withdrawn and dysfunction escalated, FLSW nonetheless 
intensified as RMs became ever more vigilant on staff budgets. Cover proliferated, as 
did the much-despised practice of leaving stores “on one” for prolonged periods 
(discussed above). In the meantime, a variety of new requirements were added to the 
workload including additional expectations to host events (as mentioned in Doug’s 
email) and to generate sales via low-cost social media instruments like Twitter.  
Try as they might it become increasingly difficult for FLSWs to paper over the cracks 
and facilitate pleasant customer experiences. As much as many FLSWs enjoyed the 
sale/customer service side of their role, the marginal cost of personalised “quality” 
service had increased as human resources grew scarce. Merchandising standards slipped 
because of time pressure, whilst the price/quality proposition worsened as WC passed 
on a greater proportion of cost increases to customers than the competition did. 
Management also delisted many old favourites with low margins, alienating customers 
further. 
Relative decline did not escape the attention of some industry watchers, as was 
encapsulated in an article I stumbled across around the time. A leading broadsheet 
newspaper95 ran a series of “Face Offs” between retailers, where like-for-like 
comparison would be made between rivals’ stores on the same high street. The 
investigator would then declare a winner based upon the overall offering of each. In this 
particular “Face-Off” WC would be pitched again old foe Oddbins, which had risen 
from the ashes as a scaled-down operation under new ownership. The comparison was 
intriguing because WC’s ascent had mirrored and partly caused Oddbin’s decline years 
95
 Article, national broadsheet, 2012. 
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earlier. The contrast validated aspects of my analysis so far through the eyes of “typical 
customer.”  
First Impressions [of WC] An unattractive warehouse … fronted 
by a car park peppered with red Biffa bins and discarded 
trolleys. Inside, the giant space is full of boxes topped with price 
information. But it’s confusing: not knowing the minimum 
purchase on wine is six bottles – of any kind, not just the same 
brand – I assumed every price sign that clearly read “one bottle, 
£7.99” meant you could buy a single bottle at that price. Silly 
me. When I went to the till clutching a bargain bottle of claret I 
was quickly turned away with a curt “six is the minimum,” and I 
felt a bit stupid. The pricing is doubly confusing with many deal 
stating: “buy two bottles and save £10.” Maybe I should have 
known about WC’s pricing … but I found the whole thing 
irritating. 
What were the staff like? Two men resplendent [in branded] 
polo shirts were busy moving boxes of wine about … They were 
reasonably helpful when I asked a question, but considering I 
was the only customer in the warehouse and was clearly 
confused, I should have received better service. 
Setting aside the quagmire of WC’s price mechanics, I agree that the service should 
have been better yet empathise with the FLSWs having given similarly perfunctory 
service by necessity on countless occasions. What is beyond the customer’s 
comprehension is the compromising array of operational pressures and cost-driven 
constraints that alienate staff from their primary duty of selling wine and providing 
service. To be on the WC frontline around that time was to be stuck between a rock 
and a hard place, with the perverse effect of minimising the perceived value of 
individual customers. Costumers did not know this and could understandably 
misattribute poor performance to individual FLSWs rather than the forces and factors 
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hidden from view. By way of contrast in Oddbins “the man was … polite, 
knowledgeable and helpful” and overall it “won hands down.”
As competitive clouds gathered over WC the organisation further tarnished its image 
when it became embroiled in scandal that strongly implied “race to the bottom” 
management. It emerged in 2014 that the company was subjecting suppliers to intense 
cost-related pressures by demanding special terms that well overshot conventional 
rules of engagement. At the heart of the matter was an attempt by WC’s Board to get 
suppliers to “stump up the cash”96 for a new national distribution centre which soured 
relations considerably. Put plainly the firm used “bullying tactics”97 to get suppliers to 
subsidise capital expenditure. This manoeuvre garnered national press attention and 
lumped WC in with a bunch of other abusers who were exposed around the same time 
included Tesco,98 DM’s template for success. 
In Spring 2015 the unthinkable happened and “Mr. WC” was ousted after serving WC 
for 29 years. Financial markets seemed to have been unaware or indifferent to the 
internal deterioration in WC’s performance I have described here, but they did take 
notice of a profit warning that was issued towards the end of FY2015. By then DM had 
run out of options, there were no costs left to squeeze and the organisation was 
haemorrhaging customers. The disgruntled emailer (Figure 15) was proven right in my 
view that “there is no longevity beyond sheer exploitation in this model.” The 
Chairman’s one and only public statement concerning DM’s departure was to say “I 
believe we can do better.”
Section Three: Discussion – the Dan Mitchell era 
Having been on the frontline of WC throughout this period, I know that the big picture 
of top-down control and under-investment did not have unmitigated effects on FLSW 
96
 Quote from article in national broadsheet, 2015. 
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 Taken from an analysis of the unsustainability of large retailers’ treatment of suppliers in a 
national broadsheet, 2015. It featured WC as an example of myopic practice.
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 Media reports proliferated concerning Tesco’s aggressive behaviour towards suppliers circa-
2013/14. See for example Butler, S. “Tesco delayed payments to suppliers to boost profits, 
watchdog finds.” The Guardian, 26th January 2016. 
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actors’ experience. Some elements of the work continued to be a source of joy and some 
days, weeks and months were better than others for FLSWs. A significant proportion of 
customers may have also remained largely oblivious to the deterioration I have 
described, even as a great many others “spoke with their feet” and took their custom 
elsewhere. It is valid to say that different types of FLSW actor responded differently to 
the processes under review (see Chapters Seven and Eight for elaboration), even if the 
effect was relatively clear cut at the aggregate level.  
The majority of FLSWs that I worked with throughout the period gave far more to WC 
than management deserved in my view, even as they felt progressively unable to do so 
as “the Sharon Dilbert era” cut deeply into the fabric of the WC negotiated order. Being 
“treated like monkeys” and drilled via direct control was one thing but to assault 
extrinsic rewards was quite another. Even diehard “bleed blues” began to seek sanctuary 
outside the company in 2013, as the effort bargain grew ever more insufferable and 
management grew ever more delusional.  
The “crisis” of WC was a complicated one in which the term “crisis” itself had to be 
understood in a relative contextual sense. It was not a crisis of deep financial losses or 
chronic mismanagement but was rather, a crisis of squandered opportunity and 
organisational inertia. In the first few years of the 2010s WC emerged as the shining 
star of a decimated industry, occupying a sweet spot between the drab complacency of 
the “big four” and elite merchants. In the absence of strong mid-market competition WC 
appeared to be “best of both worlds,” with a price-quality-service proposition fine-tuned 
to exploit the weaknesses of polarised competitors as summarised in the previous 
chapter. 
What the “crisis” of WC really referred to was the speed at which “best of both worlds” 
became displaced by a new reality of “stuck in the middle” between competitors on both 
flanks with better trade-offs. The same argument was actually levelled at Tesco around 
that time,99 and similarities between the two are not surprising given that one 
99
 See “Stuck in the middle: Tesco is trading in difficult markets. That is just part of its problems,” 
The Economist, 7
th
 December 2013. 
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consciously imitated the other. In 2016 a well-respected analyst explicitly drew these 
parallels between the organisations,100 arguing that in essence they were “different dogs 
with the same fleas.” 
The speed with which WC lost its shine must be understood as an unfavourable 
alignment of internal and external forces and factors. These contrasted markedly with 
years earlier when synergies between strategy, tactics, market forces and positive PR all 
aligned in the organisation’s favour. As the tide of external factors turned away from 
WC from FY2012 onwards its management opted to turn its guns on FLSWs and 
suppliers, with a view to defending margins. Both were pushed to breaking point and 
frustration grew at the sense of blood being squeezed from a stone. The actuality helped 
competition by undermining WC’s USPs and damaging its public image. 
The counter-productive and self-destructive nature of management’s behaviour was 
painfully obvious to FLSWs who dealt with its effects daily. This poses a question of 
why management failed to see what FLSWs could, and did not alter course 
accordingly? A simple explanation may be that FLSWs were to some extent right that 
“management haven’t got a clue,” having lost their grasp of reality through processes 
that compounded wilful ignorance. The role of RMs was important in this regard as they 
acted as a vanguard in falsifying a picture of frontline health, although management set 
the stage for their behaviour. 
Another logical explanation for management’s holding course related to WC’s history 
and its growth model since inception. Up until the second half of DM’s tenure the “WC 
way” had been to deliver organic growth via quality/service-centric USPs, footprint 
expansion and marginal gains through economies-of-scale. Fundamental deviation from 
this model – even as it began to fail and falter - would have been seen as risky due to 
the costs and complications involved as well as fear of the unknown. It is worth 
remembering that the business model was originally conceived as an ostensibly 
contradictory web of interconnected elements (see Chapter Five) that would come 
together to better satisfy a market niche. The resulting interdependence of systems, 
100
 Article, national broadsheet, 2016.
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structures and human resources constrained disentanglement for the purpose of strategic 
change. Moreover, if this were the agenda (as conceived by controlling interests when 
JS retired) then DM would have been a poor selection of CEO. He was after all “Mr 
WC,” the human embodiment of the “WC way.”  
Whilst these explanations are useful in explaining why management held course, they 
are less useful in explaining the profound shift in emphasis towards short-term 
profitability. The most credible explanation for this in my view relates to two 
intersecting factors: the nature of executive’s performance incentives and the 
forcefulness of “the market” as a driving factor. Starting with the former, management’s 
remuneration package was explicitly designed to align executives’ interests with those 
of the market. The primary mechanism in this regarded was a system of extraordinary 
bonuses that increased in proportion to increases in “shareholder value.” The more the 
share price went up the greater the financial rewards on offer to management - thereby 
proving a strong incentive to prioritise short-term “value” at the expense of long-term 
stakeholder equity (Chang, 2011). In the three-year period to FY2012 DM’s 
performance bonus totalled £672,000 (excluding other benefits and share options), 
roughly equivalent to 40 years of full-time trainee labour at 2018 costs. Whilst financial 
inducement on this scale may not have swayed conservative “old boy” JS, few doubted 
the effect it had upon “butcher’s son” DM.101
Complementing this was the power exerted by the market itself, a force and factor that 
had grown in significance as WC grew in stature. From the market bottom in 2008 
through to 2013, WC had proven highly profitable for investors with a fivefold increase 
in its share price. Rather than moderating expectations, rapid price appreciation tends to 
be both a cause and a consequence of “backing the winners” logic, which stokes rather 
than diminishes speculation in a self-reinforcing spiral. The pressure upon management 
to “keep the ball rolling” would have been considerable, constraining its capacity to take 
long-sighted actions that risk bursting the bubble. 
Without consideration of these conflicts and alignments of interests between the market, 
management, FLSWs and other stakeholders it is difficult to rationally explain the 
specifics of management’s deployment of agency throughout the period. Whilst a 
101
 DM frequently indulged his “rags to riches” story. 
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“structural antagonism” and market factors provided the conditions for the processes 
described above, it was the elevation of “Mr WC” to CEO that catalysed the particular 
use and misuse of executive power. DM had the ability and willingness to act as a 
steroidal force in the pursuit of short term profit. He also had a rarefied degree of 
patriarchal authority to pacify, marginalise and/or remove internal forces opposed to his 
agenda.  
The experience of FLSW in WC during the DM era was shaped by forces and factors 
beyond their view and out of their control in the first instance. It was not driven by 
mechanical bureaucracy nor homo economicus per se but rather by people with specific 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and constraints. The axial relationship between 
management and labour dominated FLSW’s experience even if it did not entirely 
determine it. A range of other factors came into play and these will be explored in 
further chapters. 
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PART B: BACK TO THE FUTURE  
After six years working for WC I could be forgiven for thinking that the past would be 
the best predictor of the future. As it transpired the next stage in the company’s history 
would challenge my assumptions over the inevitability of continuity, only to then 
underline deeper beliefs over the improbability of positive change. Chapter Six Part B 
tells the story of an organisation that tries to reinvigorate itself after a sustained period 
of going sideways in terms of profit and backwards in terms of revenue, 
competitiveness and stakeholder relations. It does this by removing its seemingly 
unassailable figurehead Dan Mitchell (DM) and installing industry CEO de jour Lyle 
Fisher (henceforth LF). LF came as part-and-parcel of the acquisition of WebWines, 
which then became a division of WC. WC took ownership of WebWines but the 
management takeover flowed in the other direction. 
The bulk of the data presented below seeks to clarify how the new regime tried and 
failed to set WC on a sustainable “stakeholder growth” trajectory modelled on 
WebWines’ approach. It will be argued that their failure was due to a culmination of 
factors which meant that they found themselves operating on “borrowed time.” When 
time ran out LF took WC “back to the future” by combining DM-esque slash-and-burn 
tactics with an ever-evolving web of technocratic substitutes for traditional line 
management. These were sold as mechanisms in service of FLSW “freedom” and 
“meritocracy,” but they actually served management’s control agenda whilst obscured a 
new reality of “you’re on your own.” What “freedom” really meant in “WC 2.1” was 
freedom from help, support and active leadership from the “post-ironically” (see 
Cremin, 2003) renamed “Support Centre” (formally known as head office). In turn 
meritocracy really meant that FLSWs had the opportunity to win a metaphorical 
“Rudis”102 provided that they prove their ability to consistently exceed a raft of new 
KPIs “autonomously.” Taken together these policies introduced a disorientating process 
whereby management retreated from the frontline whilst attempting to control it more 
systemically than ever before.
102
 My interpretation. A Rudis is a sword received by a gladiator in Roman antiquity – proof that 
they had earned their freedom.  
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The discussion commences with an overview of the formation of “WC 2.0” – the 
chosen designation of new management to demark past from present. The stories of LF 
and WebWines will be outlined in order to illuminate the nature of the takeover, after 
which point the remainder of Part B splits into two parts. The first part chronicles the 
growth phase of the new regime’s tenure, during which time considerable resources 
were staked on an attempt to return WC to an upward trajectory. The second part 
outlines the fall-out from management’s failure to deliver proportionate growth and the 
control cycle (“WC 2.1”) that followed.  
Section Four: The formation “Wine Corp 2.0” 
The year between spring 2014 and 2015 was the longest period I had spent outside WC 
since beginning employment in 2009. During this period I also relocated to another part 
of the country so temporarily lost touch with colleagues. It was against this backdrop 
that I found myself in a state of disbelief when I eventually caught up on events. I recall 
saying to a colleague “you’re winding me up” and …“seriously!?” when he mentioned 
that “Dan’s gone!” This turned out to be the tip of the iceberg as he went onto explain 
“we’ve bought a company called WebWines for £70 million … and their CEO’s now 
our CEO.”  
By the time this conversation took place LF had been in place for a few months and had 
made a “good start” by all accounts. To this end one of his first acts was to remove the 
much reviled Sharon Dilbert from her position as HR Director. An email went out 
immediately after saying that whilst “some changes would take time others were 
immediately necessary” for the organisation to move forward. Asides from a few other 
largely symbolic measures (such as the introduction of “free lunch Friday’s”) there was 
little change in the transition period. In communiqués LF stated that the plan was to 
“come up with a plan” and to build a top team to implement it. The only point of 
strategic clarity early on was that the target of 330 stores would be abandoned. The new 
regime would focus on fixing the pre-existing estate. 
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Shifts in tone and emphasis helped LF to receive a warm welcome from WC’s FLSWs. 
His stump speeches and press interviews were filled with optimism and positivity, which 
contrasted markedly to the dreary tones of the old regime. Whether consciously or 
otherwise LF presented himself as both the antithesis and antidote of prior management 
which proved music to the ears of FLSWs, who had been dragged to the brink of despair 
by DM and company. LF did not withhold direct criticism of the old regime either, 
going so far as to adopt FLSWs’ own lexicon to iterate bad practices and flawed 
philosophy. For example, he described FLSWs as being “treated like monkeys” by 
deposed management in mainstream press. This was a long-standing complaint amongst 
FLSWs themselves. 
6.4.1. Diagnosing the problem  
As the discussion so far implies the stranglehold of the old regime over the health and 
welfare of the organisation had set the stage for a boardroom coup. So much had been 
appropriated during the DM era that few FLSWs feared things getting worse. Early 
symbolic gestures seemed to validate tentative optimism because they expressed tacit 
recognition of what was broken and how it needed to be fixed.  
LF’s assessment of the retail estate ran in parallel to the analysis in the preceding 
chapter. In the first instance he was acutely aware of the shabby and neglected state of 
the company’s retail units, a result of the old regime’s excessive of focus on new stores 
at the expense of old ones. The latter were being milked to fund expansion, even though 
the return-on-investment grew ever smaller as WC pushed further into marginal 
territory. In the second instance LF grasped that the old regime’s approach underpinned 
a poverty-cycle within heartland stores. This operated as follows: the struggle to stay 
still (with ever diminishing resources) would reduce FLSW morale and generate 
turnover which negatively impacted sales. Reduced sales would then be used to justify 
resource cuts that would further damage morale, turnover and sales in a self-reinforcing 
death spiral. Lastly, LF could see the obvious that operational matters such as “loading 
stock at the expense of serving customers”103 were greatly undermining the customer 
experience by compromising FLSWs. The new CEO rightly argued that this was one of 
103
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the chief factors “intimidating customers” alongside convoluted prices and the use of 
trade restrictions (e.g., the requirement to buy by the case). 
Perhaps more important than his diagnoses of any given afflictions was his recognition 
of the root cause though – that being, doing the wrong thing by stakeholders other than 
shareholders. Whereas “old WC” had become adversarial and antagonistic vis-à-vis
suppliers and FLSWs (see Part A), new WC would be committed to “sustainable” 
stakeholder values as a means of achieving long-term shareholder value. According to 
the new management’s rhetoric this would mean nurturing rather than neglecting; 
collaborating rather than commanding, and investing rather than depleting. Henceforth 
the order of business would be to sacrifice short-term for the long-term by “doing the 
right thing,” up unto a point at which sustainable growth became a life-affirming spiral 
of positivity. The logic model of “WC 2.0” is set out in Figure 22.104




 Featured in AR-FY2015.
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6.4.2. New leadership 
In terms of presentation of self, career trajectory and leadership style LF could have 
barely been more different from DM. Whereas the latter forcefully advocated 
“professional” comportment, LF had the rough demeanour of an early retiree running a 
hobby business. Much to the delight of HQ staff he disbanded the dress code upon 
arrival and advocated a “be yourself” neo-normative aesthetic (see Warhurst & 
Nickson, 2007; Fleming & Sturdy, 2009 – Chapter Three). As comments below make 
clear LF believed that it is what you do that counts. 
LF started his career as a chartered accountant before moving into private equity, which 
appeared to be an incongruent start for a man more flip-flops than brogues. Indeed, one 
of Lyle’s more refreshing qualities compared to DM was his humble reflexivity and 
self-acknowledged imperfection. Some of these characteristics are apparent in the 
following Virtual Post-box106 (VPB) Q&A between himself and an anonymous FLSW. 
The former is defending his decision to call a newly issued code of conduct “A guide to 
how not to be an idiot.”
What’s on your mind? 
Staff: “How not to be an idiot??? How about, how to protect 
yourself and the company?” 
L.F: “Your CEO doesn’t call you anything of the sort. I am 
baffled at how ‘how NOT to be an idiot’ can be read as ‘you are 
an idiot.’ We, including me, are all idiots from time to time. As to 
whether that is professional or not…what you call things doesn’t 
make you professional. What you DO is what’s important…” 
The significance of this exchange relates more to its form and the fact that it happened 
rather than its content. Under DM top management did not engage with FLSWs as 
people, and certainly did not facilitate or indulge dissent. It kept itself at an emotional 
and professional distance, perhaps making it easier for them to overlook the real-world 
106
 A month long opportunity for FLSWs to air grievances in an open intranet forum.  
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effects of their policies in later years.107 In contrast LF wanted to present himself as a 
General who is close to his troops and unafraid of a little dissension in the ranks. 
By his own account there were two career defining moments that projected LF away 
from middle management and into a life of “serial entrepreneur.”108 The first was his 
recruitment into a corporation owned and controlled by Rex Whittingdale, one of 
Britain’s most famous entrepreneurs. Whilst working for Rex LF conceived of 
“Maverick Money,” apparently convincing the tycoon that “no one trusts banks but 
everyone trusts Maverick.” Success here led to his next venture which was the 
development of “Maverick Wines” – a direct order retailer that would use Maverick’s 
brand power to challenge the sterile dominance of the “big four.”  
Under LF’s leadership Maverick Wines proved sufficiently disruptive to justify its 
purchase by the dominant player in the direct order sub-sector. This precipitously 
bought LF to his second career defining moment, which was being fired soon after the 
acquisition’s completion. He described the occasion as follows: 
“After I got fired, I walked out and they’d turned my phone off so 
I had to go and buy another phone. I called the office and they 
said it was crawling with lawyers. I had a list of people and I 
told those on it not to sign anything.  
I made another phone call to someone who said they would like 
to invest in a wine company. Within 15 minutes of being fired, we 
had the money and the people to start up a business again.”109
These events transpired in 2008 and WebWines was the resultant creation. It would be a 
new kind of wine business according to the prospectus, one based upon “sustainable” 
fair trade between producers and customers. Its main innovation was “crowdfunding,” 
which basically referred to an arrangement whereby customers would support 
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independent winemakers in exchange for “exclusive access to delicious wines at 
preferential prices.”110 These crowd funders, or “heroes,” would pay a monthly 
subscription in exchange for said benefits whilst providing WebWines with the cash 
flow needed to expand the model further. The supposed symbiosis is summarised as 
follows: 
“The whole premise of WebWines is that you are joining a 
community and benefiting from the recommendations and 
experiences of fellow consumers… We give talented winemakers 
the freedom and time to make wines that inspire, supported by a 
community of passionate wine drinkers, which results in a 
virtuous circle where everyone is better off.”111
As is evident in these remarks WebWines was conceived as a niche operator with an 
emphasis upon “everybody wins” sustainability. It acted as a middle-man facilitator and 
platform, one that cuts out all of the other middle men (wholesalers, distributors, sales 
agents) and redistributes value amongst “partners.” The concept as described proved 
successful in attaining “customer loyalty” in the following years. By 2015 WebWines 
had grown sales to £80million primarily through its 300,000+ “heroes.” It was lauded as 
the best of a new generation of wine “e-tailers,” making it an attractive buy-out target 
for a traditional “bricks-and-mortar” with stalled growth.  
WC’s acquisition of WebWines thus coincided with ousting of DM and the coronation 
of LF as CEO of the combined concern. A £50m cash price was agreed with further 
£20m in ordinary shares available to LF as a “performance consideration” over the 
following four years. The exact formulation of this incentive scheme is not specified 
publically but the essence of it is straightforward. It would be made available in three 
tranches over four years, with tranches one and two released in relation to WebWines’s 
ROI targets and tranche three released in relation to “EBITDA”112 targets for the group 






 Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation. 
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“long-term shareholder value” according to press releases, meaning that long-term is 
technically defined as four years. This then would be the turnaround window for the pre-
buy out WC retail business (henceforth WCR). 
Figure 23: Lyle Fisher’s performance consideration
Section Five: Waging war 
6.5.1. Year zero of the new regime 
With a view to what was happening at HQ it was not entirely surprising that major 
changes failed to materialise on the frontline in year zero. The company had recently 
moved its command centre to a larger site near the old one. It was an old regime 
initiative that coincided with lease expiration, which partly explained why the move did 
not happen sooner. The other reason was that the old site dually functioned as the 
administrative and distribution centres so upscaling would involve taking on the cost of 
separate larger sites. 
Nonetheless, the scaling-up of central premises neatly preceded the acquisition of 
WebWines and the reverse management takeover as described above. This would be of 
considerable benefit to the new regime because it could mould the facilities according to 
its vision. Along these lines LF’s immediately began to turn the space into a cliché 
“creative” work environment, with pool tables symbolising a new “slacker-cool”/“fun at 
work” ethos (Fleming & Spicer, 2008). Some other features of new-HQ life were so out 
of lockstep with frugal WC traditions that I could not believe it when I first heard about 
them. The following examples were revealed through shop floor conversations: 
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Me: [having read the announcement of “good news” in an 
internal PR statement] “what’s all this about ‘ringing the bell’?” 
Colleague: “Haven’t you heard about that? Every time they 
achieve something at Head Office they wheel out a big bell and 
ring it. Then they open a load of Champagne and everybody has 
a glass. That’s what they mean by ringing the bell.” 
As someone who can be gullible I insisted that my colleague prove his claim. After a 
few minutes of playing around on the store computer he produced a verifying picture of 
a large bell encased in a custom-built stand. Another example stemmed from a titbit 
arising in the VPB: 
Me: [speaking to a colleague] “I don’t understand what this 
person (anonymous dissenter) is complaining about in terms of 
the food at Head Office.”
Colleague: “Well all the food and drink is paid for at Head 
Office, so nobody has to bring in their own stuff.” 
Me: “Seriously…!?” 
Colleague: “It’s not rubbish either, it’s loads of fresh stuff … the 
fridges are packed with all those Italian meats and all sorts.” 
Again, as a child of the old regime the sudden largess was disorientating. Easement of 
the Sharon Dilbert-era cost-slasher tyranny was warmly welcomed by all, but a swing of 
the pendulum towards cost indifference seemed to pose new problems for those with a 
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grasp of business basics. Still, with the HQ party getting into full swing the other 
substantial change was “out with the old and in with the new.” Sharon Dilbert aside 
most of DM’s top lieutenants were left in place initially then removed several months 
later, with generous severances packages and non-disclosure agreements. In relation the 
store-level rumour mill was in full swing with stratospheric pay-offs allegedly having 
been handed out to “big men” of the old regime. The credibility of some of these was 
dubious but the AR-FY16 does state severance costs of £1.0m. Combined with DM’s 
£0.7m exit package the new regime spent a minimum of £1.7m removing senior officials 
in year zero alone. 
Replacements would apparently be needed, and the man bought into command WCR 
was Tim Stapleton. Tim had over 20 years’ industry experience with “big-box” retailers. 
His job would be to develop and deliver “the plan” which was conspicuous in its 
absence up until that point. Before Tim’s arrival and more so after, another remarkable 
trend at HQ was filling the newly enlarged space with what David Graeber would call 
“bullshit jobs.”113 New roles included a “Transformation Director,” a “Director of Store 
Development,” a “Group Partnerships Director,” a “Customer Director,” a “Central 
Operations Manager, new “Divisional Directors,” as well as an assortment of 
imaginatively titled roles. This was no mere rebranding exercise as many of these posts 
were additional to traditional line roles. I recall colleagues asking “how much money do 
we have to take to pay for all these new jobs?” Such incredulity is evident in the 
following VPB question: 
“Another career opportunities e-mail sent around last week, yet 
more new positions being created at [HQ] adding more to the 
wage bill … are all these new positions 100% needed? It seems 
we’re creating more new jobs … than we can buy desks for 
people to sit on.”
FLSWs were right to be concerned about the accumulating cost of roles with 
questionable value, bearing in mind that WCR had somehow managed without them in 
the past. As an indicator, it was announced in AR-FY2016 that the total cost of the 
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“corporate team” had risen from £1.2m to £2.3m. This was then dwarfed by increases to 
£4.2m in FY2017 and £7.2m in FY18. Thus, the cost of corporate management grew by 
500% in three years! Although few FLSWs are likely to have read the annual reports to 
ascertain these numbers there was a keen sense that HQ was costing us a great deal more 
than it did under the old regime. Given the context it seemed fair to expect dramatic 
improvements in the quality of HQ output as a result. In year zero too little trickled 
down to provide reliable indication, so the real test would be Christmas 2015 and 
beyond. 
The capacity of a seasonal retailer to successfully navigate “peak” is taken as a critical 
barometer of its health. Peak for WC refers to Christmas, a period during which roughly 
one-third of annual sales boil down to the 4-6 week “party season.” Such is its 
significance that planning and strategizing typically begins six months in advance for a 
high street retailer. Given the churn and change at WC’s HQ though it was reasonable to 
believe that it would have been behind the curve. Top management were after all 
preoccupied with rebuilding WC from the centre outwards with a vision for on long-
term transformation.  
That being said, peak also represented an opportunity for a PR coup if fledgling 
management could deliver unexpected sales growth. Ultimately the prospect proved too 
tempting to resist and in an attempt to “win Christmas” (albeit with the same basic 
proposition that failed in years prior), management adopted a strategy of reduced profits 
to enhance competitiveness. In practical terms this meant lowering prices and 
bombarding past/present customers with discount vouchers to “create buzz.”114
Management’s other noteworthy Christmas sales driver was the “quick fix,” which 
basically referred to small cosmetic make-over of stores appearance (see Figures 24 & 
25). As a result WCR was able to announce a 7% sales boost which LF summed up as 
follows:115
“This is an encouraging result. I am particularly heartened to 
see the WC retail business grew as the impact of our better 
114
 “WC 2.0” management regularly spoke of the need to create “buzz.” 
115
 Article, national broadsheet, 2016.
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pricing, better service and better-looking stores start to take 
effect. However, there is still much to do.” 
LF did concede that “costs rose and margin narrowed slightly” yet the investment 
markets seemed happy to focus on top-line performance. The company’s share price 
rose 10% upon the trading update. 
Figure 24: “Quick fix” (a) - presentational cages 
Figure 25: “Quick fix” (b) - barrels and fins 
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6.5.2. Year two of the new regime: “The plan” 
The specifics of “the plan”116 were a seemingly common-sense mix of measures to 
enhance relative strengths whilst tackling weaknesses, so as to pursue a new goal of 
growing overall group sales to £500m p.a. It was interesting to note that profit was 
temporarily side-lined as a primary objective, underlining the new regime’s willingness 
to throw money at the challenges confronting it. If “phoney war” serves as apt analogy 
for year zero (i.e., lots of bluster and little happening on the frontline) then “blitzkrieg” 
is equally apt for the second year. Once the broad strokes were settled upon management 
began to fire endless salvos at FLSWs and customers alike. The most prominent feature 
of “the plan” (as with peak-2015) was to flood the market with discount vouchers in an 
attempt to boost sales. Initially these were distributed “scattergun” via traditional 
channels (i.e. mail shots) but more recently there has been a push towards “email 
capture” and social media distribution. 
An overlapping initiative was to launch partnerships with other service providers,117
where our FLSWs would give out vouchers to cross-promote non-competing brands and 
vice-versa. Another type of partnership was the free giveaway, where WC would 
facilitate an incentive to buy partner products (e.g., a gift voucher if they buy X brand’s 
washing machine) in exchange for WC brand awareness.118 Conventional marketing 
mechanisms such as these were complemented by some eccentric ploys to increase 
footfall and sales. A memorable example was the joker card initiative, where HQ mailed 
a cohort of WC customers a literal joker card. If they presented it in store then they 
would be entitled to try any wine (to the value of £20) with no obligation to buy. The 
few who activated their entitlement seemed as bemused as FLSWs by the idea. 
This barrage of “exciting” reasons to visit stores was mirrored by frenetic activity in-
store to “wow” customers upon arrival. Every week during summer 2016 an elaborate 
package of marketing materials would arrive to coincide with ceaseless promotions. 
These packages featured posters and bespoke features for what I came to call “gimmick 
116
 A comprehensive overview features in the Appendix, Section 2.  
117
 By summer 2018 there were 26 active partnerships. 
118
 The financial specifics of these arrangements are not in the public domain.
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of the week,” in mockery of management’s hyper-active attempt to generate “buzz.” It is 
difficult to generalise over other FLSWs’ interpretation but the common position was 
that management were trying to do “too much too fast” and/or “had to learn to walk 
before they can run.” Others took a more sympathetic view, arguing that “at least 
they’re trying to do something.” Most however felt that too few of these initiatives 
appeared to justify their high cumulative costs as one interviewee remarked: 
“I think sometimes because we’ve rushed into some of the 
changes we’ve thrown money at things … and then actually two 
months down the line we’ve realised they really don’t work and 
… how much money we’re thrown in the bin, that kind of scares 
me a little bit.” 
Vouchers: a closer look 
WC’s FLSWs accept that discount vouchers boost short-term revenue but their 
practicality and long-term effects are disputed. Once vouchers became omnipresent 
many customers became reluctant to shop until they had one, meaning that sales would 
peak and trough with voucher issuances. This represents an obvious problem (albeit one 
management somehow overlooked) for a lean staffing/high service model which works 
best when customers come in a steady flow. Another issue was that savvy customers 
would build up voucher collections and then deploy them in an attempt to game the 
system. One classic manoeuvre is to pressure FLSWs to allow them to subdivide overall 
transactions (e.g., 24 bottles) into smaller transactions (4 lots of 6) and use a voucher 
with each. The idea is that customers can thereby circumvent the one-voucher-per-
transaction rule whilst price-optimising via the “mixed six discount” mechanism. 
Another scam is to re-use the same voucher over and again because customers soon 
realised that codes were not unique. On this basis discount codes began to appear on 
websites dedicated to disseminating them across unentitled masses. These systemic 
weaknesses became a central component of FLSWs operational/commercial struggle. 
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They each had to choose between playing detective (in order to prevent “cheats”) or 
waving them through (in order to prevent discomfort and conflict). 
Of course, there is a more fundamental issue with vouchers - the effect on profitability. 
When customers use vouchers they often clear the threshold by as little as possible. 
Thus, if the spend threshold is £100 they will spend just over to given themselves an 
optimal percentage discount. If they take advantage of other price mechanics at the same 
time then sales can become profitless for WC. Ironically, it is WC’s most “loyal” 
customers who are the best at gaming the system meaning that management have turned 
some of their most reliable profit-generators into loss-leaders. 
Whilst management spent millions on discounting they exhibited much less zeal in 
relation to FLSW’s chief concerns. Summer 2016 was as generously staffed as anyone 
could remember on the frontline, yet the bugbears of lone working and cover remained 
steadfast. Nothing meaningful came down the line to address long anti-social hours 
either, and management were neither speaking nor listening on these key topics. What 
made the silence altogether more deafening was the sheer volume of “communication” 
on matters other than those FLSWs really cared about. Vouchers aside the single most 
prominent feature of “the plan” was the sheer volume of HQ’s “engagement.” The 
longstanding weekly memo was abandoned as too passé, and in its place came the 
“Huddle” video-memo that lasted about fifteen minutes per episode. Its themes were 
reinforced in a quarterly in-house magazine called “Our Wine Corp,” as well as a swathe 
of “fun” G+119 virtual communities that FLSWs were pushed to participate in.  
Webstore and peak-2016 
Webstore was rolled out with the intension of streamlining online orders within stores. 
As mentioned in Chapter Five, within the traditional system web orders were routed to 
local store teams who would manually input them into EPOS. In contrast, the 
119
 Google’s social networking platform. 
182 
distinguishing feature of Webstore was that it removed the need to manually execute 
orders through the tills. Management calculated that the old processing method cost the 
company 10,000 work days (50 days per-store on average). This seems like an 
exaggeration but the old system was certainly resource intensive. 
Regardless, the significance of Webstore was that it served as much more than a mere 
streamlining exercise. A profound implication was that it marked a shift to direct order 
dispatch by the new national fulfilment centre (NFC), creating an alternate home 
delivery system that bypassed stores altogether. If customers opted for “next day”/“name 
day” delivery or if they ordered products unavailable locally, then they would be 
automatically routed to the NFC and handled by an external courier. A fundamental 
change like this may have caused only minor disruption if management rolled it out 
“off-peak” with clear signposting of the implications. As it happened, management 
rolled it out at the start of peak with only two weeks trialling.  
Before taking annual leave late in the year I had heard rumours of staffing shortfalls for 
Christmas, and joked with colleagues about the inevitability of whose lap it would fall 
into (meaning my own). Sure enough, the phone call came from Doug Slazenger who 
requested that I “do a few days in Greenbush” over Christmas. Upon arrival it became 
apparent that “a few days” actually meant the whole of the Christmas period. Being 
transferred to a comparatively inexperienced/under-staffed team was inevitably going to 
mean more work and pressure for the same pay. In this situation the assistant manager 
became the manager, I would be acting manager and I would be cast as acting assistant 
manager and the remainder of the team was a trainee with six months’ experience and 
two temporary drivers. Fortunately the trainee was an above average performer whereas 
the temps seemed to hinder more than help. 
With three weeks to go until Christmas Greenbush was depressingly below minimum 
standards. Given its general condition it made sense for me to focus on store standards 
and service, freeing my full-time colleagues to focus on Webstore and managing the 
temps. The unforeseeable consequence was that I ended up running the store pretty 
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much by myself because Webstore churned up chaos and confusion to the point at which 
my colleagues would have to spend days trying to disentangle the mess. Not only was 
the new system counter-intuitive it was also ridden with bugs and flaws. Staff confusion 
was compounded by customer confusion because long-time shoppers neither knew of 
nor understood the changeover. When they selected “next-day”/“name-day” delivery 
they assumed it would be within the conventional store delivery framework. Instead 
Yodel120 was unleashed upon them, and customers encountered the sharp end of a “race-
to-the-bottom” courier service at peak-season breaking point.  
When things went wrong on an overwhelming number of occasions matters became 
worse. The only point of contact for online customers was the ironically named 
“customer happiness team” (CHT). Due to the sheer scale and range of problems the 
CHT found itself swamped and customers were put on hold for hours. Out of frustration 
many would end up phoning their local stores, only to be told (truthfully) that they 
cannot help because they have no information relating to their order. 
If these failings were not bad enough in dampening FLSWs’ morale, management 
dropped another bombshell which typified their emerging good-in-theory/bad-in-
practice reputation. The decision was to run a huge joint promotion with a major utility 
company. In the region of 100,000 E&G Corps’ customers would be entitled to claim a 
free bottle of prosecco worth £10. All they had to do was present a unique barcode in 
stores to claim their prize. Management’s logic here was straightforward; they expected 
that a substantial proportion of these walk-ins would be “converted” into WC customers 
during peak. In theory staff would have the chance to “show and tell” this captive 
audience what makes us special.
It did not occur to management that the tactic could backfire on account of timing. 
Firstly, by the time the free bottle promotion launched Greenbush already looked war 
torn. If this served as potential customer’s first impression of WC then it would almost 
certainly to be a bad one. Another problem was that the processing of these claims was 
120
 A low cost and notoriously low-quality courier; see Tims, A. “Online retailers pass the parcel 
as couriers fail to deliver the goods,” The Observer, 12/11/2017.  
184 
time consuming, tying up a till for 2-4 minutes per transaction. This may not sound 
onerous but when you have to repeat the process 650 times as we did at Greenbush then 
it comes to represent a major distraction during the busiest few weeks of the year. The 
final problem was the opportunity cost of neglecting “proper” customers. All of that 
time could have been spent by their side during the time of year when they are most 
amenable to upsells and add-sells. Instead, we were tied up with “free bottlers” who 
overwhelmingly wanted to get in and out as quickly as possible without spending a 
penny. 
It was not all bad that Christmas; in the few light-hearted moments we joked about the 
experience of trench warfare and mocked management’s delusionary denial of the self-
induced crisis. Although I joined in the camaraderie I was seething on the inside, feeling 
that I had been double-shafted by an unpaid/unwanted temporary “promotion” and 
management hubris. It seemed like the worst of the “bad old days” (understaffing, 
overwhelming pressures) combined with system failures on a scale I had never witness 
in WC before. When new RM Daisy Bouchard asked me “how things are going” I 
uncharacteristically gave an undiplomatic answer: 
Me [slightly irate]: “Really not happy … I just can’t believe the 
extent to which top management’s screwed us over … 
Webstore’s a complete nightmare; the amount of time it’s tying 
up is ridiculous … the free bottle thing … we’ve had hundreds of 
claimants and I get what it’s about but it’s come with a cost and 
the store’s being neglected. Ever since I arrived here I’ve been 
trying to straightened things up and I’m getting nowhere...”
As if the debacle never happened, it was announced a few weeks later that WC 
“outperform[ed] City expectations to deliver its ‘biggest ever’ Christmas.” WCR sales 
were apparently up 7.5% which the stock market embraced with a 6% price rally.121
121
 Article, national broadsheet, 2017. 
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However, some more astute analysts were starting to suspect that things were not really 
stacking up. As one commentator put it: 
“It worries us that the group in aggregate, given its superior 
delivery of customer service in general, cannot extract any 
pricing premium with consumers. Indeed, it has to bear the 
higher costs of superior service whilst competing head on in 
price terms with supermarket competitors, which see wine [and 
spirits] as promotional footfall drivers.”122
If this analyst knew how bad WC’s “superior delivery of customer service” had really 
been on account of the “higher costs of superior service” (i.e. Webstore roll-out) then 
“worried” would probably not have cut it. LF did know how bad things were though 
despite press briefings insinuating otherwise. As it turned out peak-2016 would be the 
decisive turning point for the new regime because it would silently abandon value-
adding “sustainability” and switch towards something more akin to “sustainable with 
WC characteristics.”123 This would intersect with a new you’re on your own form of 
“empowerment” as detailed in the next section.  
Section Six: A cost-cutting/“freedom” enhancing pincer movement 
In January 2017 a surprisingly insightful analysis of “the plan” surfaced in a leading 
trade journal. A colleague made me aware by asking “what [I] think?” Having read it my 
exact words were “I couldn’t put it better myself,” and this mirrored a consensus that 
formed amongst FLSWs who absorbed the article. The most poignant observation was 
made Rupert Kendall, the MD of a rival wine specialist who argued: 
122
 City analysis, national broadsheet, 2017. 
123
 I mean this with the same irony that Deng Xiaoping displayed in his call for “socialism with 
Chinese characteristics” (see http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/17ct/17e/1019/17e1920.htm).
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“The proliferation of new initiatives tells me that they’re 
throwing a bunch of things at the wall and hoping something 
sticks. If I was an investor I would be seeing flashing red 
because all those things they’re now doing are moving away 
from the primary WC business model – volume sales twinned 
with low operating expenditure. These changes are adding costs 
without a countervailing lift in sales or margins.” 
As an active participant in “gimmick(s) of the week” it was difficult to disagree. After a 
while it seemed desperate rather than smart, like WC had become an organisation that 
would stop at nothing (including net losses) to get customers through the door. Another 
salient point in the article was its emphasising the long-running existential question of 
what WC is trying to be. Is WC a big “indie” or a small wine supermarket? The 
difference is more than semantics - it goes to the very heart of what the organisation 
sells. Is the idea to sell a unique/customised experience to “wine people” or a superior 
supermarket experience to the mass market? If the answer is “both” then how do you 
manage the contradiction inherent in catering to customers with very different 
qualitative/quantitative expectations in practical terms, bearing in mind the limits 
imposed by WC’s existing model? The contradiction is expressed in the following 
observations: 
“At the same time, [WC is] seeking customers in bigger volumes, 
but wants to do so whilst flashing its specialist credentials and 
cutting heavy and widespread price promotions, the marketing 
mechanic that historical market data clearly shows has most 
appeal to a mass-market audience.” 
Building upon the theme Rupert Kendall further concludes: 
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“WC seems to be experiencing cognitive dissonance. It wants to 
cater to growing interest in small parcels and other indie-led 
trends, yet as a PLC it needs to bring in many more customers 
from an already mass-market level. Good strategy requires 
trade-offs but WC seems to be chasing everything in front of it.” 
As Chapter Five illuminated the original WC model fully incorporated the need for 
strategic trade-offs, tailored as it was to exploit competitors’ weaknesses. In contrast the 
fundamental flaw in “the plan” was that it added greatly to WC’s cost, making it less 
competitive with volume-led market leaders. At the same time it added little in terms of 
store experience that customers were willing to pay extra for. The overall effect was to 
weaken WC on both competitive flanks. 
Around the time this feature article was published LF was doing the rounds reassuring 
all via media channels that “the plan is working.” This may have seemed plausible to 
outsiders but the inside story suggested an alternate reality. Immediately after Christmas 
management announced “dash for cash,” where everybody was “invited” to save money 
in the final quarter of FY2017. Management accepted that it had “slightly overspent” 
over peak (i.e. firefighting the Webstore crisis), so we must “all pull together” to save 
money. As part of “dash for cash” staff would lose their much loved “Free lunch 
Fridays,” and throughout the first three months of 2017 there was an endless stream of 
management evangelism on “how we can all do our bit.” In the meantime a great many 
FLSWs grew angry at what they felt was chronic unfairness. Why were they paying the 
price of management failures?  
As management became increasingly aware of FLSWs’ sense of betrayal they took the 
decision to clear the air in the VPB exercise (as described above). Unsurprisingly in the 
circumstances it opened a Pandora’s box of grievances concerning management’s 
sudden swing from profligacy to frugality. Management short-sightedness and failure to 
address long-running FLSW concerns also reared their head as the following remarks 
show: 
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Anon (1): “With the dash for cash and the recruitment 
freeze my staff are constantly covering - making them 
disinclined to consider WC a long term future career. If we 
lose staff over this wouldn’t it be a massive own goal?”
Anon (2): “What is WC “Support centre” actively doing to 
help the morale crisis affecting staff in retail stores?”
Anon (3): “Why doesn’t HQ abide our policy of ‘right first 
time’?124 Retail staff constantly have to pick up the pieces 
of consistent mistakes, errors, missed POS’s, incorrect 
prices, vouchers not working properly.”
Anon: “More IT problems this morning, seriously 
hampering store teams. What happened to ‘right first 
time’?”
6.6.1. The new “new plan”: Less from us, more from you 
The AR-FY17 is a remarkable document when considered in relation to the forgoing 
discussion. Management were bound to put a positive spin on results and they did so by 
reframing “the plan” year as the “test and learn” year. By the same token its purpose was 
reconstituted as an intentional test of what does not work so that management could 
focus on “backing the winners.” In order to do this management announced a new “WC 
2.1” plan within the AR-FY2017, which appeared to be a fusion of the “2.0” logic model 
(see Figure 26) combined with some extra KPI’s (Figure 28). 
124
 “Right first time” was a headline goal in “the plan.” 
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Figure 26: The new “new plan”125
Whilst the “new plan” conveyed the same unitarist win-win-win assumptions as the old 
plan, it had a different soul and more substance upon close inspection. At its heart was a 
new target for “5* performance,” which was elevated to the number one priority for 
FLSWs. Its baseline would be to achieved over 90% of customers rating their experience 
5* (the top score available), in a system where any score below 5* was awarded 0%. 
This meant that only “perfect” counted because 4* (the second highest possible score) 
was afforded the same score as 0* (the lowest), applying a lot of pressure to FLSWs to 
get it right “first time every time” irrelevant of the circumstances. Another feature of the 
“new plan” was a headline KPI for email capture. Henceforth attempting to acquire 
125
 Featured in AR-FY2017. 
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customers’ email addresses would be mandatory so as to enable the e-marketers to 
“work their magic” according to Daisy Bouchard. A final major component was to set 
“gross profit” (GP) as stores’ financial KPI rather than gross revenue. The impact of this 
cannot be overstated because it shifted responsibility for sales and profit to FLSWs. 
The practical problems with a shift to a GP metric were myriad; firstly, EPOS had no in-
built function to calculate GP so staff were effectively flying blind. Secondly, margin 
information is one of the most zealously guarded secrets in WC. To have access to the 
margin spreadsheet required WC’s version of “top security clearance” which was not 
granted to FLSWs. Inevitably the absurdity of responsibility with no visibility was 
flagged up and management offered a bizarre compromise: they would periodically 
publish a list of 20 high margin products. Otherwise they would only provide “rules of 
thumb” (e.g. own label = high margin; big brand = low margin). A still deeper-rooted 
problem with GP-orientation was the unmistakeable whiff of hypocrisy. Only recently 
management had instructed FLSWs to “sell what you love” – they even wrote it on the 
underside of staff name badges. The new guidance would be “sell what you love (so long 
as it’s profitable or risk losing your bonus and being labelled of ‘failing’ store)” as 
discussed in the next section. The policy therefore represented a volte-face on 
management’s part because it did not tally with “do the right thing” stakeholder ethics. 
Again, it looked and sounded like a return to the bad old ways of taking customers for as 
much money as you can as fast as you can. As one FLSW put it bluntly126: 
“WC is betraying its principles and its one differential in the 
marketplace, its customer service and staff knowledge, in favour 
of making greater short-term profits. I don’t see how this is 
sustainable in terms of long-term profits, as customers are 
catching on to our money making schemes and some are feeling 
betrayed themselves.” 
126
 Comment in VPB. 
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The other self-evident contradiction between rhetoric and reality in the “new plan” was a 
footnote stating management’s intention to cut staff by 10% across the board. Within 
stores this cut staff to below old regime levels; which for a small-store team (manager, 
assistant manager and trainee) meant losing the trainee, having their hours cut by 25% 
and then divided amongst two part-timers. Hence “WC 2.1” involved the abandonment 
of the “classic era” staffing model and its replacement with a cost stripping 
numerical/functional hybrid. In ten years with the company I have never witnessed mass 
condemnation on the scale that this policy unleashed. The backlash was apparent in the 
VPB:
VPB 1:         What’s on your mind? 
“Staffing – Having taken my store through £1m this year I was 
looking forward to moving my 3 person team to a 3.5, so that all 
my deliveries that are taking my trainee out the store would be 
handled by a part-time driver. I was then told that, in fact, I am 
getting the opposite; my trainee going, and her 45 hours going 
down to 36, to split between 2 part-timers. I am trying to remain 
positive … but my concern is that my 5* - currently one of the 
best in the business – is going to suffer. I can’t help but feel that 
this isn’t a move that is best for the customer, it is what is best 
for staffing budgets… I enjoy my job … but my motivation at the 
moment is probably the lowest it has been in the last 12 years.” 
VPB 2:         What’s on your mind? 
“With the removal of my trainees from my store I am going to 
have considerably less working hours per week … How am I 
supposed to grow my store and continue 5* service with 27 
hours less each week? When either myself, or my Assistant, are 
on holiday this problem will be significantly worse and include 
more lone working! In theory the flexible hours model works. 
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However, people work part time for a reason … they will not be 
dictated to.” 
A pattern evident in management’s VPB responses was to selectively answer and/or 
ignore the specifics. Having read 350 VPB Q&As it was clear that a company line had 
been agreed on contentious issues. Time and again management recycled the same 
premise that “flexible working” would serve as a panacea to fix all ills, whilst 
conveniently failing to acknowledge the negative impact of a net reduction in hours. As 
the VPB rolled-on FLSWs became increasingly hostile in relation to management’s 
evasiveness. The following question encapsulates growing antipathy: 
“Are you actually going to do anything with the responses from 
this? I’m starting to wonder what the point of letting employees 
raise their concerns when nothing is being done! Most of the 
responses on here RE: the new staffing model or work/life seem 
to have been wriggled out of. There seems to be a growing 
morale problem in the company yet nothing is being done to 
alleviate it. As cynical as it may sound, HQ seem to see everyone 
in store as statistics – as opposed to real people with real 
problems.” 
Management’s refusal to have an open and honest conversation in an exercise that 
served that very purpose reminded me of Turnbull & Wass’ (1997) findings in HSR. 
They learnt that managers were being trained to give pre-scripted answers to “all the 
usual complaints” (see Chapter Three). Similarly, the VPB exercise suggested that a 
firewall of standardised answers was actively deployed to keep FLSWs out of 
management’s business.  
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6.6.2. The Purge 
Given the manner of LF’s arrival he was under no illusion over what would happen if 
he failed to get results. At the first large gathering of store managers in 2015 he clarified 
his expectations as follows: 
“Look this is what’s going to happen. If I haven’t turned this 
company around I’ll be out of a job in three years. Then we’ll all 
be out of a job in five years.” 
When the results for FY17 were announced management went to extraordinary efforts to 
micro-manage FLSWs’ interpretation. Each store was sent a copy of the AR-FY2017 as 
well as an “In 2 Minutes” summary of “good news.” It did not take much digging to see 
that things were not so rosy though. Most KPIs had barely moved forward in the 
intervening period and some had gone backwards (staff retention being notable 
example). As for bottom line WC had slipped into minus territory with a statutory pre-
tax loss of -£1.5m, down from a £4.7m profit in FY16 (see Figure 27). Management 
argued that this was a mere paper loss, explainable with reference to the UK’s arcane 
accountancy standards. EBIT127 told the “true story” of £14.1m profits according to the 
regime. 
Setting aside accountancy speak, management contended in AR-FY17 that investors 
should not be worried by the numbers because they indicated that WC was “past the 
tipping point.” Bad numbers merely represented growth pains - the price of turning 
around a ship long-travelling in the wrong direction. In contrast FY18 would be the year 
of “backing the winners” as mentioned above, and bumper results would be the 
consequence of investors’ faith. It should be mentioned here that six months prior, 
management had to declare a profit warning due to costly failures in the WebWines and 
127
 Management’s definition of the “best [performance] indicator” seemed to shift with each 
results publication. 
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the commercial division. The share price fell by a quarter upon the announcement, 
tightening the noose around LF’s neck. 
Figure 27: WC statutory pre-tax profit (£m), 2012-17 
Immediately after the FY17 results announcement most mainstream analysts appeared to 
buy management’s narrative, although not without imposing new conditions. Continued 
support came with an expectation of “no more slips [and a] swing towards profitability.”
128  Other analysts were still more reticent, with one influential investment website 
referring to WC as “a high risk growth stock I’d avoid for now.” The reasoning 
coincided with my unfolding account: 
“The company has run into troubles of late, with EPS dropping 
in each of the past two years as it embarked on ambitious 
acquisitions and invested heavily in attracting new customers 
…Much of the blame for falling profits is due to the company 
investing in logistics, marketing and discounting … it remains to 
be seen whether these new customers … will ever prove to be a 
sustainable source of profits.…The company is right to invest as 
128
 Article, national broadsheet, 2017. 
195 
it is in the future growth … but there is little room for failure … 
falling profits and rising debt are enough to put me off until 
there are more concrete signs that turnaround plans are paying 
off.”129
Evidence that LF knew the true state of things was apparent in the way his “off camera” 
actions reflected reality rather than the upbeat assessment he was peddling to 
uninformed outsiders. As well as casting aside “the plan” in early 2017 LF also began a 
process of ousting much of the top team responsible for it. The first causality was Tim 
Stapleton who mysterious disappeared around Christmas, even though his departure was 
not formally announced until Spring. Soon after the majority of Tim’s top lieutenants 
were relieved of their duties too. The official explanation was that “things were not 
changing fast enough,” which LF took as justifying him taking direct control of WCR. 
LF felt he could no longer trust his generals so would have to make strategic decisions 
himself.130
It was around this time that “5* service [became] the only game in town” as my 
colleague described it, reflecting LF’s newly stated intention to reconfigure WCR 
around the paramount principle of flawless service. To do this he would remove any and 
all barriers to “progress” including staff that did not get “fully on board” to use his own 
term. Many of those who no longer fit the bill were the regional managers who had 
ascended the ranks during the DM era including Doug Slazenger, who was relieved of 
duty after 14 years. His and others’ apparent disposability caused discomfort amongst 
WC veterans at store-level, who wondered what their perceived value was if senior 
figures were cast out so unceremoniously. These concerns were amplified by explicit 
warnings from LF and his coterie that anyone who failed to fully commit to the “new 
WC way” is “choosing to leave the company.” 
129
 Investment website, 2017. 
130
 LF said as much in an intranet webcast. In another webcast he complained that he had too 
many “charges” due to his lack of a top team for WCR.
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There had always been an implied threat hanging over FLSWs at WC but this “choosing 
to leave the company” double-speak exposed management’s willingness to use force in 
an unusually naked way. As power became unsheathed and the purge decimated middle 
ranks a new atmosphere of paranoia blossomed as the following VPB question 
illustrates: 
“Can you categorically state that old-school staff members are 
not being pushed out of the business? It seems that a lot of the 
recent RM promotions have been in favour of young candidates, 
and combined with several high profile old schoolers leaving 
and Doug Slazenger being passed over for the divisional 
director north job, people are beginning to speculate.” 
The divisional director who responded to this question insisted that such concerns were 
baseless. A couple of weeks later he became the latest high profile operative to be 
disposed of. As discussed in Chapter Two, Du Gay (1996) anticipated that service sector 
“post-bureaucracies” would become subject to “periodic purges” as means of getting 
ever closer to the customer. Whatever the cause, the consequences of perpetual crises 
along these lines were keenly felt amongst FLSWs at WC. 
6.6.3. Meritocracy – “work will set you free” 
To further underline the significance of “WC 2.1” KPIs and to systematise them into 
something resembling strategic HR, “Meritocracy” was rolled out in the first few 
months of FY18. This crystallised the ethos of the “new plan” into a scoring system 
whereby stores would be labelled “nailing, sailing, ailing, or failing” depending on 
whether they (a) beat targets for “behaviours” (5* feedback, email acquisition, and “buy 
it again” recommendations); and (b) beat targets for “outputs” (GP growth). To be 
bestowed the “nailing” label meant beating targets for behaviours and outputs whereas 
“sailing” meant beating targets for “behaviours” but failing to exceed GP targets. The 
phrasing is significant because “meritocracy” assumes that if you “do the right thing” 
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then you are “sailing” in the right direction; hence, sailing is a pass mark because your 
behaviours are right and bottom line will follow (or so the logic goes). In contrast, 
“ailing” and “failing” (see Figure 28) indicates underperformance which 
“meritocratically” puts you on management’s radar for special attention. 
Figure 28: The Meritocracy (a) 
As can be seen more clearly in Figure 29 below, each score comes with its own 
designated “remedial action,” “autonomy,” “opportunities” and “treats.” Setting aside 
details the gist is that failing stores will receive stick and no carrot whilst nailing stores 
will be afforded the opposite treatment. The whole system would be automated through 
a software suite facilitated by Tableau, whose website proclaims “we can’t change the 
world if we have the culture of a typical corporation.” It continues to say: 
“When a company gives people self-service analysis tools, they 
feel different. Respected. Capable. Powerful. People start to 
drive their organisation forward in ways that could never have 
been anticipated. They express their full ingenuity and 
creativity.” 
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Figure 29: The Meritocracy (b) 
The fit between Tableau’s grandiose claims and “WC 2.1” meritocracy rhetoric seems 
self-evident. Tableau claims to unleash the power and creativity of workers through 
“self-service analysis” whereas Meritocracy claims to “empower” FLSWs by providing 
a framework to win their freedom. The problem for FLSWs would be that with this 
supposed system of power devolution almost exclusively operated on an ideological 
level; no meaningful power transfer accompanied it. As will be detailed further below 
Meritocracy did little more than symbolised and systematised a new we’ve given you the 
tools so you’re on your own mentality. 
To reinforce a new power’s in your hands/total-accountability ethos complementary HR 
policies were enacted by management. A first such policy was to disband the role of area 
manager and to create a new post called “regional coach.” Gone would be the old days 
of area managers calling the shots it was claimed; coaches would simply provide support 
and guidance and final authority would be vested in store managers. A second 
reinforcement policy was the newly created role of “WC partner” - a new rank created 
for store managers to aspire to. Those who proved their ability to autonomously serve as 
management’s agents would earn “partner” status, which came with a potential 
remuneration package of £50,000 p.a. according to the hyperbole.131 Nobody within 
stores believed that they would ever see this this technically-possible-but-real-world-
131
 £25-£30k is the current norm. 
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impossible income level, but this did not stop mainstream press from proclaiming a 
brave new world led by WC. One article in a leading broadsheet132 uncritically sung 
from the PR crib sheet on the new “empowerment” model: 
“Over the past few weeks the company has been testing a new 
‘franchise-light’ model … giving managers responsibility for 
areas such as staffing levels, opening hours, product lines, 
discount levels and tasting budgets… [Quoting LF] “We’re 
turning the traditional retail ‘command and control’ style of 
management on its head, giving store managers more control … 
this means staff can be rewarded for their customer service and 
profit contribution, which we believe will deliver more 
sustainable growth…if the franchise-light model had the desired 
effect … he would consider taking things a step further by 
moving to a full franchise.” 
It almost goes without saying that the devil is in the details. To take a few examples, the 
supposed “control” over opening hours only gives partners the power to extend opening 
hours rather than reduce them. Power over staffing is literally a fiction because the 
staffing model and budget remains centrally imposed. As for “reward[ing] … customer 
service and profit contribution,” the bar for “nailing” was set so high that few stores 
actually cleared it to make bonus. By mid-2018 one experienced manager told me that 
their income was down £1,000 on 2017. Thus, the system that promised managers 
£50,000 p.a. is paying a large proportion of FLSWs less including managers. 
Chipping away at the glossy veneer of management speak about “Meritocracy,” 
“empowerment” and “autonomy” quickly reveals the dark heart of what is going on. 
Management is not empowering FLSWs; it is abandoning them and using double-speak 
to cover its tracks. The real meaning of Meritocracy is that you’re on your own with all 
of the responsibility and none of the power. As is made clear the only extra power for 
132
 It appeared in the business section, September 2017.  
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store managers is to “choose” extra-intensification by doing more with less than 
management budgeted for. In this sense “Meritocracy” fits with the “bleak house” 
interpretation of sophisticated HR (see Chapter Three) because it represented an 
elaborate ruse whereby management seeks to extend its reach, whilst simultaneously 
absolving itself of any direct responsibility. Fleming (2017: 200) refers to such policies 
as “neo-liberal managerialism,” arguing that: 
“[Where] ultra-responsible autonomy meets intrusive big data 
metrics … the results are not pretty. Workers are ‘on their own’ 
in terms of owning their own fortunes in an ever volatile 
economy.”
The beauty of a “franchise-light” from management’s perspective is that they retain 
ownership and control of the brand, the strategy and centralised operations whilst 
shifting the burden of performance and bottom-line to FLSWs. All of the power and 
none of the responsibility strikes me as tantalising prospect and convenient illusion for 
management but the equal and opposite may be said for FLSWs (see Grugulis et al. 
2010 and Lloyd & Payne, 2014). Within this dynamic management becomes little more 
than a rentier class charging fees for brand management and support services. The messy 
stuff of running premises, managing “labour problems” and generating profits (from 
real-world sales encounters with real-world customers – see Chapter Seven) is shunned 
onto “autonomous” FLSWs. Their failure to make bonuses is effectively a tax on under-
utilisation of management-controlled assets. It should be noted that the few stores that 
do make bonus have any cost increase on the previous year deducted from the gross 
bonus pot, meaning that management have also shifted the costs of growth as well as 
responsibility to FLSWs. As will be shown in the next chapter, these tactics have proved 
highly detrimental to key pillars of job satisfaction in stores.  
In Chapter Three Grimshaw et al. (2002), Lloyd & Payne (2014) and Grugulis et al. 
(2010) each argued that a key trend shaping the experience of FLSW is the separating of 
conception and execution and the hollowing out of the middle. WC’s push towards 
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“Meritocracy” and “Franchise-lite” represents an extreme example of these processes in 
my view. Since becoming “coaches” regional managers have become prime examples of 
“empty suits” (see Turnbull & Wass, 1997; also Bolton & Houlihan, 2010) - 
middlemen/women with accountability for regional performance but no power (at the 
strategic-level) nor control (at the store-level). I can state confidently that nobody knows 
what coaches actually do, even a coach told me “we’re in the process of working it out” 
several months into the policy enactment. 
Of greater significance to the FLSW experience though is the general disaggregation of 
management and FLSW orbits. The franchise-lite model incorporates an ideological 
legitimization mechanism that justifies management no longer “getting its hands dirty” 
so to speak. Whereas Fleming and Spicer (2003) talked about workers “operating at a 
cynical distance,” franchise-lite seems to express management’s desire to do the same. 
They no longer see it as their place to micro-manage how tools are used by FLSWs. 
Instead their role is conceived as designing tools that pre-determine their use whilst 
enabling them to monitor the through-flow of inputs and outputs, tinkering with the 
system until it is “perfect.” In the way that Apple designs iPhones in California and 
outsources the dirty work to Foxconn plants in China,133 WC is endeavouring to separate 
creation from production and consumption in WC stores. 
You could be mistaken for believing that if management was no longer actively 
shepherding the frontline then management fees would come down. If “command and 
control” is disbanded and “autonomy” is enacted then it seems only reasonable to expect 
reduced supervision costs. As it happens reality is the exact opposite because 
“weightless management” is evidently expensive. Figure 30 tells a truer story of why 
WC has struggled to make money than management would ever dare admit publically. 
Its struggles really concern the explosion of “administrative” (i.e. management) and 
distribution costs relating to its own strategies, policies and HQ culture as detailed 
above.  
133
 See Merchant, B. (2017) “Life and death in Apple’s forbidden city,” The Observer, 18/06/17. 
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Figure 30: Non sales-related costs Vs profit before tax (£m) 
If members of management were to read this chapter they would probably argue that it is 
“just his opinion” and that their “facts tell a different story.” Yet Figure 30 are 
management’s facts and they present a clear and obvious link between costs completely 
unrelated to FLSWs/stores and declining profits. In the three year period between FY14-
FY17 distribution costs increased by 116% whilst group revenue increased by 71%. Far 
more dramatically, “administrative costs” (which includes HQ expenditures) increased 
by 324% over the same period. I calculated that if administrative and distribution costs 
had risen in proportion with revenue during the period then an extra £47m of profit 
would have been afforded.134
So why have administrative costs risen so spectacularly? Management would probably 
argue that the cost increase relates to “growth pains” and the expense of housing two 
distinct businesses within one corporate entity. They are also likely to shift some of the 
blame to the old regime, arguing that “they didn’t fix the roof whilst the sun was 
shining.” “Growth pains” is hardly a sufficient explanation for a 314% increase in 
administration costs though, whilst merger should generate cost efficiencies (via less 
duplication and better asset utilisation) at least in theory. Furthermore, blaming the old 
134
 I have to make some crude assumptions here, but even a 50% relative cost increase would 
















regime is legitimate in some senses but is not credible as a defence for the tripling of 
administrative costs over three years. 
A much more realistic proposition is that the “weightless-management” of a “multi-
channel” model has proven ruinously expensive, necessitating (or so it is thought) an 
army of “bullshit jobs” to design and administer systems of “autonomy.” The intention 
of these systems is to bind the agency of FLSWs whilst simultaneously allowing 
sufficient slack to enact dynamic roles in operational/commercial senses (see Fuller & 
Smith, 1991- see Chapter 3). The problem that WC’s management confronts is that their 
expensive system is not working, partly because it is based upon a pleasant fiction (from 
management’s perspective at least) that FLSW actors are masters of their own destinies. 
Reality is much more complicated as I will illustrate in Chapter Nine. 
Section Seven: Discussion – the Lyle Fisher regime 
When LF joined WC he appeared to share FLSWs’ understanding of what was wrong 
with the organisation and how it came to be so. This was a breath of fresh air to those 
who had spent years living with the myth that resource starvation was no impediment to 
growth. The possibility of a new and better “WC way” was made to feel all the more 
real by the logic model that LF transposed from WebWines (see Figure 22), which 
posits “doing to the right thing” as the crux of sustainable growth. Perhaps if LF could 
pull off “everybody wins” business alchemy in one wine company then he could graft it 
onto another?  
For what it is worth I believe LF was sincere in his desire to transform WC into a 
sustainable growth company by “doing the right thing” and undoing the damage of the 
previous regime. I also suspect that he would have loathed the idea of following the old 
regime down the route of cost-cutting and short-term profit squeezing. Yet it remains the 
case that after less than two years he did exactly that, enacting a 10% squeeze on staff 
budgets and taking the new regime to places even the old regime dared not go. With 
hindsight, the speed at which such an enlightened programme took on darker tones was 
remarkable.  
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As the man with his hands on the levers of power, LF has to be held responsible for the 
array of interconnecting failures that led WC to this place so hastily. That said, it would 
be unfair to lay the blame for the failure of “stakeholder capitalism” entirely at his door 
because it also related to forces and factors beyond his control. LF cannot be blamed for 
the state of “old WC” when he took over for example, nor can he be blamed for the 
momentum swing towards competition during the profit maximisations years that 
preceded his reign. The dual forces of slow economic growth and socio-economic 
polarisation in the UK (as discussed in Chapters Two and Three) are not LF’s fault 
either. The “hollowing out of the middle” is a particularly potent threat to WC because 
“middle England” is its customer base. Something else lying beyond LF’s power is the 
UK’s tax regime that subsidises and favours multinational e-tailers,135 and labour market 
policies that de-constrain race-to-the-bottom “low road” approaches such as those 
revealed at Disney’s theme parks recently.136 These forces and factors militate against 
bosses who would ideally prefer an alternative to dog-eat-dog neo-liberal dystopia.  
One thing that LF can be blamed for though is the running out of time, which goes some 
way towards explaining the specific juncture at which the cost-control/“freedom” pincer 
movement commenced. “The market” has a limited appetite for deferred profitability, 
only condoning deviations from the norm (i.e., profit maximisation) so long as losing 
out in the short-term offers greater rewards in the long-term. By peak 2016 LF had 
burned through his reserves of market patience, an autumn profit warning and 
unconvincing Christmas performance saw to that. Moreover, a timeline for a return to 
“business as usual” has been sown into LFs contract from the outset - dangling a £7m 
carrot in front of him with an FY2019 expiry date. It may sound cynical but it would not 
be the first time that a WC CEO had descended into market-induced and self-interest 
driven destructiveness to the detriment of those the organisation relies upon. It is 
perhaps possible that near-perfect synchronicity between LF’s performance bonuses, 
market signals and the above cycles of expansionist/contractionist policies are entirely 
coincidental though. 
135
 See Murphy, R. “Amazon’s tax is not transparent – but politicians let them get away with it,” 
The Guardian, 06/08/2018. 
136
 See Gumbel, A. “Disneyland hikes some wages to $15 an hour after outcry over worker 
poverty,” The Guardian, 28/07/2018
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE WORK ORGANISATION OF THE 
FRONT-LINE ROLE 
Introduction 
To provide a clear picture of how work is organised within WC’s retail division, the 
present chapter seeks to systematically describe and analyse FLSW in terms of the key 
dimensions that constitute it. Attention will focus upon those domains of interest that 
are traditionally covered within work ethnographies and industrial sociology. 
Specifically, the nature of FLSW will be assessed with a view to control (Section 1), the 
labour process (Section 2), co-worker relations (Section 3.1) and worker-customer 
relations (Section 3.2).  
In pursuit of a balance between clarity on “how it really works” and re-iteration of the 
significance of continuity and change, I have sought to illuminate the nuances of both 
regimes where appropriate. In presentational terms the analysis is framed by 
consideration of comparable research findings as presented in Chapter Three. These 
comparisons are useful in outlining and evaluating degrees of separation between WC 
and other case studies of FLSW. 
Section One: Control  
In their studies covering the supermarket and café sectors respectively, Grugulis et al. 
(2010) and Lloyd & Payne (2014) came to dour conclusions concerning the 
centralisation of control. Each showed store managers to be to some extent management 
in name only, whilst FLSWs had even less control over their work due to a combination 
of highly prescribed roles and constant surveillance by “empty suit” supervisors. This 
term was mobilised by FLSW’s in Turnbull & Wass’ (1997) study of High Street Retail, 
as a metaphor for FLSWMs137 supposedly robotic adherence to head office dictates. 
Viewed through the conceptual lens of a separation of conception and execution 
(Braverman, 1974), these studies clearly located FLSWs and FLSWMs within the 
137
 As a reminder: frontline service work manager. 
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execution-only camp. Lloyd & Payne (2014: 483) made this clear in the following 
remarks: 
“The café managers in this study … exercised limited discretion 
in relation to layout, products, pricing, pay and staffing levels, 
all of which were determined centrally by head office and/or the 
outlet owners. The main area of control was over issues relating 
to the management of staff.” 
In their earlier study of FLSWMs in “big box” supermarkets Grugulis et al. (2010: 1) 
drew similar conclusions on the extent of centralisation: 
“The work of managers was heavily prescribed with ordering, 
product ranges, stock levels, store layouts, pricing, special offers 
and staffing policies all set out by respective functional divisions 
and head office. Their work was also closely monitored and their 
personal performance assessed, through the constant and close 
inspection of sales, profit and customer service performance 
scores of the stores and the departments they were responsible 
for.” 
Within WC glass half empty and glass half full perspectives on the balance of freedom 
versus control were commonplace. Individuals could even oscillate between one end of 
the spectrum or the other on a given day. In my case for example, in one moment I 
could feel comparatively free on a relaxed day doing deliveries along country lanes then 
in another I could feel stressed and oppressed doing the same task for a number of 
reasons. These might include ill-considered scheduling (e.g. too many deliveries in a 
single time slot or impossible requirements to be at two places at once); failure of store 
colleagues to adhere to best-practice (e.g. not taking phone numbers or directions138); or 
one or more deliveries that were qualitatively difficult for some reason. That all said, the 
main pressure emanated from a common requirement to return to store as soon as 
138
 To name addresses in the countryside, which are often not well catered to by Sat Navs. 
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possible to support a colleague left “on one.” This pointed to the importance of staffing 
levels which FLSWs had little control over (see below). 
As a reflection of competing glass half empty/glass half full interpretations of FLSW 
control, I took it upon myself to challenge a senior manager on the extent of centralised 
control in WC. The exchange (below) took place during a regional director’s “meet the 
troops” gathering, throughout which he stipulated an opportunity to “get it all out in the 
open.”  This occurred during the “the plan” year (as described in Chapter Six Part B) 
and was attended by roughly fifteen FLSWs of all ranks. My remarks expressed 
concerns about “the plan” at the time of its implementation. 
Researcher: “My concern is that it will lead to even less control 
… Ideally we want more control not less.”
Divisional Director: [Snapped back] “What is it you don’t have 
control over!?” 
It is frustrating that written words cannot adequately capture the disdain with which the 
Divisional Director tonally countered my concern. The question was partly rhetorical 
but I nonetheless felt frustrated that I did not have a pre-prepared answer. Consequently, 
I was only able to respond with a scattergun of grievances rather than a point-by-point 
exposé of extant limits upon discretion and autonomy. To this I now turn however, 
using Grugulis’ (2010) and Lloyd & Payne’s (2014) categories to break down the extent 
and nature of control over key dimensions of FLSW in WC. 
7.1.1. Ordering, product range and stock levels 
FLSWs had no meaningful autonomy over the product range in WC stores. Centrally-
based buyers monopolised power over the wine range, both in terms of product listings 
and the relative holdings of wines derived from particular regions, grape varieties, etc. 
Listings (and indeed de-listings) were driven by hard-nosed decisions concerning sales, 
profit margins and the relative competitiveness of products. We knew this because 
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buyers often wrote to FLSWs when popular products were delisted, explaining the 
reasons and suggesting substitutes. Explanations always focused upon these factors. 
One of the core objectives of “the plan” (see Chapter 6; also Appendix - Section 2) was 
to systematise logistics in pursuit of “smart distribution” of products. The general idea 
was that the DC would distribute with a view to sales data rather than simply looking to 
optimise throughput (i.e. sending products to whatever stores could absorb it). This 
transition overlapped with the introduction of “WC 2.0” planograms and a new system 
of core lines being complemented by “bolt ons” (extra allocations of certain products as 
determined by sales records).  
Whilst these systems introduced new tools to standardise and streamline what was 
distributed to stores, what remained unchanged was FLSWs’ lack of control over stock 
holdings. Local discretion was limited to the placement of “direct orders,” which 
referred to a limited number of products that stores ordered directly from suppliers 
(rather than receiving them from the DC). However, even this area of limited discretion 
was repeatedly curtailed when senior management enacted cost-control cycles (see 
Chapter Six). In addition FLSWs could request listings of locally-produced ales and 
spirits but buyers retained control over final decisions and the business side of things 
(price, margins, supply arrangements, etc.). A final tool at FLSWs disposal was a 
capacity to order quantities of products from the DC to be delivered by an external 
courier, thereby circumventing conventional distribution channels in situations where 
sales could not be fulfilled otherwise. This facility was expensive139 so could not be 
used to fundamentally reconfigure stock holdings. 
7.1.2. Store layout  
Control over store layout was a prime example of glass half empty/glass half full rival 
interpretations concerning the degree of localised versus centralised control, as was 
revealed by interview data.  More senior store managers argued that their length of 
139
 £4 per 12-bottle box. Couriers distributed from the DC to stores. Payment was centralised 
and stores were provided with guidelines on the effective utilisation of the facility.  
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service and track record for getting results won them considerable leeway for judgement 
calls over store layout. That said, the specific examples they referred to seemed trivial in 
nature – a finding that paralleled those of Grugulis et al. (2010). An example follows: 
“When you’ve got the confidence and you’ve been around for a 
while you kind of say actually I know that my customer base 
wants this beer and stacks of beer here … so if you have the 
confidence to do that you just go ahead and do it, then yeah, as 
long as you can back it up, that’s fine.” 
There are truths contained in these remarks; store staff did have limited ability to deploy 
commercial acumen and pragmatism in the layout of their stores. Nevertheless, 
decisions had to be defendable and management (specifically area managers or 
“coaches”) have always policed the acceptability and suitability of decisions. Area 
managers’ visits typically involved shop floor “walks and talks.” A standard feature 
would be to review merchandising decisions with especial emphasis on ongoing 
promotional activities. If the area manager took umbrage then they could use 
superordinate power to demand changes. Most often these demands took the form of 
“suggestions” (see Doug Slazenger’s all stores email for an example, Figure 20). 
Thus, there was something of a “negotiated order” between FLSWs and RMs on one 
level, but on another level field operatives were all answerable to higher centralised 
powers. As mentioned above, Head Office imposed a standardised layout and the 
policemen (RMs) were themselves policed by more senior or specialist management. 
These senior-level control networks sought to ensure that the centrally-designed 
planogram was enacted in practice. Deviations from the template had to be defendable 
within established and emerging rules and logics (as the interviewee alluded to above).  
7.1.3. Pricing and promotion 
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FLSWs have no substantive say on pricing or promotions in WC, with the former being 
the domain of buyers and the latter being the domain of the marketing function. Within 
the classic WC model promotions were predominantly regional (e.g., Australia, Italy) 
and would involve all wines from that region being on “special offer” for a period – 
typically four to five weeks. Over the years promotions became shorter and more 
product specific to induce urgency amongst customers. Promotions also moved online 
to reduce costs and increase the speed of connection between marketing “wizards” (as 
Daisy Bouchard referred to them) and customers. 
Residual scope for FLSWs concerned style rather than substance and was driven by 
personal tastes, at least in part. FLSWs would be told to “get behind” lead promotions 
although they had room to decide exactly which promotions they would “get behind” 
and to what extent. For example, FLSWs could feature certain promotional products in 
more visible places or on the tasting counter depending upon their own agendas. In 
relation, there was a range of defendable grounds that FLSWs could deploy to 
“legitimately” marginalise a promotion.140 Perversely, management developed a 
penchant for sabotaging its own promotions as implied in the following monologue: 
“Monaco Bay Prosecco is on at £6.99 on the mix 6 but they 
[senior management] don’t want us to [proactively] sell it 
because the GP’s crap – we’re not making any money on it … If 
you can, try to upsell to this [the store manager points to another 
Prosecco] instead.” 
Monaco Bay was WC’s bestselling Prosecco and management reduced its price because 
they felt that they had to price match rivals during a key trading period. Supermarket 
competition could afford to loss-lead on wines whereas WC could not (see Chapter 
Five). Management nonetheless believed that they could not afford to be seen as 
uncompetitive, so their solution was to match supermarket’s price whilst instructing 
FLSWs to sabotage take up of the offer.  
140
 For example, you could argue that the stock holding is reserved or that you still regard it as 
inferior to an alternative product in “pound for pound” terms.  
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Two related areas of relative freedom were short-dated lines and high value 
transactions. FLSWs were encouraged to reduce the price of short-dated items to 
minimise shrinkage, although the exact strategy was left to them. Some would reduce 
prices gradually to avoid GP losses whilst others would slash prices dramatically (e.g. 
50% reduction within a month of the use-by date), in the hope of avoiding complete 
write-offs. The second area of discretion concerned large sales, typically defined as 
£1,000 or more. FLSWs had leeway to add discretionary discounts in relation to such 
transactions, although AMs kept a keen eye on stores’ overall application of this 
discretion. They would demand explanations if staff appeared prone to largesse. 
Furthermore, once “Meritocracy” had been enacted FLSW were formally made 
responsible for GP in a comparatively systematic and inescapable way. This further 
militated against a liberal application of discretionary discount. 
7.1.4. Staffing policies 
The popular wisdom “he who has the gold makes the rules” seemingly applied to the 
staffing of WC stores. In the classic WC model management addressed the challenge of 
front-line costs vis-à-vis service quality by deploying functional flexibility alongside 
full-time contracts, career progression (at least within retail) and perks above industry-
standard (see Chapter Five). More recently the Lyle Fisher regime toyed with a 
functional/numerical flexibility hybrid in an attempt to further reduce staff costs, 
sacrificing stores’ qualitative capacity in the process. 
As was made clear in Chapter Six, management determined and imposed budgets and 
the staffing model. Both regimes indulged periods of relative generosity as they 
embedded themselves – for example, DM’s regime allowed RMs to use their budgets to 
employ part-time drivers over seasonal peaks – complementing rather than displacing 
full-time staff. Eventually though (during the cost-control cycle of the late DM era) 
these precedents were exploited as a means of deploying numerical flexibility by the 
backdoor. RMs did this by delaying the recruitment of new full-timers during low-
seasons and using part-timers to partially offset shortfalls.  
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Arguably then, when LF’s regime formally disbanded the classic model and introduced 
a cost-saving hybrid it was only formalising a long-standing unofficial practice of part-
timer substitution. Store managers had always been charged with recruiting part-timers, 
so it was ironic that management framed the continuance of that arrangement as “taking 
back control” of staffing arrangements. At odds with the rhetoric, RMs continued to 
have the final say on promotions to assistant manager. 
Overall, store managers did have some say in FLSW recruitment but their options were 
curtailed and shaped by the executive power of line management and specialist 
functionaries. The rule of thumb for store team composition is broken down in Section 
7.3.1. 
7.1.5. Monitoring and surveillance  
Key performance indicators (KPIs) were management’s most prominent and 
consistently utilised mechanism for controlling FLSWs. Monitoring mechanisms 
applied pressure at all points in the retail hierarchy, with senior line managers’ 
performance assessed against aggregated KPIs for all their stores. They in turn would 
have detailed breakdowns of individual stores’ performances and would apply pressure 
to laggards weighing down their numbers. RM’s store visits and managers’ appraisals 
focused primarily upon performance against KPIs. In instances of sub-par performance 
managers would be expected to outline plans to improve upon them. Those plans would 
invariably involve applying pressure to sub-ordinate in pursuit of behavioural change 
that would improve the numbers. 
During the DM regime the primary obsession was with two KPIs: revenue and 
shrinkage, with the limit of the latter being set as a percentage of total sales (0.002%). 
For a store with £1m in revenues this would impose a £2,000 “acceptable” threshold for 
losses accrued to such things as theft, damage to merchandise and staff errors. So long 
as both of these numbers were on the right side of their target, a given store would have 
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“set the game to win” in terms of easy relations with RMs. In contrast, underperforming 
outliers were likely to move to the top of RMs’ watch list.  
Again, an argument could be made that “Meritocracy” merely formalised, systematised 
and institutionalised the well-established practice of managing by the numbers. In this 
instance however I would argue that such a position would be overly simplistic because 
“Meritocracy” broadened and changed the KPIs that FLSWs were measured against 
(see Chapter 6 Part B for discussion). One important implication was that FLSWs were 
made responsible for more qualitative performance dimensions, albeit without 
additional meaningful power to enhance them. Quite the contrary, management’s 
concurrent changes to the staffing model heightened the challenge. Put simply, 
management took away resources with one hand and expanded responsibility on the 
other.  
Alongside “Meritocracy,” management introduced mystery shoppers as an additional 
mechanism to monitor FLSWs along qualitative lines. Given that this mechanism was 
introduced alongside others pursuant of similar ends, it is difficult to tease out its 
standalone impact. Further difficulties in assessing its effects were caused by sporadic 
usage and the inaccessibility of data yields. Asides management, only the FLSWs 
involved could view feedback from mystery shopper visits and the interviewees in my 
sample had little to say about them - having not been assessed themselves. I did 
nonetheless hear several stories of “bad performances” and the supposed reasons for 
them. An example follows: 
“She [the mystery shopper] came in first thing and I was on my 
own – I had two other customers to deal with and I had to get the 
van out [start the delivery run] so I said ‘hello’ but didn’t really 
do anything else. She was a right bitch - really miserable – so I 
assumed she didn’t want any help. Then she wanted to try wine 
on the tasting counter at 10am and I hadn’t even got the wines 
[for the tasting counter] out.” 
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The FLSW who regaled me with this tale did not share the exact score that it led to, nor 
did he reveal what (if anything) was said by the “coach” in relation. Management had 
insisted at the inception of the mystery shopper programme that it was for “training 
purposes only.” I never heard any story to the contrary, but it was clear that a poorly 
scored mystery shopper visit could be distressing for those involved. 
In respect of the policy I was vigilant in trying to spot mystery shoppers and did on a 
few occasions “lay it on thick” (in terms of the service proposition) when I suspected I 
one. Eventually FLSWs learnt to spot the signs of a mystery shopper because 
management scripted their behaviour in such a way as to ensure that they would act like 
“ideal” customers (discussed below). Ironically, this made them stand out like a sore 
thumb so those few authentic “ideal” customers (i.e., keen, interested, eager to chat and 
ask questions, enthusiastic about special features/offers) become suspected mystery 
shoppers as a consequence. 
In my final two years with WC my home store was subjected to four mystery shopper 
inspections, with three passes (80%+ scores) and one “fail.” In each of the three passes 
my colleagues suspected that they were dealing with a mystery shopper and in one 
instance my colleague “definitely knew.” Knowledge of the assessment criteria 
facilitated an easy opportunity for 100% marks which my colleagues achieved on two 
occasions. The proceeding “fail” was attributed to a mystery shopper “slipping through 
the cracks,” as two staff members each assumed the other would “own” the encounter. 
In the confusion valuable marks were lost as the mystery shopper report shows (see 
Appendix, Section 4). 
Given the expansion of management’s reach into FLSW life it is reasonable to argue 
that monitoring and surveillance were intensified throughout the research process. That 
said, management’s omnipotence ought not to be over-stated because there was a range 
of factors that limited the utilisation and/or effective functioning of their monitoring and 
surveillance systems. Starting with video surveillance in stores as an indicative 
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example, the images produced were not available to management in real time. “Eye in 
the sky” cameras functioned as store-based closed circuits with the output devices (i.e. 
monitors) located in store offices and behind the till. Stores typically had six cameras 
and none were in backspace areas. They were distributed with a view to theft deterrence 
rather than FLSW monitoring and there were numerous black spots on shop floors. 
Typically equipment was unfit for even the modest purpose it served because cameras 
did not record continuously – rather, they compiled a series of still pictures with short 
lag times.141 Thus, even when a thief was caught on camera the “gotcha” moment was 
often missed on the tape. 
To make matters worse the output devices were cumbersome and difficult to use – in 
my ten years in WC I never learned to use them because the effort did not seem 
justified. Due to its functional limitations the system was rarely used as a surveillance 
tool by FLSWs in relation to suspected thieves let alone colleagues. I know of three 
occasions in a decade where colleagues went to the trouble of reviewing tapes to 
scrutinise co-worker behaviour. One was suspected of theft, another was suspected 
laziness and the last was suspected of closing the store to buy lunch. I was the “villain” 
in this latter case and the audio-visual equipment proved my “guilt” beyond reasonable 
doubt. As it turned out a contractual right to leave the store on a lunch break was no 
defence against unofficial rules that stipulated otherwise. 
Setting aside contradictions between rights and rules, there was a general gap between 
monitoring and surveillance in theory and monitoring and surveillance in practice. The 
tools available to management in WC were similar to those of “bleak houses” described 
in Chapter Three but their limited functionality – when combined with the residual 
space to contest meanings and challenge interpretations – blunted their coercive edges. 
For example, FLSWs could credibly argue that “5* feedback” was skewed by several 
factors including gripes unconnected to their own performance, malicious trolling and 
low response rates. 
141
 Roughly one second. 
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Overall, there are few credible grounds to argue that monitoring and surveillance in WC 
rendered management (or customers) all-powerful and FLSWs powerless. Direct and 
bureaucratic control remained the primary instruments of management’s power 
throughout the research period. Complementary instruments (as discussed in Chapter 
Six Part B) were intended to widen and deepen that power, but their effectiveness was 
limited by weaknesses in their design and implementation. 
7.1.6. Other formal mechanisms for performance management 
Appraisal  
There was a pronounced gap between the importance attached to “people management” 
tools in management’s rhetoric compared to reality. Starting with appraisals, I had only 
three formal appraisals in ten years which exemplified their marginal significance in 
WC. For many store managers (who shouldered the burden of appraising subordinates) 
they were a pointless exercise to be carried out only when subject to RM pressure, 
which was inconsistently applied. On numerous occasions I recall managers saying 
things like “Oh God I’ve got to do X’s appraisal;” “Daisy is on my back to do Y’s 
appraisal;” “Doug says I’ve got to….” Etc.
Store managers were the main exception; their status as “key staff” meant that their 
appraisals were carried out regularly. These were based on a traffic light system that 
graded managers as green (up to or exceeding expectations), amber (acceptable but 
room for improvement) or red (under-performance/improvement necessary) against role 
criteria. Many managers in Region X spoke of appraisals as being “a joke” (as one 
manager put it) because of the unforgiving way Doug Slazenger scored them during his 
seven-year stint as RM. As another store manager explained: 
“It’s all ambers and reds, there’s hardly any greens. How’s that 
supposed to motivate you?” 
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A handful of managers shared with me that they too felt demotivated by the exercise 
given Doug’s supposed penchant for cynical and negative scoring. The manager who 
made these remarks printed off his appraisal so I could share in his incredulity.142 He 
went on to say: 
 “You should see Jane’s [the manager of another store], hers has 
hardly any amber!”143
When Daisy Bouchard became “coach” in Region X formal appraisals receded into the 
background as a conversation point. From that point onwards they were reframed around 
“Meritocracy” KPIs and managers adopted the view that appraisals would largely “take 
care of themselves” so long as they were “sailing” or “nailing”144 (see Chapter Six Part 
B). Within this new appraisal framework FLSWs were rated 1-4 in relation to five 
constellations of Meritocracy-related performance characteristics (see Table 8). The 
mode145 score was adopted as the FLSW’s overall score, with 4 being the highest and 1 
being the lowest. Given that a new appraisal system was rolled out under a new RM, 
Daisy Bouchard took steps to ensure that every FLSW was subject to an appraisal – 
myself included. It would be my first formal appraisal in five years and my scores 
feature in the following Table. 
Table 8: Researcher’s appraisal, 2016 
CONSTELLATION SCORE 
Demonstrating the Wine Corp was of working 2 
Be the customer champion 2 
Be a savvy retailer 3 
Use wine wizardry 3 
Run a smooth operation 3 
OVERALL SCORE 3 
142
 Visual inspection confirmed his claims. 
143
 I was not able to confirm this. 
144
 This was explained in interviews and shop floor discussions. 
145
 The value that appears most often in a set of data values. 
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The FLSWs score vis-à-vis performance criteria would then be complemented by the 
store manager’s view of your “potential” to assign a label from the matrix as featured in 
Figure 31. My own store manager labelled me an “effective performer,” implying that I 
am competent albeit with limited potential. I took this as an affront but was not 
emotionally invested enough to challenge the verdict. I did share my views with an 
experienced co-worker though and he responded as follows: 
“He did the same with me [attribute the lowest that was likely to 
go unchallenged] … It’s just a box ticking exercise, I don’t give 
a shit.” 
Perhaps my lack of appraisals meant that I was not sufficiently inoculated from the “WC 
way” in this regard. I too found myself sharing the sense of demotivation that the store 
manager described in the aftermath of his above appraisal. 
Figure 31: Appraisal matrix
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Training 
What training and routine appraisals had in common were that they were largely 
informal and on-the-job rather than formally conducted. The lion’s share of knowledge 
and feedback that related to appraisal criteria (e.g. operational knowledge, production 
knowledge and cultural “how it really works round here”) was transmitted normatively 
within day-to-day activities. There were “first day,” “first week” and “first month” 
training checklists that incrementally sought to ensure that new entrants developed their 
knowhow of policy and procedures. Yet the bulk of their content could fairly be 
described as WC “common sense” so managers used them mainly to double-check that 
they have not missed anything significant in the routine transmission of know-how. 
There were also some internally and externally provided day courses that complemented 
induction; key examples included manual handling, product knowledge, driver training, 
and sales/customer service skills (from 2016 onwards). 
In the aftermath of the induction phase FLSWs were expected to be proactive in 
developing their key skills, ideally in conjunction with store managers’ guidance. An 
online training platform was rolled out in 2017 to provide the backbone for learning and 
development, and FLSWs were expected to use downtime to work their way through 
modular content. Within my home store these resources were rarely used in practice due 
to a lack of downtime, a lack of store manager support and/or a lack of interest amongst 
FLSWs themselves. On several occasions I witnessed the berating of co-workers by my 
store manager for failure to use these online resources. I also witnessed that same 
manager sabotaging their rare attempts to do so via constant interruptions and 
colonisations of their time. 
There was general silence amongst FLSWs on the quality of the online training 
provisions, which I took to mean that colleagues either had not used them or did not 
regard them as noteworthy. In contrast, the manual handling course (and similar health 
and safety-related instruction) were often cynically discussed because management 
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pressures and/or inadequate resourcing were perceived as the main threat in these 
regards. One means of expressing this was mock-irony; for example, colleagues would 
often shout “HEALTH AND SAFETY” [as if parodying management’s voice] when 
they did something obviously unsafe or “don’t try this at home” if a customer is nearby. 
This satire appeared to play on the yawning gap between management speak and “the 
[real] WC way.”
Other formal training provisions were more positively embraced, especially the product 
knowledge sessions. This is perhaps unsurprising given that the organisation 
traditionally placed heavy emphasis on product affinity in FLSW recruitment. As for the 
customer skills course, those who attended referred to it as “interesting” and “useful” 
but failed to explain how or why upon questioning. The course was meant to be 
complemented by shop floor role plays which I did engage in twice (albeit in two 
years), once as server and once as customer. In the latter role I was required to ad lib 
one of several management-designated customer types (e.g., I was a new customer; I 
needed wine for a party; I did not know much about wine).  
Given that formal training represented a fraction of a FLSW’s total formative 
engagement, it is fair to say that normative “how we do it round here” rules-of-thumb 
typically constituted guiding precedents. Store managers were especially important in 
this regard, setting the tone and acting as gatekeepers of practical real-world solutions. 
Unsure FLSW would often turn to more experienced colleagues and much of the 
learning was tacitly transmitted in these moments. As will be explored further in the 
next section, co-workers were key actors in shaping the negotiated orders that comes to 
constitute normality within stores.  
Quality of life policies 
From its early days WC’s management had plenty to say about their quality-of life (Q-
of-L) policies. It may be recalled that James Smythe boasted “we have certainly paid off 
a few graduate loans and financed a few new cars” in relation to share options and 
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profit related pay (see Chapter Five). Other things that fell loosely within the marquee 
of quality-of-life offerings included the “living wage;” “free shares;” commuter-use of 
company vehicles and also, “free lunch Friday.” These things formed the basis of 
management’s claim to be a good employer and influential entities bought into it, 
including those who compiled “top graduate recruiter” lists.146
The significance of these things to actual quality-of-life in WC was reflected in the fact 
that only 12% of its staff reported Q-of-L as a factor that made them want to stay in the 
company (the third least popular response in a survey – see Chapter Eight). This may be 
taken as indicative of FLSWs’ belief that such policies lacked substance (e.g. free 
shares147), were tokenistic (e.g. Friday lunch148), and/or failed to compensate for 
countervailing factors that damaged the Q-of-L proposition. Some of these have been 
explored in prior chapters (e.g. lone working, cover, staff shortages, antisocial hours) 
and others are detailed further in the next chapter (low pay by graduate standards and a 
“management problem”). 
Another issue with these policies was management’s ability to abandon or modify them 
unilaterally. In my ten years with WC the mechanics of performance bonuses were 
tampered with so many times that it became pointless trying to keep up.149 The spin was 
that “we want every store to make target” (the basis of bonus), but management’s 
endless tampering reflected a truer desire to keep bonuses within budget. This was self-
evident because management constantly shifted the goal posts and introduced extra 
conditions when bonuses became too large or common (in their eyes that is, as occurred 
2009-2013). Worse still, they occasionally changed the terms and conditions of bonus 
payments after the fact to avoid high payouts. On one memorable occasion Retail 
Director Ron Potter simply admitted “we’ve [management] spent too much elsewhere” 
146
 WC has featured in many as discussed in Chapter Four. 
147
 As a three day per week part-timer I was awarded 59 shares, pro rota. Ultimately I would 
have got £150-£250 if I stayed with the company for another three years, minus sales or 
transferal costs (i.e. to a share portfolio once the consideration matured). 
148
 Management offered “free lunch Friday” to head off widespread grievances amongst FLSWs 
concerning the rolling free buffet at HQs. It was seen as tokenistic because a £4 budget for 
lunch one day per week hardly compares to the gourmet offering HQ staff enjoyed every day of 
their working week. It was also marketed internally as a “free team lunch,” which ignored the 
reality that teams could not share lunch together due to the design of the labour process.
149
 I asked numerous colleagues to explain the bonus system in “The Plan” era. Only one was 
able and willing to explain it in detail. 
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as justification for retroactive measures that reduced bonuses for FLSWs. Management 
also surrendered its “Living Wage” accreditation in 2018 when it became expedient for 
them to do so. 
The only Q-of-L perks that were never taken away or diluted were the ones 
management did not bear the cost of: supplier tasting events and sales incentives. These 
were far more luxurious and generous than anything management countenanced, so it 
was hardly surprising that they were popular amongst FLSWs. As was described in 
Chapter Five, the monetary value of even short-haul incentive trips would have been in 
the low four figure range.150 Tasting events could also be a taste of “the high life,” 
especially for FLSWs based near London where most events were held – either at 
upmarket restaurants or producers’ HQs. These were genuine treats but they were also a 
sizeable subsidy to management, in the sense that they provided enviable perks at 
nominal costs to the company. Obviously suppliers were not providing these things out 
of charity, but they did nonetheless provided for rarefied moments where FLSWs could 
feel special on account of their working for WC. Having attended numerous such events 
myself I recall comments along these lines of “I can’t believe they do all this for us.” 
7.1.7. Resistance 
One of the reasons that management introduced the “new plan” staffing model (see 
Chapter Six Part B) was that there was “too much downtime” as our Divisional Director 
put it. As it happened a character who features heavily in Chapter Eight [John] was an 
instigator in this diagnosis and the cost-control cycle that followed. A store manager 
described John’s role: 
“I blame a lazy person [John] who got caught by [the Divisional 
Director]. He went into store and found them watching Netflix. 
I’ll watch something on YouTube on my 30-minute break and I 
will get back to work and always get the job done … But this guy 
150
 I base this estimate on feedback from colleagues on the specifics of their itineraries, 
accommodation and travel as well as my own incentive trip to the Champagne region. 
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was watching Netflix, you know, watching, doing a bit of stuff in 
the morning and then [watching Netflix] … he got caught and he 
was very blasé about it because he was leaving the company so 
we know he was just in the job for the pay cheque.” 
Regardless of John’s abuses, more conventional downtime and “play time” were 
essential for meaning construction and pleasure creation within FLSW – making 
management’s assault upon it troubling. Their significance was made clear in the 
nostalgic stories told by FLSWs about the “good old days,” which typically focused 
upon the exploitation of downtime. A small sample of utterances follows: 
“Doug loves cricket … we used to play in the stock room. Good 
times” 
[Whilst putting the security shutters down] “When Stephanie 
used to work here we used to have races … you had to run to the 
[other] end of the store and get back [underneath the shutters] 
before they came down.”
[In relation to a stock room squash game] “When Keith was here 
we used to have proper tournaments, it was awesome, we got 
proper serious about it!”
Figure 32 provides an overview of the types of social behaviour I was familiar with at 
store level (an annotated version features in the Appendix, Section 3). It is not an 
attempt to provide a comprehensive list; rather, it seeks to capture much of what was 
“normal” store behaviour. As can be seen I have divided up work-related social 
activities by virtue of whether they were “whiter than white” (acceptable and/or 
encouraged by management); “grey area” or “black and white” (indisputably against the 
rules). What could make WC a relatively fun place to work (as compared to archetypal 
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Taylorised “bleak houses” – see Chapter Three), was the grey area FLSWs had to play 
with. Management had long known this and generally refrained from trying to regulate 
“grey areas” too tightly because it was costly to do so. Of equal importance, 
management knew that plenty of room for manoeuvre was a requisite element of a high-
service/functional-flexibility model. A fine line therefore existed between too much and 
too little control (as was argued in the LPT discussion in Chapter Two). Overstepping 
that line may prove costly for management whilst too little regulation may lead to 
unacceptable abuses such as those by John above. 
Figure 32: The spectrum of store behaviours beyond core activities 
Historically then a negotiated order existed between management and FLSWs, with area 
managers functioning as the primary referees of where the lines were drawn. They too 
had been FLSWs, so were not naïve to the inevitability of staff “letting their hair down” 
on paid time. Most would want FLSWs to enjoy their work ideally so turned a blind eye 
to a lot of “grey area” behaviour so long as it did not create waves.151 Some of this 
151
 Doug Slazenger explained to me that the main thing he missed from shop floor life was “the 
banter.”  LF’s regime regularly spoke the language of togetherness, community and “culture of 
fun” which was then echoed by RMs. 
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“grey area” behaviour was after all functional (e.g., “taking liberties”) in the sense that 
it was necessary for efficient work or deft service. The remainder was social and 
represented relatively harmless appropriations of time, energy and effort (as described 
by Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999) for the most part. 
Black and white “crime” in WC stores (the black area in Figure 32) were born of the 
social and economic conditions as Mars (1982) anticipated with exceptional clarity. By 
far the most common cause of dismissal was theft, which is probably not revelatory in a 
company that hires “wine lovers” then provides them with plenty of opportunity to steal 
(see the limits of monitoring and surveillance above). I personally worked with three 
people who were dismissed for pilfering; in fact, one of those individuals was at the 
heart of the most widely renowned “wolf” heist in modern WC involving the 
“disappearance” of £20,000+ worth of stock. He and another reputed “seller” were put 
in charge of the company’s fine wine flagship in London. Such was the cultish ideology 
of “sellers” at the time that trustworthiness was seriously overlooked as a criterion for 
responsibility-bearing positions. Management paid a high price for this when the 
individuals in question took liberties with their elite stock holdings. A spate of 
dismissals followed the unveiling of the crime including two RMs. 
One of the more bizarre dismissals I heard about happened in the final year of the study. 
A manager I knew well had set up a business selling merchandise “on the side” within 
his store, thereby failing to pay the landlord’s (i.e. management’s) dues. What made this 
episode interesting was that it seemed like exactly the kind of “enterprise” that 
management were demanding. Nonetheless, his downfall stemmed from a failure to 
understand the unspoken logic of “Meritocracy” which was to boost the landlord’s 
return on assets not FLSW’s income. His assistant manager was sacked too, so I can 
only assume he was in on the caper.  
Both of these examples exhibit a “wolf” type pattern of manager/assistant manager 
collusion in a “strong grid”/“strong group” store dynamic (see Figure 33). Without this, 
store crime (including darker shades of grey – see Figure 32) took on an individual 
vulture-type character. As a rule those with high company/regime commitment 
(elaborated upon in the following chapter) appeared least likely to abuse grey areas. 
Furthermore, those with high team commitment (“strong group” in Mars lexicon) were 
more likely to resist as part of a pack (“wolves”) rather than as individuals (“vultures”). 
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The latter was the case with my third known pilferer, who made the rookie’s error of 
thinking he could get away with refunding bottles of wine he had bought without 
actually returning them.  
A final rarer basis for dismissals in WC related to situations where FLSWs “fought 
back.” It surprised me that such episodes did not happen more often given how stressful 
and unsupportive WC FLSW could be. It was possible that the company was effective 
at covering up episodes, which is exactly what happened in the serious one I know of. 
In said situation a FLSW “lost it” (according to my informant) and smashed up a 
portion of the store before walking out, leaving it unlocked and unprotected at the end 
of the day. I was told that damage was worth tens of thousands of pounds. For reasons 
stated I do not know how many of my co-workers “snapped” in similar ways during my 
time with the company. Fleming (2017) predicted that snapping was likely to become 
an increasingly common feature of “you’re in your own” neo-liberal managerialism. My 
experience within WC led me to believe that he will be proven right, even if the 
evidence produced few examples. 
Figure 33: Mars’ “grid” and “group” to classify occupations 
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Section Two: Labour process 
7.2.1. Skill and intensity 
As was explained in Chapter Five the “graduate scheme” system was justified in 
relation to the breadth of skills required rather than the depth of skills. “Everybody does 
everything” functioned upon the basis of an ability and willingness amongst FLSWs to 
enact relatively boundary-less roles, switching rapidly between operational, sales, 
service, clerical and administrative tasks. Boundaries were also blurry in terms of store 
ranks, as there was little difference between the tasks and functions performed by 
FLSWMs and other FLSWs. Customers would often assume that the “senior-looking” 
FLSW was the manager, only to then realise that they had made false assumptions. 
Another reason for this was that veteran FLSWs were often deferred to by less confident 
managers and assistant managers, reflecting gaps between official and unofficial 
hierarchy as has been found elsewhere (see for example Dalton, 1959).  
In a “big four” supermarket I am familiar with FLSWs are referred to as “multi-skilled” 
if they are trained to work across two or more departments leading to small hourly rate 
premiums, presumably on account of their capacity to contribute more to the 
organisation. Staff can also gain additional pay increments by adding non-departmental 
skills to their portfolio by becoming a first-aider for example. In WC every FLSW is 
expected to be omni-skilled so that they may cover every “department” (wines, spirits, 
beers, lagers, ciders) and function (under the umbrellas “operational” and 
“commercial.)” Thus within WC FLSW, both horizontal and vertical role distinctions 
are eroded by the labour process design.  
Regardless, several factors did distort the system of functional flexibility in practice. 
Firstly, it takes time for new recruits to become core members of store teams. In their 
first few months fledglings would often represent more of a problem than a solution for 
experienced colleagues, who would have to add “babysitting” to their list of 
responsibilities. As will be explored in the next section this led to divisions of labour 
that failed to fully reflect the “everybody does everything” principle. Another distorting 
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factor was the need to make allowances for individual strengths and weaknesses which 
intersected with the nature and degree of FLSWs’ commitment (as explored in Chapter 
Eight). This not only impacted upon how individuals worked and stacked priorities but 
also shaped the experience of work for colleagues. 
Perhaps the biggest distorting factor that arose throughout my WC journey though was 
the decision of the LF regime to partially disband the classic WC staffing model in 
pursuit of a cheaper alternative. A by-product of this programme was a need amongst 
management to reconstitute part-timers as core team members, whereas traditionally 
full-timers considered them peripheral “extra help” rather than viable and realistic 
substitute managers. This level of expectation was applied to assistant managers and 
experienced trainees within the “classic model” but not part-timers, who were generally 
expected to drive the van and contribute to “monkey work” (e.g. cleaning and 
merchandising).  
Even though this division “naturally” occurred in almost every store I worked in,152
management insisted at the roll-out of the “2+2 model” (two full-timers/two-part timers 
– see Chapter Six Part B) that part-timers could and would match the performance of 
full-time graduates. This new management line stood on its head the old management 
line that “it’s graduate work” and “coaches” were soon contradicting the gospel of 
yesteryear. As Daisy Bouchard revealed to me in an interview “we expect part-timers to 
do everything.” When I asked her if it is realistic to expect part-timers to perform as 
well as trainees she simply responded “yes, I don’t see why not.” 
One of the reasons management believed their system would work as expected was 
because they were making FLSW “easier” according to their rhetoric and grand plan 
(see Appendix Section 2). In some instances this was true; for example, “web order 
manager” had made processing and dealing with online orders more time-efficient. In 
other areas though their actions only made the job more difficult. To take two important 
examples, the new-era price tickets (aka “POS”) contained substantially less 
information – meaning that inexperienced staff could no longer rely upon them to sell. 
152
 During my ten years in WC I worked in 33 of roughly 200 stores. 
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Old POS provided a “cheat sheet” of key information about the wines that could be 
scanned and regurgitated in sales encounters (see Figure 34), whereas new POS lacked 
this essential feature. Quality information was replaced by “culture of fun” staff 
comments, such as a celebrated and high status Chateauneuf-du-Pape being described as 
“Del Boy’s favourite wine” with no additional information. Another talked about the 
dancing of Fred Astaire to describe a Rioja, which was of little practical use in a sales 
pitch. 
Figure 34: Old Point of Sales (POS) 
Another example was the new till system once it was finally rolled out in 2018 
(discussed further in Chapter Nine). In functional terms it was considerably less 
adequate than the prior EPOS system and it was much less intuitive. Working with it 
effectively required more practice and experience than the old till and to make matters 
worse, FLSWs had to be trained to use both systems due to continued dependence upon 
old EPOS for more sophisticated requirements.153 An anticipated two-year transition 
meant that new recruits would have to learn to use both till systems in pursuit of 
competence across the full spectrum of operational, sales and service activities. 
153
 Old EPOS was loaded onto store computers, which sat side-by-side tills loaded with new 
EPOS. 
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The predictable consequence of management’s actions was to entrench rather than 
retract pre-existing divisions of labour between core (full-timers or former full-timers) 
and periphery (part-timers) FLSWs in stores. I neither observed nor heard of convincing 
evidence of the part-timer “upskilling” that management assumed would occur, perhaps 
by necessity. In fact, remaining full-timers had to make do with a smaller core team 
member and intensification was the inevitable outcome.154
Thus, it became harder to be a fully competent and fully immersed functionally flexible 
team member as time progressed in WC. This made it more practicable to retain 
traditional divides between core-workers (“everybody does everything”) and peripheral 
workers (specialising in the bits that are easily trainable; more repetitive, etc.) A belief 
that part-timers could ever develop skill commensurate to that of experienced full-
timers stretched credibility, to a point at which it could be labelled “management make-
believe” in my view. This term refers to management’s propensity to espouse belief in 
convenient “truths” (as discussed further in Chapter Nine).  
As Chapter Five made clear, the classic-era answer to staffing the front-line was to 
exclusively hire full-time graduates. This was driven by the belief that the labour 
process necessitated a broad range of skills and motivation to develop those skills. Wine 
is after all a sophisticated product with inexhaustible scope for knowledge development. 
I personally compared/contrasted something in the region of 3,000 wines during my 
time in WC, providing a body of knowledge that could not easily be faked. WC veterans 
could “spot a fake a mile away,” leading to numerous in-jokes at customer’s expense: 
“Guy last night was saying he loves rich full-bodied wines. His 
favourite is Beaujolais.” 
154
 Virtual Post-box comments showed this to be a general interpretation as well as my own – 
see Chapter Six. 
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“Had a customer in giving it the big one about pinot noirs, 
saying he’d tried all the big boy shit … Didn’t even know 
Burgundy is pinot noir.”
It took years rather than weeks or months to master the FLSW role in WC, rather than 
being merely able to cope (which was achievable in the latter time frame). Hence there 
was some legitimacy in the classic WC model of a “graduate scheme” based upon a 
vision of skilled work being performed by functionally-flexible FLSWs. 
7.2.2. Discretion  
As was made clear in Chapters Five and Six WC FLSW was not designed to be easy; it 
was designed to make an alternative business model viable based upon a quality 
orientation. What I mean by this is that WC focussed on one product category within 
supermarkets’ vast portfolio and sought to do it better, via service “value-added” and a 
concentration upon the “quality-value” niche. To successfully capture this “middle 
ground” (i.e., better quality products, expertise-driven service and superior pound-for-
pound values on wines between £7-£20) required compromises between control over 
and freedom for FLSWs. This related to the customer interface in particular, as tight 
performative constraints were incompatible with the variability and indeterminacy of 
customers’ wants and needs. 
Given the difficulties of directly controlling FLSW behaviour within a retail multiple 
with such a business model, management used tangible metrics as a proxy. The implicit 
and explicit belief was that if the numbers were good then FLSW was probably being 
done “the WC way.” As implied above when I joined WC the rule-of-thumb was that if 
you exceeded monthly target (set as x% of last year’s sales), kept shrinkage below 
management’s threshold and avoided getting customer complaints then peaceful 
relations with management were likely. Management did not especially care how you 
met your numbers so long as you did so consistently. Failure to do so meant there “must 
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be a problem” as one RM explained to me. By this he meant a problem with the store 
team’s performance.  
Therefore, as was highlighted at the outset FLSW in WC was never easy but it could be 
easier if a team had the ability, willingness and/or good fortune to meet the basic 
requirements of keeping management off your back. This did not necessarily afford 
teams any more control over work conditions but it did provide breathing space from 
the watchful eye of senior managers. One might see the RM once a month rather than 
once a week for example, so the direct surveillance was at least less intensive. As said 
the assumption was that if the numbers were good then you were “getting it right;” the 
flipside was that if the numbers were bad then the team must be “getting it wrong.”  
These findings clearly correspond with those of Grugulis et al. (2010) and Lloyd & 
Payne (2014), who each remarked upon a substantial gap between outlet manager’s 
power over performance and accountability for it. In both cases “numbers” (i.e., sales 
targets of management’s choosing) were a means by which management pursued 
alignment between expectations and unit performances. However, neither of these 
studies presented a cyclical picture of management’s application and retraction of 
micro-management as was evident in WC (see Chapters Six and Nine). Both WC 
regimes went through cycles of relative empowerment (i.e., higher staff budgets, more 
store investment and more pluralistic relations) and relative disempowerment 
(tightening purse strings and/or attempts at governing qualitative role performance in 
store).  
Another significant distinction between the FLSW in WC and the sites upon which 
Grugulis and Lloyd & Payne focused on was the centrality of proactive selling and the 
free hand WC FLSWs enjoyed in doing so. This was an important area of discretion 
because of the heterogeneous nature of customer demands and the business logic of 
“selling” expertise as discussed above. To underline the significance of this within the 
business model, LF’s regime opted to put “wine guru” on the name badges of veterans 
rather than store ranks (thereby adding to the confusion over who’s who hierarchically 
as described). Unlike supermarkets (Grugulis et al., 2010) and cafes (Lloyd & Payne, 
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2014) WC sold between 800-1000 highly similar products; each of which are prone to 
offending some and pleasuring others. If Tesco sold sixty varieties of corn flakes or 
Costa sold eighty varieties of latte, then one can imagine the kind of anxiety that may 
ensue amongst customers without independent expert guidance. In relation, there would 
be considerable scope for customer dissatisfaction if management began trying to 
micro-manage which latte or corn flakes were sold for the sake of better margins. Such 
micro-management would be blind to individual tastes and an affront to a business 
model that sells staff’s independence and expertise. 
Despite this, both WC regimes described in the present study ultimately came to a point 
at which they were willing to undermine their business model in pursuit of better short-
term numbers. Both regimes commenced or intensified control mechanisms in order to 
manipulate sales recommendations. As was evident in Figure 20, senior management 
had traditionally applied pressure through RMs (who used sales data from EPOS) to 
ensure that “deals” were sold over and above other products in the range. RMs would 
also use things like league tables and prizes to incentivise the prioritisation of such 
products. More recently, LF’s regime took sales manipulation to a whole new level by 
making targets for the sale of “exclusive” products (with higher margins across the 
board) a central component of “Meritocracy.” Irrespective of the mechanism the intent 
was the same: to pressure FLSWs to sell the most profitable and commercially 
advantageous products rather than their personal preferences, thereby undermining a 
distinguishing area of autonomy and discretion in the process.  
In retrospect, there are solid reasons to argue that WC FLSWs had greater discretion 
than FLSWs in the case studies I am using for comparison. The centrality of pro-active 
selling, product knowledge and a quality-service proposition meant that there was 
always a “business case” that WC FLSWs could call upon to justify actions contrary to 
management’s inflexible targets. Management’s contradictory logics and demands 
could also be used against them. For example, if I were to argue that “I sold X (low 
margin) wine instead of Y (high margin) wine because that’s the one the customer 
loved” this would be difficult to challenge, given its alignment with management’s own 
rhetoric. It was also difficult for them to disprove my claim that the customer loved that 
wine, although actually it may have been the case that I sold whatever I preferred. 
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Section Three: Co-worker and customer relations 
7.3.1. Working with colleagues 
Team composition 
Store turnover varied in WC, between circa-700k per annum and a handful of flagships 
which had taking upwards of £3m. In principle staff hours per store increased in 
proportion with unit profitability which largely reflected turnover. Some stores could be 
more profitable than others though despite similar turnovers; for example, stores driven 
by commercial trade may sell low-margin products in higher quantities than other stores 
where sales are driven by wealthy residential catchments.  
The aggregate profit of a region formed the basis of RMs’ staff budgets and they had 
the power to determine staff allocations per store. This is not to say that they had a free 
hand however; their decisions would have to be justifiable in the eyes of their super-
ordinates and defendable to store managers too. The latter would make their feelings 
known to RMs if they felt their store was unfairly staffed relative to others. The 
following colleague remarks captured the nature of these gripes: 
“I don’t understand how Vale is on three all the time when they 
take three hundred grand [a year] less than us.” 
“Why have [a store not featuring in the study] got a part time 
driver and we haven’t even though we take the same money.” 
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“We’re covering Green Bush all the time … putting us on one 
and a half [full-timer + a part time] and them on two. How is it 
our fault they can’t manager their rotas?” 
Another limiting factor upon RMs’ staff allocation was legacy effects, for want of a 
better term. RMs would inherit regions that may have pre-existing “irrational” staff 
allocations for a variety of reasons. For example, to keep a valued FLSW in the 
company a RM may have introduced ad-hoc accommodating arrangements that then 
bind their successors. The latter would have to work around the budgetary implications 
because it was neither possible nor desirable to terminate a contract of employment 
because it disrupted ideal profit/staff budget ratios. 
Caveats aside there were relatively standard norms for staff allocation based upon 
revenue and profitability. In Table 9 I have laid out standard team compositions for 
stores in Region X: 
Table 9: Store staff allocation by turnover 
Turnover per annum Typical staff allocation
<£0.9m 3 full-time staff members
£0.9m-1.3m 3 full-timers + 1 part-timer
£1.3-£1.6m 4 full timers or
3 full-timers + 2 part-timers 
£1.6m-£2m 4 full-timers + 2 part-timers
The standard part-time contract was fixed for sixteen or twenty-four hours per week 
(two or three eight hour shifts respectively), whereas full-timers were contracted for 
forty-eight hours. It was left to store managers to plan rotas on a monthly basis, to book 
holidays and so forth. In the classic WC era RMs and RMAs155 closely monitored these 
and challenged managers on decisions where appropriate and necessary. The guiding 
155
 As a reminder: Regional Manager’s Assistant. 
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principle was “commercial interest,” which meant matching up staff numbers to the 
likely volume of trade on given days. Thursday, Friday and Saturday were the key 
trading days in WC. 
In this brief outline I have assumed “normal” conditions but as Chapter Six made clear 
conditions were often “abnormal” in WC for extended periods of time. During the cost-
control cycles (described earlier) staff allocations were cut back to the bare minimum, 
leaving skeleton crews staffing regions. During such periods teams as represented on 
paper could bear little relation to that which took to shop floor on a regular basis. 
“Cover” (see Chapter Six) and other makeshift practices were used by RMs to keep 
regions afloat in times of scarcity. One such practice was to pile pressure upon part-
timers to do overtime, potentially upsetting delicate balances they have with other 
activities. 
Nonetheless, when LF imposed “Meritocracy” upon WC stores it had two key 
implications. The first was that the cover system was effectively abolished. This was a 
double edge-sword because whilst it meant that a given store would no longer be 
burdened with supplying cover, it also meant that it was not available when that store 
needed it. Put simply you were on your own – management were no longer going to 
help with staff shortfalls even though their policies were driving them. In relation, the 
second implication was that this “empowerment” came with a 10% budget cut across all 
stores. As was described in the previous chapter, this effectively ended the WC system 
of full-time functional flexibility across the store network. Stores with turnover <£1.2m 
would lose their full-time trainee and get two part-timers in their stead, engendering a 
sixteen hours per-week net loss. Mid-sized stores may keep their core team of three full-
timers but would lose either a part-timer contract or have their forth full-timer replaced 
by a part-timer. The same basic approach was applied to large stores irrespective of 
profitability. 
Normative division of labour: sub-specialising generalists  
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It has explained above that a key principle upon which WC operated was functional 
flexibility, whereby “everybody does everything.” Whilst this was accurate to a large 
extent it was more complicated upon close inspection, as discussed in Section 2 above. 
To further that discussion I would argue that another important aspect of how principle 
differed from practice was economic rationalism. To take a basic illustration, the 
company regularly distributed videos and publications which management requested all 
team members watch/read. Assuming that a video lasts for 15 minutes and there are 4 
team members then the total time cost would be one hour, which is a high price to pay 
during busy seasons or understaffing. In such circumstances it becomes logical for a 
store manager to watch said video and distil key points, thereby reducing the staff cost 
from one hour to perhaps half that. Applying this principle across the panoply of similar 
HQ requirements saves days of staff hours over the course of a year, freeing up time for 
higher priorities.  
Another key factor determining the division of labour within store was the amount of 
time that given staff members spent in the customer service/sales trench (further points 
on normative FLSW relations are developed in Chapter Eight). When it comes to sales 
and service practice did make perfect to some extent, meaning that all other factors even 
store managers provided the best experience for customers. Some of this was 
capitalising on experience; bearing in mind that training generally went hand-in-hand 
with rank and years of service. Importantly though, store managers also spend much 
more time in store than junior colleagues because deliveries were normally done by the 
lowest ranked team member present. That meant that part-timers, trainees and to a lesser 
extent assistant managers did a lot of deliveries whereas store managers rarely left the 
site. 
As a part-timer I worked two days per week and spend approximately half of that time 
doing deliveries, meaning that I got about eight hours of store time per week compared 
to forty-eight hours for a store manager. This has multiple implications; firstly, my 
product knowledge could not realistically keep up with a store manager because he/she 
has vastly more store time to learn about products. It should be noted too that part-
timers worked the busiest shifts, further reducing the likelihood of engaging in non-core 
activities. Secondly, I could build personal relationships with regular customers in the 
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way that managers could because that depended upon accumulating familiarity. Thirdly, 
my lack of time in store made me less efficient at running the store because I was least 
in the loop on relevant matters. Thus, it made sense for the manager to take lead on 
service provision and operational oversight because they were structurally in the best 
position to do so. 
Once these factors are fed into an analysis of how best to contribute on an individual-
basis it becomes apparent that sub-specialisation made sense. Managers were at such a 
strong comparative advantage in certain areas that it was actually in the best interest of 
overall performance to let them dominate those areas, stepping into their shoes only 
when necessary or requested. Typically the manager would take lead if a customer 
walks in, not because others eschew responsibility but because they were reflexively 
aware of the shared benefits. In light of this each store has a negotiated customer 
serving pecking order, albeit one that can be distorted by numerous situational and 
individual factors on a given day (e.g. the manager needs you to “handle customers” for 
X, Z or Y reason). 
If manager activity coalesced around the higher value-added activities because of the 
comparative advantages their position afforded, then it made sense for less senior staff 
to focus their attention on activities that managers necessarily neglected. It was 
therefore typical for the latter to predominate in janitorial, merchandising and basic 
clerical duties as well as operational tasks. Team dynamics thus represented a 
microcosm of Ricardo’s (1817) theory of comparative advantage, where he argued that 
specialisation offered an increase in total production due to relative opportunity costs. 
Applying his terminology to WC stores, a store manager had an absolute advantage 
over all major facets of WC FLSW whereas a junior FLSW had a comparative 
advantage over more menial and manual elements. In theory and practice a division of 
labour organised around relative advantages was the most logical approach in terms of 
resource allocation, which largely explains why such patterns formed. I am assuming 
here that teams worked well together and avoided sabotage by a “loose cannon,” a 
subject for Chapter Eight. 
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Cooperation and conflict 
Sitting alongside management’s fundamental right to manage (which was never 
seriously or collectively contested in my ten years in WC156) were two things that were 
central to both cooperation and conflict. These were a negotiated order which 
represented the “unwritten rules” of how work is performed and by who, as described 
above. This existed alongside a rolling antagonism over fair and unfair, right and 
wrong. Some elements of a store’s negotiated order were unique to it whereas others 
appeared to be company-wide. The general principle of “everyone does everything” (at 
least amongst experienced full-timers) is an example of the latter. An example of the 
former was a mutual acceptance in one of my stores that the “drop” (the main stock 
replenishment from the depot) had to “go away” (be merchandised into respective 
sections) in a single day because there was literally no backspace. As a consequence, 
pallets blocked the shop floor until they were merchandised making the store experience 
unpleasant for FLSWs and customers alike. To achieve this the team would spend the 
prior days excavating “gaps” in respective sections (see Figures 17-19), greatly 
increasing merchandising efficiency once the drop arrived. 
Store managers were essential to the enforcement and reinforcement of a given store’s 
negotiated order, but its component parts gained additional legitimacy from clear 
associations with operational and commercial imperatives. In the above example, 
making the drop “go away” within a single shift made sense operationally because it 
was difficult to operate at all with blocked walkways. As for the commercial logic, if it 
annoyed staff to have an inoperable store then it was reasonable to assume it annoyed 
customers as well. 
Of course, operational and commercial factors were not the sole basis of legitimacy 
applying to negotiated orders within stores. FLSWs also made recourse to arguments 
based upon fairness and reasonableness. If in the outlined example the same FLSW was 
permanently on the rota on “drop day” whilst the manager took it as a standard day off, 
then the unfairness of the arrangement may become a source of conflict. In one of my 
156
 Considered further in Chapter Nine. 
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stores the manager did so happen to have an uncanny knack for scheduling their days 
off on operationally significant days (e.g. stock takes, large drops, seasonal price 
changes157). This bred much resentment amongst co-workers who felt “stitched up,” to 
use a popular staff term. 
In recent years a primary basis of in-store conflict in otherwise cordial teams has boiled 
down to the aptness and fairness of divisions of labour amongst full-timers versus part-
timers. As was described above the restructuring of staff allocations acted as a powerful 
lever to intensify full-timer’s work. Those tasks that typically fell upon the shoulder of 
full-time veterans had to be spread across fewer people whilst the barriers to 
“upskilling” part-timers arguably increased. Managers and assistant managers would 
grow frustrated with the inability of part-timers to “fully contribute,” whilst at the same 
time feeling that the marginal gains of providing advanced training were exceeded by 
the marginal costs. This was partly due to a feeling that part-timers would forget much 
of what they had been taught due to their lack of daily skill utilisation, speaking to the 
truism “use it or lose it.” It was also down to a widespread belief that part-timers were 
not as committed as full-timers, presumably because WC is not their primary
commitment and/or sole source of income.  
Within Region X part-timers fell into three categories: early retirees (who joined the 
company for “pocket money” or a “hobby job”); parents seeking “flexible” work and/or 
those who were using WC as a “second job” alongside an alternate primary vocation 
(see Table 10 for demographic data). Given the relatively detached nature of these 
situations store managers carried a common conviction that “you can’t expect them to 
be as committed as trainees” (as I was told in various guises). However, this was not to 
say that core full-timers did not resent the supposed inequality of commitment. It was 
expressed via constant rhetorical pressure upon part-timers to contribute more or 
equally, in spite of the mutual recognition of their inability to do so. In my home store 
this led to considerable back-stabbing and name calling, which expressed grievances on 
both sides of the full-time/part-time divide. Full-timers felt they needed a full-timer’s 
contribution from part-timers, whereas part-timers countered that “you can’t expect full 
time effort for part-time pay” (or words to that effect). Again, these tussles reflected 
157
 A detailed outline of operational work in WC stores features in Appendix Section 6. 
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how contestation over fairness and reasonableness laid at the heart of store team 
conflict. It was also possible that a generational divide existed between the full-time 
core and part-time periphery actors, given that many of the part-timers were early 
retirees as said. Contrary to that, the data yielded little evidence that age per se was a 
factor in shaping labour division in stores. 
Table 10: Permanent staff in primary research sites 






Pear Tree Manager 30-34 M White-British 
(W-B) 
Assistant manager  25-29 M W-B 
Trainee manager 25-29 F W-B 
Trainee manager 20-24 M W-B 
P/t sales assistant 60-64 M W-B N 
P/t driver 55-59 M W-B N 
Canalside Manager 35-39 M W-B 
Assistant manager 25-29 F W-B 
P/t sales assistant 45-49 M W-B Y 
P/t sales assistant 35-39 M W-B Y 
P/t driver 55-59 M W-B N 
Edgewold Manager 25-29 F W-B 
Assistant manager 25-29 M W-B 
Trainee manager 25-29 F W-B 
Trainee manager 25-29 F W-B 
P/t driver 55-59 M W-B N 
Green 
Bush 
Manager 25-29 M W-B 
Assistant manager  25-29 M W-B 
Trainee manager 25-29 F W-B 
P/t driver 55-59 M W-B N 
Oak Leaf Manager 30-34 M W-B 
Assistant manager 25-29 F W-B 
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P/t sales assistant 30-34 F W-B Y 
P/t sales assistant  25-29 F W-B Y 
P/t driver 60-64 M W-B N 
Vale Manager 25-29 M W-B 
Assistant manager 25-29 M W-B 
P/t sales assistant 45-49 F W-B No 
P/t sales assistant 50-54 M W-B No 
The second key basis of conflict occurred where one or more individuals within a team 
appeared to others as serial offenders in terms of the written and/or unwritten rules of 
FLSW in WC. Formal breaches of rules included such things as repeated lateness, 
unjustifiable failure to execute and sustain “non-negotiables” and/or failures to adhere 
to company policies that subsequently incurred loss. These things may lead to the 
exercise of formal disciplinary mechanisms but more often they led to off-the-record 
reprimands by hierarchical superiors, normally phrased as “make sure you do [X}” or 
“next time don’t do [Y].”
In most instances transgressions would be forgotten and social relations would be 
unaffected long-term, but in cases of serial offenders escalation could occur. In my first 
store I was effectively frozen out of store relations, treated as a marginal outsider and 
made to feel unwelcome in my workplace. Whether intended or otherwise this social 
marginalisation functioned as a means of punishing me as a supposed repeat offender (I 
took too long on deliveries and was “not pulling [my] weight” according to my 
accusers). This was underlined by a bad appraisal (one of my three in the company) and 
a “talking to” by the RM, showing how official and unofficial corrective mechanisms 
acted in tandem to isolate and incriminate an alleged offender. This all made for a 
lonely experience where I felt victimised within a toxic store environment. Over the 
years I watched numerous others go through similar processes of isolation and 
oppression via formal and informal mechanisms. Some stayed and fought158 but most 
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 Two managers I knew of refused to leave despite intense pressure from management. In 
one case the manager’s team had subjected him to the marginalisation process described. Both 
managers were eventually forced out via the “three strikes and you’re out” formal disciplinary 
process. 
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moved on either or externally or internally. I opted for the latter, starting over in a new 
region of the company.  
Perhaps the most serious challenge a FLSW team could confront was one in which the 
store management was the serial offender. Not only were they protected by the 
structural power their position afforded but often they also enjoyed the patronage of 
their RM, who may be reluctant to accept that they had elevated someone unfit for the 
role. In such situations subordinates could feel trapped at the bottom of a power 
structure that lacked for adequate checks and balances. In my final years in WC the 
team in my home store was subject to this very experience (as discussed further in 
Section 8.4.3). Resigned acceptance was the main response in the circumstances, even 
as resentment and tension simmered barely beneath the surface. 
7.3.2. Worker-customer relations 
Although the “new plan” had several dimensions (see Chapter Six Part B), “5* service” 
was posited as the lynchpin factor that would drive growth in the age of “Meritocracy.” 
By management’s rationale stores that consistently offered 5* service would attain 
customer loyalty, which would feed into a positive spiral that lifted the bottom line. The 
significance attached to 5* service is made clear in the following exchange which 
related to a store in long-term decline within Region X:  
M.J: “If I was to go in for the manager’s job [at the store in 
long-term decline] I would make it clear that I need 18 months to 
turn it around.”
Store manager: “Well you wouldn’t get the job!! Customer 
service is all they want to hear about now, it’s the only game in 
town.” 
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Throughout 2017 it become clear that “culture change” around the “new plan” was 
being imposed, with all of management’s levers (see Figures 45-48, Chapter Nine) 
being manoeuvred in supportive directions. The cult of sales during the DM/Doug 
Slazenger era (see Chapter Six) was rapidly being substituted for a cult of “great 
service,” to which all should be subservient and devoted according to management. A 
principal channel of ideological indoctrination was LF’s community on G+, which 
served as a mechanism to spread his gospel directly amongst the troops. On one 
occasion a colleague called my attention to one such post that summed up the general 
tone. The exchange is summarised here: 
Colleague: “did you see that posting by LF about the customer 
bringing the bottle back?”
M.J: “No.”
Colleague: “Basically a customer said he didn’t like it. What LF 
said he would have done [in the scenario] is give the customer a 
bottle [of fine wine] and tell him “have that free on us – I bet 
you’ll like that.” Can you imagine if we did that every time a 
customer was unhappy?!” 
Having perused LF’s G+ feed it was clear that this type of guidance was commonplace. 
LF seemed to regard every instance of dissatisfaction as a unique opportunity to garner 
loyalty by exceeding remedial expectations. Typically the advocated means was an 
exaggerated gesture of goodwill, thereby putting PR ahead of bottom line. The 
assumption that this would pay dividends in the long-term was difficult to validate but 
the immediate cost was a hit to stores’ GP (which FLSWs were solely responsible for in 
the age of “Meritocracy”). Consequently, many FLSWs felt it was easy for LF to talk a 
good game because he had absolved himself of responsibility for balancing 
contradictory demands in actual frontline encounters.  
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Nonetheless, the majority of FLSWs generally supported a policy of putting service 
front-and-centre because they favoured that type of orientation over the macho sales 
ethos of the previous regime. Furthermore, FLSWs were aware of the abundance of 
competitive pressures and agreed that taking the high road was a more desirable option. 
Whether and how the strategy of service exceptionalism could be made viable was hotly 
debated though, in part because countless customer engagements had made FLSWs 
aware of the delicate balance to be struck between price and service/product quality. 
This sense of uncertainty was apparent in the following debate: 
M.J: “Can you explain to me the current strategy of the 
company?”
Interviewee 1: “The logic at the moment is loyalty. And loyalty 
will breed success and everything is geared up to try and create 
a loyal customer base … it’s all to do with service. All they want 
to do at the moment is get us to give a fantastic service, get 
people to come back. I see flaws in it … I think for me if I’m a 
customer buying wine … just because WC are fantastic service 
I’m still going to go to a supermarket if it’s a pound, two pounds 
a bottle cheaper. But as a company it’s all loyalty at the 
moment.” 
Interviewee 2: “I disagree with certain points of that. As a 
consumer myself I think service is important and I would pay 
more sometimes to go somewhere and for a specialist product – I 
would go somewhere and pay more for the advice and the 
service.”
Interviewee 1: “My counter to that would be that for WC to grow 
I think they need to grow their customer base. I think at the 
moment we specifically target the upper middle class and a lot of 
the population that drink wine will not fall into the class 
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boundaries that we target. And if we’re to grab more of the 
market we need to start going after people … who are at the 
lower end kind of price of wine … those people they don’t care 
about service, they just want to pick up a cheap bottle. And we 
don’t have the prices to attract those people in so we’re never 
going to grow over the supermarkets for that long.”
Interviewee 2: “WC aren’t going to beat supermarkets in price 
[and] supermarkets can afford to run things at a loss. All we’ve 
got is service to make them come back to us. So I do think that 
it’s right that we should be targeting that.”
Ever since the fall of the DM regime a healthy internal debate has ensued about what 
kind of company WC should be. As was outlined in Chapter Five WC’s original 
business plan was to target the well-heeled middle classes as Interviewee 1 identifies, 
with a customised service/product quality proposition that bridged the best of both 
worlds between volume sellers and elite merchants. Once a foothold was established in 
the wealthiest part of the country the model was extended to other pockets of affluence 
– a pattern that sustained sales and profit growth for 21 years up to FY2013. However, 
from that point onwards it grew clear that the model had ran its course as a means of 
increasing shareholder value. Management’s “doubling down” (by growing into ever 
more marginal terrains) and squeezing costs (to sustain profits) only exacerbated a 
“crisis” that received significant press coverage. The culmination of these factors led to 
the radical changes as described in Chapter Six, where the old guard was swept out and 
a “rock star CEO” was lured. 
That crisis did not go unnoticed by FLSWs, far from it – the more astute amongst them 
saw the “writing on the wall” for the DM regime long before the business press caught 
up. Their daily experience told a story of declining health even as headline metrics 
moved upwards. It was against this backdrop that a new regime was warmly embraced 
because it might be possible to finally have an open and sensible debate about the big 
questions of WC’s surviving and thriving. Who should WC target and serve? Should it 
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be a specialist or a generalist? Is the target market “anyone who will listen” (as coach 
Daisy Bouchard put it) or a select demographic as per custom? Equally, are customers 
essentially the same in what they want from a wine shop or are they different? If so, 
then how can a workable balance be struck between tailoring and standardising?  
To some extent management’s decision to focus upon “exceptional service” 
circumvented a requirement to make difficult decisions about the basic proposition and 
the challenges of catering to stratified, “fragmented” markets (see Du Gay – Chapter 
Two). Instead they adopted an “if we build it they will come”159 (and keep coming 
back) logic centring upon fun, thrills and a feeling of belonging. The mantra coming out 
of HQ was that “boring retail is dead,” so the only means of survival is to become the 
opposite. In an interview with a leading trade journal WC’s customer director Ron 
Potter clarified management’s view: 
“We’ve got an opportunity. Wine is such an exciting product … 
the experience we are giving in stores, opening wines, letting you 
taste wines, that community feel when you come in, that will 
never be boring, that will never be dead… We need to make sure 
our stores are worth visiting. With any retailer, the ones that are 
popping up, they are fun stores to be in, they are doing 
something. It has to be experiential, otherwise why bother 
leaving your sofa?” 
Whilst all of this may have held intuitive appeal it nonetheless begged questions like 
what exactly does “fun” and “experiential” look like? Is it reasonable to assume that 
customers are a homogenous group with the same basic understanding of “fun” or is it 
more credible to consider them idiosyncratic, holding myriad views of what “great 
service” is and whether it is worth paying extra for? Along these lines two binary 
perspectives came to the fore in WC, with management holding one view and FLSW’s 
generally holding the other. For management customers were basically the same: they 
all want great service (fun, excitement, non-boring); they all want great value (i.e. to 
159
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pay a reasonable premium for an enhanced experience) and they all want the 
personal/community feel. For FLSWs however, customers were all different and 
therefore wanted different things from store visits. If the latter were correct then this 
suggested dangers in management’s attempt at imposing a one size fits all “culture of 
fun” model (see Fleming, 2005). Given the significance of the issue I asked FLSW 
interviewees “what is truer: that customers are all the same or that customers are all 
different?” Here are some representative responses: 
“I think saying customers are the same is a massive 
simplification and it’s wrong … they are completely different….” 
“Customers are all different!” 
“All customers are different is definitely true.” 
Interviewer: “Can you elaborate?” 
 “Yeah, some customers literally come in and they do not want 
any help or they don’t want to interact with you, they don’t want 
you to, you know, even talk to them. It’s like you literally say like 
‘hello’ and they won’t even look up … Whereas other customers 
they literally want to know your life story, they ask what you’ve 
done at the weekend, like about your holidays and stuff like that 
… as far as choosing the wine they’ll want loads of help, they 
literally want to know exactly what you like, they want to try 
stuff. Whereas yeah, other people ‘no, no, don’t talk to me, don’t 
try and sell me anything.’ Yeah, they’re all really different.” 
Interestingly, when I asked Daisy Bouchard this question she came up with a novel way 
of bridging the gap between management and FLSW views. It was almost as if her 
hierarchical position required her to find a compromise: 
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“I think probably in many ways all customers are the same. In 
that they all have their different requirements but ultimately 
they’ve all – walked in for the same reason – because they want 
the product and they want the experience of the store.” 
As can be seen Daisy hedges her bets by arguing that customers are all the same in that 
they are all different. What this introduces is the possibility that both positions are valid 
on some level. That said, my role as both FLSW and participant observer put me in a 
position where I could not accept management’s position as valid. It is truer to say that 
customers are all different from my perspective, even though analytical inroads can be 
made into synthesising the nature of this disparate mass. A useful starting point is to see 
WC customers as fitting a bell curve because the majority converge around the average 
(see Figure 35). 
Figure 35: Wine Corp customer bell curve
The silent majority of WC customers (those within the normal range) are instantly 
forgettable to FLSWs because they conform to the negotiated order of the 
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establishment, achieve their objectives and leave promptly. They politely decline 
optional extras as a rule, rarely use “exciting” features like the tasting counter and 
generally make instrumental/time-efficient use of facilitates and staff time. Their muted 
investment in WC means that they neither seek opportunities to complain nor do they 
harbour interest in leaving positive feedback. Essentially they are as engaged as their 
objectives require them to be, and otherwise hold themselves to conventional standards 
of middle-class public decorum. Thus, the typical WC customer approximates a 
combination of Bolton & Houlihan’s (2005: 699) “functional transactants” and “moral 
agents.” The former defines “good service” as quick and easy whilst the latter places 
high value on mutual equity according to those authors.  
Instantly forgettable is not to say unappreciated; quite the opposite, most WC FLSWs 
are quietly grateful for each and every bread-and-butter transaction. They may not 
excite or titillate in the way that management hopes but they put money through the till 
within a normal range of effort versus reward. Of course, FLSWs’ preference is for 
transactions with high rewards and low effort (e.g. an online order for 300 bottle of 
Bollinger) but these are rare and exceptional. Most transactions fall within the normal 
range of not much effort/not much reward and those unremarkable transactions made up 
most WC sales.160
In contrast, those at the edges of the bell curve (Figure 35) are customers who represent 
a poor trade-off between time, effort, energy (both emotional and physical) and rewards. 
At one extreme are the over-social customers, who seem to cost more than they are 
worth in the FLSW-customer “effort bargain” (see Baldamus, 1961). At the other end of 
the spectrum are the anti-social customers who are rude and disrespectful to staff, 
making them remarkable on that basis. Some ideal-types of over-social customers are as 
follows161: 
The bar fly: This type of customer generally fell into the over-social category although 
there were a few known examples where they were both over and anti-social. One such 
160
 As of May 2019 the average transaction value (ATV) at my home store was around £80, with 
an average bottle price around £8.  
161
 For further examples and description of over-social customers see Appendix Section 7. 
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case was a customer colleagues and I referred to as “Botherer”. Botherer was a retired 
individual who delighted in propping up the tasting counter in the afternoons. Whenever 
the selection of wines was updated (this was displayed on the store’s web page), 
Botherer would hop on a bus then work his way through the range. Visits rarely lasted 
less than an hour, and there was an uncomfortable expectation that staff would make 
him welcome despite his unpopularity amongst them. 
The reason for this lack of cordiality was that Botherer was the most prolific customer-
complainer any of us had encountered. Any failing would elicit a complaint however 
trivial, and HQ would unfailingly indulge him with a discount voucher for his trouble. 
This reward incentivised his behaviour so new complaints kept coming and new 
vouchers kept being despatched despite successive store managers’ protestations. One 
was simply told “he spends £3,000 a year so we put up with him.”
The Monopolist: These customers were store regulars; they knew your name and they 
expected you to know theirs. The defining characteristic of a Monopolist was that they 
expected all of your attention, which presented an obvious problem when they were 
frequent visitors. Another issue was that they were far more interested in socialising 
than buying, often popping in with flimsy excuses. As an interviewee insinuated above 
these were the type of customers who “want to know your life story” and want to share 
their own. On a slow day a Monopolist might be welcomed and indulged (depending 
upon the mood and sociability of the FLSW – see below). On a busy day though a 
Monopolist could be very disruptive, making it difficult for FLSWs to sustain an 
illusion of his/her special significance (Korczynski, 2002).  
The Special Friend – The common thread amongst this type was an expectation of 
extraordinary treatment in relation to some self-perceived social/cultural significance.162
Special Friends were not time inefficient like Monopolists or Bar Flies, but they did 
expect discounts and/or extra-ordinary service for no other reason than who they were. 
As the rolling theme of “over-social” implies Special Friends were typically charming 
and affable, making them potentially difficult to resist. One notorious Special Friend of 
162
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mine was a “society cad” and member of Prince Charles’ friendship circle.163 His Boris 
Johnson-esque caricature was so beguiling that I opted to play along, mainly because I 
did not want to burst his bubble. He came across as somebody from a different world, 
and to some extent he was. 
If the deviation from the norm with “over-social” customers was that they were 
disruptive via over-engagement, then anti-social customers posed the opposite problem. 
The source of their disruption stemmed from their lack of willingness to engage with 
staff and/or the abrasive way they did. Some common examples follow164: 
Mr Big – WC was awash with customers drawn from the upper socio-economic tiers but 
what distinguished Mr Bigs was a combination of brashness and condescension. In 
essence the Mr Big-type enacted the customer role as master and commander, 
projecting a strong expectation of demur servitude. To take a comic example, an 
archetypal Mr Big once put me under pressure to apply extra discount to a transaction 
where it clearly could not be justified. The total spend was too small and the products 
selected were already on genuine promotions. I therefore explained my reasoning in a 
rapid-fire session of request and denial. Concurrently he grew frustrated until he blurted 
out “IF I WAS WEARING MY LORDS ROBES YOU WOULD DEFINITELY GIVE 
ME DISCOUNT!”165
The Old Major – Given that WC was a magnet for the “grey pound” a considerable 
proportion of its customers were senior gentlemen, who in their frustration with the 
modern world fell somewhat short on the gentle part of the nomenclature. I refer to Old 
Majors as such because the ideal-type is highly reminiscent of officers in the TV show 
Dad’s Army.166 Their expectation of subservience mirrored that of Mr Bigs, although 
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 My store manager put his name into Google, verifying his Etonian background and 
establishment connections. 
164
 For further examples and description see Appendix 7. 
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 The customer sat in the House of Lords. 
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 A recent Guardian article described the show as “the very best – and very worst – of 
Englishness.” (https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jul/29/the-guardian-view-of-
dads-army-it-was-wonderful-but-we-must-now-move-on) Old Major’s often reminded me of 
Captain Mainwaring with his catchphrase “You stupid boy.” In the case of Old Majors, a short 
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the egotism is replaced by a general frustration with deviations from their expectations 
of how service should be.
The Put Upon – There was a common assumption of voluntarism when customers were 
talked about, especially amongst WC management. They romanticised the customer as 
being eager to talk, excited about the product and enthralled by the prospect of being 
“wowed.” In contrast, Put Upon customers were the antithesis of management’s fantasy 
because they wanted minimal fuss and attention. These were customers who would have 
rather not been customers at all, they were only there due to prevailing circumstances 
(e.g. “their husband/wife asked them to get the wine for X”; “their boss said get wine 
for Y” etc.). These people were prone to push back against FLSWs who seemed over-
inquisitive or friendly because these displays only exacerbated their burden, adding 
pressure to “play nice.” Two days ago (at the time of writing) a prime example of a Put 
Upon caused offence to a female colleague. It was described by her as follows: 
Colleague: “God she was such a bitch, so was so rude to me.”
M.J: “What did she say?” 
Colleague: “Well she told me she wants six prosecco, so I asked 
her what style she was looking for and how much she wanted to 
pay etc., and she just said ‘I WANT SIX PROSECCO!!!’ I was 
only trying to help…”
I therefore refer to these customers as “put upon” in two senses; firstly, they did not 
want to be there and snippiness was an expression of that. Secondly, they were 
aggressive in their rejection of value-added “experiential” service and forcefully 
imposed their minimalist expectations. 
fuse tended to go hand-in-hand with frustration at their dependence upon “stupid boy” FLSWs to 
achieve their objectives.  
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The split personality of management 
Cognitive dissonance is an apt way of describing the gap between management’s 
personal sentiments on customers and official policy. In quiet and reflexive moments 
senior managers may concede that “of course customers are different,” and therefore 
have to be approached as individuals with varying wants and expectations. Yet these 
philosophical ruminations were divorced from the identikit nature of management 
policy, which cast customers as round pegs desirous of service that pushed them 
through round holes.  
For the wide spectrum of customers (as set out above) good service self-evidently 
required tailoring and deviation from a standard script, sometimes giving more and 
sometimes giving less. The cult(ure) of “5* service” meant that “giving more” was 
unproblematic but “giving less” was highly taboo. The latter was framed as the epitome 
of bad/boring service, the polar-opposite of what customers sought when they visited 
stores. The problems this posed for FLSWs was that contrary to management’s beliefs, 
a large proportion of WC customers did not seek the “fun” and “wowing” full-service 
and were likely to be alienated by it.  
There were several elements to management’s self-delusion about WC’s customer 
composition. Firstly, a sense of the company’s survival resting upon customers paying 
more for “quality service” compelled management to adopt a more-is-more mind-set. A 
blind eye was therefore cast upon the large portion of customers for whom less was 
more. A second factor was that management’s primary means of disaggregating 
customers strategically was in terms of how often they shopped (i.e., whether they are 
“loyal”), which stripped them of their quirks in terms of how they shopped. These 
inclusions and omissions had a homogenising effect on management’s perceptions. A 
third related factor was that top management were exposed to numbers every day but 
were rarely exposed to the people that numbers represented. Seeing customers from 
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different vantage points was almost certainly a factor in explaining the perception gap 
between management and FLSWs. 
Yet another factor in management’s oversimplified thinking was that an ideology of 
“service excellence” had long since permeated the corporate realm (see especially 
Peters & Waterman, 1982; also, du Gay, Chapter Two). Most of management’s major 
policies in WC were virtually copied-and-pasted from influential management journals; 
for example, the “5* service” concept was popularised as far back as 1995 in an article 
in the Harvard Business Review.167  The year before Heskett et al. (1994) published 
their influential paper on the “service-profit Chain” in the same journal, which the “WC 
2.0” logic model mirrors exactly. Yet another article in the Harvard Business Review168
celebrated the arrival of the “experience economy” twenty years before WC’s 
management adopted the idea as their own. 
Further, in relation to “5* service” another factor militating against nuanced views of 
customers was the selection bias of the 5* feedback system. 5* feedback was heavily 
skewed by those who shouted loudest or were most invested, meaning that the voice(s) 
of average customers (who did not have the time nor inclination to leave feedback) was 
drowned out by a small minority of outliers. For example, over-social types such as 
“Bar Flies” and “Monopolists” tended to leave 5* feedback as standard given their 
abnormal engagement in store life. At the other end of the spectrum Old Major’s and 
Mr Bigs were easily disgruntled, and the former (often being retired) had the time to 
make trouble via feedback mechanisms. Thus, a combination of over-vocal edge-of-the-
bell-curve customers and under-vocal middle-of-the-bell-curve customers could 
severely distort the validity of 5* feedback signals. 
A final factor shaping management’s disconnect between policy and repressed 
knowledge was a default preference for control despite rhetoric to the contrary. As the 
previous chapter argued, the combination of “you’re on your own” behaviour standards 
167
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and “big data” monitoring/surveillance represented a “bleak house” control/cost pincer 
movement. This constrained rather than enables FLSWs in the face of customer 
variability because it sought to impose contradictory quantitative and qualitative limits 
upon their role performance. As Lloyd and Payne (2014) argued, when management are 
presented with a choice between surrendering control and potentially higher sales/better 
service the control instinct ultimately wins out.  
Prior to a concluding discussion it is worth remarking on feedback I received from a 
presentation of this material at a workshop.169  It was argued that I should attempt to 
convert the above data into a two-dimensional typology. Obviously such a step has 
presentational appeal and utilises a favoured tool of sociologists, but the problem was 
that no second y-axis dimension presented itself as having an equal and consistent 
bearing upon FLSWs’ experience. Another suggestion was that I further disaggregate 
the “normal range” into types. This is something I would like to pursue in future 
research, even if their bearing is less remarkable than that of extreme types described 
above. 
Section Four: Discussion 
As was illuminated in Chapters Two and Three the nature of FLSW has been a central 
concern amongst researchers and theorists focused upon the area. Whether de-skilling or 
up-skilling has taken place has been one debate (see for example Du Gay, 1993). 
Another has homed in on whether and to what extent the nature of control mirrors or is 
substantively different to that of manufacturing work – perhaps in relation to ICT 
systems (Fernie & Metcarf, 1998); emerging opportunities for “customer control” 
(Fuller & Smith, 1991; Rafaeli, 1989) and/or “sophisticated” and insipid HRM 
strategies (Fleming & Sturdy, 2009; Wallace et al., 2000). Yet another interesting theme 
has been the notion of management “outsourcing” managing, or at least attempting to 
create a convenient illusion that they functioned as servants rather than masters of 
FLSW. According to Fuller & Smith for example, mystery shopper programmes co-opt 
customers as management’s proxy and thereby extending the latter’s power into 
169
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qualitative dimensions of FLSW. Darr (2003) came to similar conclusions within a 
knowledge work environment, arguing that management resorted to “market control” as 
a means of governing the labour process whilst presenting themselves as a non-coercive 
mediator.  
The organisation of FLSW in WC bared a close resemblance to that discovered in 
Grugulis et al’s (2010) and Lloyd & Payne’s (2014) case studies. Management “heavily 
prescribed” key dimensions of FLSW (Grugulis et al. 2010: 1) and removed FLSWs 
from discretionary involvement in the conception of WC – thus, their residual role 
centred upon execution. This limited role span was policed by RMs or “coaches” in 
turn, as was made clear in Chapters Five and Six. Under the reign of Doug Slazenger 
store managers were better conceived as managers in name only due to their lack of 
authentic control over stores. Crucially, FLSWMs lacked budgetary discretion and 
power to hire and fire so they failed Lloyd & Payne’s test of “proper” managerial 
discretion (p.483). However, these self-evident limitations did not to result in limited 
liability for store performance. Quite the opposite, FLSWMs were increasingly held 
solely responsible for sales and performance within management rhetoric.  
By comparison, the power of modern EPOS (tills) to enable detailed analysis and 
backseat manipulation of sales by management was understated by Grugulis et al’s 
(2010) and Lloyd & Payne (2014). This may have been because of self-service (in the 
case of supermarkets); limited options (in the case of cafes); or the lack of subtle 
differentials across products meant that pro-active, discretionary selling were not 
significant features of the respective labour processes. Another notable distinction 
between Grugulis et al’s findings and those in “classic WC” was the relative emphasis 
upon “customer control.” Grugulis et al (2010) identified service scoring systems as 
being available to customers and closely monitored by senior management alongside 
“bottom line” performance indicators. No such systems existed within the classic WC 
model; there was no mystery shopper programme nor was there systematic data 
collection on customer satisfaction. DM’s regime fixated instead on the ends rather than 
means; if sales went up profits went up, and that was taken as a proxy for organisational 
vitality. The flipside was that an absence of growth was then taken as evidence of an 
absence of health, an interpretation of management’s own making. 
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The arrival of “maverick” CEO LF heralded a new strategy based upon the notion that 
WC had to become synonymous with service quality so as to halt a supposed exodus of 
“loyal” customers. The initial plan was for management to surrender control of 
interactional and sales elements of the customer interface, encouraging staff to “be 
themselves” and “sell what they love.”170 FLSWs were given additional tools to “wow”
customers and were encouraged to use their common sense to deliver “special” service. 
Unfortunately, this strategy failed to yield returns in a timeframe that satisfied 
management so they incrementally added monitoring and surveillance to ensure the 
service was “special” (5* feedback being the most important mechanism, 
complemented by mystery shoppers). Importantly though these were accompanied by a 
monolithic management-imposed concept of what good service looked like, as was 
evident in the marking criteria for mystery shoppers. In turn, this was based upon 
management’s fantasy ideal-type customer rather than a spectrum of actual customers as 
presented in Section 7.3.2. The very reason FLSWs were able to spot mystery 
customers (and adapt their behaviour accordingly) was because they stuck out like sore 
thumbs amongst the sea of “normal customers.”  
Thus, management’s attempts at manipulating the qualitative side of FLSW in WC 
failed to significantly modify behaviour in my view for a few reasons. In the first 
instance the implementation and design of their mechanisms was poor, thereby 
undermining their potentially coercive value. The threat posed by mystery customers 
was limited because they were cartoonishly easy to spot and bad reviews could 
legitimately be blamed on multiple contextual factors. Similarly 5* feedback was 
undermined by its crudeness; the scoring system was easily skewed by a tiny number of 
bad reviews (due to small sample sizes171) whilst also driven by grievances unconnected 
to store staff (e.g., “prices have gone up,” “you didn’t have X in stock”). An equally 
important limiting factor was the assumption that service quality was the weak link in 
the first place. An absence of systematic data collection pre-implementation meant that 
this was little more than a hunch that coincided with convenient ideology, in the sense 
170
 As an example, the reverse side of staff badges stated that “my job is to help you discover 
wines you will love. So I focus on the wine, not the discount. That way I get loyalty – and sales 
will follow”
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 In the six week period between 03/03/19 and 14/04/19, my home store received nine 5* 
reviews per week on average – a little over one per day. 
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that it provided a simple solution to “poor performance” (see the LF logic model, p. 
170). If there were institutional issues with service quality then it was a consequence of 
prior managerial agency (see Chapter 6 Part A) rather than the result of a FLSW labour 
problem. Ultimately LF’s regime committed itself fixing something that was not 
broken.172 By doing so they risked breaking it, a possibility I shall explore further in 
Chapters Nine and Ten.173
In summary, the organisation of FLSW in WC exhibits a number of features in common 
with the studies described at the outset. WC FLSW was defined and shaped in the first 
instance by things that FLSW actors had little or no control over, which is a finding in 
common with many well-known studies (see Chapter Three). That said, there were at 
least three things that distinguish and/or differentiate WC FLSW from that researched 
and described elsewhere. Firstly, WC FLSW was skilled work in important senses and 
this provided breathing space (i.e., viable and/or legitimate means of resisting 
management). Secondly and in relation, the business system depended upon skills and 
discretion to differentiate WC and justify its existence in the middle ground between 
elite merchants and low/no service providers. This fits a mid-market strategy as 
described by Pettinger (2004; see also Frenkel, 2006), which at its best offers a best of 
both worlds proposition that attracts customers from both poles of the market spectrum. 
This was after all the process by which classic WC grew in the first place (see Chapter 
Five). Finally, the conception and execution of management’s “modern” FLSW-specific 
control mechanism was poor and FLSWs were wise to its flaws and limitations. These 
systems were not totalising in the “Panopticon” sense and room remained for resistance 
both outside and within management’s own policy and logic.  
172
 Evidence in Chapter Eight will support this claim. 
173
 See also remarks in Appendix Section 8.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE EXPERIENCE OF FRONTLINE SERVICE 
WORK 
Introduction 
The research question asked what are the forces and factors that shape the experience 
of FLSW in Wine Corp? In a sense this is a question of two parts, with the former 
centring upon causes (see Chapters Five and Six) and the latter centring on 
consequences. Of course, this separation is for analytical purposes only because causes 
and consequences are deeply intertwined, with today’s consequences shaping 
tomorrow’s causes. I make this claim based upon the evidence (discussed further in 
Chapter Nine) and as an expression of a Critical Realist analytical framework, as 
outlined in Chapter Four.  
The present chapter nonetheless homes in on the experience of FLSW per se, looking at 
the outcome-end of the subject under study. The first sub-question I seek to answer 
(Section One) is the extent to WC’s FLSWs were satisfied overall with their work 
experience. To do this I draw upon research that management itself commissioned to 
establish a broad picture of the state of affairs within the organisation. It will be shown 
that they failed to do this to acceptable scientific standards but the data remains useful 
for addressing the matter at hand. Moreover, drawing upon management’s research 
provides an opportunity to triangulate findings whilst further exploring the theme of 
how and why management used its agency in the way that it did. 
In Section Two I make further use of the aforementioned management-commissioned 
data to examine the key points of positive and negative experiences. Much of this data 
supports the analysis in preceding chapters so I will seek to amplify instances of cross-
validation where appropriate. A similar objective is pursued in Section Three, which 
analyses turnover data with a view to mutually supportive findings across primary 
(qualitative) and secondary (quantitative) data sets. 
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An important finding that emerges from this synchronous analysis is the importance of 
social relations in stores. It will become clear that collegial relations “make or break”
the experience of WC FLSW as one interviewee put it – a finding that is supported 
(explicitly and implicitly) by the survey data. George Monbiot recently referred to 
people as “ultra-social mammals”174 and this does not cease to be the case in 
workplaces. The significance of co-worker relations makes it important to understand 
the underlying forces and factors that lead teams of individuals into enhancing or 
undermining shared experiences. There is no attempt at an exhaustive analysis here but 
two factors are illuminated that are underrepresented elsewhere: personality and 
commitment-by-type.  
A recap on methodology & epistemology 
Pragmatism lies at the heart of ethnography, as discussed in Chapter Four. When it 
comes to the specific instruments of data collection it is agnostic and flexible, driven by 
a practical belief that tool selection should be driven by the task rather than pre-
determined. A reductionist ontology – for example, one that sees discourse as the only 
thing that exists – limits a researcher tool-kit by denying them the capacity to analyse 
how things other than discourse may shape the social world. If discourse represents the 
only truth then there is limited value in looking beyond it in epistemological terms. 
Ethnography is incompatible with this tightly bounded ontology because it assumes the 
existence of extra-discursive realities that could and should be studied in situ. 
As was made clear in Chapter Four I reject the reductionist/deconstructionist 
worldview. In my view methods should be attuned to the specific area of enquiry rather 
than designated a priori on the basis of theoretical fundamentalism of some variety. I 
also believe that valid insights into the life and experience of FLSWs is best achieved 





Methods chapter but it ultimately boils down to a belief that you can best understand 
someone once you have “walked a mile in their shoes.”  
Much of the insight contained in prior chapters is drawn from a decade walking in the 
shoes of WC FLSWs. Given the nature and extent of my background knowledge of and 
within WC, I reserve the right to critically evaluate truth claims and the motivation(s) of 
their purveyors. I do not presuppose any special ability to divine truth(s) in doing so; I 
only assume that a truer account of organisational and experiential reality is made 
possible by critical investigation and expert examination of all relevant evidence (Yin, 
2014). It is by this process that a more valid account of the phenomena under study may 
be achieved, even if it remains the case that all research and researchers are to some 
degree fallible. 
It is in light of this fallibility that I caution the reader against taking the quantitative data 
below at face value. The reason is that it is derived from surveys commission by LF’s 
regime to appraise levels of engagement and progress against their “people” (i.e. HR) 
benchmarks. Management had a vested interest in “proving” that progress was being 
made vis-à-vis staff engagement, bearing in mind that this was the lynchpin of 
performance enhancement models as presented to internal and external stakeholders 
(see Figures 22 and 26). Therein, “empowering” and “freeing” were meant to catalyse 
the overarching WC 2.0 and 2.1 agendas, a backdrop that explains management’s 
willingness to invest significant sums in rolling research in the first place. This took the 
form of surveys that were repeated every six months, featuring identical questions so as 
to chart progress over time. Sections One and Two draw upon results from the Spring 
2016175 and Autumn 2017176 surveys. The work was carried out by specialist 
consultants on WC’s behalf (see Table 11 for details of their methodology). 
Table 11: People survey – methodology 
• 37 scaled questions, 1 multi-option question. 
• Questions were grouped under the following themes and headings:  
175
 Four months into “the plan.” 
176
 Twenty months into “the plan.” 
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“(1) the basics (2) passion (we bring our passion to work); (3) customer 
(customer first, customer second); (4) together (together we are WC); (5) 
resilience (the more you put in, the more you get out); (6) creativity (we make 
our own luck); (7) integrity (we deliver profit through our principles); (8) 
Overall satisfaction.”  
• All questions were presented as positively phrased statements.  
o Employees were asked to rate each statement, using a 1-4 scale, where “4” 
indicated strong agreement and “1” denotes strong disagreement. 
• The consultants provided the following guidance for interpreting results: 
o Mean score in excess of 3.20 = “excellent” 
o Mean score 2.81 – 3.03 = “good” 
o Mean score 2.4 – 2.8 = “lukewarm” 
o Mean score below 2.4 = Poor 
• The Spring 2016 survey results were based upon 781 responses (64% response rate). 
The Autumn 2017 survey was based upon 642 responses (response rate not stated). 
• All employees of WC were invited to participate including those from Retail, Head 
office, Commercial and Distribution Centre divisions. 
o The results were not reported on a division-by division-basis, which was 
likely to positively skew results. The quality-of-life was widely held to be 
significantly different for retail and non-retail staff, with the latter enjoying 
shorter working hours and regular office schedules.  
o These beliefs were substantiated by a breakdown of employee engagement 
scores. The range of employee engagement scores for the 11 store regions 
was between 59%-71%177 in the Spring 2016 survey, against a company 
average of 70% (Note: Region X scored 66%). In contrast, the range for 
specialist & Head Office functions was from 75%-87%. Seen as a proxy for 
satisfaction the data suggested a segregated picture of qualitatively distinct 
work experiences, given that all such non-retail departments had markedly 
higher average scores. The sole exception was the Distribution Centre (68% 
employee engagement), possibly because its atypical working conditions 
(long anti-social hours, physical labour, relatively low pay178) were distinct 
from those of other non-retail divisions. 
Section One: The overall balance of satisfaction and dissatisfaction 
amongst WC’s front-liners 
At first glance WC’s survey data presented a relatively upbeat assessment of job 
satisfaction in WC. On the key question “overall, I’m happy and content working in 
WC” there were 83% (Spring 2016) and 81% (Autumn 2017) positive response rates, 
equating to a little over four out of five staff members (Figure 36). The mean was 2.92 
and 3.05 respectively, which according to the consultants represented “good” and “very 
177
 These scores represented the aggregated average for all survey participants in a given 
region. 
178
 I knew this from contacts on the distribution side of the business.
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good” scores. That said, as was outlined in Table 11 there were reasons to be sceptical 
over whether this was indeed “good”/“very good.”  
In the first instance there remained almost a fifth of employees who were not satisfied, 
and this was quite consistent despite the full implementation of “the plan” in the 
interim. A second issue was that both surveys sampled the whole of WC rather than just 
FLSWs – the focus of this study. As was argued in Table 11 there were robust reasons 
to believe that this sampling decision skewed the results upwards and therefore, the 
picture in retail would not be as rosy as figures suggested. Yet another issue was 
selection-bias; I knew anecdotally that the most jaded FLSWs were the least likely to 
participate in these surveys. Time and again veterans told me “I’ve heard it all before” 
[in relation to “the plan”], “nothing changes” and “there’s no point” [in filling out the 
surveys]. With these comments in mind it seemed fair to expect that the low 
participation of veterans would have modified results downwards. It should be noted 
that the surveys themselves provided corresponding evidence of fatigue. Those with 0-6 
month’s service had an engagement score of 81% compared to 66% for those with 1-3 
years’ service and 68% for those with 3-10 years’ service. This suggests significantly 
different levels of satisfaction amongst those who have been around long enough to 
have “heard it all before.” 











Positive Negative Positive Negative
Spring 2016 Autumn 2017
Overall, I'm happy and content 
working at WC
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A third issue was that related questions concerning job satisfaction either failed to 
indicate high levels of satisfaction and/or failed to show improvements in it, although 
results were inconsistent (see Table 12). Most notably, one in four WC staff stated an 
intention to leave the organisation within 12 months – a finding that was remarkably 
consistent across the two surveys. There was a small improvement on the question “I’d 
be more than happy to tell my friends to work here as well,” although this result drew 
flattery from an abnormally bad starting point. In Spring 2016 almost one-third of WC 
staff disagreed with this statement whereas by Autumn 2017 it was down to one in four 
(25%). Simultaneously, staff became marginally less proud of working for the 
organisation but remained committed to “doing my very best for WC.” This was an 
“excellent” result, suggesting that if there was a problem to be fixed by management 
then FLSWs’ commitment may not be it. 
Table 12: WC Engagement & satisfaction 
Results Feb 2016 Results Sept 2017
Engagement questions Mean % 
Pos. 
% Neg. Mean % 
Pos. 
% Neg.
I am committed to doing my 
very best at WC 
3.62 97% 3% 3.6 96% 4% 
I am proud to work at WC 3.23 91% 9% 3.23 89% 11% 
I plan to still be working at WC 
in a year’s time 
2.97 75% 25% 2.96 74% 26% 
I’d be more than happy to tell 
my friends to work here as well 
2.8 69% 31% 2.95 75% 25% 
8.1.1. Management’s assault on truth 
Within the 2017 and 2018 annual reports management made hay of marginal 
improvements against “people” benchmarks. As was mentioned above, LF’s regime had 
made commitment and empowerment centrepieces of their differentiation strategy. In 
relation, WC’s core proposition was superior customer experiences and FLSWs were 
charged with breathing life into this experiential concept. To paraphrase LF for the 
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“company to grow [FLSWs] have to grow,” making it incumbent upon management to 
measure “growth” via surveys. 
The perceived importance of an engaged workforce was such that management were 
willing to go to some lengths to ensure that they got the research results they wanted. 
This became apparent when they took a strong dislike to the response they got to “I 
really trust the people who are running WC.” A little over one in five WC staff 
disagreed in Spring 2016, and each subsequent survey yielded evidence of growing 
distrust. By Autumn 2017 over ¼ of staff disagreed (see Figure 37), even though 
management had changed the wording of the question to distinguish themselves from 
middle management179 – probably expecting a more positive result on that basis.  
Figure 37: Trust amongst Wine Corp staff
A colleague explained why the term “witch hunt” would not necessarily be an 
exaggeration of management’s response to staff’s lack of trust: 
179











Positive Negative Positive Negative
Spring 2016 Autumn 2017
"I really trust the people who are 
running WC"
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Colleague: [responding to an open question about “whether 
upward communication channels exist”] “Obviously we’ve got 
the engagement surveys which I like as a concept but I know 
from talking to people in other stores that there was, there’s a 
certain sense of people not being very comfortable filling those 
in anymore and not necessarily feeling that they can be 
particularly kind of honest after the last one where we were kind 
of some of the answers the company then kind of came back and 
were like we want to know why you answered this, so can 
everyone that answered it email us or put a post telling us why. 
And then when people didn’t follow it up they got personal 
emails and it kind of then went against that people felt that it 
wasn’t then really confidential and they were being put on the 
spot.”
Researcher: “I remember Doug made … an iron clad promise 
that it is completely confidential.”
Colleague: “It is supposed to be confidential but I know people 
were contacted by email and kind of asked to explain why they’d 
put … Basically that they didn’t trust the leadership of WC.” 
Researcher: “Oh, okay, right.”
Colleague: “When you’ve got the kind of questions on there, it 
was something that had decreased and they were kind of 
concerned so and if people … I didn’t put it so I didn’t have one 
but I do know people that did put it and basically got an email 
saying can you explain yourself please. And then … So I think 
that rattled people because obviously other people got to hear 
about it. And I think that has rattled people across …
[telephone rings, is ignored] 
… “I was still very honest with mine. I don’t put anything in an 
engagement survey that I wouldn’t happily explain to anybody 
that phoned me up and sort of said can you explain your answer, 
you know. I’ve put it there for a reason because I believe it. But I 
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think that it did worry some people that actually I’m going to be 
contacted about my answers and is it, you know, is it really that 
confidential? So I am intrigued to see how the results come out 
of the next one that they’ve just done.” 
I too heard rumours that despite management’s insistence that the research was 
anonymous and confidential they had retained (and enacted) an ability to trace 
individuals whose contributions were especially unfavourable. The truth of the matter 
was hardly important in terms of data bias at least, what mattered was that many WC 
staff believed allegations to be true. This cautioned them against participation in 
subsequent surveys whilst reinforcing the notion that those with negative views may be 
wise to keep them to themselves. Thus the results of the survey – both in terms of 
relative positivity and/or the absence of negativity – must be evaluated with the pressure 
that management applied in mind. 
Alongside alleged individual-level monitoring of staff responses and the rephrasing 
questions, management also dropped less favourable questions or elements of them from 
the survey. The most notable example was in the open question that asked “what makes 
employees want to keep working for WC” (see Figures 38 – next section). Two of the 
three least popular answers were “the lifestyle it allows them to have” (11% positive 
response rate) and “the pay” (12% positive response rate). Management boosted the 
latter by rephrasing it as “the pay and benefits I get”180 [emphasis added], leading to a 
circa-25% increase in positive response rate. Their approach to the former was to 
remove the response altogether.  
Section Two: Key positives and negatives relating to experience  
The open question “what makes employees want to keep working for WC?” provided 
useful insights into the things that FLSWs liked and disliked about their jobs. Alongside 
“lifestyle” and “pay” the other option that was least likely to keep staff in WC was “the 
180
 The most significant benefits were discussed in Chapter 5 (Section 2) and Section 7.1.6. 
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working hours,” which was designated as a positive by only 7% of survey respondents. 
At the other end of the spectrum 65% of respondents wanted to keep working for WC 
because of the “people they get to work with.” The two other most positive responses 
were as follows: 
“The customers they help” (56%) 
“Their job – the stuff they do every day” (47%) 
A limitation of this otherwise insightful question was that it did not present some of the 
most well-known FLSW dislikes as options to be selected (or not). There was no option 
for “staffing levels” for example, and there was no means of stressing the destructive 
significance of related factors like “lone working” or “cover.” If they were presented as 
options then there was considerable reason to believe that they would have been 
identified as further factors that greatly undermined retention (see Chapters Five and Six 
Part A). Nonetheless, the results from the Autumn 2017 survey are presented in Figure 
38. 
Figure 38: Retention factors (“what makes you want to keep working for 
WC?”) 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
My job (the stuff I do day to day)
The overall culture
Feeling proud to work for the WC…
My manager
The chance to progress
The training
The pay & benefits I get
The working hours
The environment in which I work
The people I get to work with
The customers I help
Other
% of participants in agreement
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Both in terms of the highest scoring and lowest scoring retention factors, WC enjoyed 
small increases in positivity between Spring 2016 and Autumn 2017. Those reporting 
“the people I get to work with” as a motive to stay increased by 2% whilst more 
remarkably, there was a 9% increase in those reporting “the customers I get to help” as 
such a motive. Unfortunately, it is hard to say whether this represented a true shift in 
positivity or a reflection of management’s rumoured surveillance.  
Similar reservations ought to be afforded a small increase in those who claimed to want 
to keep working for WC because of “the working hours.” It is difficult to explain this 
surge in positivity (from 7% to 10%) because working hours were unchanged in the 
intervening period. In the meantime work was intensified (see Chapters Six Part B and 
Chapter Seven), although this failed to register within the survey results. To make this 
clear Figure 39 illustrates an improvement in the number of respondents claiming to “I 
have enough time to get … everything done” despite observational and interview data to 
the contrary. Nevertheless, the mean score remained “lukewarm” meaning that it 
continued to be a weak retention factor (according to the consultant’s guidelines – see 
Table 11).






Positive Negative Positive Negative
Spring 2016 Autumn 2017
"I have enough time at work to 
get everything done that I need 
to"
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8.2.1. The ten most positive and negative results 
Whilst survey output lacked credibility in the absolute sense I would argue that it 
remained useful for relative indication of likes/dislikes vis-à-vis the experience of WC 
life. It is for this reason that I draw upon the data, even whilst cautioning against 
acceptance of its results at face-value. The Autumn 2017 “Engagement survey: 
summary report” provided a useful overview of the ten most positive and negative 
results (see Table 13 and 14). These are useful in further elucidating what FLSWs liked 
and disliked about their work experience. 
Table 13: Engagement Survey (Autumn 2017) – 10 most positive results 




I love getting customers excited about wine 98% 2% 
I am committed to doing my very best at WC 96% 4% 
My manager, team and colleagues respect me 93% 7% 
I am totally clear about what is expected of me at work 92% 8% 
I’ve got a buddy/friend/mate at work 92% 8% 
My job is a really important part of what we are trying to do at 
WC 
91% 9% 
I know that someone at work care about me 90% 10% 
WC really cares about our customers 89% 11% 
My colleagues are utterly brilliant at what they do 89% 11% 
My manager is a great role model of WC principles 87% 13% 
Taken together there are clear themes apparent across the ten most positive results. Two 
of the top five concerned customer’s experience, which probably reflected both genuine 
commitment amongst FLSWs as well as management pressures as described above. In 
addition, the fact that “I love getting customers excited about wine” was the most 
popular response provides indication of how customers served as sources of work 
satisfaction. They provide staff with an opportunity to talk about a product they were 
passionate about. Another five of the top ten answers centred upon the experiential 
positive that was co-worker relations. A significant number of WCs staff worked with 
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people they regard as “brilliant at what they do;” “role model(s);” “friend(s);” and also, 
sources of respect. The responses indicated the significance of competence, congenial 
managers and meaningful social relations in WC FLSW generally. In turn, they 
underlined the significance of intrinsic sources of job satisfaction which corresponds 
with the findings presented in Figure 38. 
In contrast, communication and organisational synchronisation were the things that WC 
staff were least positive about by some margin (see Table 14). Well over half of survey 
participants rejected the notions that management implemented change or facilitated 
interdepartmental communication effectively. In relation, less than half of staff felt able 
to agree that “the different parts of WC work well together to get to the same goal.”
None of this seemed surprising given the chaotic policy roll outs described in Chapter 
Six Part B. 
In Chapter Seven I argued that the appraisal system was marginal, sporadic and 
ineffective. This position is supported by almost one-third of WC staff rejecting the 
notion that they were “100% clear on how WC measures how well I’m doing at my 
job.” Such a finding seemed incongruent with another that 92% of WC staff felt 
“totally clear about what is expected of me at work.” It seems plausible that an 
ineffective appraisal system significantly contributed to the knowledge gap implied by 
these findings. 
Otherwise the dominant theme amongst the ten least positive results can reasonably be 
connected to WC’s “management problem.” Thompson (2003) argued that a 
fundamental problem with management is that it cannot keep its promises, and LF’s 
regime made a great many promises upon its arrival in 2015. They promised to fix 
morale problems amongst FLSWs and to reverse a vicious cycle of decline initiated by 
the prior regime (see Chapter Six, Part B). However, survey results suggest that 
management were not perceived as having delivered upon these promises two years on. 
Only 72% could agree to “feeling valued” as employees, whilst 39% remained unable 
to agree that they “have enough time … to get everything done.” These failures may 
explain some of the other least positive results including “I really trust the Directors 
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who are running WC” and “I know that you’re going to do something useful with what 
I’ve just told you.” 
Table 14: Engagement Survey (Autumn 2017) – 10 least positive results 




I’d be more than happy to tell my friends to work here as well 75% 25%
I’m 100% clear on how you measure how well I’m doing at my job 70% 30%
I feel valued as an employee of WC 72% 28%
I really trust the Directors who are running WC 74% 26%
I know that you’re going to do something useful with what I’ve just 
told you [i.e. the survey data] 74% 26%
I have enough time at work to get everything done that I need to 61% 39%
The different parts of WC work well together to get to the same goal 59% 41%
You pay me the right amount for what I do 55% 45%
The different parts of WC communicate well with each other 49% 51%
WC introduces changes to the business well 43% 57%
Section Three: Linking workplace behaviours to experiences 
In early 2019 I requested a large bundle of demographic data from the People 
Department on FLSW demographics alongside basic HR information (see Appendix 
Section 5). I asked for the data to be longitudinal, covering the entire period of study 
(2009-2019) so that I may trace changes in labour turnover and the proportion of white 
males amongst FLSWs. It was made clear in Table 10 that WC’s frontline was 
overwhelmingly white-British. I wanted to see if this pattern (alongside others) changed 
as WC scaled back its traditional employment model. 
As I may have predicted the People Department failed to satisfy my request. A senior 
People manager explained to me that system changeovers were to blame because they 
caused data to be lost or mislaid in the fog of transition. My experience of LF’s regime 
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– with its endless tinkering and overnight abandonment of brainchilds – made 
departmental chaos a perfectly believable explanation for an inability to provide data as 
requested. LF’s “post-bureaucracy” had proven an apt model for flattering traditional 
bureaucracy in my view, something that Du Gay (2000) and Parker (2002) anticipated. 
The most reliable information on FLSW turnover is available in WC’s annual reports 
because retention of “key staff” (i.e. store managers) was a KPI for LF’s regime. 
According to management their research proved that sales dipped in stores after 
manager’s departures, underlining their importance to customer loyalty. As the latter 
grew in importance as an aspect of management’s commercial strategy so did the 
importance of retaining and leveraging FLSWM’s personal relationships with 
customers. That all said, key worker retention actually declined between FY15 (the first 
year of LF’s regime) and FY17, from 78% to 74% (see Figure 40). Retention did then 
increase to 81% in FY18, probably reflecting hyperbole about dramatic pay rises 
connected to the “Partner” programme launched around that time. This led to some 
FLSWM’s playing “wait and see.”181 Once £50,000 p.a. remuneration failed to 
materialise182 it seemed likely that turnover would rebound in FY2019.183
It is reasonable to believe that turnover for all store staff was considerably higher than 
that of “key workers.” One factor was the astounding number of new recruits who left 
after one day on the job. My ten years in WC was laden with stories of FLSWs walking 
out after their first taste of WC FLSW. Such stories were not myths; two of my home 
store’s new recruits walked out after their first days in late 2017 and early 2018. Our 
next recruit lasted roughly two months before he too walked out at the beginning of the 
peak-Summer period, compounding an under-resourcing crisis that originated with the 
one day walk-outs just mentioned. 
181
 Some of the store managers interviewed expressed a desire to become “partners” and see 
whether the much vaunted extra rewards materialised. My own store manager clarified this as a 
reason for staying on despite having served in the role for 3+ years. 
182
 Whilst it may have been technically possible such an income relied upon practically 
impossible results within the Meritocracy framework. Much of the extra pay was set to come 
from bonuses and bonus accelerators. Having viewed numerous bonus spreadsheets (which 
showed total bonus pot for stores) I was satisfactorily convinced that there was little substance 
behind management’s claims. The majority of informants believed that they were actually 
getting smaller bonuses as a result of the Meritocracy system.  
183
 The annual report for FY2019 will not be realised until Summer 2019. 
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Those who made it passed their first day would be confronted with long anti-social 
hours, physically arduous work and salaries towards the lower end of the graduate 
range. Graduates.com estimates average salaries for starting graduates in the UK as 
being between £19,000-£22,000, and WC’s full-time starters earned just over £19,000 
in 2019.184 Basic salary may increase to £23,000 upon promotion to assistant store 
manager, typically taking about eighteen months (assuming open-mindedness over 
location). An additional increment to circa-£26,000 occurs if and when a FLSW is 
promoted to store manager, although there are few examples of this being achieved in 
less than three years. Even then basic salary remains well below the UK median of 
£28,677 for full-time employees,185 locating WC’s “key workers” well within the UKs 
bottom half of earners. This goes some way towards explaining wide spread discontent 
on pay (see above).  
Figure 40: Annual turnover of key frontline service workers
Knowledge of what made WC’s staff more likely to stay could be logically turned on its 
head to indicate those who were most likely to leave. Pay and hours were known 
problematic factors, so those with a high degree of extrinsic motivation and/or an 
increased need for “normal” conditions were amongst those most likely to depart. My 
184
 FLSWs in greater London stores earned a London weighting which equated to approximately 
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former store manager Jack Swift left for this reason; he was a “natural” at WC FLSW 
but could no longer reconcile lifestyle limitations with the needs of a young family. 
Quality of life aspirations (for “normal hours,” free weekends, meaningful work and/or 
laid back lifestyles) generally constituted key push/pull factors (see Table 15 below for 
a list of destinations). Survey data (above) made clear that “quality of life” was 
considered a serious drawback in WC. Dan Mitchell aside, I did not encounter anyone 
in WC who explicitly perceived it as a “job for life.”  
Turning to intrinsic motivators (i.e. factors other than pay and conditions), data in the 
prior section made it clear that social relations (with both colleagues and customers) 
were powerful retention factors. This aside the other major retention factor was “the 
stuff I do every day,” so it stands to reason that those who did not “cut it” were likely to 
be those who failed to enjoy the social nature of WC work and/or its intersecting 
operational elements.186 Two additional factors that appeared to drive departures were 
“perfect storms” and “chain reactions.” In terms of the latter, the departure of a popular 
colleague (especially a manager valued by subordinates) appeared likely to compel store 
colleagues to follow suit – hence the term chain reaction. This happened in Canalside 
where I found myself the store’s longest serving member of staff after only a few 
months. The store manager seemed to be the glue that held the team together so his 
departure led to others expediting their own departure. The domino effect described 
here provided further indication of the significance of co-worker bonds. 
A further related factor was the “perfect storm,” which refers to situations in which the 
good bits about WC life (e.g. downtime, “playtime,” quality time with “good” 
customers) were stretched to breaking point whilst the bad bits became overwhelming. 
A perfect storm would typically feature staff shortages (at store/regional levels); periods 
of high demand (e.g. summer or Christmas-peak); budgetary squeezes; excessive lone 
working; lots of “cover” (staff working outside their home stores); and also, 
inexperienced part-timers making up for labour shortfalls. When perfect storms arose 
the organisation could feel like a tinderbox in my experience. Even some of the more 
“happy go lucky” personalities and “bleed blue” diehards became willing to accept that 
something was fundamentally wrong at these times, possibly rebelling as a response 
186
 A list of operational elements of WC FLSW features in the Appendix, Section 6. 
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(albeit within constrained individual boundaries).187 Less upbeat and restrained staff 
were vulnerable to less controlled explosions, such as the protest letter exhibited in 
Chapter Six. The most likely stress response however was to plot a path to leave as soon 
as possible, drawing a line and saying “I’ve had enough.” These were the literal words 
used by two store colleagues (in different stores) during one “perfect storm.” I told one 
of their stories in Chapter Five (pp. 105-106). 
Unfortunately WC had no program of exit interviews so Table 15 is based upon my 
data. Relatively few trainee managers and assistant managers feature therein because 
most went on to work in stores outside the research area. 
Table 15: Departure destinations of research participants and co-workers 




Doug Slazenger 10+ RM No destination; eventually joined Aldi 
(position unknown) then another wine 
company as a travelling rep. 
Jack Swift 5-10 SM Examiner for the DVLA, working office 
hours. 
Sharon Bletchley 5-10 SM Joined the graduate scheme of E.ON. 
Gerald Marks 5-10 SM Emigrated to New Zealand, joined a wine 
company. 
Aleister Jones 5-10 SM Become an officer in the Metropolitan 
Police. 
Scott Parker 5-10 SM Moved to WC Commercial; later left to 
joined a rival wine company. 
John Price 5-10 SM Became an assistant wine buyer for a 
small generalist retailer. 
Robert Dickens 5-10 SM Commercial arm of a brewing company. 
Sally McCloud 3-5 AM Joined the commercial arm of a rival 
wine company. 
John Ryan 3-5 AM Teacher training. 
James Wicks 3-5 AM Joined an online wine emporium. 
187
 In one example I am aware of a popular senior store manager - who was inebriated one 
evening - wrote her regional manager an email about “how bad everything is at the moment.”
Within that email she stressed “either I go or [one of her part-timers] goes,” believing that a 
poorly performing part-timer was dragging everybody else down. According to the source the 
RMs response was to say she “was welcome to leave if she is not happy” and that there were 
plenty of people “waiting in the wings” to replace her. 
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Lee Donovan 5-10 AM Acquired a role in the NHS; office hours. 
Rose Smart 3-5 AM No destination; eventually became a 
travelling sales rep outside the wine 
industry working “normal” hours. 
Roger Twell 1-2 TM Joined Wolseley in a sales role. 
Section Four: Psychological types and the experience of frontline 
service work in Wine Corp 
A proposition set forth in proceeding sections was that co-worker relations could greatly 
enhance the experience of FLSW in WC. In this regard there is clear synchronicity 
between quantitative data and qualitative data, as will be illustrated below. The flipside 
of the coin is that in the case of co-worker disharmony relations could have the opposite 
effect, negatively impacting the experience in an immediate and profound sense. Store 
colleagues were meant to “have your back,” making it all the more injurious when the 
“enemy within” became a predominant threat. 
All of this puts into context the seriousness of breakdowns in the delicate social eco-
systems that existed in stores. Experienced full-timers and part-timers represented “in 
groups” in WC stores whilst others were outsiders to varying extents (see Section 
7.3.1). In-group relations were both cause and consequence of meaning construction 
(see Collinson, 1992; Burawoy, 1979), as occurred within the utilisation and enjoyment 
of downtime for example.188 Positive in-group relations facilitated escapism (amongst 
other things) by providing space to get away from sources of antagonism. The problem 
was that store life provided considerably less escape space if co-workers were the 
source of antagonism. This section provides two case studies of such instances, and 
seeks to illustrate the causes and consequences of individuals becoming “enemies 
within.”  
Summary of guiding concepts 
Prior to embarking on said task, I will introduce the theoretical apparatus that is useful 
for understanding and exploring how individuals engage with FLSW and shape the 
188
 Appendix Section 3 elaborates on some specific examples of this, witnessed first-hand. 
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experience of it for those around them. What I am referring to here is personality theory, 
specifically trait theory as developed by Carl Gustav Jung and Hans Eysenck. For Jung 
the most significant differentiator in the psychology of individuals is whether their 
attitude is “extrovert” or “introvert” in nature. Extroverts are social, outward-looking 
and habitually place primary emphasis upon the significance of objective outer events. 
Such individuals have a “candid and accommodating nature that adapts easily to a given 
situation [and] quickly forms attachments” (Jung 1921 in Stevens, 2001: 87). Introverts 
by way of contrast are pre-occupied with their inner subjective realm (i.e. they are “lost 
in their own thoughts”). Being so gives him/her “a hesitant, reflective, retiring nature 
that keeps itself to itself, shrinks from objects, is always slightly on the defensive and 
prefers to hide behind mistrustful scrutiny” (ibid). 
The centrality of Jung’s concept of extroversion/introversion to individual orientation 
was underlined by the influential work of Eysenck (2017), who presented “e” 
(extroversion) and “n” (neuroticism) as the root dimensions of personality. For Eysenck 
these are “domain traits,” composed of numerous sub-traits (see Table 16) that combine 
to distinguish one person from another both behaviourally and experientially. A large 
body of evidence validates e/n as determinant factors in individual differences in human 
conduct (Costa & McCrae, 1986).  
Table 16: Neuroticism/extroversion inventory 
                                                                          (Costa & McCrae, 1986: 69)
Jung failed to award neuroticism parity with extroversion as a “domain trait,” but he 
was keen to explore the “dark shadow” of his eight psychological types (Stevens, 2001). 
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These types were constituted by two factors: (1) extroversion/introversion and (2) 
individuals’ preferential bias in terms of the four “psychological functions” (sensation, 
thinking, feeling and intuition). Individuals are thus sub-divisible on the basis of 
attitudinal (introvert/extrovert) and functional biases into eight distinguishable types 
(see Table 17). 
Table 17: Jung’s personality types189
189
 Developed from Stevens (2001: 88-97). 
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Personality refers to “individual differences in characteristic patterns of thinking, 
feeling and behaving.”190 The cognitive realm was not an area of interest at the outset of 
my study but it became one retroductively, as I searched for explanations for the 
stubborn intransigence and consistency of colleagues over time. The common notion 
that workers are adaptable players of work-based identity games (see Knights & 
Willmott, 1989; Collinson, 1992; O’Doherty & Willmott, 2001) seemed inadequate in 
explaining why some FLSWs resist involuntarily, with John below providing a partial 
example. What I am implying is that actors do not have a free hand in how they 
construct self or formulate responses within socially mediated workplace settings. 
Rather, they are constrained and enabled by traits inherent to them as people. A 
fortunate by-product of this for others is that they appeared to “conform” despite 
themselves, rather than as an expression of commitment to management and its agenda 
– as was the case with Keith (see Section 8.4.3). Overall these observations led me to 
believe that human variability emanates from a deeper place than conscious-level
identity-construction; hence, its relative stability in the face of management oscillation 
and challenges of frontline social relations. 
8.4.1. Qualitative evidence on co-worker relations 
The importance of effective teamwork and positive team relations was highlighted time 
and again by colleagues as a key determinant of the day-to-day quality of work-life (see 
the responses to Q1 below). There was also remarkable consistency on the issue of what 
makes for a bad co-worker as responses to Q2 show. 
Q1: “How much does the store team affect your quality of life at 
work?” 
R1: It makes all the difference. It’s so important. It’s…yeah; it 




R2: Huge…having the right team hugely affects my morale and 
my work-life balance. 
R3: It’s massive. Yeah, I mean, the probably biggest influence … 
even your motivation in store is the team really. 
Q2: Let’s do a bit of imagining here. Think about a terrible 
colleague, what traits and attributes would that person have?  
R1: Someone who works to rule. I had a few people who worked 
to rule … they’d go out of their way not to do anything and it’s a 
real drag. 
R2: …Let’s say when you run a three man team each individual 
contributes 33% to that team, so if someone is letting someone 
down it affects everyone. So it’s very important I think for 
everyone to be working together so a team player is what I 
would say can pull it through or bring it down.  
R3: Oh, just an individual … anybody that was inward looking 
… Do you remember Beth? She was just out for herself and it 
was the most frustrating thing … she was just not a team player 
at all. 
Contained within these remarks is a primary basis of conflict between FLSWs. The 
foremost sin a WC FLSW could commit in the eyes of co-workers was failing to be a 
team player, which generally translated into failing to carry their fair share. Within a 
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small team dynamic (against the backdrop of general labour scarcity), any shortfall on 
the part of a given individual had to be picked up by other team members. Inevitably this 
stirred resentment which could boil over into antagonism and conflict if it persisted (as 
discussed in 7.3.1). Carrying an under-performer was challenging at the best of the times 
but if a store was underperforming, short-staffed or navigating “peak” then the 
likelihood of tension was further enhanced. 
Paradoxically though, whilst the myriad of pressures that came with small team 
interdependence forged tension it also acted as a preventive factor in conflict becoming 
too venomous. The reason was that as the above comments made clear, no other factor 
determined quality of work-life more than relations with co-workers. Full-time staff 
typically spent more of their waking hours with store colleagues than they did with 
friends and family, meaning that something of a familial relationship was born of 
circumstances. Work effectively became a home from home, and given its centrality it 
was critical to maintain cordial relations. One poignant story of relationship breakdown 
(between manager and assistant manager) underlined this: 
Interviewee: “I started off with a very strong assistant and a 
very keen and eager trainee manager … so my job was quite 
easy really. They then left or got snatched away … and in their 
place I got an assistant manager who wasn’t motivated when … 
I mean, he’s just left the company, he knew he was leaving for 
the past six months. He wasn’t motivated when he wasn’t 
leaving. When he decided he was changing careers he took that 
even further, it was a real battle. And I really hated going to 
work, it was really a horrible place to be and I think probably 
some customers may have picked up on that as well and there 
was some ill feeling between the two of us…” 
MJ: “As a manager did you feel you had any power to try and 
improve the performance of that individual?” 
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Interviewee: “There are things I probably could have done 
better. I mean, there was a real sense of injustice from head 
office I think, the assistant manager felt, he felt that they were 
against him very much.”  
MJ: “I don’t know anything about that, I can’t resist finding out 
a bit more?” 
Interviewee: “Yeah. So basically [the Divisional Director] came 
to visit the store with [Daisy Bouchard] when I was away on 
holiday. John [the assistant manager under discussion] was 
there. And the Divisional Director criticised the store really and 
basically John was sulking, answering back, being a bit 
teenagery from what I’ve heard from Daisy … but all it really 
did was put pressure on me and him … in terms of our 
relationship and from above. So yeah, it’s been really hard work 
… I felt I was facing a losing battle there and one that wasn’t 
worth fighting for.” 
8.4.2. Commitment & personality (1) – the case of John 
Whilst it could be said that John had a useful degree of boyish charm he lacked for 
institutional, team or customer commitment (see Figure 42 below). This meant that he 
created a fair impression of being “out for himself” and “not a team player,” the worst 
traits a colleague could have as highlighted above. He was also something of a “hostile 
caretaker,” being more interested in his daily TV schedule than the wants and needs of 
customers. As the term hostile caretaker implies, John preferred an empty store 
customer-wise because it was less disruptive to his personal agenda. My personal 
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experience with him (discussed below) confirmed that “getting him to do his fair share”
was a constant battle. I too concluded it “wasn’t worth fighting for” with John. 
One of the few people seemingly oblivious to John’s limitations was Doug Slazenger, 
who promoted him to assistant manager. In Doug’s defence there were no other 
applicants for the role, although if there were then John would have probably got the job 
anyway. John was an apt fit for Doug’s envisaged ideal-type FLSW in certain senses 
(see Chapter Six); he carried himself with “rugger boy” swagger and exhibited the type 
of masculine bravado that often accompanied “seller” personas favoured within the old 
regime. Doug had been made aware of John’s limitations but true to form, he failed to 
listen to his frontline subordinates. 
If John’s commitment(s) (or lack thereof) underpinned performance problems then it is 
fair to say that his personality contributed too. John was badly wired for the type of 
FLSW that prevailed in WC. I too witnessed the “sulky”/“teenagery” behaviour myself, 
where John would somehow take offence at basic guidance and instructions. A typical 
response would be to engage in extended periods of work-to-rule and/or retraction into 
an inner shell. These periods would then spill over into his dealings with customers (as 
my colleague observed above), whilst generally toxifying the store atmosphere. In one 
memorable incident I saw John sit down on the shop floor and refuse to do anything 
because the assistant manager rejected his last minute request to leave early. 
Whilst John was an extreme case he did nonetheless bring into view two of the most 
significant subjective factors that determined FLSWs’ behaviour: (1) commitment (in 
terms of degree and type) and (2) personality. In making this claim I find myself echoing 
a similar proposition to that of Awadh & Ismail (2012), although they got there via 
different means. A combination of meta-analysis and deductive reasoning led them to 
argue that personality and “work-related attitudes” (as moderated by organisational 
culture and personal “fit”191), were likely to prove the foremost factors in determining 
191
 For the sake of topical focus I have omitted discussion of organisational culture as a 
mediator here, although this is implied at multiple points in the thesis. “Meritocracy” for example 
can be reasonably construed an attempt at top-down culture management which threatened to 
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employees’ performance (see Figure 41). Interestingly, the authors pointed out the 
following based upon their review of evidence:  
“Openness to experience, conscientiousness and agreeableness 
have a weak association with performance; extroversion [is] 
positively related to performance; neuroticism is negatively 
related.” (p.114) 
Figure 41: Awadh & Ismail’s model of work performance 
What makes this synthesis useful is that it cross-validates my findings which indicated 
the high significance of extroversion/neuroticism and the comparatively marginal 
significance of the other “big five personality traits” (see H1 in Figure 41). I also found 
“work related attitudes” to be highly significant as illustrated above, although I found it 
necessary to develop a multi-dimensional picture of commitment that better reflected the 
undermine the social fabric of store life (as will be argued in Section 8.4.3). In relation, the crux 
model in Figure 41 is the notion that positive and negative interactional effects will occur at the 
interface of organisational culture and workers (who have particular personality compositions 
and work-related attitudes). “Fit” was shown to be important for actors within both regimes, with 
favoured sons of Dan Mitchell regime purged by LF due to their supposed incompatibility with 
the WC 2.0/2.1 vision (see Chapter 6 Part B). LF wanted managers who were committed to 
service whereas the old regime was synonymous with a focus on ends (revenue) rather than 
means. At the store level those who failed to fit with official/unofficial group norms could also 
find themselves marginalised (see Section 7.3.1). 
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specific orientations of individuals (Figure 42). A useful way to further explore the 
significance of these factors is to compare John to myself. Out of the two of us I had the 
less outgoing personality, being an introvert who was not the most comfortable around 
customers. All other factors even John had a significant advantage over me in relation to 
customer-facing dimensions of the role because sociability required less effort on his 
part. I was and am an “introverted thinking type” (i.e. preoccupied with theories and 
ideas) to draw upon Jung’s typology, whereas John exhibited hallmarks of an 
“extroverted feeling type.” This informed John’s likeability and popularity as the 
framework postulates but also infused an “infantile, archaic, negative” (Jung, 1961 in 
Stevens, 2001: 94) aspect of his personality as exemplified by the sit-in protest. Thus, 
John’s “dark shadow” cancelled out and overshadowed his natural abilities – making 
him a much less reliable frontline server than myself. 
As Jung made clear every personality type has a “dark shadow” and the social intensity 
of WC FLSW made it all but impossible to permanently contain your “inner demons.” 
During intense periods WC FLSWs were pulled in too many directions and were subject 
to too many pressures to avoid build-ups of negative emotions. It is for these reasons 
that commitment(s) mattered, in that they directed coping mechanisms and decision 
making about who and what got prioritised in challenging times. This was another 
crucial plain upon which John and I differed, making the experience of working with us 
significantly different as I will explain. 
Drawing upon Figure 42, my chief characteristic as a WC FLSW was my degree of 
“team commitment.” I cannot pretend to have been especially customer-committed nor 
was I a self-sacrificing martyr (low on the self-scale). I was however high on 
“comradeship,” in the sense that I worked hard for my team in an operational/behind-
the-scenes sense.192 In part this reflected my introversion but it was also logical in terms 
of Ricardian comparative advantage theory (as discussed in 7.3.1); basically I “played to 
my strengths.” As for institutional-level commitment I did not register as high on either 
scale but I was closer to being a “company man” than a pro-regime “entrepreneur.” This 
192
 Loose support for these claims is available in my appraisal (see 7.1.6), wherein I scored 
comparatively low for “demonstrating the WC way of working” and “be[ing] a customer 
champion” but highly for “running a smooth operation.” 
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distinction was important because it carried the implication that I would happily resist 
the LF regime when I believed it to be in the best interest of the company,193 provided 
that doing so seemed low risk. 
Figure 42: Commitment at different levels of abstraction194
Getting back to the comparison with John, what made him relatively unique was a lack 
of any discernible form of institutional commitment combined with a notable degree of 
“self-commitment.” From the perspective of higher-ups such a mercenary demeanour 
193
 I will pick up this theme in Chapter Nine. 
194
 Notes on Figure 42: (i) The extremes for each of these types of commitment are ideal-types
– thus, FLSWs were not one or the other. (ii) The idea is that individuals occupied different 
positions along interrelated spectrums, making them more or less easy to work with in the eyes 
of others - including management. (iii) Performance models often focus upon single dimensions 
like engagement (as per WC’s surveys above) or organisational commitment (see Awadh & 
Ismail’s model below). Figure 42 seeks to express a more nuanced understanding of 
commitment based upon a pluralist perspective of socio-economic relations (see Edwards, 
1986). 
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led to a perception of a “bottom feeder”195 and “freeloader.” These terms refer to beliefs 
that John was out to do the bare minimum and only interested in a free lunch. Those who 
worked with him at store-level may or may not have agreed, but there was a general 
conviction that John was a “loose cannon” who could not be relied upon. He was more 
of a “buccaneer,” meaning he was focused primarily on achieving the best effort-bargain 
returns on an individual-basis. In John’s mind this would have been rational but in the 
eyes of team-centric co-workers it was irrational and selfish because his load had to be 
carried by others. 
To recap, the argument here is that commitment (by type and extent) and personality 
were two primary subjective-level factors that determined how FLSWs acted and 
affected the experience of their co-workers. In the next section I will attempt to illustrate 
how these factors intersected with WC’s neo-liberal managerialism (as described in 
Chapter Six Part B) in my home store. 
8.4.3. Commitment & personality (2) – the case of Wayne 
Some degree of thick description is necessary to illuminate my argument so I can only 
describe a few FLSWs characters in detail. The next character I will describe is Wayne, 
an experienced store manager who I worked with for four years and knew for six. 
Wayne was interesting analytically because he was something of a “golden boy” of both 
regimes. He also provides a useful case in point of the dangers posed by the “new plan” 
staffing model and “Meritocracy” to the experience of co-workers. 
What Wayne and John had in common was that they were both natural extroverts, 
meaning they were comfortable in other’s company. Wayne in particular was an 
example of the type of extrovert who was uncomfortable without company; not really 
being one to reflect or ruminate too much by his own admission. Wayne was more of a 
practical man and problem solver who strongly resembled Jung’s “extrovert sensation 
type.” In Table 17 they are described as lovers of details with a main aim of 
experiencing sensations and deriving pleasure from them. This combination of traits 
went some way towards explaining how and why Wayne was a natural in the world of 
WC. His product knowledge was encyclopaedic; he described wines with a unique 
195
 What I am referring to here is someone of low-status within the WC institutional/ideological 
milieu, who is perceived by those of higher status as willing to survive by any means.  
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degree of passion and experiential knowledge. He also came across as the kind of person 
who gets things done, making him a customer and management favourite. To customers 
he was every bit the “attentive host” as per Figure 42, which was paradoxical in light of 
his wilful ignorance of co-workers’ wants and needs - as I will come to below. 
There was more to Wayne’s popularity with management over and above his over-sized 
share of sales and customer skills though. Something else that distinguished Wayne was 
that he was high on the self-commitment scale and low on the team-commitment scale, 
which set him up well under the new regime which sought “partners” and 
“entrepreneurs.” The very idea of management’s neo-liberal ethos was that managers 
would act as “buccaneers” who were out for themselves. As per neo-liberal assumptions 
generally it was assumed that greed and self-interest were good within meritocratic WC, 
so management celebrated FLSWMs who appeared willing to fight “tooth and nail” to 
get ahead. If this orientation so happened to make Wayne slightly unpleasant to work 
with, then management would see it as a price worth paying because “entrepreneurial” 
types got results in their view. Curiously, I never developed a sense of Wayne being 
especially committed to the LF regime although his hidden allegiances hardly mattered. 
That was because his behaviours naturally fitted with regime aspirations for 
showmanship and charisma so his institutional commitment was inferred on that basis. 
His outward appearance as a champion of the “WC way” led to him being nominated for 
upgrade to “partner” by Daisy Bouchard towards the end of the present study. 
Unfortunately for Wayne’s colleagues, his ability to “play well with others” barely 
featured in management’s ideologically-driven appraisal of his aptitude. This 
represented a problem because even before management’s “you’re on our own” tactical 
retreat, store managers had a profound effect upon the work experience of colleagues (as 
found by Lloyd and Payne, 2014; Grugulis et al., 2010). Once this epoch became 
embedded though their capacity to injure and harm co-workers increased remarkably. 
Being “on your own” meant being stuck with each other because the checks and balance 
once offered by RMs were disbanded with that role and the shift towards 
“empowerment.” Rotas were no longer monitored and “cover” (the movement of staff 
between stores to avoid prolonged periods of understaffing in any one store) was no 
longer overseen by external agents. Also, increased reliance on part-timers meant that 
managers had to be far more pro-active in recruitment and retention than they had been 
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in the past. In these senses managers had to step up or their store and co-workers would 
suffer. 
All of this extra responsibility intensified the store manager role in the context of them 
having also been made solely responsible for unit sales and profits. Furthermore, it 
carried the important implication that store managers (rather than RMs) would be 
credited and rewarded for squeezing front-line costs. The combined effect of these 
policy offshoots was to shift the frontier of control inside stores and between store 
managers and staff (see Figure 43), as will be explained presently. It was made clear in 
Chapter Six that the old regime favoured “strong man” RMs who were the “shot caller” 
in no uncertain terms. This came with its problems but a significant upside was that it 
provided a common (external) enemy for FLSWs to unite against. Hence an external 
frontier of control displaced internal conflict and partially precluded store team disunity. 
In contrast, by shifting RM’s control burden to store managers, Meritocracy acted to 
reposition the frontier of control directly between themselves and co-workers. A 
predictable outcome was to amplify the potential for internal conflict, especially in cases 
where managers had a significant degree of self-commitment and a low degree of team 
commitment - as was the case with Wayne. 
Wayne was notoriously difficult to work with even before neo-liberal managerialism 
came to life in WC, exhibiting strong neurotic tendencies including anxiety and hostility 
(see Table 16). Co-workers bore the brunt of these traits which partly explains why two 
of Wayne’s latest recruits did not return to work after their first day. Wayne made no 
attempt to soften his rough edges in order to accommodate and induct new starters, 
making for a hard landing on WC’s shop floor.196
To make matters worse the very thing that made Wayne a star within the new regime’s 
ideology (a “get ahead” combative mind-set) was co-determinative of behaviour that 
made him seem “out for himself” and “not a team player” amongst colleagues. Over 
peak-summer 2018 Wayne scheduled himself to work only five out of thirteen 
Saturdays, whereas historically managers had been made to work at least three out of 
196
 For a short while in 2017 Canalside was made the main induction centre for new recruits into 
Region X, as part of a company-wide policy. Soon after this responsibility was taken away after 
negative feedback from the recruits themselves, centring upon Wayne’s performance in the 
role. Two of these recruits confirmed to me that they felt they were “treading on eggshells the 
whole time” as one put it. 
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four. This would have been impossible pre-Meritocracy but Wayne knew that nobody 
was watching anymore. He also scheduled four of his six weeks of annual leave during 
this intense period which again, would never have been countenanced pre-Meritocracy. 
At the same time he failed to recruit and replace the one-day walk-outs mentioned 
above, leading to the most extreme case of understaffing I that witnessed in 10 years in 
the company. In the Meritocracy age management had disowned responsibility so FLSW 
colleagues were literally “on their own” with the consequences of Wayne’s neglect in 
times of crisis. As one might expect morale collapsed and team members sought to leave 
store or company as soon as possible.197 Concurrently, the unit lost its “nailing” status 
for the obvious reason that even the most committed FLSWs could not compensate for 
shortfalls of that magnitude.  
Figure 43: The “meritocratic” shift in the frontier of control 
197
 In the 12 months to spring 2019 Canalside had a turnover rate of 125%. The sole remaining 
team member (aside from Wayne) had widely shared his desire to leave too, only remaining 
due to a “sweetheart deal” struck with Doug Slazenger on pay and conditions resulting from 
exceptional circumstances. 
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In a job where who you work with is “everything” as one interview put it above, 
management’s tampering with the structure of social dynamics could have profound 
consequences (see Sosteric, 1996 for an instructive example). For me, one of the things I 
liked most about working in WC stores was that “proper management” were not present. 
If you achieved the numbers and avoided complaints you were largely left alone to make 
the best of it as teams and individuals. In relation, the danger posed by “Meritocracy” 
was that its attempt to “buy” managers undermined the sense of “all being in the same 
boat” that was critical to camaraderie and solidarity. Furthermore, it cut managers 
considerable slack to run stores as personal fiefdoms and thereby facilitated even more 
extreme abuses than conventional bureaucratic/hierarchical control in WC allowed for. 
Whilst few managers may have abused the opportunity to the extent that Wayne did, co-
workers would have been “on their own” in dealing with managers who sought to 
exploit “empowerment” at their expense. 
Section Five: Discussion 
Chapter Eight has pursued four objectives: to illuminate the overall level of satisfaction 
with FLSW in WC; to identify the key positives and negatives that shape the experience 
of it; to explore links between experiences and outcomes (i.e. turnover); and lastly, to 
examine key forces and factors that undermine co-worker relations within stores. This 
latter emphasis was born of qualitative and quantitative data that underlined the 
centrality of social relations, which is a theme I will return to in closing (see 8.5.1). 
The overall balance of satisfaction/dissatisfaction was shown to be a difficult question 
to answer. WC invested considerable sums in gathering “objective” data to answer this 
very question but then set about undermining its credibility by pressuring survey 
respondents to give desirable answers. Management’s motivations may well have been 
multi-faceted and are likely to be myriad, but a determination to “prove” their logic 
model and ply “the market” with good news was likely to have been influential. I say 
this because it fits with a wider behavioural pattern (see next Chapter) of putting “spin” 
and PR ahead of what could reasonably be construed as reality. Examples of such 
behaviour are illuminated in Chapters Five and Six. 
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Management’s schemes were not the only barrier to a clear answer to the overall 
satisfaction/dissatisfaction question. The data drawn upon failed to focus on FLSW 
specifically, making it highly likely to be positively skewed. Furthermore, anecdotal 
evidence suggested that dissenters amongst the ranks were the least likely to participate 
in management-commissioned research. Thus, it is beyond question in my view that 
circa-80% satisfaction was an artificially high number for WC’s FLSWs, although it is 
difficult to speculate on what a valid number might be. It is also debatable whether 
numbers are a suitable means of expressing something as complex, nuanced and 
changeable as job satisfaction in the first place. I would argue that a valid and vigorous 
understanding of satisfaction and experience requires a detailed understanding of the 
context and “bigger picture” that framed survey responses. Taken at face value, this data 
would provide a misleading picture of contentment. 
Arguably staff turnover is a better barometer of satisfaction although this too has its 
problems within the WC case. WC only releases turnover data for “key staff” and there 
is clear reason to believe that this positively distorts attrition rates. Regardless, WC’s 
average turnover during the LF era was 23% which translates into replacing the key 
frontline actors every four and a half years statistically. The UK average is thought to be 
around 15% per year198 whilst 10% is often floated as a “healthy” number.199 This 
suggests that the level of turnover for WC’s “key staff” (let alone non-key staff) is more 
than double what is commonly regarded as healthy. 
However, this assumes that WC is operating a HR model based upon conventional logic 
in terms of retention. The “classic WC” model of mass graduate recruitment was not 
typical to my knowledge; I am not aware of any other organisation that has taken this 
approach to FLSW. In 2015/16 WC recruited over 250 graduates making it the UK’s 
second largest graduate employer at that time.200 According to Wallace et al. (2000 – 





 See as examples: https://smallbusiness.chron.com/healthy-employee-turnover-rate-
12145.html; https://business.dailypay.com/blog/employee-retention-rate 
200
 According to WC’s Annual Report for that year. 
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of “sacrificial HR,” where the idea is to use up and burn out FLSWs’ energy and 
goodwill until they leave “voluntarily.” With its “graduate scheme” WC tapped into a 
large labour pool and arguably created a system that depends on high turnover rather 
than high retention. If using up and burning out was the tacit objective of the WC model 
then 23% turnover may have been considered “healthy” (or at least cost-effective). That 
is because it circumvents the costs of genuine “sophisticated HR” (as Wallace et al. 
2000 argue) required to achieve high-performance and high retention simultaneously. 
This would probably mean wholesale improvements in rewards, working conditions and 
quality of life that management were unable or unwilling to support. 
Moving onto the positives and negatives of experience, the data seems clear that social 
relations within stores can be a meaningful positive of WC FLSW. The product itself 
underpinned one of the most positive aspect of working with customers; that being, 
selling wine. A common phrase heard in WC was that “if you don’t like wine there’s not 
much point being here.” Other FLSW studies (see Wright 2005; Leslie, 2002) have 
illustrated the special meaning that products can hold for FLSW, enabling some 
organisations to attract/retain labourers at subsidised rates. This is because proximity to 
esteemed products is a reward in itself (ibid.) and evidence suggests this was be the case 
at WC. 
Setting aside social relations for a moment, the other standout positive experiential 
factor was “the stuff I do every day.” The implication in the question (from which the 
response was drawn) was that this referred to “stuff” other than dealing with colleagues 
and customers as these were specifically asked about. Respondents were therefore likely 
to have interpreted “stuff” as meaning the “operational” side of the work as detailed in 
the Appendix (Section 6). An outsider may expect these elements of WC FLSW to be 
distasteful to young graduates and it was to some (John above being a case in point). 
However, a large proportion of WC’s graduates (as well as non-graduate part-timers) 
made this their niche sub-specialism and considered it an enjoyable aspect of the work 
(as discussed in Chapter Seven, Section 3). It provided some with a way of contributing 
that better fitted their natural inclinations. It enabled others to work around relative skill 
deficiencies whilst simultaneously providing space for colleagues to exercise their 
relative advantages. Thus, a key reason the “stuff I do every day” was a popular 
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experiential aspect of WC FLSW was because it represented a domain in which a 
considerable number could positively contribute to store life. Hence, whilst cleaning 
and organising may have been a burden to some they were favoured aspects of the work 
experience for others.  
So what was bad about WC FLSW? An overwhelming consensus formed around the 
notions that pay, working hours and “quality of life” generally were amongst the most 
repellent aspects. In my view pay was considered the least problematic aspect of this 
unholy trinity, as other quality of life factors (the inescapabilty of long hours and 
weekend work in particular) acted as greater barriers to lifestyle aspirations. A typical 
leaver’s story would feature comments like “oh the pay’s about the same/a bit more [in 
their next role] but…”. But would be followed by a predictable menu of gripes about 
WC life and how it is managed. As was mentioned above, the “management problem” 
sat alongside pay and condition as the thing least likely to compel WC’s FLSWs to stay. 
8.5.1 The co-worker effect  
When I think about the colleagues I have worked with and the customers I have served 
(see Section 7.3.2.), Dickens’ classic line “it was the best of times, it was the worst of 
times” springs to mind. At its best the social experience of co-existing with customers 
and colleagues came with intrinsic rewards. Even when it was not at its best, workplace 
social relations could still infuse work with meaning and pleasure. Mocking awkward 
customers could break the tension and monotony for example, whilst “sticking it to the 
man” could give one a pleasant sense of moral and intellectual superiority that took the 
edge off their latest act of villainy. Management may not have appreciated the contempt 
they were held in, but its usefulness in forging bonds seemed self-evident. It was those 
bonds that “[could] pull it through or bring it down” to quote a colleague above, which 
aptly illustrates the immediate and sustained influence of co-workers over the day-to-
day experience of WC. 
A key theme of this chapter has been to show how personality types and the nature of 
commitment mattered to the FLSW experience. Neither FLSWs nor customers left their 
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personalities at the door upon entrance; sociable people continued to be social whilst 
less social people continued to exercise their willingness to do otherwise, albeit where 
space allowed. One of the things that I found ironic during my research was that Wayne 
actually partook in the Myers-Briggs test as part of his management training, which is 
based upon Jung’s typology (Table 17). The idea was that he would learn about his 
strengths and weaknesses and reflexively moderate his behaviour in pursuit of 
performance improvement. What made this somewhat comical was the fact that he was 
privately working through course material whilst periodically appearing on shop floor 
and displaying the negative traits he was supposedly unlearning. It was not just me who 
picked up on the irony; a co-worker observed at the time “he’s supposed to be learning 
about his personality … It’s not working.”  
It is of course naïve to think that a leopard might change its spots after a questionnaire 
and light reading, but it did reinforce my view that a FLSW’s behaviour (as well as its 
effects upon co-workers) was driven by involuntary psychic forces and factors – at least 
in part. Wayne “conformed” despite himself from my perspective, which was a by-
product of traits and attributes he naturally embodied. In contrast, John struggled to 
adapt to store-level and institutional-levels norms even though it caused him pain to defy 
them. As my colleague remarked “he felt like head office was out to get him” which 
would almost certainly have underpinned unease in the workplace. Thus, my argument 
is that personality and commitment-by-type were important aspects of the behavioural 
and experiential jigsaw puzzle in the WC case.
These reflections on the difficulty of inducing change in individuals puts management’s 
attempts at “cultural control” into perspective (see Legge, 1995). It was hardly 
surprising that LF eventually turned to threats and dismissals (see Chapter Six and Nine) 
because tinkering with the HR system and chanting mantras proved quite inadequate in 
the face of entrenched patterns of individual and team behaviour. At best management 
were preaching to the converted; at worst they were upsetting delicate social balances 
whilst failing to understand the downstream ramifications.  
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I believe that the shift of the frontier of control (as depicted in Figure 43) was both 
causes and consequence of a calculated attempt to “buy” store managers’ regime 
commitment, to the detriment of other forms. In simple terms it was a divide and 
conquer strategy that risked sabotaging one of the primary bases of commitment; that 
being, positive social relations and a determination not to let your co-workers down. 
Management benefitted from this vicariously so breaking team spirits seemed like an 
unlikely means of improving performance or commitment to their goals. For better or 
worse teamwork in WC’s stores was a complex outcome of structurally-embedded 
negotiated orders, with sub-cultural elements that expressed the personality and 
commitment(s) its members (see Section 7.1.7 for examples). Residual space to “be 
yourself,” appropriate meanings and resist “business bullshit”201 within teams was 
amongst the best things about working in WC’s stores (and other relatively humanistic 
FLSW environments – see Filby 1992; Benson, 1978, Paules 1991 in Chapter Three). 
Research and theory has pointed to the value of authenticity and genuine teamwork as 
facilitators of positive FLSW experiences (see Hochschild, 2012; also, the bleak 
house/happy house studies in Chapter Three), so an assault upon these bodes ill for WC 
and its FLSWs. 
201
 Spicer, A. (2017) https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/nov/23/from-inboxing-to-thought-
showers-how-business-bullshit-took-over
299 
CHAPTER NINE: DISCUSSION 
Introduction 
Prior to concluding arguments it is worth taking a moment to reiterate some key 
propositions set out in Chapters Two and Three. Two main points were explicated in 
relation to the theorising of FLSW (Chapter Two): 
1. That bridge-building appears to be most fertile soil for the advancement of 
knowledge.  
2. That people generally recede into the background in terms of the “variability of 
human character” as Bolton and Houlihan (2005: 692) described it.  
With reflection upon the latter point it was argued that a stratified ontology synonymous 
with critical realist philosophy (CRP – see pp.72-77) may serve as a bridgehead to avoid 
the pitfalls of structural or agential reductionism (O’Mahoney et al., 2018). CRP 
codifies the conventional sociological tradecraft of separating out people and parts for 
analytical purposes,202 so that their respective powers and properties may be 
synthesised. 
The review of evidence in Chapter Three made three additional points. The first was 
that the evidence base overwhelmingly implied that control dynamics lie at the heart of 
the FLSW experience. The second was that few studies have adequately illuminated the 
“service triangle” in its entirety, generally focusing upon one group or link (typically 
the FLSW-management dyad) to the exclusion of others. The third point was to argue 
that the use of powers (i.e., how and why agents use their powers in the way that they 
202
 O’Mahoney et al. (2018: 577) point out that many “classic” theorists (e.g., Marx, Weber, 
Durkheim, Polanyi, Veblen and Bourdieu) exhibited realist assumptions. 
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do) was ill-explored, even in instances where the basis of power differentials were 
articulated.  
These positions shaped the point of departure for my study, both in terms of the 
research methods and the style of data presentation. Speaking to the latter point, the idea 
has been to explore the subject matter chronologically in an attempt to illustrate the 
ways in which agency has been shaped by structurally embedded 
constraints/opportunities at given points in time. Those deployments of situated agency 
then become the constraints/opportunities for subsequent generations of actors, so on 
and so forth. Critical realists refer to this as “anteriority,” which encapsulates the notion 
that contemporary actors are not simply constrained/enabled by other contemporary 
actors (as social constructionists imply). Rather, limits are equally (and perhaps to a 
greater extent) imposed by historical others who bequeathed a legacy of structural and 
systemic objects. These things are real (e.g., constitutions, infrastructure, assets, 
liabilities) and cannot be whimsically “talked out of existence.”  
That said, a key distinction between social objects and objects of the physical world is 
that the former are not entirely inalterable. Social objects may be subject to reformation, 
especially by individuals or groups who exercise “actual” or “real” power over social 
relations at the empirical level. Such latent and structurally-embedded powers sit 
outside the interactions and transactions of everyday life according to Bhaskar (1989). 
They manifest and reveal themselves at times of crisis, thereby providing a rarefied 
window into the deeper stratified powers that order everyday societal affairs.  
To illustrate the significance of CRP concepts in my longitudinal case study of FLSW 
in WC, a decision was made to tell the story chronologically. Thus, Chapter Five told 
the story of the organisation’s inception and “classic model;” Chapter Six Part A 
outlined the steroidal impact of Dan Mitchell (DM) upon the company and FLSW 
experiences therein; and Part B analysed the two phases of Lyle Fisher’s (LF) “Wine 
Corp 2.0” era in light of their effects. I hope to have shown that none of these epochs 
occurred in a vacuum. They were each outcomes of people and parts intersecting with 
opportunities and constraints both internal and external. Building upon this, a key 
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objective for the present chapter is to further synthesise the nature of these multifaceted 
interactions as part of a historical continuum driven by actors. 
This aside the overarching task below is to explicate theoretical generalisations about 
the experience of FLSW, making use of “retroductive” reasoning to draw inferences 
from the data. As a reminder, retroduction involves working backwards from the 
evidence and imagining what has to exist in order to explain manifest patterns. Their 
very existence implies that those things are likely to enact themselves in similar ways in 
similar contexts, even whilst those contexts may be unique in terms of their historical 
trajectory and the specific forces and factors acting upon them. I therefore proceed on 
the assumption that WC is unique case, albeit one that may provide valuable insight into 
other cases subject to similar internal and external tensions. To illustrate the wider 
resonance of my theoretical propositions I draw parallels between WC and other well-
known cases. Furthermore, I situate my claims in relation to theory and research that 
has explored particular aspects of my theoretical framework. 
In the spirit of bridge-building I have developed an interconnected set of explanatory 
models that encapsulate my understanding of the experience of FLSW in WC. Much of 
the discussion centres upon laying the groundwork for these models via cross-
examination of the data. Section 1 begins with a discussion of an important element of 
Hochschild’s (2012) emotional labour thesis; the significance of which only emerged as 
I came to consider the nature and meaning of social life in WC stores. Taking my cue 
from the debate outlined I propose the utilisation of Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgical 
analysis, as a means of developing a model of the WC FLSW experience that I call 
amphitheatrical relations. I believe this model provides a useful construct to illustrate 
and examine the relative capacities of agents and structures that produce and reproduce 
WC. 
Section 2 focuses on management’s agency, with the intention of clarifying why WC’s 
recent history followed the trajectory that it did. My position is that both regimes were 
constrained (and enabled) by a mutually constitutive set of “external” forces with 
profound power and reach. What I am referring to here is the ideological/structural 
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nexus of neo-liberal managerialism and shareholder value maximisation (SVM), which 
intersected with the power and influence of “royal box holders” to funnel management’s 
choices. Section 3 seeks to further synthesise the significance of my contribution by 
comparing it to the propositions of du Gay (see Chapter Two) and Rafaeli (1989). I 
selected these works because they are useful in underlining key points of theoretical and 
empirical differentiation. Finally, Section 4 summarises my conceptual model and 
explains it as both a cause and consequence of the socio-economic stratification it 
embodies. 
Section One: Incorporating social behaviour into economic arenas 
I recently read a fascinating book on world affairs which took as its main premise the 
notion that the “geo” part generally goes missing from geo-political analysis.203 The 
focus tends to be today’s actors and dramas with the consequence of neglecting or 
ignoring their geographic bedrock. Taking the opposite tact, the author aims to put 
“geo” back into analysis by showing how forgotten fixed factors – such as mountain 
ranges and coastal access routes – continue to transfix the gaze of contemporary stage 
actors.204
Having read the book at a timely moment, the premise led me to consider whether an 
analogous oversight occurs with socio-economic analysis. Is the socio part lost in work 
studies via over-emphasis on economic forces and factors? Or is it in fact valid to 
foreground the latter and background the former, perhaps in line with Marx’s (1971) 
premise that the “superstructure” (social lives in capitalist economies) is etched in the 
“base” (its relations of production) and explainable in relation to it? 
A similar concern over the conceptual space afforded to social behaviour within FLSW 
inspired Bolton’s (2005) critique of Hochschild’s concept of emotional labour (as 
203
 Marshall, T. (2015) – see references. 
204
Ibid., Marshall’s discussion of Vladimir Putin’s deployment of agency in the Crimea is an 
instructive example, pp. 4-31. 
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reviewed in Chapter Two).205 Bolton argues that Hochschild overplays the division 
between private and public spheres of emotional management, which is partially an 
offshoot of the latter’s conflating the terms “public” and “commercial” according to the 
Bolton. This then precludes Hochschild’s ability to identify subtle distinctions between 
emotional work performed in the production of commercial services and that originating 
“during normal social interaction in the workplace” (p.60). 
Bolton extends her critique by arguing that emotional labour is but one form of “feeling 
rules and associated motives” (p.100) that prevails within commercial confines 
alongside three others, which differ by virtue of their source. Importantly two of 
Bolton’s four types occur “outside” corporatized life even though they play out within 
its boundaries. These she refers to as “philanthropic” and “presentational” rule/motives, 
with the former referring to free and voluntaristic giving and the latter expressing 
emotional management in accordance with wider socialised norms.  
The crux of Bolton’s argument is to say that there is more to the FLSW experience than 
corporate subjugation and alienation. Space remains for workers to enact modes of 
human conduct that are fundamentally disconnected from the capitalist pressure cooker 
in which they take place. What makes this position noteworthy is the manner in which 
Bolton’s re-articulation of Hochschild’s thesis encapsulates the spirit of putting the 
“socio” back into socio-economic, to redress treatments that excessively centre upon 
homo-economicus. 
Nonetheless, as much as a re-alignment of emphasis holds promise some have argued 
that Bolton’s conceptual disaggregation of social and work experiences within work is a 
false dawn. The problem stems from Bolton’s underlying assumption that social 
relations in FLSW hold meaning over and above the extraction of surplus value. What 
this fails to acknowledge is that the point of commodification lies upstream of actors’ 
performances, at the moment when labour power is purchased. By implication the 
structural antagonism between capital and labour is embedded before roles are actually 
205
 Bolton’s interest in “reintroduc[ing] humanity to the analysis of the employment relationship” 
(Bolton & Houlihan, 2007: 10) is made clear in the introduction to their essay collection 
Searching for the human in human resource management. See references. 
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enacted, meaning that downstream experiences are fruit of the 
commercialisation/commodification tree. As Brook (2009: 539) explains: 
“irrespective of workers’ witting intentions during the execution 
of emotional labour, their performance and display … is bought 
and paid for labour time and capacity, and is therefore primarily 
a commodified product; albeit of a contested, open-ended 
variety.” 
I accept Brook’s point but nonetheless contend that there is room to build upon 
Hochschild’s work by better expressing the agential scope of FLSW actors, bringing to 
light their idiosyncrasies and the mediating effects of work groups. The most promising 
toolkit in this regard is Goffman’s template of dramaturgical analysis as explicated in 
The Presentation of Everyday Life (1959).206 Several facets of this micro-study of social 
interaction are relevant to the present discussion, although they can be broken down into 
(a) those relevant to actors and (b) those relevant to settings.  
Speaking of the former, Goffman came to see the actions of individuals within social 
contexts as staged performances where they seek to control audience impressions by 
altering/fixing their manner. Viewed in this way social behaviour is concomitant of role 
play, whereby individuals acts out situationally defined performances (e.g. the role of 
customer or FLSW). Their being situational means that roles are subjected to normative 
expectations, drawn from wider social experiences. For example, my knowledge of how 
to act as a customer is based upon my past experiences and observations of actors 
within similar customer-service settings. This guides my view of what is “normal” and 
appropriate and I act out the role accordingly so as to avoid sanction or discomfort.  
Perhaps more interesting are Goffman’s remarks on the role of the settings because 
these introduce structural dimensions into his analysis. Goffman conceptually stretched 
Shakespeare’s the “all the world’s a stage” metaphor much further than his 
206
 Goffman’s body of work was described in Chapter Two. 
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contemporaries did, by incorporating all elements of acting into his analysis. In his view 
real social productions have a “front stage” and “back stage” just like theatre 
productions do. Actors within each are similarly enabled and constrained by “props” 
made available in the setting, whilst both types of production also feature performances 
that are honed to particular audiences in particular places and spaces. 
Anteriority revisited: stages, roles and props  
These distinctions capture the nature and experience of FLSW in WC stores in a series 
of ways. To explore significant examples it is worth returning to the theme of 
anteriority, because it may be argued that the key mechanism of past management’s 
control upon present WC actors is that they selected the stage(s) and props.207 Arguably 
the most important legacy factor bequeathed by the founding regime was its decision to 
utilise marginal premises in low-rent parts of town with ample floor space. As was 
described in Chapter Five these “stages” were not designed with retail in mind. Disused 
open-plan warehouses were the norm because they were cheap and compatible with the 
“inside-out” store design that management had in mind. Stock would be kept “front-
stage” thereby removing the cost of back stage “dead spaces”208
When these decisions about store design were combined with the logic of lean 
functional flexibility the implications for FLSW were profound. By locating backstage 
activities and physical goods (i.e. stock) on shop floors much of the spatial separation 
between frontstage and backstage was removed. A related effect was to collapse role 
distinctions between frontstage (commercial) and backstage (operational) acting, 
because both roles would be performed on stage by the same actors. The removal of 
these boundaries imposed tensions that remain central to WC FLSW and the experience 
of it to this day. On one level management have repeatedly waged war on store 
“bureaucracy” and those who sub-specialised in the swathe of “back of house” 
operational dimensions (see Section 7.3.1). This is in spite of the fact that store design 
physically fixed operational labour processes as on-stage performances, meaning that 
207
 All stores within the WC chain were acquired and set up during the “classic” or DM eras. 
Consequently they embodied and embedded the priorities of that era. 
208
 Both within retail units and distribution hubs.
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FLSWs had no choice but to perform “bureaucracy” therein. On another level, the 
patterns of conflict and accommodation that have emerged within teams deeply related 
to actors’ pursuit of equitable and logical divisions of commercial/operational labour in 
light of individual proclivities (see Chapters Seven and Eight). 
The foreseeable role span of FLSW in WC was the primary justification for the 
development of a graduate management trainee scheme in the first place. Management 
did not imagine that FLSW would require cutting-edge analytical competence or 
evaluative skills. The logic of recruiting graduates en masse centred upon the belief that 
individuals drawn from that labour pool would have the ability and willingness to 
effectively perform multiple roles condensed into one. Hence, the framing of FLSW 
roles as management traineeships where performers would “learn all aspects of the 
business from the ground up”209 – acting as sales assistants one minute then account 
clerks or merchandisers the next. For many recruits this was central to its appeal. The 
role would neither be pure sales/service nor pure operational, allowing individuals to 
accrue experience across a social and technical spectrum in spite of their natural bias 
towards one aspect or another.  
Moving onto “props,” the other definitive legacy of the founding regime was the 
agential role it played in store I.T. When WC introduced electronic points of sales 
[“EPOS” – computerised till systems] in 2004, it bought a software suite originally 
developed for the London Eye.210 It barely needs stating that a multi-channel retailer 
with 1,000 products per store would benefit from a bespoke software suit, customised 
around its service quality aspirations. Yet management opted for short-term gain (cost 
savings) at the expense of long-term pain for FLSWs, who have been stuck with that 
decision for over a decade. 
If a “workman is only as good as his tools” then it is not entirely untrue to say that 
WC’s FLSWs are only as good as their software. As soon as EPOS was rolled-out it 
209
 According to the recruitment “sales pitch.” Interview data suggested that many of the 
recruitment tactics from my interviews in 2009 remained prominent in 2018. The “owning your 
own store” rhetoric has grown in prominence during the LF regime.  
210
 A funfair ride on the banks of the Thames.
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became clear that it was riddled with bugs and functional flaws – put simply, it was 
outdated upon arrival. After a decade of experience with EPOS I still struggled with this 
dysfunctional and antiquated system, often with a customer in front of me growing 
increasingly impatient as I try to “fudge” some solutions without creating new problems 
(e.g. the till being “down” or stock discrepancies). WC’s clunky “internet-1.0” EPOS 
was like a dial-up modem in a smartphone age, imposing an endless stream of 
disruption to management’s fantasy of seamless multi-channel retailing.  
Despite this, the cost and complication of replacing EPOS (which also houses the once-
celebrated customer database) were high so LF’s regime resisted calls for its 
replacement. Management only surrendered when they realised that the system would 
unlawfully contravene consumer data protection regulations, introduced in 2018.211
Simultaneously they realised that the problem was systemic rather than cosmetic so it 
could not be patched over quickly and cheaply. Thus, higher powers of the “external 
environment” (see the model in Figure 44) unwittingly intervened in this long-running 
struggle by removing management’s discretion. 
These are but two important examples of anteriority at work, illustrating how the 
agency of past management cast a long shadow over present day actors through 
decisions concerning props and stages. To further illustrate the interplay between past 
and present forces and factors I have presented them in a series of chronological flow 
diagrams (see Figures 51-53). 
9.1.1. The people and parts of amphitheatrical relations 
As the unfolding analysis indicates WC’s FLSWs have at no point had control over the 
design of their stores or the props made available. Furthermore, it is fair to say that the 
current regime have been hamstrung by the agency of past management too. As was 
argued in Chapter Six the “classic WC” model featured a web of interlocking 
components that imposed path dependency on future actors. Put simply, it made it hard 
211
 EU “GDPR” – see https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj 
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for management to unravel key elements of the model without incurring higher costs 
and unleashing unforeseeable risks. 
Nonetheless, even if past agents set the stage this is not to say that they have determined 
what plays out there. Role performance and experience in WC FLSW is a complex 
outcome of socio-economic relations in the broad context of UK political economy. In 
turn, each of the major actors who constitute the WC “role set” has structurally bound 
roles on the one hand and significant degrees of agential scope on the other hand. Figure 
44 provides a graphic update of Goffman’s dramaturgical metaphor as it applies to the 
experience of FLSW in WC. As can be seen the basic model of actors performing on a 
stage with props (referred to as “systems” in the model) has been retained. What has 
been added to better reflect the forces and factors central to the WC case is “royal 
boxes” (occupied by the two most powerful/influential “external” actors) and a 
“technical box,” occupied by management. 
Management’s technical box is composed of “levers of power” (see Figures 45-48) that 
they can manipulate to mould substantive aspects of performances on the WC stage. It 
is housed at a distance from the production itself, which is a by-product of its 
functioning as national “brick-and-mortar” retail chain where “conception” and 
“execution” are enacted at distinct physical locations (Braverman, 1974; Rafaeli, 1989). 
Regardless, the technical box owes its existence to management’s desire to control and 
condition FLSW actors so as to ensure that productions are conducive to the generation 
of surplus value.  
The other noteworthy constituents of amphitheatrical relations are the audience and the 
“outer walls.” The latter refers to the largely impervious structural bedrock that WC is 
itself couched in. It is composed of structurally-embedded actors and things that are 
independent of WC and external to it, with powers and properties of their own. Key 
examples are markets; competing organisational entities; suppliers; industry regulators; 
legislative branches; and national and supranational government executives. As for the 
audience I extend Goffman’s (1959) view that this comprises all actors who participate 
in the production and reproduction of the WC amphitheatre, not just on-stage 
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performers. To take myself as an example, I am an actor upon the stage but also a 
reflexive observer of colleagues and customers. Furthermore, I know that there is a 
world “out there” that regulates my agency and proceed upon the assumption that others 
are similarly aware and act accordingly.   
Figure 44 Wine Corp amphitheatrical relations 
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The remainder of this chapter seeks to disaggregate amphitheatrical relations in order 
to explain them in terms of their component people and parts, thereby illuminating 
respective roles in the production. I will start out with a discussion of the FLSW “stage 
actors” (FLSWs and customers) within the “service triangle.” This will be followed by 
analysis of management’s deployment of agency within the “technical box,” which is 
tightly interwoven with the power and influence of the “royal box holders” as 
subsequent sections explore. 
9.1.2. Between fantasyland and reality – actors on the main stage 
The WC shop floor is a social space even if the basis of its production and reproduction 
is economic in the first instance. As was described in Chapter Six (Part B) 
management’s rhetoric has been anchored in a unitarist “black and white” worldview of 
cause and effect. Their logic went like this: (1) happy and “fun” staff will lead to (2) 
“wowed” customers who enjoyed their time in store, meaning that (3) they stayed 
longer and spend more and (4) visited more often and become “loyal” members of the 
WC “community.” In addition they (5) told their friends and family about the wonders 
of WC so that they too could discover WC and bask in its warm “stakeholder capitalist” 
bosom. Driving this vision was not the technocratic stuff of revenues and profits 
according to LF but rather, an authentic desire to carve out a win-win dynamic that 
benefits capitalists as a happy coincidence of “doing the right thing.” 
The problem with this pleasant fiction was that it endlessly chafed with frontline reality 
and it fell to FLSWs to actively manage endemic frictions. Indeed, a useful heuristic for 
understanding the daily experience of FLSW in WC is to see it as an unending cycle of 
managing contradictions that inevitably arise between management fantasies and FLSW 
realities. Korczynski (2002, 2008 – see Chapter Two) placed emphasis upon a tension 
between enchantment and bureaucracy at the FLSW-customer interface. My argument 
is that a disconnection between imaginary and practical realms underpinned tension 
between management and stage actors generally. 
So when I talk of frontline “reality” as the counterpoint to management “fantasy” what 
do I mean? Firstly, it is important to be clear on what I do not mean. I am not saying 
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that there is a simple binary of management fantasyland and FLSW truth. Nor am I 
saying that certain individual members of management do not “get it,” even if they feel 
obliged to mimic the make-believe for whatever reason. The distinction I am seeking to 
identify is that FLSWs have to live with the gap between rhetoric and reality, whilst 
seniority in WC goes hand-in-hand with distance from and inexperience in FLSW. The 
far more visceral experience of management policy and ideology at the interface of 
FLSW exposes faults and flaws in an emotive immediate sense. 
Regardless, the social experience of WC stores is an outcome of FLSW individuals 
functioning in teams to perform roles with numerous operational and commercial 
elements. It is the latter element that brings WC’s second actor to the stage – customers. 
A particularly inconvenient truth for management is that customers are not all looking 
for excitement or “enchantment” as part of their experience. This is to over-simplify 
empirical reality to a dangerous extent212 (see Chapter Seven), putting staff in the firing 
line of customer resistance whilst threatening to counteract management’s “2.1” logic 
model (Figure 26). 
“Forced fun” for customers and staff alike can be a heavy burden. It is easy to imagine a 
customer visiting a store after a long day at work, seeking only to choose some wine in 
peaceful environment. Given that mission it is equally easy to imagine how annoying 
that customer might find it if a FLSW imposed themselves and persisted in the role of 
amateur entertainer. Some such customers may vow never to come back, as I myself 
have done after customer experiences of being harassed. The majority may suffer in 
silence, perhaps deploying subtle signs that they wish to be left alone and/or moderating 
their behaviour in response (e.g. picking faster, leaving sooner). Still others may 
forcefully resist the sense of imposition, making it clear to the FLSW that “fun” is 
optional not obligatory. Rarely will the latter fight back, but they will almost certainly 
feel resentment towards management for putting them in the firing line through their 
manipulation of power levers. 
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 Sutton & Rafaeli (1989) made an analogous argument concerning management’s pressure 
upon FLSWs to “serve with a smile” in convenience stores. They argued that management’s 
expectations were contradictory and antagonistic vis-à-vis FLSW-customer relations. 
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What these dynamics indicate is some of the complexities surrounding “commitment” 
and “resistance” as well as nuances relating to people. Sensible FLSWs try to read the 
customer and glean an impression of the type of customer they are dealing with. They 
then tailor their behaviour accordingly, investing more or less time and energy 
depending upon their perception of the customer’s wants and needs.213 In some cases 
this means leaving the customer alone and in other cases it means “handholding” and 
entertaining. Herein lies the problem: management is resolute that “boring retail is 
dead,” so leaving a customer alone is tantamount to a dereliction of duty. From 
management’s perspective anything short of full/high value added service is a missed 
opportunity to imprint WC in the customer’s mind making “loyalty” less likely. 
The perversity that this mind set introduces is that by reading customers and tailoring as 
described I am “resisting” management, even if I do so out of a genuine conviction that 
I serve the company’s best interests by doing so. Understood in this way “resistance” is 
actually commitment that management would interpret as defiance. My research 
suggested that most FLSWs are “resistant” along the same lines, based upon a shared 
belief that most customers fail to resemble management’s idealised fantasy. FLSWs 
also knew that those marginal few who did conform to the fantasy (typically being 
“over-social” in nature) confounded management’s logic rather than confirm it. What I 
mean is that these customers are probably amongst the least profitable once staff effort 
versus reward is factored in. If every customer was as resource inefficient as these over-
social archetypes then stores would cease to function under the weight of their demands 
and expectations. It is therefore fortunate that the majority of FLSW actors continue to 
enact their roles in their own way, rather than as management envisage. 
9.1.3. Social space and the location of management power  
The structural position of management in the technical box is the basis of its power but 
also the main constraint upon it. Management has to rely upon frontline agents to 
perform with some degree of self-directed autonomy because micro-management is 
expensive and prone to negative net returns past a certain point. Furthermore, a “high 
road” service quality model cannot be delivered by FLSWs locked in a straightjacket of 
213
 For the sake of simplicity I am assuming here that the FLSW has time to assess the 
customer, which is not always the case (see Chapter Six). 
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technical and bureaucratic constraints. Such conditions are associated with the 
“computer says no”214 service of low-road operators that customers are willing to pay a 
premium to escape, so long as the pay-off feels justified. 
It was in the residual spaces beyond management’s reach that individual variation 
inevitably and necessarily flourished amongst WC’s FLSW actors. In the first instance 
“customer missions” varied considerably, underpinning the WC truism that “customers 
are all different” and have to be treated as such. In the second instance and perhaps 
paradoxically, customers conformed to types and reverted to them so long as 
extraordinary circumstances did not preclude their doing so (e.g. FLSWs imposing an 
alternate agenda). For some reverting to type meant projecting an outgoing sociable 
persona, probably reflecting how they enact themselves generally within the public 
sphere. For others it meant warding off unwanted attention and pressure, making use of 
normative social cues to safeguard personal space.  
What may be said of customers may also be said of FLSWs, although the situation is 
more complicated. Firstly, FLSWs were subjected to management power levers in a far 
more systematic and direct way than customers. Secondly FLSWs had more at stake, in 
that WC provided them with a living or necessary supplementary income. Thirdly, 
FLSW in WC was more than just a job for most FLSWs. Often work constituted a 
social hub and a place of cultural significance given their personality affinities with the 
people and the product that WC specialised in. Each of these factors served as powerful 
bases of “commitment” or “resistance” depending upon where the lines were drawn by 
management at any given time. Oscillation meant that their location was constantly 
moving, so “heroes” of one era may be recast as “villains” in the next – as Doug 
Slazenger discovered. 
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 This is the catchphrase of fictional FLSW “Carol Beer” in seasons two and three of Little 
Britain, a TV sketch show, aired 2003-2007 [Written by Walliams, D. Lucas, M. UK: British 
Broadcasting Corporation]. Its cultural resonance was underlined in a recent article on the 




As this implies time was a critical factor in the experience of WC FLSWs. Individuals 
were tacitly aware of the requirement to “put on a show” and accommodated it through 
their varying capacities as actors. Few had a problem with acting per se but most had 
reservations over the sustainability and reasonableness of management’s performative 
expectations, especially during the LF era. Even the most committed of FLSWs would 
soon become exhausted by a role that stretched them far beyond their comfort zone for 
prolonged periods. It should be emphasised that WC remained structurally dependent 
upon small functionally-flexible teams working nine or ten hour shifts throughout the 
LF era, so typical days were an endurance challenge purely in physical terms. Against 
this backdrop some degree of resistance was an inevitable outcome of management’s 
excessive demands. 
Those least likely to “tune out” management’s performative expectations were the 
“bleed blue” true believers who also had a natural disposition for the social 
gregariousness that management conspired to disseminate. This FLSW type tended to 
combine a high degree of regime commitment with a natural social orientation that 
made “deep acting” (Hochschild, 2012) comparatively effortless. At the other end of the 
spectrum those who did tune out performative demands were not necessarily the 
recalcitrant saboteurs of management rhetoric. Many were committed FLSW who 
nonetheless resisted because they (a) felt too alien; (b) felt too tiring or (c) seemed 
counterproductive, given that a large proportion of store work remained operational – 
providing space to sub-specialise as discussed in Chapter Seven. 
Regardless, in the idealised world of management make-believe it was imagined that 
FLSWs could enact an illusion whereby operational facets ceased to exist and they 
would only have eyes for customers. As a consequence the latter would have their 
expectations of excitement and entertainment fulfilled and would commit to WC 
exclusively on that basis. The problem for LF’s regime was that all too few on either 
side of the stage actor divide were willing to play along with the make-believe and 
profits were not taking care of themselves (as their logic model assumed). Most 
customers and staff “operated at a cynical distance” (Fleming & Spicer, 2003) from 
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management and its constant drives to yield more out of stage performances.215 It 
appeared to be the case that management were “preaching to the converted” whilst the 
majority sought to minimise the threat and/or maximise the opportunity without 
substantively altering their role performances. 
Summary 
When the intricacy of socio-economic relations in WC stores is considered – especially 
with a view to management’s regulatory power – it seems difficult to sustain a position 
that a social realm exists “outside” of capitalism yet within its spatial confines (as per 
Bolton above). The consumer capitalism that WC embodies both enables and constrains 
social exchange as an intractable and meaningful element of economic exchange. Put 
another way, social space is a necessary condition of the business model that in and of 
itself imposes limits upon management’s capacity to control stage actors. Closing or 
suppressing that space risks “throwing the baby out with the bathwater,” which explains 
the company’s large investment in means of control that do not directly infringe upon 
FLSWs discretion and autonomy (i.e. “Meritocracy”). DMs attempt at draconian direct 
control delivered a self-inflicted wound that remained etched in the institutional 
memory.  
To illustrate the long view of strategic oscillation I have produced a serious of “control 
panels” which show how management “changed gears” to impose its agenda. Figure 45 
shows the configuration of the “classic WC model” and Figure 46 shows the changes 
made by DM (note: arrows show the extent and direction of change). As can be seen the 
thrust of the DM era was to reduce costs across the board whilst shifting towards “direct 
control” (Edwards, 1978). Figure 47 shows LF’s initial attempt at reinvigorating the 
business (“WC 2.0”), whereas Figure 48 illuminates a resurgent control impetus that 
emerged in early 2017 (“WC 2.1”). The former involved spending more and controlling 
less whilst the latter featured an unprecedented hybrid of “you’re on your own”
vicarious control combined with cost cuts. The next section seeks to explain why the 
levers of power were manipulated in this way and for whose benefit.  
215
 Hopkinson (2003) argued that the frontline in FLSW is constantly shifting, as FLSWs formed 
shifting allegiances with customers and management. Patterns of FLSW-customer collusion 
and/or “resistance” were widespread within WC.  
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Figure 45: Wine Corp “classic model” 
Figure 46: Gear shifts under Dan Mitchell 
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Figure 47: LF’s manipulation of the levers post-Dan Mitchell 
Figure 48: Aftermath of the Lyle Fisher honeymoon
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Section Two: External powers and the ideology of shareholder value 
The danger posed by the analysis so far is that it may appear to substitute dupe 
customers and workers for dupe management instead. I would argue however that 
historical analysis of management’s predicament – combined with a proper 
understanding of the external environment and power relationships they were subjected 
to – goes some way towards making sense of their deployment of agency. 
A paradox at the heart of management’s predicament was that it was by far the most 
powerful actor in the WC socio-economic arena and yet relatively powerless (note: LF 
makes the same argument below). As much as LF’s regime had unilateral capacity to 
manipulate the levers of power, the agential manipulation of those levers by past 
management had profound legacy effects that constrained and enabled present actors (as 
illustrated above). Whilst this did not necessary impose concrete constraints it did make 
for an imperfect world in which certain opportunities were more or less viable to 
pursue. 
A second structural impediment to management’s action was that it was not sovereign 
and autonomous in the strictest sense. They were subject to external threats over which 
they had little control and competitors were chief amongst them. WC remained a 
minnow in competitive waters that were dominated by whales (e.g. Tesco, Sainsbury’s). 
To continue with maritime metaphors, it is also fair to say that WC’s management were 
at the helm of an ironclad rather than a state-of-the-art destroyer. Moreover, with circa-
4.5% of the UK market216 and limited foothold abroad it was heavily reliant upon the 
health of local waters. In addition, those waters happened to be favoured by the meanest 
buccaneer on the sea (Amazon), for whom the UK is its third largest market. Whales 
like Amazon are not dependent upon particular product categories or territorial waters, 
so it can afford to loss-lead across categories and markets if it makes sense in the wider 
theatre of war. In relation, WC is especially vulnerable because its specialist category is 
a loss-leading favourite amongst generalist heavyweights. 
216
 As of 2018. 
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Whilst there is an “external” bigger picture then over which WC’s management had 
limited power and influence, it is also true to say that some of the powerful “outsiders” 
were also “insiders” in key sense. I am referring to the royal box holders here – those 
being, major shareholders and blue-chip press/media. The former are the legal owners 
of the means of production and management occupies the technical box only at its 
consent (discussed further below). The latter are primary influencers of public opinion, 
providing a window into WC for customers and non-customers alike as well as 
investors who occupy the other royal box. Management therefore has a vested interest in 
courting these influencers and in a deploying PR machine to mould the message. These 
powers can make or break companies in extreme cases,217 but in a more mundane sense 
they can help or hinder by shaping the narrative arc in relation to a particular entity. An 
instructive example is Tesco, the UK’s largest retailer. For many years under Terry 
Leahy’s leadership Tesco could seemingly “do no wrong” and then for years in the 
aftermath of his departure it could “do no right.” This narrative arc glossed over how the 
seeds of Tesco’s struggles were planted during Terry Leahy’s tenure.218
What may be said of Tesco may be said of WC – in fact, whilst they operated at 
difficult scales with varying degrees of specialism there were notable similarities in 
terms of the “up-waves” and “down-waves” they have ridden. In Chapter Six it was 
argued that both retailers were “stuck in the middle,” flanked by cheaper operators at 
one end of the spectrum and “cooler” niche operators at the other. Another similarity 
between the two organisations is that they were both darlings of the nineties and 
noughties, with solid/consistent growth based upon organic footprint expansion in the 
UK. 
The similarities do not end there because Tesco and WC had at least two other 
important things in common. The first was that their “golden years” were dominated by 
figureheads whose legitimacy stemmed from a romanticised “drawn from the rank and 
file” narrative. In the case of DM he was selected as heir apparent at an early stage of 
his career and was fast-tracked accordingly. Terry Leahy’s ascendancy appears to have 
217
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followed a similar trajectory, whilst both were elevated from humble backgrounds. The 
latter made this a part of his armour by presenting himself as an “everyman” with the 
“common touch.”219 DM was more self-congratulatory in his presentation of self but did 
mobilise a “butcher’s son” pauper-to-prince story for PR purposes, generating some 
degree of ideological buy-in amongst WC’s FLSWs. For example, my first store 
manager told me that her ambition was to beat DM’s record of “getting onto the Board 
in less than 10 years.” 
A second thing that WC and Tesco had in common was that their once all-powerful 
figureheads got their organisations into trouble by squeezing them to breaking point. 
This was not coincidental in my view; it was a by-product of two very similar leaders 
charting similar courses in light of the same structural/ideological forces and factors. In 
relation to the WC case, Chapter Six evidenced prominent links between “shareholder 
value maximisation” (SVM), management behaviour and resultant conditions of FLSW 
experiences. Specifically, it was argued in Chapter Six that DM effectively starved WC 
of resources to a point at which stores became dysfunctional. It may be a failure of my 
imagination, but I cannot find a “logical” explanation for management’s behaviour 
throughout this time beyond the alignment of its own interests with the short-term ones 
of powerful outside economic actors. An even more striking pattern played out 
throughout LF’s regime, during which time it became clear that “the markets” had 
profoundly influenced the direction of travel and the timing of “gear changes” (see 
Figures 45-48 above). When the market sent a signal that it would no longer indulge a 
“stakeholder” model of value-creation LF promptly switched to value-extraction in the 
form of neo-liberal managerialism (see Chapter Six Part B). I will return to these themes 
below. 
The interplay described here exposes the structural and ideological interconnectedness 
of “managerialism,” “neo-liberalism” and “shareholder value” ideology respectively. 
Speaking of the former two, Hanlon (2018: 311) recently made the case that in essence 




“Neo-liberalism and management are the same programme. 
Both share responses to the crisis of authority which emerged 
with the transition to corporate capitalism. Both argue 
intervention, expanded competition and elite leadership should 
reshape the subject and social relations through new forms of 
external regulation and internal discipline … Both programmes 
addressed what they saw (and still see) as the same problem – 
collectivism and democracy.” 
Integral to both is the SVM model,220 which is the dominant ideological frame of 
“financialised” corporate governance in contemporary Western economies (see Cushen 
& Thompson, 2016; Thompson, 2013: Lazonick, 2013; Lazonick & Mazzucato, 2013; 
Lapavitas, 2011; Dore, 2008; Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000). Given its current degree of 
systemic entrenchment it is almost difficult to imagine that the concept only dates back 
to the early 1980s (Chang, 2011). The story goes that as part of the neo-liberal 
reconstruction of how economies should work (and more specifically who they should 
serve), there was a belief that management had lost its way as a class of actors 
(Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000). Much of their activity was framed as empire-building 
and self-aggrandising which diminished “shareholder value” rather than adding to it. 
What was clearly needed according to the celebrants of SVM were powerful incentives 
to re-align managements’ interests with those of owners. 
It was against this backdrop that the “SVM model” of corporate governance took hold, 
with a key principle being that management should be appraised and rewarded for 
actions and activities that boost the share price. This was argued to be logically intuitive 
in the context of declining profits and international competitiveness (as discussed by 
Jones, 2015; Vidal, 2013; Vidal, 2011), which no doubt contributed to the 
infectiousness of the idea. Less apparent to advocates was the moral hazard that SVM 
posed, in the sense that management were heavily incentivised to see rapid increases in 
share price as an end in itself. One consequence would be that the means of driving 
220
 Denning, S. (2017) described shareholder value as “making money for shareholders.” In 
essence, the shareholder value maximisation model is a set of principles for corporate 
governance that pursues optimisation of shareholder returns. The author cites The Economist 
as stating that “today … shareholder value rules business.”  
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share price growth diminished in importance. Another consequence would be that 
value-extraction (e.g., labour intensification, cost reduction, wealth re-distribution to 
shareholders) increasingly took precedence over value-creation (see Fleming, 2017) 
because it involved less risk and could gratify “the markets” more immediately. Overall 
then, management were powerfully encouraged to focus on the short-term even if it 
meant jeopardising their organisation’s long-term health by diminishing far-sightedness 
and “future building.” “Beating the street” became the overwhelming preoccupation as 
Lazonick (2013: 904) notes: 
“It is generally accepted, by both proponents and opponents of 
shareholder-value ideology, that corporate executives in the US 
have developed an obsession with meeting Wall Street’s 
expectations … It is also generally the case that people respond 
to financial incentives in their resource allocation decisions.”221
Once more, a critical issue is time horizons. Footloose capital is flighty by definition; it 
quickly and easily detaches from entities failing to deliver SVM and attaches itself to 
other more successful entities in this regard. It is therefore inherently short-term with 
profound implications for the management of public concerns. It imposes upon them a 
requirement to court “the market” (as discussed above) to retain their speculative 
interest, selling them a compelling story of why participants should buy or hold the 
company’s stock.  
This backstory helps to explain the underlying dynamics of how and why major 
shareholders and mainstream press have become royal box holders with the WC 
amphitheatre. As much as management in large listed FLSW institution are responsible 
for what plays out on stage, they are nonetheless pre-occupied with powers and 
influencers far removed from it who act as both “insiders” and “outsiders.” All 
prominent political dramas feature vignettes of power holder’s inner circles debating the 
likely effects of policies, only to then vet them in terms of “how it will play out in the 
221
 Lazonick is referring to the US here but it is widely accepted that the US and UK are 
frontrunners and flag bearers of neoliberalism and SVM – see Coates, 2000. 
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press” (e.g. The West Wing, House of Cards). An equally common trope is for executive 
agents to do things purely for purposes of spin (as depicted in shows likes VEEP and 
The Thick of It), thereby laying emphasis upon impression management rather than 
actual management. Empirical evidence of this type of behaviour is not difficult to come 
by. For example, Ken Burns’ documentary of the Vietnam War222 features extensive 
recordings of Presidents Johnson and Nixon engaged in practices that are substantively 
identical to those depicted in fictional representations.  
At this point I can return to my disembarkation point for the present discussion: the 
second link between Tesco and WC. I would argue that in both cases impression 
management began to overtake reality and this was tied to the individuals who led them 
and the way they were incentivised. Both leaders presided over the respective 
organisations’ golden-ages of rapid organic growth via footprint expansion as 
mentioned. Not unlike conquering empires, their growing fortunes came from capturing 
new territories and expanding sales and market share on that basis. As was described in 
Chapter Six DM consciously modelled WC on Tesco, so similarities are not surprising.  
However, the problem that any empire eventually encounters is that scale becomes more 
of a problem than a solution at a certain point – that being, when diminishing marginal 
returns makes footprint expansion unprofitable. As Tainter (1988) argues in The 
Collapse of Complex Societies empires tend to reach their limits when the cost of 
further expansion exceeds the probable rewards. Their eventual demise is then spawned 
by the ever-increasing bureaucratic costs of defending and controlling vast territories 
with a dwindling resource base. 
Although this analogy does not fit the Tesco and WC cases perfectly223 it is nonetheless 
indicative. Both organisations experienced explosive share price growth during their 
expansionist heydays whilst both leaders accrued fortunes and valorisation as part of the 
222
The Vietnam War, 2017 [TV series]. Directed by Burns, K. Novick, L. USA: Public 
Broadcasting Service. 
223
 At the time of writing their decline is relative rather than absolute, although neither shows 
credible signs of profits reaching or exceeding record highs. Tesco’s revenue also remains well 
below heyday levels, partly due to “de-leveraging” the balance sheet through asset sales.  
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process. In Terry Leahy’s case he was even made a knight of the realm in Britain. Yet 
both leaders sowed the seeds of their organisations’ struggle by becoming obsessed with 
“making the numbers” and keeping the share price rising at (almost) any cost. 
Progressively though this meant that the long-term health of their empires was being 
eroded by a short-term focus on “beating the market.” To this end they each managed 
their organisations in ways that sought to ensure that SVM was institutionally 
embedded via “do or die” targets. In the meantime they actively sold media influencers 
a rosy picture whilst quietly suppressing stakeholders (customers, suppliers, FLSWs) to 
compensate for diminishing marginal returns on footprint expansion. 
9.2.1. The fine line between shareholder value, make-believe and 
criminality  
Although legal proceedings are ongoing, it seems reasonable to infer that Tesco’s 
£250m accountancy scandal was in no small part a consequence of the huge pressure 
being placed upon senior executives to “beat the numbers” as described above.224 In this 
instance it is alleged that executives crossed the line into criminality, which only makes 
sense in light of the extraordinary risks and rewards available to those both able and 
willing to “keep the ball rolling” in my view. 
The most extreme example of SVM-induced moral hazard is explored with exceptional 
clarity by Alex Gibney in his documentary on Enron.225 He credibly explored how stock 
options were used as a lever to indoctrinate staff into an ethos of living or dying by the 
sword of shareholder value. In relation to such processes, management itself 
progressively lost touch with reality and became little more than manufacturers of 
illusion to sustain the Enron myth and share price growth. Reality only closed in on 






Enron: The smartest guys in the room, 2005 [film]. Directed by Gibney, A. USA: Magnolia 
Pictures
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The Enron case exemplifies and embodies the potentially toxic combination of 
shareholder value; huge management incentives (with short-term time horizons) and 
power structures that enabled leaders to unilaterally impose their ideology and fantasies 
upon the workforce. Enron’s most successful “pump and dump” management actor 
escaped the organisation with roughly $250 million dollars, several months before its 
final demise.  
The primary control mechanisms used by Enron’s management throughout its illusory 
heyday was a particularly amped-up version of the carrot and the stick. On the one hand 
huge stock incentives were offered to leaders and employees who beat their quarterly 
numbers by whatever means, whilst on the other hand the bottom 10% of performers 
were culled annually irrelevant of whether they performed competently or not. 
Management argued that this euphemistically named “performance review 
committee”226 was the lynchpin of Enron’s “success,” in that it instilled a competitive 
spirit from bottom to top. What it more obviously did was instil fear amongst potential 
dissenters whilst embedding a mechanism to remove perceived “bad apples” who 
questioned the programme. 
It is telling that the most famous exponent of the auto-cull policy is Jack Welch, the 
famed CEO of General Electric who ironically was also credited as the founding father 
of the SVM model.227 During his time at General Electric Welch championed the SVM 
model whilst enacting the 15% auto-cull policy as a sub-component of it,228 regarding 
the later as indispensable instrument to that end. What makes these practices noteworthy 
in relation to the case study under discussion is that LF formally introduced an auto-cull 
to WC at the beginning of FY2018/19. As of yet its existence has not been explicitly 
announced to FLSWs. I only know if it because I took the time to read the investor 
publications and spotted LF’s declaration to “continuously improve the average by 
losing the bottom 10% of products, suppliers and people.”229
226
 Unofficially it was known as “rank and yank.” 
227





 Emphasis added. 
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Such an extreme policy (by UK standards) could not be further removed from the 
benevolent leadership espoused by LF at the beginning of his tenure. Four years on that 
“honeymoon period” of 2015 seems like a short Indian summer in amongst the 
dreariness of a long winter. LF’s immediate aim was to raise morale amongst FLSWs 
whilst setting into reverse the resource starvation of DM’s regime, as described in 
Chapter Six Part B. Upon arrival LF made clear his contempt for the extremity of prior 
mismanagement in a series of unveiled critiques. Rather than continue down the road of 
short-termism he committed himself to fixing the estate, setting FLSWs “free” and 
clawing back the stranglehold of over-management. 
During his first two years LF was good to his word (see Figure 47 vs 46 above) in spirit 
if not in substance but things changed decisively after Christmas 2017. The question 
then became why, and the only credible explanatory link was to the chorus of 
market/media signals suggesting that they had ran out of patience with LF’s experiment 
with “stakeholder win-win” as stated above. In the eyes of the “commentariat” and 
market (the occupants of the royal boxes) two years had been enough time for the new 
logic model to bear fruit in terms of key financial indicators.230 For the sake of self-
preservation and to sustain the support of royalty LF had little choice but to intensify his 
programme in pursuit of “good numbers.” Subsequently, frontline costs were subjected 
to an assault that even surpassed the frugality of DM’s late era. To add insult to injury 
LF explicitly blamed FLSWs for the failure of his programme which again overstepped 
DM’s lowest ebb. This “passing of the buck” is explicit in the following remarks231: 
“What I’d ask you to do is look in the mirror and ask yourself 
‘why you come into work every day.’ If the answer is ‘for the 
easy life’ you’re probably in the wrong job. If the answer is ‘you 
want to grow’ … you’re probably in the right place … for you to 
grow the company needs to grow… 
230
 “EBITDA” (WC’s main performance measure in financial reports); return on earning (ROE - 
which also features prominently in WC statements) “beta” (a measure of price volatility); and the 
price-earnings (P/W) ratio are the top four valuation indicators used by institutional investors – 
see Cushen & Thompson, 2016: 357) 
231
 Remarks of LF in an in-house video, released to coincide with the announcement of FY2018 
results.
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Being a CEO is a really weird job, because everybody thinks 
you’re the boss and you have the power and everything else and 
the reality is you don’t… I can’t make any of these things 
happen, that’s over to you. So whatever you do, think hard about 
why you come to work, and if it is because you want to grow as a 
person you’re in the right company.” 
In the previous financial year management had decimated its own ranks, finalising the 
long-running task of removing managers inherited from the DM era whilst “trimming 
the fat” from the John Stapleton-led first phase of the LF era. One can only assume that 
they were the “staff problem” then, but by 2018 management’s cross-hairs were firmly 
fixed on the “staff problem” that was newly imagined amongst FLSWs. LF’s initial 
salvo was to impose “Meritocracy,” a software suite of targets and league tables 
designed to streamline performance management monitoring. Within this new 
framework the prize for “beating the numbers” would be that “work would set you free” 
because “nailing” stores would be left alone by management. It speaks volumes of the 
unpleasantness of modern managerialism that being spared from it is dangled as a 
motivational carrot. 
Regardless, after several months of Meritocracy almost every store was “sailing” – 
meaning that they were beating all of management’s targets for “behaviours” yet were 
failing to meet gross profits targets. Hence by managements own definition FLSWs 
were performing at or above their expectations, and yet the regime still came to the 
conclusion that the explanation for the lack of profit growth must be FLSWs’ resistance 
and/or inadequacies. Upon that conclusion the regime institutionalised its 10% auto-
cull, presumably as a means of scaring FLSWs into the realisation that “for you to grow 
the company needs to grow.”
Thus a new era of management make-believe dawned upon WC, embodying the truism 
that “the more things change the more they stay the same.” To be clear the fantasies of 
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the LF regime were different to those of the DM era. The latter seemed to believe (or 
hope) that cost-cutting and squeezing stakeholders (other than shareholders) could serve 
as a sustainable source of profit growth indefinitely. The former had chosen to believe 
that the acting capacities of FLSWs (when combined with a data analysis tools) could 
achieve some of kind profit alchemy against the backdrop of diminution of the 
frontline.232
Whilst these fantasies were nuanced they drew their lifeblood from the same well – that 
being, a structural tension between serving a higher power whilst relying upon a 
subservient semi-autonomous cast of actors to satisfy that power. These “masters” and 
“servants” have fundamentally different wants and needs which no amount of unitary 
rhetoric can mask (Thompson, 2003). They also have quite different time horizons in 
mind, which underpinned an interlinked tension between the short-term interests of 
owners and the long-term interests of the organisation and its employees.  
The counter-productive behaviour of two WC’s regimes showed that when push came 
to shove, the interests of higher powers took precedence over those of lower powers in 
the age of shareholder capitalism. It is perhaps worth reiterating at this point the scale of 
the incentive devised by controlling agents to encourage LF to “go with the flow.” In 
Chapter Six Part B it was highlighted that LF was handed a £20m contingent stake 
based upon the 2015 share price. Any increase in “shareholder value” during the four-
year vesting period (to 2019) would increase the value of that performance 
consideration still further, whereas failure to meet its SVM criteria would come at huge 
personal cost.233
Almost 40 years on from the birth of the SVM model it has become the primary driving 
force of FLSW experiences in WC alongside its spiritual twin neo-liberal 
232
 As was described in Chapter Six Part B, LF reduced the total number of staff hours per store 
in 2017 and pared back the “graduate scheme” which dates back to the organisations 1980s 
inception (see Chapter Five). 
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 LF’s performance consideration has recently been dwarfed by that offered to John Lyttle, the 
incoming CEO of online retailer Boohoo. A £50m bonus is offered on the basis of achieving a 
180% increase in the share price over 5 years. His potential £58m total reward package 
equates to £37,780 per day gross income. 
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managerialism. Interestingly, the originator of the SVM model (Jack Welch – 
mentioned above) has since gone on to admit that it is “probably the dumbest idea in 
the world” (Chang, 2011: 22).234 What makes it “dumb” is the irony that it was meant 
to focus CEOs minds on the competitiveness of their organisations, whereas we know 
with hindsight that it has led to short-termism and destructive behaviour in pursuit of 
self-enrichment and public plaudits.  
What about customers? 
In a range of complex ways the “functional stupidity” (Alversson & Spicer, 2012) that 
manifested itself upon WC frontlines throughout my time thereupon are the empirical 
reverberations of power relations that play out nowhere near it. Both customers and 
FLSWs matter in the power game but only as aggregates, in that both are critical as 
collective formations to the buying and selling processes that created surplus value. Yet 
as individuals they are substantively powerless in the face of far more powerful forces 
and factors that enabled and constrained stage performances, whilst obscured from the 
view of those upon it. The inability of FLSWs and customers to act collectively and 
mobilise resources makes them weak in the face of organised capital (i.e. management), 
which speaks and acts as one. The relative power/influence of individual FLSW actors 
over agents of capital compared to that of royal box holders is miniscule. 
It is no surprise then that management entangled itself in the detrimental short-term 
focus of elite shareholders even as it extolled the virtues of “partnership” and espoused 
rhetoric of “customer [as] king.” In reality the individual customer was more akin to a 
factor of production, whose behaviour needed to be manipulated and controlled to the 
extent that is possible. In key senses then they were closer to FLSWs than royal box 
holders in the socio-economic pecking order. Whilst it may be true that the “customer is 
king” (and relatedly that Western societies have become “consumer societies”) at a 
certain level of abstraction (see Chapter Two for discussion), it failed to resonate at the 
empirical level of FLSW actor experiences.  
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 See also: https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2017/07/17/making-sense-of-
shareholder-value-the-worlds-dumbest-idea/#2ba1fcf72a7e 
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Customers “got what they were given” by organisations in the day-to-day sense and if 
they did not like it their only real choice was to go elsewhere where they would also get 
what they are given. Although competition is no mere fiction there were no opt-out 
options in terms of escaping the forces and factors of which I speak. Put simply, the 
“grass was not [necessarily] greener on the other side” because management there 
would almost certainly be playing to the same ideologically and systemically-embedded 
rule set. As much as those rules are not entirely fixed (present agents can and do modify 
them), they may nonetheless appear “set in stone” for given a generation of actors 
constrained and enabled by them. In sum, customers can choose their favourite players 
but are powerless in determining the rules of the game. 
Section Three: Synthesising similarities and differences 
9.3.1. Du Gay – sovereign consumers and enterprise culture 
My lengthy discussion of Du Gay’s thesis (Chapter Two) was based upon a conviction 
that he made credible and important observations about the effects of “enterprise 
culture,” even if his conceptualisation of it was bound by inherent limitations in my 
view. Du Gay argued that chaos and confusion emanates from endless management 
reorganisations and forays into “culture management,” which certainly corresponded 
with my experience in “WC 2.0.” LF’s regime had a penchant for “pop-management” 
concepts that gained traction in the 1980s and 1990s including “5* service,” 
“experiential retail” and the “service-profit chain.” This treadmill of “new” management 
concepts became powerful forces within WC in their own right, as management bought 
into them began to experiment with implementation. A considerable degree of 
oscillation stemmed from these experiments as management tried an idea, abandoning it 
(often without announcement) and then moved onto its next big idea. To critics they 
were “throwing everything at the wall and seeing what sticks,”235 whereas management 
argued it represented a “test and learn culture.”  
235
 Quote from Chapter Six Part B. 
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Du Gay also made valid observations on an ideological assault on “bureaucracy” which 
resonated with my data. “WC 2.0” management generally saw fixed things236 as 
enemies of rapid change and responsiveness to emerging initiatives. They also framed 
operationally-oriented FLSWs as the antithesis of their ideal-type FLSW buccaneer (see 
Chapter Eight), whereas DM’s regime laid siege to the same type based upon a belief 
that they were not “sellers.” This had the important consequence of making operational 
efficiency and behaviours that supported it taboo, which undermined the functionality 
of stores and consequently the experience of working within them. 
However, du Gay’s dual notions that customers are the sovereign drivers of change and 
that “enterprise discourse” is its midwife does not appear to be a credible explanation 
for the patterns and outcomes described above. My main reservation is that it leaves too 
much unexplained; for example, if the customer is king then why do they feel and seem 
so powerless? Why also does credible evidence show that customers are more 
dissatisfied than in previous eras (see Batt, 2007), even as management (and academics) 
tell them that they are “calling the shots”? Why also are FLSWs bowing to the demands 
of management when push comes to shove, and why are management bowing to the 
will of shareholders rather than “sovereign consumers” upon close inspection?  
With these contradictions in mind I would argue that if we substitute customers for 
shareholders and discourse for ideology/rhetoric then it is possible to better explain the 
data. The true sovereign over the WC saga is the shareholder – specifically, a small 
group of block-shareholders led by founder Deacon Hill who alone owns almost 1/5th of 
the stock. Their real power only surfaced and revealed itself once in the last decade, at a 
time of “crisis.” That power makes them the sole arbiters of “crisis” and the sole 
“insider” actor able to force change upon management.237
At the moment of “crisis intervention” (the over-throw of DM) it seems reasonable to 
believe that these real sovereigns did not especially care about the thoughts and feelings 
236
 For example, the chain of command and established administrative processes. 
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 As was shown above the UK government also has the power to force change upon WC’s 
management. Within the amphitheatre model the UK government is an “external” force which 
makes up a part of the “walls” in which WC is embedded.
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of FLSW stage actors. After all, for years shareholder value had grown whilst other 
optics (e.g. customer/FLSW turnover) provided forewarning of deteriorating conditions. 
Throughout this time many of the more astute customers and FLSWs had made clear 
their escalating sense of something rotten in state of WC, yet none amongst the “powers 
that be” intervened. It was only when growth in shareholder value seized up that real 
power intervened and imposed regime change, with the meek announcement that “we 
think we can do better.” Who we is and what better means was never stated. 
Up to that point WC’s FLSWs (including myself) regarded DM as the power – a king 
subject to few if any internal limits. The reality was that DM governed only by consent 
and real power had the capacity to withdraw that consent unilaterally. Since that 
moment of regime change the journey of WC’s FLSW actors has been incidental of that 
intervention to a significant extent. If its object was to positively affect customers or 
FLSWs experience then one might have expected LF’s performance consideration to 
comprise relevant benchmarks. Instead, it was fine-tuned to ensure SVM which speaks 
volumes on the question of “better for who?” 
Moving on to my reservations concerning discourse theory, I would argue that the 
constant gap between what management says and does – and the fact that it spins 
different stories to different audiences – poses a problem for discourse purists. Their 
guiding assumptions discount the possibility of management “make believe” because 
discourse and reality are seen as indistinguishable in essence. You cannot therefore 
specify real “things” that exist outside discourse and have power/properties independent 
of it (e.g. stages, control panels, royal boxes, amphitheatres and other structures 
aforementioned). There is only social construction, discourses and the ideas they 
embody.  
What this leaves unresolved in the WC case is the disconnection between the reality of 
shareholders being put first and the “discourse” of “customer first, customer second.”238
As said, discourse theory struggles to account for such discrepancies because it 
238
 This was actually the tagline of “WC 1.0” management’s brief flirtation with “culture 
management” before they were removed from office. 
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conflates rhetoric and reality. Once the two are disaggregated though – with rhetoric re-
conceptualised as a component of “reality” rather than constitutive of it – then the 
hegemonic basis of the disconnection reveals itself. It also makes possible a set of 
alternative assumptions concerning the consciousness of stage actors. In my view 
FLSW actors are (a) tacitly aware that power is structurally embedded in things (e.g., 
capitalism; legal structures of ownership; money; material wealth); (b) consciously 
aware that management’s role in the first instance is to grow sales and/or profits in 
capitalist enterprises; and (c) knowledgeable on some level of the need for actors to act 
out different roles for different audiences. With these competing truth claims in mind it 
becomes is easy to see how and why spin and “PR” have become inherent components 
of empirical reality. 
9.3.2. Two competing view of the forces and factors that shape FLSW 
experiences 
Rafaeli (1989) is one of few theorists to have assessed power and control dynamics 
amongst service triangle constituents specifically (see Chapter Three), making cross-
examination of her work useful. Overall my results resonate with Rafaeli’s synthesis – 
for example, she identifies that a key challenge for management in multiple retailers is 
that it operates at a distance making it “remote.” By comparison customers are an 
“immediate” threat, an unpredictable mass that physically imposes itself and its agenda 
on the FLSW stage. Their presence and status (as customer) is the source of their self-
perceived power, which is actively contested by FLSWs due to its perceived 
illegitimacy. A struggle results over who has the right to control service encounters 
according to the author. 
Whilst accepting these propositions I wish to highlight two points of departure between 
Rafaeli’s model (see Figure 49) and my own. Firstly, Rafaeli depicted co-workers as 
having less “immediate influence” on FLSWs than customers and this does not tally 
with my data. In WC store teams form into an “in group” whilst customers were 
perceived as part of the “out group.” Something akin to a trench warfare mind-set was 
common amongst members of the former, accompanied as it was by a hierarchy of 
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contempt featuring management and customers as abstract entities. The lion’s share was 
reserved for particular “bad” managers and customers, although the generalised other 
(Mead, 1934) was often framed as a villain simply because their interests diverged from 
FLSWs in key respects. Given such tendencies I believe that the influence of FLSW 
colleagues held greater sway in both immediate and legitimate senses. One possible 
explanation for the divergence between findings is that WC’s lean functional flexibility 
in WC entrenched in-group normative control to a greater extent than in Rafaeli’s 
supermarkets.239
Figure 49: Rafaeli revisited 
The other key distinction between my amphitheatre model and Rafaeli’s is that the latter 
was based on a closed loop, which brackets off outside influences such as shareholders 
and the external environment generally. As I have attempted to make clear above, none 
of the actors who act within the WC amphitheatre enact themselves in a vacuum 
removed from the wide socio-economic milieu. They are each connected to and 
239
 The power of “horizontal surveillance” (Sewell, 1998) in autonomous/TQM teamwork settings 
has been identified elsewhere (ibid., Sewell & Wilkinson, 1992). 
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influenced by the “outside world” and their perceptions of it (as depicted by the 
influences lines in Figure 44), which both constrain and enable their activities within the 
WC amphitheatre.  
9.3.3. Power and influence in the “service triangle” 
Inherent to the “service triangle” heuristic is a notion that it is not just FLSWs who 
experience FLSW but customers as well. Some have argued that “co-production” takes 
place with a view to the intertwinement of consumption and production. By logical 
extension customers are specified as a powerful “third wheel” in the battle for control in 
FLSW socio-economic arenas (see Leidner, 1993; Rafaeli, 1989). 
Whilst agreeing that the incorporation of the customer into analysis of FLSW was a 
necessary and important step forward, I would caution against the (seemingly) logical 
next step of presenting/conceptualising relations as a triangle. I believe that there are 
two significant empirical bases to reject the approach. Firstly, if we are to extend 
analysis beyond the FLSW-management dyad then why stop at inclusion of the 
customer? In the preceding sections I have made a case for the inclusion of at least two 
other powerful actors in order to better understand the nature and experience of FLSW. 
Whilst this stance is valid in its own terms, it is also indicative of a need to connect the 
“inside” (relations between triangle constituents) with the “outside” (wider political 
economy and external powers). This leads me to my next point. Power is highly 
lopsided both within FLSW organisations and the capitalist political economies that 
house them. The service triangle implies a parity and evenness in the distribution of 
power and resources that empirical study fails to articulate (see Chapter Three). Perhaps 
then a better starting point is to frame FLSW as exhibiting and/or embodying a lack of 
parity and evenness as LPT argues (see Chapter Two). 
To flesh-out these positions WC is a useful case in point. FLSWs are the weakest parties 
in the “service triangle” which boils down to their inability to act as one and apply their 
latent power collectively (as discussed above). As for customers they exhibit little 
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cohesion (e.g. do they want more or less service; are they willing to pay more for it), 
making it improbable that they could consistently bring their collective power to bear. 
Furthermore, even if they were to somehow agree upon a common ground then what 
would be the means by which they collectively coordinate and mobilise – bearing in 
mind that we are talking about over 1m people dispersed through the UK? The knee jerk 
response might be social media but recent events seem to have suggested that power has 
the capacity to tame this threat and turn it against the less powerful.240 Lest we forget 
we are also talking about a wine re-seller here, a provider of a commodity that is widely 
available. The path of least resistance for customers is to tolerate imperfections or go 
elsewhere to tolerate those imperfections instead. To paraphrase a former government 
colleague “nobody is going to die in a ditch over it.”
There is a certain aptness in invoking war imagery at this point because management’s 
rhetoric has always been filled with battlefield metaphors and hyperbole despite the 
mundane basis of WC’s existence. To them FLSWs are not service providers or wine 
re-sellers, they are the “thin [bleed blue] line” in a kill-or-be-killed/winner-take-all
struggle for survival. As an indication, LF recently remarked to the troops: 
“One or two things are going to happen this year. Either we 
reach escape velocity, and get so good at looking after our 
sectors of the market that our competitors give up and decide to 
go somewhere else, or we leave the opportunity open to other 
people…” 
It is after these remarks that LF explained the two options available to FLSWs (as 
discussed above) – those being, to “grow as people” or accept “you’re probably in the 
wrong job.” What made these comments interesting to me was the naked power they 
conveyed as well as management’s willingness to make use of “market control” as Darr 
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 I am referring here to the weaponisation of Facebook and other social media platforms, 
which traditional powerholders sought to mobilise in pursuit of their preferred outcomes in the 
2016 US election and “Brexit” referendum. See: Cohen, N. “Why isn’t there greater outrage 
about Russia’s involvement in Brexit,” The Guardian 17/06/2018; also: Yourish, K. Griggs, T. “8 
U.S. intelligence groups blame Russia for meddling, but Trump keeps clouding the picture,” The 
New York Times 02/09/2018. 
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(2003) described it. What LF was saying is essentially true; FLSWs do only have two 
choices which is to get with the programme or leave, voluntarily or otherwise. The latter 
are under no illusions that these are the options and they each have to grapple with that 
in their own way. 
An important residual question then is why do FLSWs not resist management and its 
ultimatums? The first explanatory factor is that the workforce is divided and conquered 
with no credible means of collective resistance. Successive UK governments have made 
it incredibly difficult for workers to organise and act collectively, especially in a multi-
site corporate entity like WC. Management cannot dispose of its entire workforce at 
once but it can dispense with “upstarts” long before they incite collectivising 
momentum. The idea of collective resistance is little short of fantasy once the 
structural/legal barriers and individual risks are understood, and FLSWs see it as such.  
The second main factor is that FLSWs know that there is a real world “out there” that 
limits choices, as do other constituents of the service triangle. One of the reasons that 
FLSWs do not leave is because they are reflectively aware that other prospective 
employers are in all probability governed by the same neo-liberal mind-set, meaning 
that “escape” (from the company) does not mean escaping. As said there is no opt out 
from “turbo capitalism” as Chomsky (1999) calls it (others have used less upbeat terms 
like “wreckage capitalism” and “disaster capitalism” to describe present epoch).241
This includes the public sector and the 3rd sector, which have long since become 
bastions of the neo-liberal managerialism in their own right (see Parker, 2002). 
A third factor is supply and demand for graduate labour. New Labour’s policy of mass 
higher education locked the current generation of graduates into a supply/demand 
imbalance that is highly stacked in employers’ favour. Supply outstrips demand (Keep 
et al., 2006) creating a “buyer’s market,” with numerous cascade effects. A key 
example is that degrees have become commodities in the UK so graduates increasingly 
find themselves occupying non-graduate roles due to “grade inflation.” Those who lack 
specialist degrees (e.g., medicine, law, engineering) and/or fail to access the top-tier of 
241
 Fleming. P. (2017) & Klein, N. (2007) – See references. 
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graduate schemes are left to “choose” from an unappetising menu of “options.” This 
includes graduate schemes in name only.
It is clear that the agency of one generation (1990s politicians) structurally embedded 
the employment options of the next by laying the foundations of future labour 
supply/demand imbalances. Whatever the intentions of the former, they helped to shape 
graduate labour market condition that were ripe for corporate exploitation in pursuit of 
surplus. In WC management needs only to offer the pay and conditions necessary to 
sustain reproduction of its business model, which perhaps explains why they have 
always been comfortable with circa-25% turnover. So long as UK universities continue 
to churn out an over-supply of “cannon fodder” each year then WC’s graduate 
“sacrificial HR strategy” (see Wallace et al., 2000, Chapter Three) represents a 
sustainable and logical exploitation of that opportunity. 
Section Four: Disentangling the forces and factors that shape the 
experience of FLSW 
Real and actual power were barely present on the WC FLSW stage, yet it is within 
these stratified and concealed domains that empirical experiences of it took their shape. 
To make this statement is not to retreat into structural determinism; it is only to say that 
the stage was set long before individual actors assumed their role and enacted their 
performances upon it. Individuals do nonetheless bring their personality and character 
into the workplace with them, so these constituted important factors in shaping both the 
manner of performance and the experience of it. 
Hence the experience of FLSW was on one level determined by performers themselves, 
who used discretionary space to make roles their own and to realise them in accordance 
with a range of idiosyncrasies. On another level FLSW was also a collaborative effort, 
made up of follow FLSWs actors each engaged in the same process whilst occupying 
the same spaces. It is on this basis that patterns of conflict and accommodation emerged 
that greatly enhanced and/or undermined the experience of work for individual actors.  
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The actor who bridged the divide between the “empirical” realm under study (FLSW) 
and “real power” was management, who occupied the technical box of actual power.
Due to its position between the poles of empirical stage reality and real power it was not 
all-powerful, but it did have sufficient ideological and material resources to dominate 
the stage – even though it was not an occupant of it in a straightforward sense. Setting 
aside token gestures and unitarist rhetoric, management’s power meant that the residual 
“choice” for stage actors was to accept actual power or “leave the building.” In current 
UK political economy the only serious threat to real and actual power is other holders of 
real and actual power. For WC’s management the most poignant such threats are (a) its 
royal box holders and (b) big beast competitors, who may threaten to bring down their 
walls entirety.  
The seemingly chaotic and self-immolating behaviour of the technical box occupants 
are manifestations of its reactions to perceived threats and opportunities in alternate 
realms, often well removed from the WC FLSW stage. Management is at one and the 
same time trying to destroy competition whilst precluding its own demise in material 
and status terms. One the one hand it is telling real power actors that victory is assured 
whilst on the other hand it is telling FLSWs that their doom is assured if they do not 
fight harder and better. If the kill-or-be-killed mind-set of CEOs is in doubt then it is 
worth considering Dick Fuld’s comments on what he would like to do to competitors:  
‘What I really want to do is reach in, rip out their heart, and eat it before they die.’242
This was not “locker room talk” intended for a small audience of friends and colleagues 
behind closed doors, these remarks were made in a widely circulated corporate video 
like those of LF above. A year later Fuld’s brinkmanship led Lehman Brother’s into 
bankruptcy.  
242
The love of money: the bank that bust the world, 2009 [TV documentary]. Directed by Smith, 
G. UK: British Broadcasting Corporation. 
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LF has never made such vivid pronouncements but he is a creature of the same kill-or-
be-killed/winner-take-all neo-liberal mentality that sees precious little difference 
between market warfare and actual warfare. As stated above, I believed that LF was 
sincere in his initial attempt at something akin to benevolent dictatorship in WC. He 
stretched the “stakeholder” principle further than I expected, enacting quality-of-life 
policies that seemed alien in the aftermath of the DM regime. Unfortunately 
mismanagement and ill-conceived strategy off-stage undermined the potential for 
progress on-stage, so we will never know if the strategy could have worked with better 
execution or more time. 
Synthesis 
My argument and contribution is to say that the experience of FLSW is shaped by a 
stratified socio-economic construct as depicted in the amphitheatrical model, wherein 
different levels of ontological reality interlock like Russian dolls. The outer doll is the 
one that FLSWs experience – that being, the “empirical level” of reality. At this level it 
is quite true to say that FLSW actors’ shape their own experience of the WC stage 
alongside fellow cast members thereupon. 
The middle doll is management who perform for two audiences: the outer doll (workers, 
customer) and the inner doll (higher powers). An understanding of its compromised role 
and the internal pressures that go with it are essential for an understanding of the 
“madness” in the technical box, as it appears to FLSW stage actors. Much of what 
management does is really about pandering to or dealing with the pressures applied by 
real powers (state actors, owners, capitalist rivals), some of which are obscured by 
management’s actual power. 
This brings me to the inner doll where real power resides and lies hidden for the most 
part. The agents who make up this layer occupy structural positions deeply embedded in 
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the socio-economic and ideological fabric of “UK plc” as it is sometimes known.243
This is no banal conspiracy theory, merely a statement of the obvious that wealth and 
power in the UK is highly concentrated244 and WC is no exception to the rule. The 
latent capacity of WC’s base-level “inner-circle” was made clear when “Mr Wine Corp” 
himself was effortlessly deposed by powers that up until that moment few knew of. This 
is hardly surprising because two decades of stable growth meant that it never had to 
reveal itself to the public domain. Figure 50 sets out my understanding of the social 
stratification of amphitheatrical relations in WC as per the preceding argument.  
Afterword: Figures 51-53 
I have condensed a chronology of events (covered in Chapters Five and Six) into a 
series of flow diagrams, in an attempt to draw out the theme of past agency imposing 
present-day limits (i.e. anteriority). A defining “game changing” moment occurred in 
1996 when the company was stock market listed (see Figure 51), although the 
implications did not fully surface until the early 2010s because footprint expansion 
enabled a comfortable pattern of steady growth. After that point diminishing marginal 
returns set in, and DM opted to squeeze internal stakeholders so as to meet market 
expectations and achieve bonus targets. Figure 52 illustrates the “tale of two halves” LF 
era. In the first half investment was increased but was poorly allocated. A consequent 
lack of pay-off then led to external pressures to rein in spending and start delivering 
“bottom line” results, even though the business had not substantively or proportionately 
improved. Due to those pressures LF had little choice but to pile pressure upon FLSWs 
in turn. 
In contrast, Figure 53 condenses the story of continuity and change at store-level. The 
key point is that whilst there was considerable change throughout the period of study, 
the “props” and “stage” remained unchanged asides from a few cosmetic touches. 
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 Pfeffer (2015) makes some interesting remarks along these lines in relation to Amazon and 
Jeff Bezos. The title of the article “Why the Assholes are Winning: Money Trumps All” usefully 





Management’s expectation of performance improvement was therefore akin to 
expecting a race car driver to out-compete the pack whilst refusing to replace the car or 
significantly invest in its improvement. It seems like common sense that competitors 
would catch up and overtake the standard setter of 8-10 years prior in such 
circumstances, especially when rivals have much deeper pockets. 
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Figure 50: The stratification of amphitheatrical relations 
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Figure 51: Interplay of agency and constraints during “classic Wine Corp” and Dan Mitchell eras 
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Figure 52: Interplay of agency and constraints during the Lyle Fisher era 
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Figure 53: Store-level/empirical-level view of Wine Corp continuity and change 
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CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSION 
My research asked what are the forces and factors that shape the experience of frontline 
service work in Wine Corp? Ten years as a “complete participant” put me on the front 
row of that experience as an observer and investigator.245 It also put me “on stage” as a 
fully immersed member of the cast. The unusual duration of the study when combined 
with the analytical tools of CRP have facilitated an original answer to the research 
question; albeit, one that is built upon well-established foundations. Thus, my 
explanatory model of amphitheatrical relations is not so much born of “blue sky 
thinking” but rather an attempt to re-arrange the theoretical furniture so as to better 
accommodate pre-existing insights.  
In relation, amphitheatrical relations sought to bring together the “big picture” of macro 
and meso-level forces and factors with the “small picture” of work experience upon a 
FLSW stage. The former – a loosely connected web of real/actual powers including 
media influencers, “rentier” capitalists, policy makers and institutions under their 
control – was represented as the structural walls in which WC is ensconced. These walls 
are “external,” by which I mean that they exist independently of WC’s internal 
dynamics but have powers and properties that constrain and enable agents inside. Their 
foundations are set in the structural bedrock of the Western political economy which 
WC is a product and reproducer of, as I have attempted illustrate through my analysis of 
the links between “external” and “internal” forces and factors as mediated by 
management. Their structural nesting makes them the most powerful agent acting upon 
“small picture” FLSW relations. 
Hence the power of management was most clearly visible to those who were bounded 
by it – workers and customers. Each has been shown to be subject to the tyranny of 
management (albeit to varying extents and in different senses), who seek to manipulate 
both as factors of production so as to satisfy an agenda moulded by external forces. In 
an elemental sense the role of one is to keep selling and the other is to keep buying. I 
saw little sign of management holding much interest in stage actors beyond ensuring 
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 As a reminder, the formal research period only covered three of these years. 
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that they each played their designated role in the extraction process. Statements to the 
contrary (e.g. “love the customer,” “customer first, customer second”) were rendered 
hollow by the reality of strategies and tactics that boiled down to attempts to either (a) 
ensure “commitment” or “loyalty” amongst buyers/sellers or (b) enhance the value of 
transactions.  
For all of management’s scheming and structural advantage (i.e. governance of the 
“technical box”),246 the limits of its power to “stage manage” were nonetheless exposed 
by the research. A negotiated order prevailed within stores that was an amalgam of 
historical precedent (“how we do it round here”), team-level customs and a mutually 
accepted “grey area.” What made it so was a requirement for “space to manoeuvre” in 
light of the variability of customers and the unpredictability of their wants and needs in 
a high-service/full-service context. This required discretion which in turn unleashed the 
individuality of FLSWs actors on the WC stage. Their personality and the nature of their 
commitment constituted mediating factors in their deployment of that discretion.  
When the many layers of inter-connected yet semi-autonomous reality are brought into 
view, to accept reality as a stratified and multi-tiered phenomenon seems an intuitive 
next step. Thus, my conceptual model as outlined in Chapter Nine sought to provide 
space for human agency on-stage whilst also illustrating the wider web of institutional 
and structural powers that limit and direct it. In my view the model has four main 
strengths. Firstly, as a framework it is easy to understand and could potentially be 
applied to the analysis of a range of experiential phenomena. Secondly, the separation 
of people and parts for analytical purposes is an in-built element of the model – so it 
may be mobilised as a tool in pursuit of “analytical dualism” which Archer (1996) has 
called for. Thirdly, it underlines the significance of space and is alterable in terms of the 
proximity of powerful actors. For example, in a large corporate HQ management may 
share the stage with frontline workers with significant effects upon social relations. 
Fourthly, the notion that “all the world’s a stage” could hardly seem more relevant than 
in the age of “smartphones” and “social media.” In the WC case, FLSW’s were 
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 Section 8 of the Appendix provides an update on how management used its structural power 
and agency in the six months after the completion of this thesis. It provides compelling new 
evidence in support of claims made throughout. 
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encouraged to be active on G+; to build their “profile” on the store page247 and to be 
proactive on Instagram and Twitter. Much of this was unimaginable when WC was born 
and even more so when Goffman’s (1959) Presentation of self in everyday life was first 
published. Understanding modern life through his lens has never seemed timelier. 
The concept of “mass customised” and the Overton Window 
One of the reasons I joined WC and took an interest in the organisation was because it 
appeared to be a “poster child” for quality work and service provision. It also seemed to 
be a relatively rare example of a service organisation offering “good” and “interesting” 
work, that was neither desk-based nor over-specialised. That aside, what appealed to me 
in particular about WC was the promise of “running a small business” and “learning 
from the bottom up.” I was flirting with the idea of an entrepreneurial career path so a 
low-risk taster seemed wise. I also really like wine. 
Looking back what strikes me about my decision making process is how naïve it seems 
in hindsight. Just as customers hoped for the “best of both worlds” in WC – i.e. 
supermarket prices with boutique quality and customised service – I was probably 
hoping for the same in an employer. I was not concerned with finding the best paid 
opportunity (which WC definitely did not offer) but was attracted to the idea of 
developing new skills, working with a “special” product and being “left alone” to run a 
business without bearing the risks of “going solo.”  
Ten years down the road it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Frenkel’s (2006) 
typological framework of the relative upsides and considerable downside of “mass-
customised” service work were highly astute. I can offer little by way of improvement 
(see Figure 2), but what my research does is offer is analytical and empirical insight into 
how and why occupying the middle-ground is both rewarding and punishing as Frenkel 
247
 Each store has its own page on the company’s website. 
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anticipates.248 The main challenge of thriving in the mass-customised middle ground for 
WC was that it proved to have no fixed point. What constituted “the middle” was 
emergent rather than static, much dependent upon the agency of competitors further up 
or down the quality/service spectrum. To complicate things further, “service quality” 
did not have a fixed universal meaning. To some customers this means efficient 
impersonal delivery (e.g. Amazon consistently rates highly for “service quality”249) but 
for others it means the human and personal touch. Hence “service quality” has an 
internal qualitative/quantitative spectrum and trade-offs have to be made between 
qualitative and quantitative emphases (see Korczynski – Chapter Two). 
An interesting related concept is the “Overton window,” which had its origins in the 
work Joseph Overton hence the name. What Overton argued was that the middle ground 
of acceptability is never stationary, it is constantly moving along a sliding scale (see 
Figure 54). As it moves or expands in a given direction, policies that once sat outside 
the window in the direction of its movement become increasingly “acceptable.” It is on 
this basis that proponent of “unacceptable” policies have a vested interest in persuading 
the public to acquiesce to the movement of the window in their favoured direction.250
Once the window has moved then this reflects a “new normal,” with the knock on effect 
of making once unthinkable things seem merely “radical” as those ideas move closer to 
the “middle ground.” 
Overton was talking about public discourse but I would argue that the concept has equal 
value in explaining the challenge of occupying the “mass customised” FLSW middle-
ground in the UK context. In the last decade the powerful lever in moving the Overton 
Window has been the Great Recession and the polarising “austerity” macro-economic 
248
 As a reminder, Frenkel’s typology located “mass-customised” in the middle of a skills/reward 
spectrum between “knowledge work” and “mass-service” work. It offers something of a half-way 






 The CEO of Pure Gym Humphrey Cobbold has drawn upon the Overton Window implicitly by 
arguing that his company strategy was to shift perceptions of what is an appropriate/acceptable 
compromise for middle class consumers between price and quality. He argued that he was 
following the “Premier Inn model” of gaining “classless” acceptability for budget operators. 
Comments made at Retail Week, London, 7-8
th
 March 2018. 
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policy that followed.251 In the realm of wine retail these mutually reinforcing forces 
have had the effect of shifting the “Overton window” down the “low road” in favour of 
“cheap plonk” mass-service model operators.252 What was “unthinkable” before (middle 
class people buying their wine at Aldi or Lidl) became merely radical and progressively 
moved towards “popular” and “normal.” 
Figure 54: The wine retail Overton window 
Setting aside the many internal factors I have discussed throughout the thesis, this 
structurally-embedded shift seems bound to have compromised those in the middle-
ground and the ability of their management to deliver upon progressive promises (see 
Thompson, 2003). In amongst SVM pressure and a general shift in the Overton window 
in the least favourable direction, life “in the middle” appears bound to have become less 
comfortable for WC and its FLSWs.  






 Fitting my position, Huddleston (2011) argued that in the aftermath of the Great Recession 
the whole retail sector has sailed down river towards “low-road” strategies.
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This research is a product of my deployment of agency as a frontline operator, observer 
and ethnographer. It is also an expression of my strengths and weaknesses in enacting 
those roles, and I harbour no illusion that this account is faultless or composed of final 
truths.  In Chapter Eight I flagged up the importance of commitment as a key basis of 
FLSW orientation, and I suspect that commitment-by-type is significant to researchers 
too. My commitment in this endeavour has been to “tell the truth” of life on the 
frontline whilst staying mindful of the inescapability of the Verstehen problem. Some 
may regard a commitment to truth as a “romantic” throwback to a less self-conscious 
age of positivistic assumptions. In response, I can only re-articulate my belief that a 
world exists independent of the researcher’s gaze that is available to study. Whether and 
to what extent my presence created a “Hawthorne effect” is difficult to say, but I would 
argue that my presence in the research setting was of minor significance compared to 
the forces and factors that my thesis has centred upon.  
There are three addition points I wish to make. Whilst in no way denying the centrality 
of the story teller I hope to have made clear that my argument rests upon a systematic 
analysis of a variety of sources. A considerable proportion of the evidence draws upon 
verifiable facts, meaning that some core elements of the story cannot sensibly be 
disputed even if the interpretation can be. The second point I wish to make is that I have 
no tribal allegiances in terms of theory, at least that I am aware of. Through the course 
of this research I have applied numerous theoretical models and conceptual constructs to 
the data, rejecting them only on the basis of the aptness of their fit rather than any pre-
conceived notion of right or wrong. I am confident that I have honoured the spirit and 
substance of the analytical steps identified in Chapter Four.  
A final point I wish to make is that this account has been selective by necessity, 
focusing on a limited selection of the most important forces and factors that shaped the 
experience of FLSW in my view. This is not to say that the list of candidates for 
discussion has been exhausted – quite the opposite, there were a number of themes I 
would have liked to have pursue but deprioritised them to focus on the core themes. 
One of the biggest unexploited windows of opportunity is to synthesis the data in terms 
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of class relations. At a conference earlier in 2018253 I presented a paper on how Wine 
Corp “buys”254 and “sells” class as aspects of its profitable reproduction, which then 
perpetuates whites middle class advantage. I hope to continue on this path as a future 
endeavour whilst also exploring the forces and factors that underpinned an apparent 
gender division in amongst store-level “negotiated orders.” These divisions were along 
predictable lines but exploring how those patterns emerged in relation to personality, 
commitment-by-type and other factors may contribute something useful. Other ideas for 
future endeavours are reviewed in the next section. 
Directions for future research 
A key area of interest going forward is to cross-examine and develop Hochschild’s 
“three stances” on emotional labour (see Figure 1). She highlighted three types of 
responses to management’s attempts to commercialise feelings – those being, 
identifying, distancing and a combination of the two. She also argued that each “stance” 
was accompanied by particular risks (e.g. of burnout, “going robot,”255 etc). As much as 
these patterns were apparent amongst my FLSW cohort I felt that there is more to the 
story. In Chapter Eight I presented two factors that I believe are central to that story, 
although for reasons of space and relative significance I could only really touch upon 
them. A better understanding of how personality and orientations intersect with 
emotions seems both interesting and relevant vis-à-vis stage behaviour and experiences. 
Wharton’s (1993) study provided empirical support for the notion that individual 
personality characteristics mediate emotional labour effects. Deery et al. (2002) also 
highlighted the significance of “personal characteristics” as mediating factors in 
emotional exhaustion amongst FLSWs. Importantly, they identified a link between 
“extroverted” personality types and burnout which is worrying given the pressure that 
WC’s FLSWs are under to enact this type whether it comes naturally or not. 
253
 The International Labour Process conference (ILPC), Buenos Aires, Argentina, March 2018. 
Paper entitled: Locating class in “high end” frontline service work. 
254
 In my view WC’s most consistent recruitment priority was to “buy class.” DM’s explicit 
recruitment policy was to “hire people who remind customers of their children.” This means 
white and middle class by virtue of the customer composition. One store manager explained to 
me WC’s recruitment policy in the following terms: “Are you white? Tick. Are you middle class? 
Tick. You’re in!” 
255
 Van Maanen (1991) – see references. 
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On the topic of types, one of the most interesting to revealed itself in the study was the 
“bleed blue” – a fanatic in the eyes of co-workers. A mystery that remained unresolved 
at the completion of the research was how to explain the phenomena. Whether and to 
what extent there are common threads, shared beliefs and unifying characteristics of 
these “identifiers” (to use Hochschild’s language) strikes me as a fascinating topic.  
Another such topic would be the role of “actor networks” (see Latour, 2005) in shaping 
cultural norms within stores. Several of the managers in Region X were trained by two 
“patriarch” store managers, one of whom remains in the company. My analysis 
suggested that there may be inter-generational transmission of both official and 
unofficial customs and micro-practices (see Fineman & Sturdy, 1999), which then 
disseminate as “norms” as trainees are promoted and dispersed throughout the region. 
An attempt to identify and trace these patterns, seeing whether and to what extent they 
lead to re-negotiation of orders may provide compelling theoretical insights into 
normative behaviour. 
Two final suggestions warrant mention. Firstly, there is a clear need for more research 
into the links between SVM, “you’re on your own” neo-liberal managerialism and 
FLSW experiences.  I am unaware of any other study of FLSW that articulates and 
explores this link as I have, but research elsewhere has highlighted the reverberations of 
“financialisaton” throughout companies with significant effects upon employees (see 
Cushen, 2013; Ezzamel et al., 2008; Widmar, 2011; Baud & Durand, 2011). Cushen 
(2013) for example summarised her ethnography of “Avatar Group” – a large 
knowledge work PLC as follows: 
“In the financialised workplace investors dominate, accounting 
narratives permeate and knowledge workers are not that special 
after all.” 
Thompson (2013; see also Cushen & Thompson, 2016) has been particularly vocal in 
calling for analysis of the links I have sought to trace so as to better understand 
connecting mechanisms between different levels of phenomena.  
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Lastly, there remains a need to develop a better understanding of what “good” FLSW 
looks like256 and what institutional and structural arrangements are conducive to it (see 
Andersson et al., 2011 – Chapter Three). When the LF regime came into WC my hope 
was that it might facilitate a research story of two halves, with a “happy house” back 
end contrasting with a descent-into-bleak house front end (i.e. the latter DM era). As we 
now know history did not play out that way, and the WC study did not yield much 
insight into “happy houses” other than indicating forces and factors that helped or 
hindered. With this in mind I have provided a trait comparison of WC with the two 
examples of happy houses offered in Chapter Three (see Table 18).257 Comparative case 
studies at a sub-sectoral and/or occupational level (see Knox & Warhurst, 2018) may be 
a useful way of further understanding the nature of “good” FLSW experiences, as well 
as the sustainability of models that facilitate it. 
Table 18: Wine Corp Vs “happy houses” 
256
 As suggested by Odul Bozkurt in a stimulating discussion of retail work during feedback to 
my presentation at the ILPC, mentioned above. 
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Section 1: Review of the strengths & weaknesses of ethnography 
This section reflects upon on the methods deployed in pursuit of my research objectives. 
It was written with an intention that it would feature as a section of Chapter Four, but 
was relegated to the appendix to conserve space in the main thesis. I include it here so 
as to illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of my methods in general terms. 
Rather than recite well-known arguments in a de-contextualised way, I have framed the 
discussion as an exploration of work that influenced my approach to data collection and 
analysis. 
Silverman’s (2007) jocular work brings to light many of the advantages of ethnography. 
For example, he draws attention to how it allows us to synthesise the “remarkable in 
unremarkable things” (p.16); to capture unique and/or overlooked aspects of mundane 
life and to “look at things afresh” (p.18). This congruence between “looking at things 
afresh” and ethnography crystallised in Dalton’s (1959) account of managers’ behaviour 
and experience in work, and consequently threw into sharp relief a range of pre-existing 
assumptions about the unit of analysis. Patton & Appelbaum (2003) argue that 
ethnographic studies are adept for the development of individual, organisational, social 
and political insights. This also resonates with Dalton’s achievements in Men Who 
Manage, as it continues to be regarded as an authoritative account on the pervasiveness 
of political dynamics and normative control in work lives (see Hales, 1999). 
Furthermore, the main pillar of Dalton’s work – its detail and depth of description – 
represents another advantage of ethnography. 
However, a strength that was not apparent in Dalton’s essay is the capacity of 
ethnography to provide explanatory frameworks or typologies as I have sought to 
achieve. Mars’ (1982) ethnography of workplace “fiddles” leveraged these capacities to 
a remarkable extent. Based upon a comparative study in several workplaces over ten 
years, Mars developed a typology of fiddles that posited links between job conditions 
and illicit practices. This resulted in workers being labelled as “donkeys, wolves, 
hawks,” and “vultures” (p.29 – see Chapter Seven) so as to express how the structural 
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conditions of certain occupations led to patterns of fiddles characteristic of certain 
species.  
Watson (2011: 204) argues that ethnographic methods are “uniquely able to address 
questions of how things work” including the processes of “cultural learning.” These 
aptitudes in particular enabled Mars to make convincing links between work relations, 
structural conditions and fiddles that seem unlikely to have materialised without 
observation and participation. Indeed, a foremost advantage of ethnography is that it 
avoids some of the problems associated with relying exclusively on interviews (see 
Watson, 2011: 210-213). Noted such examples are the inability of interviewers to 
scrutinise the relationships between point-of-view and actions (Silverman, 2007) and 
identity and actions (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). Conversely, “triangulation of 
methods” is a defining characteristic of ethnography, which serves as a key basis for 
proponents’ consideration of the approach as synonymous with valid findings. Another 
such basis is the degree of integration that researchers apparently achieve, by actively 
participating in the research sphere and accruing trust (Baszanger & Dodier, 1997). 
Again, it does not seem unreasonable to argue that Mars (1982) would have struggled to 
attain such insights without achieving close-up collegial access. 
In summary, Mars’ (1982) achievements were two-fold. Firstly, by developing an 
explanatory framework for patterns of workplace fiddles he may be credited with 
“theory generation” (see Bluhm et al. 2011). Secondly by elaborating upon pre-existing 
anthropological work – in particular that of Mary Douglas (see Mars, 1982: 23-39) – 
Mars may also be credited with “theory elaboration” (Bluhm et al. 2011). Each 
represents an important theoretical justification for ethnographic research, enabling 
those labouring under its auspices to contribute significantly to world knowledge 
despite “inherent scale limits” (Star, 1999: 383). Another form of theoretical 
contribution for which ethnographic studies are suited is theory testing. An outstanding 
example of such was produced by Armstrong (1983), who deployed ethnographic 
techniques to arbitrate over a dispute: are supervisors more appropriately construed as 
members of the proletariat or bourgeoisie? To address this question the author carried 
out participant observations over four months, so as to comprehend the nature of their 
role. He found in favour of the latter, and couched the credibility of his account in thick 
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description and clear analysis of interview data triangulated with first-hand 
observations.  
Weaknesses of Ethnography 
Multiple problems have been cited in relation to ethnography. Projects have been called 
into questioned on the basis they “lack transparency” (Bluhm et al. 2011: 1879); lack 
representativeness and/or failure to provide concrete foundations for generalising; and 
also, because they lack “rigour” in the collection, construction and analysis of empirical 
materials (Patton & Appelbaum, 2003: 62). The most deleterious weakness posited by 
critics is the problem of verstehen, a term that may be loosely defined as “subjective 
understandings.” It is argued that despite the degree of empirical rigour exhibited by 
researchers, findings are ultimately bound by their own interpretations and fundamental 
assumptions (see Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). The implication then is that it is an 
inappropriate vehicle for objective social research and the production of valid insights.  
As Silverman’s (2007: 119-144) discussion highlights, this problem has even led some 
social-constructionists to abandon the pursuit of ideals such as truth altogether, thereby 
conceding the irresolvable nature of the problem and adopting instead an “anything goes 
… motto” (p.138). Silverman however adopts a stance that would resonate with most 
contemporary ethnographers including myself, which advocates the retention of 
naturalist aspirations such as “clarity, reason” and “truth” despite their problematic 
nature.  
The ontology underpinning ethnography – or assumptions about what type of things 
exist (Ackroyd & Fleetwood, 2000: 6) – is fundamentally incongruent with “strong 
social constructionism” (Reed, 2005: 22). This is because the solipsism and relativism 
of the latter belies a social world out there that may be studied systematically and 
validly. However, constructionists’ critique has nonetheless incurred greater reflexivity 
on the part of mainstream ethnographers such as Watson (2001). His major work In 
Search of Management features many elements in common with Dalton (above) in 
terms of settings, questions, and access acquired. Yet a significant divergence occurs in 
their respective analytical approaches. Whereas Watson is at pains to explain his 
interpretation of given data – to present alternative possible interpretations, and to 
integrate himself as “co-constructor” – the “researcher’s hand” (Watson, 2001: 6) was 
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largely concealed by Dalton. Consequently, the former enhances the reader’s ability to 
evaluate researcher-role, perhaps mitigating the effects of verstehen by accentuating 
foundational assumptions.  
Another strong example of mitigating the weaknesses of ethnography is evident in 
Maitlis’ (2005) work. What differentiates her account is the rarefied degree of rigour 
and transparency with which the methods section is constructed (pp.22-30); each stage 
of the project from conception to execution to analysis is outlined in succinct detail. 
Maitlis’ work also exhibits several key features that are perceived as “best practice” for 
qualitative research (see Bluhm et al. 2011: 1873) including “accuracy checks; counting 
the countables; longitudinal design; a strong theoretical foundation, and triangulation” 
(ibid. – see also Chapter Four). This meticulousness appears to mitigate the perceived 
dangers of researcher bias, thus enhancing the likelihood of valid findings. It also 
provides an exemplary template for how ethnographers may systematise their research 
as a bulwark against those eager to question the conscientiousness of non-quantitative 
research. 
A final noteworthy attribute of Maitlis (2005) is the form of generalisations made. 
Maitlis utilises a typological matrix to hypothesise likely outcomes of range of 
conditions that are likely to arise in a broad range of similar circumstances and contexts. 
Such qualitative generalisations are commonly referred to as “analytical” (Patton & 
Appelbaum, 2003) or “descriptive” (Watson, 2001) so as to differentiate them from the 
formal generalisations synonymous with quantitative research. This type of 
generalisation may equip ethnographic research with wider implications and resonance 
beyond the particular case. 
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Section 2: “The plan” for “Wine Corp 2.0” as stipulated by management 
The plan (1/4): Improving the experience 
379 
The plan (2/4): Improving the product offer 
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The plan (3/4): “Making it easier” 
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The plan (4/4): “People” (aka human resources) 
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Section 3: The spectrum of frontline service work behaviour in Wine Corp – annotated 
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Section 5: Request for demographic data 
Email to senior figure in the People Department: 
On Fri, 18 Jan 2019 at 10:40, Martin James < > wrote: 
Dear [Zoe],
You may not have heard of me or my PhD thesis but I was granted access by 
senior management during the [Dan Mitchell] and [Lyle] eras to carry out 
longitudinal ethnography of the experience of store work. My PhD thesis passed 
the viva examination in December 2018 but there were some suggestions by 
the examiners for additional data in the final submission, mainly as 
background/contextual information. 
I should add that my coach [Daisy Bouchard] recommended you as the best 
person to contact. I currently work for [WC] part-time in the [Canalside] store, 
174. I first joined [WC]in 2009. 
The examiners recommended the following information be added: 
1) % store staff turnover for each year discussed in the thesis, ideally 2009-
2018. 
2) Average tenure for store staff, in other words how long the average store 
worker stays in the company. Again, year-by-year change data (2009-2018) 
would be ideal, if it's available. 
3) Composition of store staff by gender and ethnicity: % male Vs female & 
proposition of white-British employees throughout the study period. 
I do not know the extent to which this data has been collected and retained but 
it would be a huge help if you could provide it or direct me in its collection and 
collation. 
To be clear, my study is anonymised and all the actors (including [WC] itself) 
are given pseudonyms. The study observers all aspects of the code of ethics as 
outlined by the British Sociological Association and American Sociological 
Association.  
As mentioned this data is not a feature of the analysis. It is background data 
that will be added to the methods chapter. 
If the data is not available then this would be useful information in itself so 
please let me know. 
If it is easier to talk on the phone then please feel free to phone on  
. 
Kind regards, Martin James. 
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Response 1: 
From: [Zoe]  < > 
Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 at 11:38 
Subject: Re: Request for basic information to complete PhD 
To: Martin James < > 
Hi Martin,  
Apologies for the delayed response, we are currently a little light on resource! 
Exciting stuff about your PHD - super interesting! Do you have any written 
consent from [Dan]/[Lyle] for this project? 
Some of the date we have some we may not, in the process of transitioning into 
a data led people team currently. We will see what we can do, 
Thanks 
[Zoe] 
Response 2:  
From: [Zoe] < > 
Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2019 at 15:41 
Subject: Re: Request for basic information to complete PhD 
To: Martin James < > 
Hey Martin,  
Can you leave this with me, we are currently undergoing a lot of transformation 
in the team so we can get this sort of data moving forward, we may be able to 
get none, some or all- we will keep you posted! 
Thanks 
[Zoe]  
p.s high fives on the phd- very impressive and must be lots of hard work! 
Response 3 (after some pestering around the time of my departure from WC): 
From: [Zoe] < > 
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 at 10:57 
Subject: Re: Request for basic information to complete PhD 
To: Martin James < > 
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Hi Martin, 
Soory to hear you are leaving, and apologies I have not been able to provide 
the information you need, it is a bad time for us with low resource and us 
currently undergoing projects so we can report on this data quickly, 




Section 6: The operational side of frontline service work in Wine 
Corp 
INVENTORY 
Stock take Physically counting all store stock. 
Stock adjustments Using EPOS to align stock levels in store and 
on the system. 
Receiving & counting direct orders Checking that physical stock received matched 
the invoice. 
Stock additions Adding direct order inventory to EPOS. 
Merchandising (aka “box opening”) A rolling task, the WC equivalent of 
replenishing shelves in a supermarket. 
Drop Merchandising pallets of stock onto the shop 
floor. 
Drop adjustments Aligning stock actually received on EPOS 
with anticipated numbers, as stated on the 
drop sheet. 
Stock runs Acquiring stock from other stores to satisfy 
customer needs. A given store also received 
stock runs. At both ends stock needed to be 
“pulled,” checked and stored. 
Stock requirements Lists needed to be maintained of stock needs, 
to ensure that customer orders were satisfied 
in accordance with agreements (e.g. for 
deliveries on certain days). Stock runs (see 
above) and webstore (see below) provided last 
resort but expensive options. 
Webstore Requests for stock were required to be 
executed and monitored, with an expectation 
of a 48 hour delivery window. 
Webwines WC stores provided “click + collect” services 
for WebWines customers. These had to be 
processed using WebWines’ electronic 
interface. 
Write-offs Products used (in support of sales) and 
shrinkage had to be recorded on a rolling 
basis, to avoid wide discrepancies between 
EPOS and actual stock. 
Returns and refunds Given that WC loaned out auxiliaries and 
operated a “no quibbles” returns policy, a 
large volume of sold stock was returned. 
These returns had to be checked (to ensure 
correct quantities & re-sellable conditions), 
inputted into EPOS and re-merchandised into 
stock holdings. 
WC also offered a free collection service, 
meaning that FLSWs had to pick up as well as 
drop off. Quality service expectations 
mutually applied here. 
Date rotation Beers and ciders are perishable whilst the 
majority of WC’s wines were not for aging. 
WC FLSWs had to rotate stock to ensure that 
older stock sold first. This added considerable 
time to merchandising. 
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Sales transfers Sales transfers from other stores had to be 
manually inputted item by item, making them 
very time consuming. This ensured that stock 
levels were adjusted on the tills. 
The quickest way to do these was to take 
pictures of invoices (with delivery notes 
written on them) and send them to the 
delivering store. They would then input the 
identical sale and sell it to “other” on the 
EPOS payment screen. The originating store 
would then refund it to “other” and HQ would 
match up the two ends for accounting 
purposes. 
Petty cash Purchases had to be made, processed through 
EPOS and recorded for monitoring purposes. 
The budget (£50 per month for a smaller store) 
was typically used to support sales and store 
welfare (tea, coffee, cleaning products). 
Office equipment WC had an exclusive office supplier so orders 
had to be placed with them to keep stores 
operational.  
DELIVERIES (AKA “dels”) 
Picking orders Rounding up and boxing up (if necessary) 
products and then grouping them together as 
delivery runs. 
Scheduling/route planning Balancing the meeting of customers’ delivery 
requirements and expectations with time 
efficient and cost effective routes. All 
customers had to be contacted in advance via 
phone or email. 
There was no bespoke software for this 
purpose. Staff typically inputted post codes 
into Google maps manually as part of the run 
planning process. 
Order checking The gold standard was to triple check orders 
going out for delivery. One person did the first 
pick, another checked and a final person 
checked and loaded onto and off of the van at 
store and destination. 
Order labelling Delivery errors were a lot less likely if each 
individual box is labelled. There was no 
automated system for this, so each box was 
written on by hand. 
Delivery execution A WC FLSW had to carry the right products 
in the right quantities “across the threshold” 
into customers’ properties.  
The service proposition was significant here 
because there was a mutual expectation of 
skilled delivery. Customers had various wants 
and needs and some deliveries may have had 
hundreds of products spread across multiple 
invoices. At peak time 25+ orders may have 
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been loaded onto the van for a single run, 
making it easy to make mistakes that could 
prove expensive and time consuming, not to 
mention costly in reputational terms and 5* 
feedback. 
Maintaining a paper trail Orders had to be accepted and signed for. It 
provided proof of delivery; sometimes 
customers would challenge store teams on 
whether they had received their order in full. 
On rare occasions this would be weeks or even 
months after the fact. 
Filing All sales related paperwork was stored in the 
“period box.” 12 months’ paperwork would be 
retained. 
Webstore (2) Deliveries had to be “moved through the 
system” online and recorded as “complete.” 
There was also a paper system (the “del” 
folder”) that had to be monitored and 
administered on a rolling basis. 
CLEANING, MAINTENANCE, 
SECURITY 
Alarms Had to be activated and deactivated at the 
beginning and end of each day. 
Closing down procedure  Each store had its closing down routine. Signs, 
windmasters and trolleys had to be brought 
into store; tasting counter wines needed to be 
chilled; gates, security doors, etc., had to be 
closed and/or locked; the “shutters” had to be 
put down. 
When a store opened many of these steps had 
to be done in reverse. A careful opening or 
closure took circa-20 minutes. 
Cash up The till had to be counted every night prior to 
closing. Discrepancies had to be investigated 
in advance of HQ enquires. 
Banking We were advised to bank cash from payments 
“2 or 3 times per week.” 
As a stand-alone round trip, it took a FLSW 
roughly half an hour from Canalside. 
Sweeping & mopping Clean shop floors were a “non-negotiable” in 
WC stores. The kitchen and toilet (see below) 
also needed to be kept presentable and 
hygienic. 
Dusting Removing cobwebs and cleaning shelving 
units for fine wine, spirits, Champagnes, 
French wine, WIGIGs, etc. 
Tasting counter Glasses had to be washed; wines had to be 
maintained and monitored for deterioration; 
wines had to be selected and written-off; 
surfaces had to be maintained. 
Sales counter Needed to be kept tidy and organised for the 
purposes of sales support. 
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Car park Had to be cleared of leaves in autumn and 
litter all year round. 
Car parks also had to be monitored for abuses, 
given that some stores were located in areas 
where free parking was scarce. Some WC 
stores had automated “eye in the sky” car park 
monitoring. None of the stores in my sample 
did, meaning that FLSWs had to deal with 
abusers themselves.  
This occasionally led to threats and other 
forms of staff abuse. I was a victim of this on 
a handful of occasions.  
Kitchen & toilets Both were used by FLSWs and customers so 
required upkeep. The kitchen and its basic 
amenities were used to prepare food for wine 
events, carrying public health and safety 
implications. 
Store van(s) Required regular maintenance given their 
heavy use. Insurance was covered by a 
company-wide policy but general upkeep was 
the responsibility of stores.  
HQs set weekly and monthly van checks as a 
standard expectation of store teams. Both 
featured 20-30 checks which had to be carried 
out and then submitted online. 
Fire alarm checks To be carried out weekly. It was a manual 
process of inserting keys into active sensors to 
ensure that they activated. 
SALES SUPPORT 
Wine events These had to be scheduled and coordinated 
with rotas. Food, wines and support materials 
(e.g. handouts, tasting notes) had to be 
prepared. The sales floor had to be prepared 
with tasting stations or whatever else the 
occasion requires. 
Sales were taken during and after events so 
these had to be processed and scheduled. 
Stores had to be returned to their usual state 
after events, necessitating a tidy-up and clean 
down. 
Some events were paid for so staff had to 
ensure payment and monitor for “freeloaders.” 
“POS-ing up” Given that price tickets hung on bottles - 
attached only by pieces of string - they often 
went missing. A POS on all products was an 
important non-negotiable. 
Replacing a POS meant printing it out onto 
card (templates of all POS were available on 
the intranet) then manually cutting it out and 
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mounting it. This could be time consuming if a 
large number of POS went missing, as 
occurred during busy seasons. 
Promotions Posters and marketing material had to be kept 
up-to-date in support of commercial drives. 
These were displayed both inside and outside 
of stores. 
“Dump stacks” were also changed regularly to 
ensure that promotions featured prominently 
and were accessible.  
All of the stores I worked in had a promotions 
folder containing marketing bulletins and 
promotional updates. The former could be 30-
40 pages long, covering seasonal trading 
cycles. The Christmas bulletin was in the 
region of 100 pages long in LF era. 
Miscellaneous admin 
Phone calls Numerous calls were made for trivial reasons 
unconnected to sales. Many callers were not 
customers at all and considerable proportions 
were automated diallers. 
Calls to stores went to stores whereas other 
retailers (e.g. Tesco) route callers through call 
centres, effectively vetting them. In contrast, 
any and all calls were FLSWs responsibility in 
WC. It was surprising how many concerned 
the most basic of information (e.g. opening 
hours) that was available elsewhere. 
Emails The issues that applied to phone calls also 
applied to email. Stores’ email addresses and 
other contacted details were easily accessible 
online.  
This meant that they were used by a wide 
variety of human and automated entities. 
These had to be sifted and sorted. 
Commercially and operationally significant 
messages required replies from FLSWs. 
Product recalls These happen relatively often (at least several 
a year at a guess). In the least products had to 
be taken off sale. Sometimes it was specific lot 
numbers that had to be removed from sale, 
requiring FLSWs to inspect boxes or even 
individual bottles to minimise shrinkage and 
inconvenience to customers. 
“Weekly tasks” HQ distributed a weekly task list. It was a list 
of literal tick boxes with instructions like 
“complete price change by 31st” or “Chicago 
Bay goes onto promotion Thursday (lasts until 
Monday close of play).” 
In essence it was a reminder list that covered 
numerous operational requirements. 
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Section 7: Over-social customers & anti-social customers – 
examples and elaboration 
Mr Greystone - Bar fly & Monopolist 
This individual was one of our most regular visitors in Canalside. He drove a distinctive 
car, meaning that his arrival would always be recognised by FLSWs. Usually this would 
lead to one or more FLSWs fleeing in different directions to hide away, leaving the 
slowest to react with the burden of service and conversation. Dread of Mr Greystone 
was part of the store’s satire and there was some innuendo around the question of what 
he wanted besides wines from certain FLSWs. This related to the store manager who Mr 
Greystone liked in particular, although he had gotten to know the name of all store staff 
and would ask after them on days off. On one occasion when I was on my own he asked 
“where’s Wayne” (the store manager), and soon after followed up with “where’s the 
kids?” – a reference to my younger colleagues. On one occasion Wayne hid in the small 
back area for roughly 45 minutes to avoid having to talk to Mr Greystone. 
Mr Greystone spent £1000-£2000 per annum but he would only make purchases once in 
a handful of visits. On other visits he would attempt to hold court on the tasting counter, 
vocally sharing his opinions with staff and fellow customers. He seemed to take 
pleasure in writing off wines as “crap,” “rubbish,” or saying things like “I wouldn’t pay 
a fiver for that (if the wine was +£10, for example). 
His constant critique was one of the reasons staff swerved to avoid him; I personally 
avoided recommending wines due to the high likelihood he would complain about them 
on his next visit and/or return the bottle half consumed. His volume of returns and 
colonisation of staff time made me suspect that he was not a profitable customer, 
although it was too complicated to calculate. On some level my colleagues appeared to 
share this suspicion because there was team-wide indifference to whether we kept him 
as a customer, and Wayne was sometimes overtly rude in the view of the rest of us. 
These breaches of etiquette were relatively subtle but not to the extent that they would 
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be missed by onlookers. He would tell Mr Greystone off for interrupting him as an 
example, or would needlessly contradict him in front of other customers.  
What ultimately separated Mr Greystone from the bulk of “ordinary” customers  was 
the frequency of his visits, the length of his stays and the expectation of special 
treatment. Staff were reluctant to award special treatment because they took displeasure 
in doing so. 
Mr Rigetti - Monopolist 
Conceptually each of these types relate to a pattern of behaviour. Those labelled 
“monopolists” are those who repeatedly attempted to colonise FLSWs’ time, leading to 
their discomfort. It was not just regular customers who exhibited these types of 
behaviours though; some one-off customers were capable of producing a “masterclass” 
that was so abnormal that it would become part of store folklore. 
One such example was the visit of Mr Rigetti, who by happenstance visited our store at 
the exact moment an evening Customer Invite Tasting was due to commence. At the 
time Customer Invite Tastings featured 10% additional discount for purchases on the 
night so they were very well attended. On that evening we expected and received 
around 120 guests, turning the store into something akin to a controlled explosion of 
customers. The majority arrived soon after the session started at 18:30. 
It was against this backdrop that Mr Rigetti’s behaviour was so unusual, in that he had 
an incredible knack of pretending that none of this was happening - carrying on as if he 
was the only customer in the store. As he walked in he commandeered the store 
manager and began talking him through an extensive list of questions and requirements. 
Mr Rigetti wanted and expected the “full works” of WC’s personal service proposition 
which seemed delusional and bizarre in the context. Most “normal” customers would 
see that they had picked a bad time and volunteer to come back some other time in my 
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experience. To the store manager’s amazement as well as my own, Mr Rigetti pressed 
his agenda  regardless and took up around 50 minutes of the manager’s time. The rest of 
us had to rally around the manager’s abandonment of his post so to some extent, all 
attendees were affected by the blinkered behaviour of one customer. 
This story was retold amongst us on numerous occasions, perhaps as an expression of 
disbelief at the lack of self-awareness customers can exhibit. It was told as an example 
of a “tasting gone wrong” too because we lacked for the spare bodies to deal with a 
“difficult (regular) customer” should one present themselves. If the manager had known 
how much time Mr Righetti would ultimately take up then he would have told him to 
“fuck off and come back another time” as he latterly explained. Once he had committed 
however, he felt obliged to see the sale/service encounter through. 
Mr Harvey - Special Friend 
Now retired, Mr Harvey spent much of his career working in the wine industry and 
enjoyed regaling us with tales of his trips to wine regions. It was clear that he was 
authentically knowledgeable about wine, especially those from the “classic regions” of 
France, Italy and Spain. He liked to tell stories about famous wines he had purchased 
for fractions of their modern day costs. Some such wines he would occasionally gift to 
staff. Just prior to my resignation from WC, he left us with a bottle of Port with a 
current market value of around £80. 
Unlike Mr Greystone (above) Mr Harvey was friendly in his demeanour and far more 
diplomatic in his appraisals of wines on the tasting counter. He was therefore more 
warmly embraced than Mr Greystone although there was typically a collective sigh 
upon his arrival nonetheless. Perversely, it was his very friendliness and generosity that 
was resented because it imposed upon FLSWs a pressure to reciprocate with their time 
and emotional energy. On a slower day this may be a relative pleasure, and I do recall 
Wayne in particularly seeming to genuinely enjoy time on the tasting counter with Mr 
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Harvey. On numerous other occasions it would be a burden though, due to the nature of 
the day and/or the mood of FLSWs present. 
Mr Cole – Mr Big  
Another example of an extraordinary customer was Mr Cole who had become the arch 
nemesis of store manager Dean. Dean’s account was that Mr Cole had had a problem 
with a delivery and phoned the store to complain. During that phone call Mr Cole 
apparently grew irate and critical before shifting to abusive and expletive language. The 
main line of critique was how “shit” Dean was as a manager and how much better the 
previous manager had been. 
Given the professed extent of Mr Cole’s grievances it seemed reasonable to expect that 
he would take his business elsewhere, either to another company or another store. Two 
were less than 20 miles away, and would deliver free of change to a high-spending 
customer like Mr Cole. Peculiarly though Mr Cole opted to remain a customer of 
Canalside, possibly for the sadistic reason that he enjoyed tormenting somebody who 
had made himself an enemy. Whilst this claim may sound extreme the evidence was the 
very fact that he remained a customer and waged a proxy war on Dean in the meantime. 
He did this by attacking him indirectly through his staff, explaining to them his view 
Dean’s incompetency and inadequacy. I discovered this long-running feud when a co-
worker returned from a delivery to Mr Cole and Dean joked “did he say anything about 
me?” She responded “oh God he LOVES you,” to which Dean responded “he HATES 
me!” [laughing]. It was at this point he told the forgoing story which then rolled on until 
Dean’s (unrelated) departure from the company. 
Old Majors amongst the ranks 
Review of the data set revealed that old majors did not stand out as characters in the 
way that some other types described do. Old majors represented the “old school” 
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backbone of WC’s loyal customer base (see Chapter Five), who were in all likelihood at 
the high points of their careers in the 80s and 90s when they first became customers. 
They were now comfortably retired, residing in affluent “exurb” villages near market 
towns like Canalside. As professionals they were part of the elite and they remained so 
as retirees, judging by the size and comfort of their residencies. I say this as a delivery 
driver of ten years, one who spent much of that time seeing “how the other half live[d].” 
A paradoxical part of the Old Major’s character make-up was impatience, which was 
ironic given their lack of care responsibilities or full time work.258 These people are 
amongst the relative few who enjoy “a life of leisure,” but they nonetheless had a 
pronounced ability to make you feel like you were a burden on their time. One of the 
ways they did this was to close down the space for you to talk, interrupting you mid-
sentence or mid-flow. As examples: 
Colleague: [talking] 
Customer: [interrupting, sounding unduly burdened] “…I just 
want a decent Claret!”
------------------ 
Colleague: [explaining our policy of opening wines on the 
tasting counter] 
Customer: [interrupts, snapping] “Can I try it or not!?” 
------------------ 
Either of these examples may be imagined amongst various types of people but in the 
case of Old Majors such actions correspond with an expectation of servitude, probably 
on generational as well as wealth/status grounds. What made them stand out was less 
about what they said and more about how they said it and what it conveyed about 
258
 I knew this through getting to know many during a decade in the company. 
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relative socio-economic positioning. This led Old Majors to regard their time as more 
valuable than staffs’ despite their relative abundance of it. 
Another trait of Old Majors (as implied in the main text) was an irritability in response 
to complexity and bureaucracy – bearing in mind that even “personal service” providers 
functioned on the basis of impersonal rules and practical norms. A major bugbear of Old 
Major’s was “small print” T&Cs which they appeared disproportionately to challenge or 
contest. Some of the most common examples related to discount vouchers: 
“Can I use this even though it’s a little out of date” 
---------- 
“Can I use this one [voucher] to pay for this and the other 
[voucher] to pay for that.” 
---------- 
“I’ve got a voucher at home but I didn’t bring it…” 
If challenged they could be awkward; once I witnessed a rejected Old Major enact a 
peculiar stand-in protest, the equivalent of a sit in protest but without the sitting part. 
Instead he slouched over the sales counter, neither saying nor doing anything asides 
creating confusion amongst staff. He was asked “what do you want to do” repeatedly 
[i.e., buy the goods within the voucher rules or refrain from going ahead with the 
purchase] and the customer did not respond, as if stunned into indecision by an 
expectation of compliance. After what seemed like an inordinate amount of time he 
opted to buy the goods, although he mumbled a number of complaints as he 
begrudgingly closed the transaction. It seemed like time was weaponised in this 
dynamic, but the customer was first to blink. 
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Fear of awkwardness and embarrassment was a significant motivating factor when 
dealing with Old Majors.259 For most of us “playing along” with feigned deference was 
the easiest way to process such customers, whereas challenging role expectations could 
result in discomfort that was not commensurate with probable gains. In the words of 
Bolton and Houlihan (2005: 699) it was almost always better to let this variety of 
“mythical sovereign” have their way.  
259
 The normative effect of fear of embarrassment was a key theme in Goffman’s work, as 
discussed in Chapter Two. 
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Section 8: Sold out. My final six months in Wine Corp 
I continued as an employee of WC for six months after the completion of the first draft 
of this thesis, in September 2018. By the end of the following February I had new 
opportunities opening up and was at the end of my tether with the store manager, 
making it time to move on. I submitted my notice at that point and began working the 
one month notice period.  
As coincidence had it, I ended up leaving the company exactly one week prior to a 
major announcement, leading to suspicion amongst former colleagues that I knew it was 
coming. It seemed too coincidental to be coincidental, although I had no idea of the 
timing or the specifics of the announcement. I soon discovered that none of my inside 
contacts knew before I did, even though I only found out myself from news feed. 
The announcement was that LF and his coterie were putting the WC brand and its 200+ 
stores up for sale, moving the “reverse takeover” towards a bizarre conclusion of “old 
WC” being disposed of. What started out as the tail wagging the dog had become the 
tail eating the dog then attempting to throw away the carcass.  Management did not 
especially care about the manner of the disposal because their only concern was to 
“release capital” to fund the growth of WebWines. As LF explained once the news 
broke: 
“We are open to any permutation of sale, from someone buying 
the whole business through to people wanting to buy a number of 
stores.” 
A respected industry analyst continued: 
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“If no one does step up, then the [old WC] business will be run 
down, the name dropped, and what remains of it subsumed into 
[WebWines], the online business that is part of the same group.” 
Email exchanges with former colleagues revealed a dual sense of shock, in the first 
instance because they could not believe it was happening and in the second because they 
had not seen it coming. One colleague responded in those exact words: “Some might say 
how did we not see it coming?” Another colleague responded in a more tongue-in-cheek 
way, saying “it’s almost as if you knew! You obviously have your finger on your pulse. 
I’ll probably be joining you as a [employee of another organisation].” 
In making the announcement LF had to perform a balancing act between justifying the 
decision to stakeholders (especially investors) and talking up the value of the soon-to-be 
relinquished assets. He did this by emphasising how “we are doing this from a position 
of strength … WC is still growing even in a very tough market … it just happens 
WebWines is growing faster.” Both of these latter statements are true, but what they fail 
to intimate is the extent to which a self-fulfilling prophesy contributed to the disparity in 
growth. WebWines was comparatively smaller than “old WC” and operated in more 
markets, meaning that it had more growing space and required comparatively small 
amounts of revenue growth to secure impressive sounding percentage growth. That then 
justified “agnostic” channelling of investment funds into the “rapid growth” portion of 
the company’s portfolio, which would then grow faster than the other portions as a 
result. Superior growth rates then justified the investment patterns that produced them. 
It would require a forensic accountant to “follow the money” in granular detail but one 
is not necessary to understand the broad strokes. In each year since the takeover the 
holding company’s surplus was increasingly channelled into Webwines as revealed by 
annual statements. In 2018 it was announced that “investment” in Webwines (i.e., the 
amount spent on advertising and marketing) would grow to £26m p/a in the next 
financial year. Over three years that would equate to almost half of the market 
capitalisation of the present concern, speaking to the scale of investment in WebWines. 
By comparison “old WC” had been badly mismanaged when the tap was turned on, 
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which then justified a resource diet. Throughout both phases management blamed slow 
growth on anyone and everything but themselves.260 Away from the media spotlight 
they synchronously waged an ideological propaganda campaign against their own 
FLSWs whilst attempting to institutionalise the “Meritocracy” system of belief. What 
management demanded and expected was “instantiation” – that is, an instantaneous 
feedback loop between “better” performances and “better numbers.” In light of the 
damage done to the brand by the previous regime and the further damage inflicted by 
“Webwinesification” (see below), such an expectation bordered on obscene in my view. 
As was stated at the end of Chapter Six and throughout Chapter Nine I am not 
attempting to develop an overly simplistic “it’s all management’s fault” counter-
argument. There were powerful external forces and factors shaping “old WCs” malaise 
that cannot fairly be laid at LF’s doorstep. It was and is nonetheless true that as the 
unassailable master of the “technical booth” - with unilateral power over the levers of 
control for a period the length of a US Presidential term – LF had far more sway over 
the destiny of “old WC” than any other internal actor(s). 
Doing some basic maths, I discovered that even at its lowest ebb in the late DM era “old 
WC” was still valued (by the market) at circa £215m in February 2015. Soon after it 
bought Webwines for £70m, which has grown since (for reasons set out above) making 
it reasonable to believe that its value remains at least constant. Once £70m (the value of 
WebWines at point of purchase) is deducted from the current market capitalisation it 
gives us a crude current value estimate of £120 million for pre-WebWines WC. In short, 
the market values “old WC” at roughly £100m less after four years of LF than after the 
final negative growth year of Dan Mitchell. It is hard not to wonder why. 
It barely needs stating that the high street has hardly become a better/safer investment 
prospect in the last four years, but it is easy to forget that the high street’s long-term 
viability was anything but certain in 2015. At the time I was working for the Welsh 
Government on the Vibrant & Viable Places regeneration programme, aimed at 
breathing new life into decimated shopping districts and urban communities. In 2012, 
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 Their favourite euphemism was “headwinds” as a reference to external forces and factors. 
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Mary Portas had been charged with “saving the high street” and three years earlier, 
countless household names went into administration during the recession (see Chapter 
Five). Upon consideration then, the demise of the high street and the online shift is 
neither an original challenge nor narrative. 
I cannot pretend to be able to provide a verifiable and complete explanation for the 
aggregate behaviour of “the market” but I do believe that the inside story of “old WC’s” 
demise is captured throughout this thesis. As said, the internet was hardly new in the run 
up to 2013/14 when WC’s profits peaked and its rivals went out of business. Around that 
time and for reasons I sought to explain in Chapter 6 Part A, WC lost its mojo and 
momentum. LF was bought in to recover these but it was always likely to be a tall order. 
Nevertheless, his solution was to transplant the WebWines model onto WC which 
alienated and offended many traditional WC customers, as discussed in Chapter Seven. 
More astute industry observers came to the same conclusions as the following analysis 
indicates:261
“So what big ideas did [LF] have for [Wine Corp]? Over the 
last four years we have seen the company slowly [WebWines]-
ified. Its press releases got sharper and more agenda-setting. Its 
language has taken on a matey tone that appeals to some but 
grates on anyone who would rather speak to a customer service 
department than a customer happiness team. A lot of energy 
went into increasing customer and staff engagement – for 
example: more focus on tasting; a new “wine concierge 
service”; an online ratings system and a “franchise-light” 
programme to incentivise managers… 
For me, the problem was the wines. My hit rate at [WC] tastings 
began to tank. It wasn’t that they were terrible – not usually, 
anyway – more that too many were insipid, or easily beatable 
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 Taken from a feature article in a national broadsheet, soon after the announcement of the 
sale of “old WC.” 
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elsewhere, and so impossible to recommend. I knew things were 
bad when my dad – a diehard [WC] customer – shelled out for a 
Wine Society membership.” 
It seems reasonable to ask how and why such a deterioration in wine quality ties into the 
thesis. With her usual astuteness the commentator answered this question for me, albeit 
with a degree of subtlety: 
“In its new incarnation, [WC] went big on own-label: buyer 
[Victoria Crookshank] recently told a conference that around 
half of [WC’s] wine is now “private label”. What does that 
mean? In [WebWines]-speak it means “exclusive” wines. In 
reality, anyone can have wine made or blended to order to 
ensure no one else has exactly the same thing … The problem is 
“exclusive” doesn’t necessarily mean better – though it does 
mean the customer can’t run a price comparison to check they’re 
getting the best deal.” 
LF’s regime prized “exclusives” in part because they obscured true worth as the author 
suggests, enabling the extraction of higher profits by depriving customers of 
straightforward bases of comparison and valuation. WC’s FLSWs were pressured to sell 
exclusives and own-label via “Meritocracy” exactly because they carried higher margins 
than well established brands. We were advised against selling the latter for the sole 
reason that they offered “crap margins,”262 although it went without saying that 
profitability ought not to feature in a sales pitch. Pressure to sell the best margins (rather 
than the best pound-for-pound products) laid naked the mythical nature of “customer 
first” in LF’s WC. 
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 These were the exact words of a regional director who provided general guidance around the 
time of the implementation of “Wine Corp 2.0” (see Chapter Six Part B). In a day to day sense it 
was store managers who applied the pressure to sell “exclusives”, although it was 
institutionalised through “Meritocracy.” This made the sale of “exclusives” one of the four KPI’s 
that would lead to stores being designated as “nailing” (at best) or “failing” at worst. 
Management explicitly reserved the right to dismiss managers of failing stores. 
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In the article that I quoted from above, the author made extensive reference to the 
disingenuousness and superficiality of the Webwines model that LF and his lieutenants 
sought to superimpose onto “old WC.” A thorough illustration of this would require 
quoting the article in full but her sentiments are contained in the following passage:   
“I kept meaning to write a general state-of-affairs piece about 
[WC] and talked to its retail & managing director –[Ron Potter] 
… [Potter] talked a lot about ‘the heavy lifting’ that had been 
going on within the business to ‘build the foundations’ … [Potter 
continued]‘There’s a lot of talk – is the high street dead? I see 
only opportunities. Shopping’s never been better.’ But I couldn’t 
shake the feeling that I was missing the real story, so I never 
wrote the piece.” 
The author was proven right: in March 2019 it was revealed in a conference call with 
investors that the divestment of “old WC” had been in the pipeline for eighteen months, 
dating its conception to around October 2017. For the year and a half since management 
had done the rounds telling anybody who would listen about their “excitement” about 
the “opportunities” in high street retail. It is now clear that they were secretly preparing 
to offload the business throughout the period.  
Happenings on the inside made the “real story” even more blatant with hindsight – 
hence my colleagues’ remark (above) “some might say how did we not see it coming?”
A common conviction heard around Christmas 2018 was “I don’t think they
[management] are bothered anymore.” It felt to me like the lame duck period at the end 
of a political administration, with the executive disappearing from view and no “vote 
winners” coming down the pipeline. The only exception to the rule was some radical 
experimentation with new store formats and aesthetics in isolated locales. This was 
clearly the road-testing of management’s hidden-in-plain-sight plan to roll out 
Webwines either alongside “old WC” (after a buyer was found) or as its replacement. 
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In the conference call just mentioned an investment analyst asked LF to explain the 
dramatic volte-face, abandoning the high street after a continuous and zealous stream of 
contrary rhetoric up until that point. The gall of LF’s response is perhaps worthy of 
admiration: he said “we’ve felt an obligation to the WC staff to give the strategic plan 
the runway. To let them implement it and see what happens ...” Here LF insinuates that 
his role was little more than that of patient backseat passenger, which is perhaps one of 
the finest examples of “role distancing” I have encountered throughout my WC journey. 
Little by way of detective work was required to identify the main beneficiary of WC’s 
last four years though; it just so happened to be the person who was at the controls the 
whole time. As the same industry analyst (above) remarks:  
“Read [WC’s] accounts and you notice that one independent guy 
who seems to have done rather well for himself is [LF]. While 
his package seems modest, in CEO terms, at £343,000 in 
2017/18, his remuneration has consistently been geared to 
shares rather than cash. At the end of the last financial year his 
shareholding in [WC] ran to 4,526,881 ordinary shares, with the 
final tranche due to be vested in April.” 
One colleague of mine increasingly spoke of the new regime in “conspiracy theory” 
terms in my final year with the organisation. So bizarre was the mismatch between effort 
and energy expended on WebWines versus “you’re on your own” “old WC” that he 
began to suspect purposeful sabotage. In his own words “I think they’re crashing the 
bus on purpose.” I was not personally of this view; it seemed more likely that LF’s 
initial attempt at turnaround was sincere but failures and complications led to fatigue 
and distancing.  
Regardless, my colleague did present me with a piece of evidence that could not be 
easily explained away. He set up the store computers to display Webwines’ and WC’s 
website side by side and said “look at the difference!” Indeed, the quality difference in 
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appearance and user interface was the difference between night and day. This led to a 
second question: why hadn’t WebWines’ superior online commercial platform been 
transposed onto Wine Corp’s? It seemed self-evident that it would have improved 
customers’ experience and boost sales, customer retention etc. Furthermore, WebWines 
owned the intellectual property and had in-house expertise to make the improvement at 
low cost. Adding to the mystery still more, WC’s present online commercial platform 
was newly created under the LF regime. Why spend considerable sums developing a 
website for “old WC” that is blatantly inferior to one that the company already owns and 
operates in another division? 
These questions tie into another, which is why LF failed to converge the businesses 
more broadly, which could have saved millions in operational and admin costs over the 
four years under consideration.263 Perhaps an analogy is the best way to appraise the 
meaning of these concerns. If one was to marry someone but they insisted on a clear 
separation of assets, friend groups and life styles then one might wonder whether they 
were hedging their bets. One might also wonder what the point of the marriage is in the 
first place if you are going to live apart, married in name only. If that same partner then 
suggests that you pool household income but prioritise “investment” in them because 
they are achieving faster career growth then you might begin to wonder – bearing in 
mind the other oddities just mentioned – whether your “partner” had your best interests 
at heart. 
Thus I ended my ten year journey in Wine Corp perhaps with more questions than 
answers. Something that I can say with confidence is that the few who are adequately 
positioned to answer these questions are almost certain to give inaccurate or incomplete 
responses. Goffman (see Chapter Two) believed that authority is at best deceptive and 
this study has provided few indicators to the contrary. 
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 As Figure 30 illustrated the exact opposite happened: centralised costs skyrocketed after the 
“reverse takeover.” 
